

Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque

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Gregory of Nyssa, Augustine of Hippo, and the Filioque

By

Chungman Lee



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To Oh-jin



*nec aliquid quaeremus mente ratiocinante, sed contemplante cerne-
mus
quare non sit filius spiritus sanctus, cum de patre procedat*

Nor shall we seek anything by the reasoning of the mind, but by
contemplating we shall perceive
why the Holy Spirit is not the Son when He proceeds from the
Father.

AUGUSTINE OF HIPPO, *De trinitate* 15.45



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Pusan, January 2021

Abbreviations

For the original titles and abbreviations of the works of Gregory of Nyssa, I follow *Lexicon Gregorianum: Wörterbuch zu den Schriften Gregors von Nyssa*, ed. Friedhelm Mann (Leiden: Brill, 1999–2014). Titles and abbreviations for the works of Augustine of Hippo are as prescribed in *Augustinus-Lexikon*, eds. Cornelius Mayer et al. (Basel: Schwabe, 1986–). For all other primary sources, secondary literature, and biblical abbreviations, I use the conventions in *The SBL Handbook of Style*, 2nd ed. (Atlanta: SBL Press, 2014). Alternate or additional abbreviations are provided below:

<i>Aug(L)</i>	<i>Augustiniana</i>
<i>AugLex</i>	C.P. Mayer, <i>Augustinus-Lexikon</i> (Basel: Schwabe & Co.AG, 1986–)
COPCE	Centre orthodoxe du Patriarcat œcuménique
DH	Heinrich Denzinger, Helmut Hoping, and Peter Hünermann, <i>Enchiridion symbolorum, definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum</i> , 40th ed. (Freiburg: Herder, 2005)
FKD	Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte
FLV	Fondazione Lorenzo Valla
FOP	Faith and Order Papers
GNO	Gregorii Nysseni Opera
IEA	Institut d'Études Augustiniennes
<i>IJST</i>	<i>International Journal of Systematic Theology</i>
IPA	Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum = Istituto Patristico Augustinianum
LEV	Libreria Editrice Vaticana
Mansi	J.D. Mansi, <i>Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio</i>
<i>ModSch</i>	<i>Modern Schoolman</i>
Œuvres compl.	Œuvres complètes de saint Augustin, Paris
PASA	Pontificio Ateneo Sant'Anselmo
PenOcc	Il pensiero occidentale
<i>RAP</i>	<i>Recherches augustiniennes et patristiques</i>
<i>RB</i>	<i>Revue bénédictine de critique, d'histoire et de littérature religieuses</i>
<i>REAug</i>	<i>Revue d'études augustiniennes et patristiques</i>
SGL	Scrittori greci e latini
SPM	Stromata patristica et mediaevalia
VCSup	Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae
VELKD	Vereinigte Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Deutschlands
WSA	The Works of Saint Augustine: A Translation for the 21st Century

Introduction

1 The *Filioque* Again?

The long history of the *filioque* began with its interpolation into the text of the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (*Symbolum Nicaenum Constantinopolitanum* [hereafter cited as *Symb. Nicaen.*] of 381) by local councils in the Latin Church. Among these local councils, in Spain in particular, whose creeds included formulae analogous to the *filioque*, the Third Council of Toledo in 589 was “the most vivid illustration of the hold the double procession had on Spanish Christianity.”¹ At the behest of Reccared, the council added the term *filioque*, or more precisely *et filio*, to the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* to indicate that the Holy Spirit proceeds (*procedit*) not only from the Father but also from the Son.² In other words, the council was probably the first council, whether local or ecumenical, that modified the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* With the interpolation, the council directed itself against Arianism (and Priscillianism) in Spain, defending the orthodox faith that the deity of the Son is the same as that of the Father.³ After the Third Council of Toledo,

1 John Norman D. Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 3rd ed. (London: Longman, 1972), 361. Between the third and fifth centuries (up to Augustine's *De trinitate*), phrases and ideas similar to the *filioque* were found in the trinitarian works of Latin fathers such as Tertullian (*Aduersus Praxean*), Novatian (*De trinitate*), and Ambrose of Milan (*De spiritu sancto*). Tertullian's phrase *a patre per filium* in *Aduersus Praxean* 5.1 (CCSL 2, 1162; cf. *De resurrectione carnis* 5–7) appears to signify a notion similar to the *filioque*, while Ambrose of Milan had already stated *Spiritus procedit a patre et filio* in *De spiritu sancto* 1.11 (CSEL 79, 67). Similar phrases and ideas can also be traced in the formulae of creeds. *Quicumque* (DH 75–76) in the fifth century included a similar expression: *a patre et filio*. Such phrases and ideas seem to have been particularly popular in Spain. As Kelly accurately noted, “the presence of the *filioque* in Spanish creeds in the sixth century merely testifies to the popularity of the doctrine in this section of the Western Church.”

2 The council anathematized those who did not believe that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father *and* from the Son (*a patre et filio procedere*) in its third anathema (Mansi 9, 985; Hefele 3, 49). Reccared himself made this confession at the beginning of the council (Mansi 9, 977–978). See Franz Courth, *Trinität: In der Schrift und Patristik*, Handbuch der Dogmengeschichte, vol. 2, no. 1a (Freiburg: Herder, 1988), 128; Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 361–362.

3 However, it is still debated whether the third council of Toledo itself added the *et filio*, or whether the addition came at a later time. The latter possibility was first raised by Andrew E. Burn. See Andrew E. Burn, “Some Spanish MSS of the Constantinopolitan Creed,” *JTS* 9, no. 34 (1908): 301–303. At the very least, it is true that the interpolated creed was accepted

the interpolated version of *Symb. Nicaen.* received wide acceptance throughout the Latin Church,⁴ where there was thought to be no reason theologically to be reluctant about accepting the interpolation.

In the ninth century,⁵ the long history of the actual *filioque* controversy has its origins in Photius (d. 895), Patriarch of Constantinople.⁶ When Photius encountered the interpolated the *Symb. Nicaen.* which some Frankish missionaries were using in Bulgaria, he in his polemical treatises criticized the new *filioque* teaching as a heresy.⁷ The core of his criticism can be summed up in five points: First, if the interpolated phrase is accepted, the Son becomes another source of the deity, such that the monarchy (μοναρχία) of the Father and the unity of the Trinity it establishes collapse; second, the *filioque* blurs the hypostatic distinction between the three persons and falls into a kind of semi-Sabellianism; third, if the added phrase introduces the Son as another source, the Son becomes not just a Son of the Father but a Father of the Spirit, and then the Spirit becomes not a Spirit but a grandson of the Father; fourth, the

by the churches in Spain immediately following this council. See A. Edward Siecienski, *The Filioque: History of a Doctrinal Controversy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 69.

- 4 Apart from the later councils at Toledo, the *filioque* was confessed at the Synod of Merida (666), the Fourth Synod of Braga (675), and the Council of Hatfield (680). See Siecienski, *The Filioque*, 69, 88–89; “The *Filioque*: A Brief History,” in *Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century*, ed. Myk Habets (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 10.
- 5 In the seventh century, an occasion presented itself to explain the meaning of the *filioque* clause, or, more precisely, ἐκπορεύεσθαι καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ τὸ Πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον. Maximus the Confessor attempted in his letter to Presbyter Marinus, *Epistula ad Marinum Cypri presbyterium* (PG 91, 133–140, 133D–136AB especially), to defend the synodic letter of Pope Theodore to Constantinople, which included the phrase. He mediated between the eastern and western understanding of the procession of the Holy Spirit during the seventh-century christological dispute over Monothelitism. See Orphanos, “The Procession,” 276–277; Jean-Claude Larchet, *Maxime le Confesseur médiateur entre l’Orient et l’Occident* (Paris: Cerf, 1998), 11–75; Siecienski, *The Filioque*, 73–86; Carlo Dell’Osso, “Il *Filioque* in Massimo di Confessore,” in *Il Filioque: A mille anni dal suo inserimento nel credo a Roma (1014–2014)*, ed. Mauro Gagliardi (Città del Vaticano: LEV, 2015), 147–164. The first council, where Latin and Byzantine theologians discussed the interpolated *Symb. Nicaen.*, was held in 767. See Mansi 12, 677, cited in Courth, *Trinität*, 131; Richard Stanley Haugh, *Photius and the Carolingians: The Trinitarian Controversy* (Belmont, MA: Nordland, 1975), 41–44. For a good introduction to the theology of Maximus the Confessor, see Andrew Louth, *Maximus the Confessor*, ECF (London: Routledge, 1996).
- 6 Dietrich Ritschl, “Historical Development and Implications of the Filioque Controversy,” in *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical Reflections of the Filioque Controversy*, ed. Lukas Vischer, FOP 103 (London: SPCK, 1981), 51. This article includes a useful table offering a concise overview of the main historical events surrounding the *filioque*.
- 7 The works are *Encyclica epistula ad archiepiscopales thronos per Orientem obtinentes* (PG 102, 721–741), *Epistula ad archiepiscopum et metropolitam Aquileiensem* (PG 102, 793–822), and *De spiritus sancti mystagogia* (PG 102, 279–400).

filioque makes the relation between Father and Son closer than that between Father and Spirit, making the dignity of the Spirit inferior to that of the other two hypostases; lastly, if the Spirit indeed proceeds from the Son, this relates only to the sending of the Spirit by the Son into the world.⁸ Photius' criticism went on to become the theological basis on which later Byzantine theologians also criticized the *filioque*.

After the controversy involving Photius had come to an end,⁹ Pope Benedict VIII officially altered the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* in 1014 by the interpolation of the *filioque*. By the time the Great Schism occurred in 1054, "the *filioque*, although it was not the direct cause of the schism of 1054, did become the epitome of West-East alienation."¹⁰ Cardinal Humbert accused the Byzantine Church of heresy due to its omission of the *filioque*, while Patriarch Michael I Cerularius conversely called the formula "an artifice of the devil."¹¹

Since Photius and the Great Schism, the discussion on the interpolated term has passed through different phases of historical, political, ideological, and theological change. Throughout these changes, the core issue has been ardently and furiously debated between East and West. On occasion, the various phases have offered opportunities for improving mutual understanding. Both in the medieval period and over the course of the last two centuries, remarkably promising ecumenical advances were even made. Nevertheless, it cannot be denied that, regardless of the expectations, true rapprochement has still not been achieved.

2 Validity of Renewed Reflection

Notwithstanding the fatigue experienced by some, we do well to reexamine the *filioque* due to its nature as a question with extensive ramifications for other essential elements of Christian dogma. An examination of all of the implicit or explicit effects of the interpolated phrase falls beyond the scope of the present work. Nevertheless, a thumbnail sketch of the relationship between the *filioque* clause and several essential doctrines will show how necessary

8 Haugh, *Photius*, 91–99, 131–139, 142–157; Orphanos, "The Procession," 282–291.

9 On the minor schism known as the Photian schism, see Francis Dvornik, *The Photian Schism, History and Legend*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1948).

10 Karl Christian Felmy, "Filioque," in *RGG*, 4th ed., eds. Hans D. Betz et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2000), 3:119; Bernd Oberdorfer, *Filioque: Geschichte und Theologie eines ökumenischen Problems*, FSÖT 96 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 163.

11 Siecienski, "The *Filioque*," 12.

it is to attempt to move beyond the aforementioned fatigue, and to launch a new study on this thorny and unresolved issue. The ramifications of the *filioque* are readily conspicuous in the doctrines of Christology, pneumatology, and ecclesiology. Yet they are particularly evident in the doctrine of the Triune God which, as Wolfhart Pannenberg accurately noted, influences all of Christian belief.¹²

2.1 *Doctrine of the Triune God*

The twentieth century saw a reassessment of the doctrine of the Triune God, at least in Western Christianity, which has come to be known as the “Renaissance of trinitarian theology.”¹³ While this renaissance was occasioned by several different factors,¹⁴ one of the most important circumstances was the West’s encounter with the Eastern Orthodox Church and its trinitarian theology. This encounter led to a re-evaluation of purported eastern trinitarian theology and a devaluation of purported western trinitarian theology. Eastern theology came to be recognized as a forgotten or overlooked approach by which western trinitarianism could and was expected to overcome its emphasis on the perspective of “*de deo uno*” for the starting point of the investigation of the Trinity. The western tradition, for its part, was criticized as a form of essentialism that failed by its concentration on the divine essence to distinguish fully between the three persons. Moreover, the West was accused of rationalism for its psychological approach to the processions in the Trinity. On the eastern side, critical notes were sounded by theologians like Vladimir Lossky and John Zizioulas,¹⁵ while in the Western Church Karl Rahner, Catherine M. LaCugna, Colin E. Gunton, and Robert W. Jenson heeded the voice of their eastern counterparts and crit-

12 Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 1:363.

13 Christoph Schwöbel, “Christology and Trinitarian Thought,” in *Trinitarian Theology Today: Essays on Divine Being and Act*, ed. Christoph Schwöbel (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 1–30; Gijsbert van den Brink, “De hedendaagse renaissance van de triniteitsleer: Een oriënterend overzicht,” *Theologia Reformata* 46 (2003): 210–240.

14 Schwöbel listed four factors for the renaissance: 1) the encounter with Eastern Orthodoxy, its liturgy and theology, in the ecumenical context; 2) increasing awareness of the problems in western trinitarian theology (especially in the case of Karl Rahner); 3) the failure of philosophical theism; 4) increasing awareness of the close relationship between western theology and social problems. Schwöbel, “Christology,” 3–12.

15 Vladimir Lossky, *Essai sur la théologie mystique de l’Église d’Orient* (Paris: Aubier, 1944); John Zizioulas, *Being as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985); *Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church*, ed. Paul McPartlan (London: T&T Clark, 2006).

ically reexamined their own tradition.¹⁶ This devaluation of western theology was so severe that western theologians were advised to adopt what was purported to be the eastern approach.

There is no doubt that the sharp contrast that was commonly drawn in the last century between the theologies of East and West can be traced back to the work of Théodore de Régnon, a nineteenth-century Jesuit theologian. Following the publication of his four-volume *Études de théologie positive sur la Sainte Trinité*, a massive study on the history of the doctrine of the Trinity,¹⁷ theologians coined the term 'de Régnon's paradigm' and applied it widely in studies on the history of dogma as well as systematic theology. Those who implicitly or explicitly used de Régnon's paradigm identified the two approaches to the Trinity as a 'Latin' and a 'Greek' one. They tied the Latin approach to the western tradition with Augustine as its forefather, and connected the Greek approach to the eastern tradition for which the Cappadocians were considered most representative. Yet far from limiting themselves to a mere principle of division, these theologians went so far as to hail the Greek tradition at the expense of the Latin one, which they subjected to severe criticism.

Regardless of the ready way in which de Régnon's paradigm was adopted and applied, it did not pass unchallenged. Most interesting, perhaps, is the evaluation of de Régnon by fellow French scholars such as Henri Paissac, André Malet, Ghislain Lafont, Marie-Joseph Le Guillou, and Bertrand de Margerie, who seemed to adopt de Régnon's "portrait of 'Latin' and 'Greek' theologies only to invert, reverse, or ridicule it."¹⁸ A more balanced approach is visible in the work of patristic scholars such as Michel R. Barnes and Lewis Ayres, who recently called for a re-evaluation of the paradigm, particularly in terms of its relevance for the patristic tradition, noting that the distinction between 'Latin' and 'Greek' theologies, or between Augustine and the Cappadocians, does not entirely fit the picture of fourth-century theology.¹⁹ A number of systematic

16 Karl Rahner, *The Trinity*, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970); Catherine M. LaCugna, *God for Us: The Trinity and Christian Life* (San Francisco: Harper-Collins, 1993); Colin E. Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); Robert W. Jenson, *Systematic Theology*, vol. 1, *The Triune God* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997); *The Triune Identity: God According to the Gospel* (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock Publishers, 2002).

17 Théodore de Régnon, *Études de théologie positive sur la sainte Trinité*, 3 vols. (Paris: Retaux, 1892–1898). The last volume of this study was published in two parts.

18 Kristin Hennessy, "An Answer to de Régnon's Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of 'His' Paradigm," *HTR* 100, no. 2 (2007): 179. For a critical evaluation of the French scholars, see Michel R. Barnes, "De Régnon Reconsidered," *AugStud* 26, no. 2 (1995): 51–79.

19 For Michel R. Barnes, see Michel R. Barnes, "Augustine in Contemporary Trinitarian The-

theologians have similarly expressed their dissatisfaction with the paradigm. In a recent article, D. Glenn Butner Jr. thus questioned the validity of de Régnon's paradigm for systematic theology. Distinguishing accurately between de Régnon himself and the paradigm named after him, Butner concluded that the paradigm does not fit the history of Christian doctrine apart from the *filioque* controversy in the early medieval period, and that "new controlling schemas" are required "for trinitarian theology that more accurately reflect trinitarianism East and West in a way that provides helpful material for systematic."²⁰

Responding to the criticism launched against de Régnon's paradigm, Kristin Hennessy offered a fresh interpretation and evaluation of de Régnon himself. In an article entitled "An Answer to de Régnon's Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak of 'His' Paradigm,"²¹ Hennessy argued that de Régnon's works were seldom studied firsthand and in-depth by either his advocates or opponents, and that de Régnon "has been buried."²² Furthermore, she continued, in conflict with de Régnon's own aim and ideas, the paradigm named after him has been used to develop a theological construction to criticize Augustine's theology and the western tradition and to praise the Cappadocians and the Eastern Orthodox tradition, or to criticize schematic and inaccurate accounts of trinitarian development. For her part, Hennessy distinguished de Régnon's ideas and aims from the history of the reception of his works. Based on her own in-depth analysis of the work of de Régnon, Hennessy argued that his aim was not to draw a sharp contrast between the two approaches to the Trinity and so to devalue or criticize one of them. Instead, de Régnon's intention had been to illustrate

ology," *Theological Studies* 56, no. 2 (1995): 237–250; Barnes, "De Régnon,"; for Lewis Ayres, see Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); "The Trinity and Modernity," *AugStud* 26 (1995): 127–133. Also, see note 25 below.

20 D. Glenn Butner, "For and against de Régnon: Trinitarianism East and West," *IJST* 17, no. 4 (2015): 412.

21 See note 18 above.

22 Hennessy, "An Answer," 179–180. She insisted that de Régnon's interment occurred four times over: First, as Barnes has noted in his paper "De Régnon Reconsidered" (see note 18 above), the French scholars identified above distorted de Régnon's ideas; second, the English translation of Lossky's *Essai sur la théologie mystique de l'Église d'Orient* largely effaced the significant influence of de Régnon which are found in its original version in French; third, English scholars such as Frederick Crowe, James Mackey, John O'Donnell, David Brown, and Catherine M. LaCugna rarely cited de Régnon, but just implicitly assumed he was drawing a paradigmatic distinction between 'Latin' and 'Greek' theologies; finally, theologians "have begun to use the phrase 'de Régnon's paradigm' as a shorthand category by which to lump overly schematic and inaccurate accounts of Trinitarian development."

the abundance of the mystery of the Trinity by offering a description of the diversity of approaches to this mystery. On the basis of his description, de Régnon underscored that the two approaches were complementary for a proper investigation of the mystery of the Trinity. His study was thus intended as a criticism of the Neo-scholasticism or Neo-Thomism of his time, which attempted to bend all thinkers to the scholastic theology for which Thomas Aquinas was thought to offer the “definitive system.”²³ Against this alleged but false unity of the Neo-Thomist “modern theologians,” de Régnon structured “his portraits of ‘Greek’ and ‘Latin’ theologies to reveal how they encounter the divine mystery in complementary and inverse ways.”²⁴

If the criticism of de Régnon’s paradigm and the defense of his own views are both taken seriously, it means that it is necessary to study the two trinitarian traditions in a deeper and more thorough manner, to evaluate de Régnon himself, and to move beyond him to a more complementary understanding of the two traditions.²⁵ As such, the *filioque* needs reexamination as one of the most representative problems discussed between East and West in terms of the mystery of the Trinity.²⁶

As the present work will show in the following chapters, the *filioque* controversy has encompassed most of the substantial issues of the two trinitarian traditions. Characteristics of each of the two trinitarian traditions have been described, underscored, summarized, and contrasted in the long history of the

23 Hennessy, 183–186.

24 Hennessy, 193.

25 For a critical and profound evaluation of de Régnon’s paradigm in terms of the Cappadocians, see André de Halleux, “Personnalisme ou essentialisme trinitaire chez les Pères Cappadociens?,” in André de Halleux, *Patrologie et oecuménisme: Recueil d’études*, BETL 93 (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), 215–268. For a criticism of the paradigm in terms of Augustine’s trinitarian theology, see Rowan Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on De Trinitate,” in *Collectanea Augustiniana: Mélanges T. J. van Bavel*, eds. B. Bruning, M. Lamberigts and J. van Houtem (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1990), 1:317–332; Basil Studer, “La teologia trinitaria in Agostino d’Ippona: Continuità della tradizione occidentale,” in *Cristianesimo e specificità regionali nel mediterraneo latino (Sec. IV–VI)*, ed. IPA, SEAug 48 (Roma: IPA, 1994), 161–177; “History and Faith in Augustine’s De Trinitate,” *AugStud* 28, no. 1 (1997): 7–50; Nello Cipriani, “Le fonti cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei primi Dialoghi di S. Agostino,” *Aug* 34, no. 2 (1994): 253–312; “Le fonti patristiche e filosofiche del De trinitate di S. Agostino,” *Aug* 55, no. 2 (2015): 427–460; *La teologia di Sant’Agostino: Introduzione generale e riflessione trinitaria* (Roma: IPA, 2015).

26 See Kelly, *Early Christian Creeds*, 360: “Their steadfast refusal to fall into line with the Latins was not the fruit of mere obstinacy, but sprang from an instinctive sense of the deep principle involved. What really divided East and West in their acrimonious and often unsavory quarrel over the *filioque* was a fundamental difference of approach to the problem of the mystery of the triune Godhead.”

filioque controversy. Two of the most substantial issues identified include: 1) the relationship between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity and 2) the source of the divinity and unity of the three persons. In regard to the first issue, Karl Rahner has tried to establish the close relationship between the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity against the distinction between the two as follows: “The ‘economic’ Trinity is the ‘immanent’ Trinity and the ‘immanent’ Trinity is the ‘economic’ Trinity.”²⁷ Even apart from the validity of this axiom of Rahner for the doctrine of the Trinity, the relationship between the immanent and the economic Trinity is an essential issue in the *filioque* discussions. How this relationship can be defined is a salient point for the interpretation of important passages of Scripture, including John 15:26.²⁸ Another essential issue in the *filioque* discussions is the source of the divine nature and unity of the three persons. The eastern trinitarian tradition, which has followed the legacy of the Alexandrians (and of Athanasius [295/300–373] in particular), places the source of the godhead and the unity of the three persons in God the Father. The West, on the contrary, has been alleged to prefer the one divine essence in which the three persons share. According to Peter Widdicombe in his recent monograph on the fatherhood of God, this difference has been of substantial significance for a fundamental understanding of the characteristics of the two trinitarian theologies.²⁹ The key criticism of the eastern tradition on the *filioque* arose from the western understanding of the source of the divine nature and unity. If issues related to the *filioque*, including these two examples, are examined more deeply from the patristic foundation of the two traditions, a reading of the two traditions as complementary (rather than exclusive) can

27 Karl Rahner, “5. Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte,” in *Mysterium Salutis: Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, eds. Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer (Zürich: Benziger, 1967), 2:328.

28 Bernd Oberdorfer, “‘... Who Proceeds from the Father’—and the Son? The Use of the Bible in the Filioque Debate: A Historical and Ecumenical Case Study and Hermeneutical Reflections,” in *The Multivalence of Biblical Texts and Theological Meanings*, eds. Christine Helmer and Charlene T. Higbe (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2006), 145–159.

29 Peter Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood of God from Origen to Athanasius*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 4–5. Interestingly, Widdicombe called Augustine, together with the Cappadocian Fathers, the theological successors of Athanasius in that Augustine identified the Father as the fountain of the godhead. Widdicombe, *The Fatherhood*, 255. For the ecumenical importance of the concept of the paternity of the Father in the *filioque* controversy, see also Lucas F. Mateo-Seco, “The Paternity of the Father and the Procession of the Holy Spirit: Some Historical Remarks on the Ecumenical Problem,” in *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology*, eds. Robert Józef Wozniak and Giulio Maspero (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 69–102.

be promoted so as to form more accurate schemas for the description of both shared and distinguishing elements in the two respective traditions, and to reinforce the recognition of the mystery of the Trinity, which had indeed been de Régnon's own aim.

2.2 *Christology*

The *filioque*-discussion affects not only the doctrine of the Triune God, but also Christian belief concerning Jesus Christ. The christological implications of the issue of the *filioque* become particularly conspicuous in the criticism of Logos Christology from the perspective of a so-called Spirit Christology.³⁰

30 There are many variant terms in use for a Spirit Christology: Spirit Christology, Spirit-oriented Christology, pneumatological or pneumatologically oriented Christology, or Pneuma-sarx Christology. The precise significance of these terms has not yet been defined unanimously, however. See Harold Hunter, "Spirit Christology: Dilemma and Promise (1)," *HeyJ* 24, no. 2 (1983):127; Myk Habets, *The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian Spirit Christology* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 189. Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg defined Spirit Christology as follows: "Spirit-Christology is thus here a Christology *in which Jesus is God's Son because the Holy Spirit came in him and made him God's Son*" (emphasis original). See Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, "Toekomst voor een Geest-Christologie?," in *Meedenken met Edward Schillebeeckx: Bij zijn afscheid als hoogleraar te Nijmegen*, eds. Hermann Häring, Ted Mark Schoof, and Ad Willems (Baarn: Nelissen, 1983), 147. Regarding the different starting points for Logos Christology and Spirit Christology, Schoonenberg noted: "Logos Christology starts with the divine Word which from God 'comes down' and incarnates itself in Jesus; Spirit Christology supposes the man Jesus and describes him as filled with Holy Spirit. The latter shows us a man in whom God is present, a 'God-bearing man' (*anthropos theophoros*), to speak in terms of the Fathers, whereas Logos Christology presents us an 'enfleshed God' (*theos sarkotheis*)." See Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, "Spirit Christology and Logos Christology," *Bijdragen* 38, no. 4 (1977): 362–363. Myk Habets distinguished the proposals of theologians claiming a Spirit Christology into two categories: those who "seek to complement Logos Christology with a Spirit Christology," and those who "seek to replace Logos Christology with a Spirit Christology." Each trajectory has developed its ideas in a different direction in terms of the doctrine of the Trinity: "The first is toward a thoroughly trinitarian orthodoxy while the second is towards a post-trinitarian theology." See Myk Habets, "Spirit Christology: Seeing in Stereo," *Journal of Pentecostal Theology* 11, no. 2 (2003): 203–204; *The Anointed Son*, 194. He also provided a good summary of the arguments used by the theologians in these two categories. See Habets, "Spirit Christology"; Habets, *The Anointed Son*, 193–220. For a similar distinction, see Schoonenberg, "Spirit Christology," 356; Paul W. Newman, *A Spirit Christology: Recovering the Biblical Paradigm of Christian Faith* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987), 172. In two articles, Harold Hunter criticized a Spirit Christology developed in a post-trinitarian theology, outlining four identifying characteristics: "(1) It is a Christology 'from below' and thus starts with the Synoptic, (2) There is no ontological distinction made between the Spirit and the risen Christ, (3) Classical trinitarianism is not accepted, (4) It claims to reject the influence of philosophy, particularly Platonism, (5) There is an explicit denial of the hermeneutical

The classical Logos Christology is grounded in the prologue to the Gospel of John and in the creeds of Nicaea (325) and Chalcedon (451). This Christology accentuates the one perfect divine Person of Jesus Christ from the perspective of the incarnation of the Logos, the second Person of the Trinity. As such, the human nature is not “personal” by itself without the divine Person of the Logos; it is thus called *anhypostasis*. The nature rather has its personhood in the incarnated Logos; in other words, it is *enhypostasis*.³¹ This traditional Christology, however, has been criticized by contemporary theologians for allegedly failing to reflect seriously the concrete historical works of Jesus Christ, who was faithful in his obedience to God the Father up to the cross.³² Moreover, Logos Christology has been accused of ignoring the pneumatological perspectives in Christology.³³ To put it differently, contemporary theologians have criticized the one-sided relationship between Son and Spirit (or, more precisely, the relation *from* the Son *to* the Spirit) in Logos Christology, which western theology has maintained using the *filioque*. For their part, these contemporary theologians present their own exegetical evidence evincing a reversed relationship which is *spirituque*, that is, *from* the Spirit *to* the Son. By the Spirit, who had already worked as the hand of God in the salvation history of the Old Testament, Jesus Christ was filled, performed miracles, and proclaimed the good news of God’s kingdom. In this sense, the coming of Jesus Christ was the fulfillment of the work of the Spirit of God. Jesus of Nazareth was thus no divine Person that the divine Logos assumed, but a Jewish person definitely inspired by the Holy Spirit.

A sketch of the work of the three theologians Hendrikus Berkhof, Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, and Walter Kasper yields three characteristics of Spirit Christology in relation to the *filioque*: 1) criticism on the traditional Logos Christology and emphasis on the human nature of Jesus Christ; 2) greater emphasis on the *spirituque*-relationship between the Son and the Spirit than on the traditional *filioque*-relationship; 3) the divinity of Jesus Christ as the fulfillment of the Spirit.

principles associated with Systematic Theology.” See Hunter, “Spirit Christology (1);” “Spirit Christology: Dilemma and Promise (2),” *Heyl* 24, no. 2 (1983): 266–277. For useful bibliographies of the theologians in these two categories, see Habets, “Spirit Christology,” 204n21, 209n41; Hunter, “Spirit Christology (1),” 128nn1–2.

31 Jan van Genderen and Willem H. Velema, *Beknopte gereformeerde dogmatiek*, 4th ed. (Kampen: Kok, 2013), 423–424; Gijsbert van den Brink and Cornelis van der Kooi, *Christelijke dogmatiek: Een inleiding* (Zoetermeer: Boekencentrum, 2012), 375.

32 Abraham van de Beek, “Theologen van de 20ste eeuw en de Christologie,” *AcT* 22, no. 1 (2002): 169.

33 Schoonenberg, “Spirit Christology and Logos Christology,” 354–355.

2.2.1 Hendrikus Berkhof (1914–1995)

One of the theologians to take the initiative in a Spirit Christology over the course of the last century was the Dutch Reformed theologian Hendrikus Berkhof (1914–1995).³⁴ Although he had favored the traditional approach to Christology in the early stages of his career, during the 1960s a turning point took place. This change could be seen in his book on pneumatology published in 1964, *De leer van de Heilige Geest* (*The Doctrine of the Holy Spirit*).³⁵ Here it became clear that his Christology had changed from a traditional Logos Christology to a Spirit Christology. Berkhof's adherence to the latter could also be seen in his later theological works, most notably his *magnum opus*, *Christelijk Geloof* (*Christian Faith*).³⁶

Berkhof argued that traditional Logos Christology had a restricted purpose, intending to give full expression to the true humanity of Christ. The post-Chalcedon theological tradition focused on the one divine Person of Christ by *enhypostasis* of the human nature. This *enhypostasis*, however, was intrinsically related to the *anhypostasis* of the human nature and its personhood. Within this *anhypostasis* perspective, the human nature of Christ could not be contemplated to its fullest extent. Berkhof thus argued that the *anhypostasis* and the emphasis on the true humanity of Christ have been in conflict ever since Chalcedon.³⁷ Moreover, Berkhof also indicated that the Logos Christology

34 For a theological biography of Berkhof, see Eginhard P. Meijering, *Hendrikus Berkhof* (1914–1995): *Een theologische biografie* (Kampen: Kok, 1997). Habets considered Berkhof a representative of theologians such as Schoonenberg, Geoffrey Lampe, James Dunn, and Paul Neuman who had replaced Logos Christology with Spirit Christology and developed a post-trinitarian theology in which the traditional trinitarian language of 'person', 'nature', and 'essence' is dropped and the distinction between Christ and Spirit disappears. Habets, *The Anointed Son*, 196–197; also, see note 30 above. The most radical argumentation in this post-trinitarian approach was probably provided by Lampe. Criticizing Logos Christology, he claimed that the *hypostasis* of Jesus Christ, who was possessed by the Holy Spirit, was not the Logos but the man Jesus and that he was neither God "substantially" nor "adjectively" but only "adverbially." See Geoffrey Lampe, "The Holy Spirit and the Person of Christ," in *Christ, Faith and History: Cambridge Studies in Christology*, eds. Stephen Sykes and John Powell Clayton (London: Cambridge University Press, 1972), 124.

35 Hendrikus Berkhof, *De leer van de Heilige Geest*, trans. L.M. de Geus (Nijkerk: Callenbach, 1964). The original version of this book is the lecture Berkhof gave in Princeton. According to Meijering, this lecture bears traces of the influence of theology from the English-speaking world, although he fails to substantiate this observation. Meijering, *Hendrikus Berkhof*, 115.

36 Hendrikus Berkhof, *Christelijk Geloof*, 4th ed. (Kampen: Kok, 1979). English translations have been taken from Sierd Woudstra's translation (*Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Study of the Faith* [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979]).

37 Berkhof, *Christelijk Geloof*, 303.

was limited to a particular period when the word “logos” represented a widely-used philosophical term and Christian apologists could use it as a cornerstone to defend their Christian faith.³⁸ In Berkhof’s eyes, this restriction was a sign that the one person of Christ could be explained and expressed using other terms that are more consistent with both scriptural revelation and contemporary thinking.

To overcome the weakness of a Logos Christology with a Spirit Christology, Berkhof examined various passages of Scripture, arguing that they are reflective of a double relationship between Spirit and Christ.³⁹ First, he argued that the Synoptic Gospels reveal definitely and plainly that Jesus of Nazareth was filled with the Spirit. The Spirit is “the name for God himself in his activity among us,”⁴⁰ and “no timeless and static phenomenon, but a power which bears the creation, appears in history and works in a way that shapes history, and in the end brings about a new period in the whole of God’s works.”⁴¹ This Spirit had already worked in the covenant relationship between God and his people. By this Spirit, God created the new human covenant partner in Jesus for the restoration of His covenant. Jesus was the new covenant partner who was created, fulfilled, and inspired by the Spirit,⁴² and the bearer of the Spirit. Jesus is a new and eschatological person.⁴³ With this perspective of the eschatological bearer of the Spirit, Berkhof attempted to maintain the “from above” in Christology and to integrate with it the “from below.” In this integration, he accentuated the weakness of the *anhypostasis* of the human nature in traditional Logos Christology.⁴⁴

The fourth Gospel and the writings of Paul similarly, albeit less clearly, expressed the perspective of the bearer of the Spirit which Berkhof had found in the Synoptic Gospels. Nevertheless, he continued, they do clearly describe

38 Berkhof, *De leer*, 22.

39 Berkhof, 17–20; Gerrit Cornelis van de Kamp, *Pneuma-Christologie: Een oud antwoord op een actuele vraag? Een dogma-historisch onderzoek naar de preniceense pneuma-Christologie als mogelijke uitweg in de Christologische problematiek bij Harnack, Seeberg en Loofs en in de meer recente literatuur* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1983), 211.

40 Berkhof, *Christelijk Geloof*, 343: “De naam voor God zelf in zijn werkzaamheid onder ons.”

41 Berkhof, 340: “... geen tijdloos en statisch verschijnsel, maar een macht die de schepping draagt, die in de geschiedenis opkomt en geschiedenisvormend werkt, die tenslotte in het geheel van Gods werken een nieuwe periode inluidt.”

42 Berkhof, 343.

43 Berkhof, 302.

44 Berkhof, 302: “Zijn menselijke ik is tot in de verste uithoeken volkomen en uit vrije wil doordrongen van het ik van God; en krachtens deze doordringen wordt hij dé representant van de Vader.” Also, see Berkhof, 302: “God verdringt de menselijke persoon van Jezus niet, maar doordringt hem geheel met zijn Geest, dus met zichzelf.”

another relationship between Spirit and Christ. In this relation, Jesus was not only the receiver and bearer of the Spirit, but also his sender. Prior to his resurrection and glorification, Jesus was the presence and work of the Spirit of God. But after the resurrection and glorification, the Spirit was not only the presence and work of God, but also the presence and work of the glorified Christ.⁴⁵ Now the Spirit as the Spirit of Christ and of God makes God's people to participate again in the covenant relationship which God restored by the eschatological covenant partner created and inspired by the Spirit.

From these studies of Scripture on the double relationship between Son and Spirit, Berkhof constructed a Spirit Christology. In this, he placed much greater emphasis on the first perspective derived from the Synoptic Gospels: the Spirit made Jesus Christ the eschatological covenant partner of God. Within Berkhof's framework, the second perspective is a consequence of the first perspective as follows: "The person and the work of Jesus Christ has to be considered as the *result*, the starting point, and the center of the life-giving presence of God, of the work of the Spirit among human beings" (emphasis added).⁴⁶ Jesus was first the result of the work of the Spirit, and then he became the starting point and center.⁴⁷

2.2.2 Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg (1911–1999)

Another critic of traditional Logos Christology was the Dutch Roman Catholic theologian Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg. He insisted that Logos Christology had caused elements of Spirit Christology in the New Testament and in theology of the Church Fathers to disappear. Yet he did not fully substitute a Spirit Christology in the place of the traditional Logos Christology, suggesting instead a synthesis of the two Christologies by means of a Wisdom Christology.⁴⁸ A full

45 Berkhof, *De leer*, 129: "En de Geest is niet een persoon naast de personen van God en Christus. In de schepping is hij de handelende persoon van God, in de herschepping is hij de handelende persoon van Christus, die geen ander is dan de handelende persoon van God."

46 Berkhof, 20: "De persoon en het werk van Jezus christus te beschouwen als het resultaat, het beginpunt en het middelpunt van Gods leven-schenkende aanwezigheid, van het werk van de Geest onder de mensen."

47 Berkhof's construction of a Spirit Christology did not pass unchallenged in Dutch Reformed theology. For instance, Barend Kamphuis criticized his emphasis on the human personality of Jesus Christ and on the covenantal functionality of the Trinity following from his Spirit Christology. See Barend Kamphuis, *Boven en beneden: Het uitgangspunt van de Christologie en de problematiek van de openbaring nagegaan aan de hand van de ontwikkelingen bij Karl Barth, Dietrich Bonhoeffer en Wolfhart Pannenberg* (Kampen: Kok, 1999), 448–459.

48 Schoonenberg, "Toekomst?," 154 f.

description of his criticism, his reinterpretation of classical Logos Christology, and his efforts for a synthesis of Logos Christology and Spirit Christology is beyond the scope of the present introduction. Instead, the characteristics of his Spirit Christology will be sketched in relation to the implications which the *spirituque* notion had on his ideas.

Schoonenberg attempted to overcome the main problem of classical Logos Christology, namely the existence of the Son before and apart from the incarnation.⁴⁹ To his mind, this issue led to the Alexandrian approach of “a disguised Christ” (een verklede Christus) on the one hand, and on the other to the Antiochian approach of “a divided Christ” (een verdeelde Christus).⁵⁰ Moving beyond these approaches and their consequences following from the pre-existence of the Son, Schoonenberg sought a new approach to describe Jesus Christ as a person without duality of divine and human nature (Christus zonder tweeheid).⁵¹

Schoonenberg did clearly acknowledge that Jesus Christ was not just a human person, nor did he ignore his divine nature.⁵² In this sense, he did not deny the traditional *enhypostasis* signifying that the human nature has its personhood in the incarnated Logos. He did, however, change the traditional emphasis. When he insisted on a reciprocal *enhypostasis* between the human and divine natures,⁵³ Schoonenberg underlined the *enhypostasis* of the divine nature in the human personhood of Jesus more than he did the *enhypostasis* of the human nature in the incarnated Logos. In this sense, the personhood

49 Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, *Hij is een God van Mensen: Twee theologische Studies* ('s-Hertogenbosch: Malmberg, 1969), 290; “Toekomst?,” 153.

50 Schoonenberg, *Hij is een God*, 68, quoted in Van de Kamp, *Pneuma-Christologie*, 178.

51 See Kamphuis, *Boven en beneden*, 443–444.

52 Although Van der Kooi describes Schoonenberg's theology as a theology with an adoptionist character (Van den Brink and Van der Kooi, *Christelijke dogmatiek*, 373), Schoonenberg tried to avoid the adoptionism which he found in the theology of E. Irving and Lampe. See Schoonenberg, “Spirit Christology,” 360–375. He attempted to affirm the relationship between the Spirit and Jesus not just functionally, but also ontologically: “In Spirit Christology as well, the Spirit is connected with Jesus not only functionally but also ontologically, because function is the expression of being and being includes function. Nor can Jesus be divine only ‘adverbially’, because ‘the human Jesus acting divinely’ also *is* divine by the Spirit's presence pervading him” (365).

53 Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, “Het avontuur der Christologie,” *TvT* 12 (1972): 312: “Dit woord [wederkerige enhypostasie] duidt nu niet aan dat Jezus' persoon-zijn buiten zijn mens-zijn ligt, nl. in de Logos. Ik bedoel er nu mee dat de waarlijk *menselijke* persoon van Jezus, of: Jezus die *in zichzelf* menselijk persoon is, in de Logos is opgenomen, waardoor dit menselijke persoon-zijn verdiept, bevestigd en voltooid wordt en zo uiteindelijk en voor allen heilbrengend is,” quoted in Kamphuis, *Boven en beneden*, 445.

of Jesus Christ is *human* for Schoonenberg: "Jesus Christ is a *human* person" (emphasis original).⁵⁴ In this human personhood, the Logos carried the human nature of Jesus as His hypostasis.⁵⁵

Schoonenberg's creative idea of "reciprocal *enhypostasis*" in his Christology was based on his understanding of the reciprocal relationship between God and His creatures, and of the concept of *hypostasis*. For Schoonenberg, God, who is transcendent, "is present in, or to, the creature, entering into it and pervading it, but also embracing it, containing and sustaining it, indeed grounding it."⁵⁶ This presence of God in His creatures is *reciprocal* in that God is present in His creatures *and* they are "present and immanent" in God by God's presence which pervades, contains, and grounds them. God is "in no way enclosed in it, let alone he is confined by it."⁵⁷ In this sense, he claimed the following: "The reciprocity is not a measure of God's presence but an inherent and essential quality of it."⁵⁸

This reciprocity occurred also in the man Jesus. God and man existed in the man Jesus by "reciprocal *enhypostasis*." When Schoonenberg explains this reciprocity using the traditional concept of *hypostasis*, the most substantial expression he uses is that of "grounding," taken as it is from his aforementioned description of the relationship between God and His creatures. If God "grounds" His creatures in the reciprocal relation, "God's Logos, being fully present in Jesus is also the ground, the *hypostasis*, of Jesus' human reality."⁵⁹ For Schoonenberg, *hypostasis* is the ground on which the humanity of Jesus was carried, and it was God's Logos. "Grounding" or "pervading" it, the Logos was the *hypostasis* of the man Jesus, who was simultaneously the *hypostasis* in which God's Logos was present.

In this reciprocal *enhypostasis*, God's presence in the man Jesus occurred by Logos and Spirit. More than that, Wisdom/Word and Spirit coincided in the Old Testament generally in that Wisdom/Word (Logos) and Spirit realized the

54 Schoonenberg, "Het avontuur," 309. As Kamphuis concisely summarized the argument of Schoonenberg's *Hij is een God*: "Christ is one and Christ is a human person" (see Kamphuis, *Boven en beneden*, 445), Van de Kamp, *Pneuma-Christologie*, 188–189, critically wrote: "De Logos wordt persoon, maar de mens Jezus is reeds persoon, alvorens er sprake kan zijn van de enhypostasie van deze mens Jezus in de logos. Daardoor is deze enhypostasie duidelijk anders gekleurd dan de klassieke enhypostasie. Deze vorm van enhypostasie deelt Jezus trouwens met iedere mens!"

55 Schoonenberg, "Toekomst?," 156.

56 Schoonenberg, "Spirit Christology," 364; "Het avontuur," 312; "Toekomst?," 156.

57 Schoonenberg, "Spirit Christology," 364.

58 Schoonenberg, 364.

59 Schoonenberg, 364.

presence of God in his created reality.⁶⁰ Yet the latter had an eschatological character. In the event of the man Jesus, however, the eschatological character was substantial in that the Spirit was present in the man as the overflowing fullness of the Logos' self-communication: "The Spirit does not influence Jesus' human reality alongside the Logos, but as the overflowing fullness of the Logos' selfcommunication, overflowing *in* Jesus during his earthly life, overflowing *from* Jesus since his glorification" (emphasis original).⁶¹ By this eschatological character, the difference between Jesus Christ and other human beings is not one in nature, but in degree. Only in Jesus did the definitive and eschatological *enhypostasis* of the Logos occur by the Spirit's definitive and eschatological fullness. The eschatological presence of God in Jesus Christ was revealed as the goal and the award for which our entire history should strive. On this point, Schoonenberg's Christology can be described as "a Christology as the completion of humanity" (eine Christologie der menschlichen Endvollendung).⁶²

In terms of the above summary, Schoonenberg was probably more positive than Berkhof in maintaining the traditional approach to Christology, at least when he kept the aspect of the *enhypostasis* of the human nature in the Logos. The Spirit-christological elements in his Christology, however, are identical to those in Berkhof. With respect to the *filioque*, Schoonenberg's position implies

60 Schoonenberg introduced an Israelite concept of 'person.' According to his understanding, this concept concentrates less on individuality and "leaves room for extensions or expansions of a person's care, influence or presence, indeed of the person itself." Schoonenberg, 367. He considered Wisdom/Logos and Spirit as extensions of God, and then insisted that They existed in God as His extensions prior to the incarnation. As Kamphuis has accurately pointed out, Schoonenberg thus failed to answer the question whether the Logos is an apart hypostasis from the incarnation. See Kamphuis, *Boven en beneden*, 445. In fact, one might accurately say that Schoonenberg attempted to apply the concept *hypostasis* to the Logos and the Spirit after the incarnation and glorification, and to avoid Sabellianism. However, he himself acknowledged that his ideas can be labeled modalist if they are "confined to the divine existence of the Logos and the Spirit before the Christ event." Schoonenberg, "Spirit Christology," 369–370.

61 Schoonenberg, 374.

62 Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, *Ein Gott der Menschen*, trans. Heinrich Mertens (Zürich: Benziger Verlag, 1969), 104. Also, see Piet J.A.M. Schoonenberg, "Jezus Christus vandaag dezelfde," in *Geloof bij kenterend getij: Peilingen in een seculariserend Christendom*, eds. Hendrik van der Linde, Hermanus A.M. Fiolet, and Willem H. van de Pol (Roermond: J.J. Romen, 1967), 176–181. Schoonenberg even said, "De Logos is de hypostase van elke mens, elke mens is enhypostatisch in de Logos." Schoonenberg, "Het Avontuur," 314. See Van de Beek, "Theologen," 188: "Daarom is het Christus gebeuren voor Schoonenberg uiteindelijk ook de vervulling van de schepping. Er is niet een nieuwe inzet, maar de vervulling van de mens die God schiep met de Geest van God die zo expressie wordt van Gods diepste Woord."

a preference for a *spirituque*-relationship in that it is the Spirit who made Jesus the Son of God. Pneumatology therefore determines Christology.

2.2.3 Walter Kasper (1933–)

Another critic of classical Christology was Walter Kasper, who criticized its definition of the unity and diversity in the person of Jesus Christ and provided an alternative from the perspective of a Spirit Christology. Nevertheless, he was more traditional in his approach than Schoonenberg.⁶³ This can be seen, for example, in Kasper's greater emphasis on the traditional *enhypostasis* of the human nature in the Logos. Against Schoonenberg's reciprocal *enhypostasis*, he anchored the unity of the personhood of Jesus Christ in the Logos. In and through the Logos, the human nature of Jesus is personalized.⁶⁴ Otherwise, so Kasper insisted, the biblical message concerning the identity between the eternal Son of God and Jesus Christus collapses.

At the same time, Kasper did not neglect the human nature of Christ, and attempted to do justice to the biblical passages on his human nature. As such, he took an approach "from below" before an approach "from above." In this regard, Kasper's analysis of the concept "personality" was crucial in his Christology for integrating the approach "from below" into his emphasis on the traditional *enhypostasis*. For him, the essence of the human personality is nothing but love.⁶⁵ It signifies that a person is defined as "who he is" by another to whom he renounces his own abstract and isolated personality. A person realizes himself only in relation to other people and his environment. In short, personality is transcendental in terms of love. Moreover, the relationship with God is fundamental for this transcendental characteristic of personality. A person realizes himself in the transcendental and fundamental relationship with God, in the openness toward God. Through this transcendence, the absolute and infinite being shines out into the finite. Then, human personality is not only "reference" (Verweis) but also "participation in God's being" (Teilhabe am Wesen Gottes),⁶⁶ and God himself belongs to the definition of the human personality.⁶⁷ There-

63 For Walter Kasper's criticism of Schoonenberg, see Walter Kasper, *Jesus der Christus*, 10th ed. (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1986), 289 ff.

64 Kasper, 294.

65 Kasper, 291.

66 Kasper, 291–292. "Deshalb ist die Person nicht nur Verweis, sondern auch Teilhabe am Wesen Gottes. Die Person des Menschen läßt sich also letztlich nur von Gott her und auf Gott hin definieren; Gott selbst gehört in die Definition der menschlichen Person hinein."

67 For the concept of the transcendence of human nature, Kasper placed himself close to Heidegger and Karl Rahner. John E. Wilson, *Introduction to Modern Theology: Trajectories in the German Tradition* (Louisville: Westminster John Knox Press, 2007), 206: "Hei-

fore, according to the transcendence of personality, Christology “from below” essentially needs Christology “from above,” and the “from above” belongs to the “from below” in Kasper’s theology.

In this project, Kasper did not return to the ontological and static understanding of classical Logos Christology. Rather, he kept the peculiarity of human freedom and self-consciousness in the divine Person of Jesus Christ.⁶⁸ Kasper explained the Person of Jesus Christ from the perspective of a Spirit Christology. In traditional Christology, the fulfillment and charisma of the Holy Spirit in Jesus Christ results from the hypostatic union of the Logos with the human nature of Jesus Christ. Kasper, however, reversed this sequence.⁶⁹ The Holy Spirit as love is the essence of God. Through the essence as love, the divine nature can fully accept the human nature without neglecting the peculiarity of that human nature, since the mysterious essence of love is to unite two distinctives while respecting the peculiarities of both.⁷⁰ Then, Kasper continued, the Holy Spirit as love “completely fulfills the humanity of Jesus and gives it the openness, due to which Jesus’ humanity can be quite a hollow mold and empty form for the self-communication of God in freedom.”⁷¹ In brief, the Holy

degger’s concept of human transcendence toward Being is recognizable in what Rahner calls human being’s *Vorgriff*, which literally means reaching before or ahead. In ordinary human existence *Vorgriff* reaches beyond finite things, always already transcending the things themselves toward Being, that is, the meaning that originates in the absolute luminosity of God. Because Being’s ultimate source is God, and insofar as Being is the medium of meaning, the *Vorgriff* is the medium or condition of the possibility of hearing God’s word, the historical event of Christ.” For the influence of Heidegger’s philosophy in twentieth-century theology, see John D. Caputo, “Heidegger and Theology,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Charles Guignon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 270–288. For the transcendental project of Karl Rahner’s theology, see Thomas Sheehan, “Rahner’s Transcendental Project,” in *The Cambridge Companion to Karl Rahner*, eds. Declan Marmion and Mary E. Hines (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 29–42.

68 Kasper, *Jesus*, 294: “Die Menschheit Jesu ist deshalb auf eine menschliche Weise und d.h. auf eine Weise, die menschliche Freiheit und menschliches Selbstbewußtsein einschließt, mit dem Logos hypostatisch verbunden.”

69 Kasper, 298: “Die Heiligung der Menschheit Jesu durch den Geist und seine Gaben ist deshalb nicht nur eine akzidentelle Folge der Heiligung durch den Logos aufgrund der hypostatischen Union, sondern umgekehrt auch deren Voraussetzung.”

70 Kasper, 296.

71 Kasper, 296. Moreover, Kasper described the union of the divine nature and humanity in Jesus Christ from a trinitarian perspective: “*Letztlich läßt sich die Vermittlung von Gott und Mensch in Jesus Christus nur trinitätstheologisch verstehen. Jesus Christus ist als wahrer Gott und wahrer Mensch in einer Person die geschichtliche Exegese (Joh 1,18; ἐξηγήσατο) der Trinität, wie diese die transzendentaltheologische Ermöglichung der Menschwerdung darstellt. Näherhin läßt sich die Vermittlung von Gott und Mensch in Jesus Christus theologisch nur*

Spirit as love completed the transcendent openness of the human nature in Jesus for the hypostatic union, without detracting from the freedom and self-consciousness of the human nature. In this regard, Kasper's Christology too bears the characteristics of the *spirituque* rather than the *filioque*.

In summary, the Spirit-Christologies of the three theologians surveyed above show that they preferred the notion of *spirituque* to *filioque* in determining the relationship between Logos and Spirit. They criticized traditional Logos Christology, and emphasized the human nature and personhood of Jesus Christ through a Christology conditioned and determined by pneumatology.⁷²

als ein Geschehen >>im Heiligen Geist<< verstehen. Das führt uns zu einer pneumatologisch orientierten Christologie" (emphasis original).

- 72 Some eastern theologians, in particular Vladimir Lossky, Nikos A. Nissiotis, and John D. Zizioulas, have challenged western theologians to construct a Spirit Christology or pneumatological Christology. See Ralph Del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in trinitarian perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 8–33; Oberdorfer, *Filioque*, 447–460 and 492–501. Lossky denied the *filioque* on account of the apparent subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Son, and accentuated the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father in monopatristism. Based on this monopatristism, he emphasized that the economy of the Holy Spirit is distinct and does not depend on the economy of the Son. Moreover, he indicated a pneumatological perspective in the economy of the Son following Basil of Caesarea (*De spiritu sancto* 29 [PG 32, 157AB]). See Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 156–173. Nissiotis and Zizioulas took a slightly different approach. Whereas Lossky posited the two missions of the Son and the Spirit as two sequential economies, Nissiotis and Zizioulas considered the two missions christological and pneumatological dimensions of the one divine economy; see on this Del Colle, *Christ*, 27. Based on this difference, the latter two accentuated the perspective of the bearer of the Spirit in the economy of the incarnated Son more explicitly than Lossky did. Criticizing filioquism in the East as well as the West for underestimating the work of the Holy Spirit, Nissiotis emphasized that the Spirit as God was active in the incarnation, the anointment, and the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and that the whole life of Christ depended on His work. The work of the Spirit in Christ is the culmination of God's plan for salvation in that it was the realization of the whole humanity and history. See Nikos A. Nissiotis, "Pneumatological Christology as a Presupposition of Ecclesiology," in *Oecumenica: Jahrbuch für ökumenische Forschung*, eds. Friedrich Wilhelm Kantzenbach and Vilmos Vajta (Gütersloh: Gütersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn, 1967), 235–252 (240–243 in particular); Nikos A. Nissiotis, *Die Theologie der Ostkirche im ökumenischen Dialog: Kirche und Welt in orthodoxer Sicht* (Stuttgart: Evangelisches Verlagswerk, 1968), 64–85. Likewise, Zizioulas insisted that for a proper synthesis between Christology and pneumatology in Orthodox theology, "Pneumatology must be made *constitutive* of Christology and ecclesiology, i.e. condition the very being of Christ and the Church." Zizioulas, *Being*, 139 (emphasis original).

2.3 *Pneumatology and Ecclesiology*

The implications of the *filioque* for pneumatology and ecclesiology have been summarized in particular by John D. Zizioulas in his study on the close relationship between pneumatology and ecclesiology in the patristic era. In “Implications ecclésiologiques de deux types de pneumatologie,”⁷³ he distinguished between two types of pneumatology in that period and described how ecclesiology was formed by these diverse pneumatologies. The first was a missionary-historical type, the other a Eucharistic eschatological type. In his book *Being as Communion*, Zizioulas provided the following general description of these two types:

In the New Testament writings themselves we come across both the view that the Spirit is given *by* Christ, particularly the risen and ascended Christ (“*there was no Spirit yet*, for Christ had not yet been glorified” John 7:39); and the view that there is, so to say, *no Christ* until the Spirit is at work, not only as a *forerunner* announcing his coming, but also as the one who *constitutes his very identity as Christ*, either at his baptism (Mark) or at his very biological conception (Matthew and Luke).⁷⁴

While both types correspond to the teachings of the New Testament, each was accompanied by different pneumatological and ecclesiological views. In the missionary-historical type, pneumatology was “conditioned by Christology.”⁷⁵ Here the historical linear sequence between the work of Jesus Christ and that of His Spirit proves crucial. After the resurrection and ascension, Christ sent the Holy Spirit as His agent to accomplish “the mission of Christ and to glorify Him.” When this type was further bolstered, Christology “tended little by little to dominate pneumatology, the *filioque* being only part of the new development.”⁷⁶ The ecclesiology emerging from this type of pneumatology, corresponding to the sequence exemplified by the *filioque*,⁷⁷ depicted the church

73 John D. Zizioulas, “Implications ecclésiologiques de deux types de pneumatologie,” in *Communio Sanctorum: Mélanges offerts à Jean-Jacques von Allmen*, eds. J.J. von Allmen and Boris Bobrinskoy (Neuchâtel: Labor et Fides, 1982), 141–154.

74 Zizioulas, *Being*, 127–128 (emphasis original).

75 Zizioulas, “Implications,” 141.

76 Zizioulas, *Being*, 129. Sergius Bulgakov criticized the ecclesiological implicitness of the *filioque* for papal absolutism: “The *filioque*, in subordinating the Spirit to the Son, led to the subordination of the Spirit to the Vicar of the Son and, hence, to the creation of the papal monarchy and a Latin Church bent on earthly power and universal jurisdiction,” quoted in Robert M. Haddad, “The Stations of the *filioque*,” in *SVTQ* 46 (2002), 264.

77 In contemporary theology, the pneumatology of Karl Barth is typically included in this

from the perspective of mission, that is, the fulfillment of the work of Christ through the Spirit. By the Holy Spirit, “the church becomes the body of Christ in the sense where the head (Christ) *precedes* and *leads* the body, and the body follows in obedience” (emphasis original).⁷⁸ Moreover, the church is called by the Holy Spirit to a pilgrimage toward the coming Kingdom of God.⁷⁹ In this sense, a certain “*distance* between the head and the body” (emphasis original) was assumed.⁸⁰

type. In his doctrine of God’s revelation and reconciliation, Christology conditions pneumatology in connection with the *filioque*. When Barth explains the subjective reality of God’s revelation in his *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, he emphasizes that God is known through the Word and the testimonies about Him. See Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, vol. 1, bk. 2, *Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes: Prolegomena zur Kirchlichen Dogmatik* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1938), 258. These testimonies, through which believers receive knowledge of God, are the work of the Spirit of the Word. The Spirit of the Word can bring the human subject to the objective revelation in the Word. In other words, through the work of the Spirit of the Word, the subjective reality of God’s revelation cannot become religious and spiritual human experience unless it is appropriated to the objective revelation of God in the Word. If the Spirit is of the Word for Barth, he stood firmly in the *filioque* tradition. So too in Barth’s doctrine of reconciliation, Christology determines pneumatology. By the Spirit as the power transmitted from Christ to Christians, the history (*Geschichte*) “between the existence of the man Jesus and that of other men” occurs. See Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, vol. 4, bk. 2, *Lehre von der Versöhnung* (Zürich: Theologischer Verlag Zürich, 1953), 357, 372. In other words, reconciliation is achieved through the Holy Spirit between God the Father and His children whose brother is Jesus Christ. In this reconciliation, the Spirit works as He did between Father and Son in eternity. The Spirit eternally unites the Father and the Son in that He proceeds from the Father and the Son (*ex patre filioque*) and is common to both of Them (Barth, 381–382). Considering these elements of the *filioque* in Barth’s pneumatology, David Guretzki accurately insisted that Karl Barth adamantly defended the *filioque*, which even proved theologically significant for his creative explanation of Christian faith. See David Guretzki, “The Filioque: Assessing Evangelical Approaches to a Knotty Problem,” in *Semper Reformandum: Studies in Honour of Clark H. Pinnock*, eds. Stanley E. Porter and Anthony R. Cross (Carlisle: Paternoster Press, 2003), 183–207; for Guretzki’s profound study on the *filioque* in Karl Barth, see David Guretzki, *Karl Barth on the Filioque*, Barth Studies (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); for similarities between Barth’s and Calvin’s views on the *filioque* and the relationship between pneumatology and Christology, see Gabriel Widmer, “La théologie réformée et le Filioque,” in *Le 11e Concile Oecuménique: La Signification et l’actualité du 11e Concile Oecuménique pour le monde chrétien d’aujourd’hui*, ed. C.O.P.C.E., Études théologiques 2 (Chambésy: C.O.P.C.E., 1982), 319–337.

78 Zizioulas, “Implications,” 142.

79 Boris Bobrinsky, however, presents this ecclesiological implicitness as a positive significance of the western *filioque*. See Bobrinsky, “The Filioque Yesterday and Today,” in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 141–142.

80 Zizioulas, “Implications,” 142; also, see Aristotle Papanikolaou, *Being with God: Trinity*,

The missionary-historical type of pneumatology and ecclesiology followed the sequence between baptism and confirmation, so Zizioulas insisted: "Given the fact that confirmation was normally regarded as the rite of the 'giving of the Spirit,' one could argue that in cases where confirmation preceded baptism we had a priority of pneumatology over Christology, while in the other case we had the reverse."⁸¹ Baptism preceded confirmation in the church which had developed the missionary-historical type of pneumatology and ecclesiology.

The Eucharistic eschatological type of pneumatology had a different character. Here pneumatology was not conditioned by Christology, but vice versa.⁸² *Spirituque* took the place of *filioque*. The Spirit does not intervene *a posteriori* within the framework of Christology, but *constitutes* the historical person, Jesus Christ.⁸³ This type of pneumatology makes real and present Christ's personal existence as a body or community without any distance between Head and body. Zizioulas remarks the following:

... we are meaning His [Christ's] *whole personal existence* ...; that is, we mean *His relationship* with His body, the Church, ourselves. In other words, when we now say "Christ" we mean a person and not an individual; we mean a relational entity existing "for me" or "for us". Here the Holy Spirit is not one who *aids* us in bringing the distance between Christ and ourselves, but he is the person of the Trinity who actually realizes in history that which we call Christ, this absolutely relational entity, our Savior ... Between the Christ-truth and ourselves there is *no gap to fill* by the means of grace Christ does not exist *first* as truth and *then* as communion; He is both at once.⁸⁴

From the perspective of the real and present existence of Christ, Zizioulas connected the work of the Spirit to the *eschaton*. In contrast with the economy of the Son as *becoming* history, he claimed that the Spirit is "the *beyond* history, and when he acts in history, he does so in order to bring into history the last days, the *eschaton*" (Teilhabe am Wesen Gottes).⁸⁵ In other words, the church as the real body of Christ is an eschatological event in which the Spirit brings God's Kingdom. As Aristotle Papanikolaou has noted, the Spirit "does not sim-

Apophaticism, and Divine-Human Communion (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2006), 34.

81 Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 128.

82 Zizioulas, "Implications," 142–143.

83 Zizioulas, *Being as Communion*, 11.

84 Zizioulas, 110–111 (emphasis original).

85 Zizioulas, 130.

ply lead us to the Kingdom, but makes it present. The Church is the Eucharistic *synaxis* which is filled with the presence of the Spirit that is the presence of the eschatological unity of all in Christ.”⁸⁶

In summary, as Zizioulas’ distinction between two types of pneumatology and their effects on ecclesiology in the patristic era shows, the two relationships between Son and Spirit—*filioque* and *spirituque*—have offered differed viewpoints for the construction of a pneumatology and ecclesiology. With the *filioque*, pneumatology and ecclesiology were deeply conditioned and colored by Christology. The Spirit as the agent of Christ is subordinated to the work of Jesus Christ, and the church has a missionary character and is future-oriented in the distance between Christ and His body. The *spirituque*, on the contrary, provided another opportunity for determining pneumatology and ecclesiology. Here Jesus Christ was depicted as the bearer of the Spirit, and the Spirit determined who Jesus Christ was. The church as the body of Christ is an eschatological event in which Christ is really present and God’s Kingdom comes through the Holy Spirit.

3 Questions

The far-reaching theological implications of the *filioque* as outlined above are indicative of the necessity to study this age-old issue again. Even though the *filioque* is not the “war criminal” of the East-West schism Lossky made it out to be,⁸⁷ its various understandings still mark a watershed in diverse theological constructions of the Christian faith. These implications, as well as the necessity for a renewed investigation, are the driving forces pushing us to participate in contemporary ecumenical discussion on the *filioque*.

For a better mutual understanding in ecumenical dialogue, so Christoph Schwöbel noted, it is necessary to trace how East and West have each formed and developed their own trinitarian traditions.⁸⁸ As such, the trinitarian thought of the Latin and Greek Fathers are crucial, since they represent the origin and source from which the two traditions have been created, nourished,

86 Papanikolaou, *Being with God*, 36–37. Nissiotis likewise emphasized a pneumatological ecclesiology: “The Church is the receptacle of the trinitarian presence in history through the action of the Spirit If this action on the part of the Spirit is denied the Church becomes anthropomorphic and is reduced to a sociological institution.” Nissiotis, “Pneumatological Christology,” 244.

87 Vladimir Lossky, *In the Image and Likeness of God*, trans. T.E. Bird and John H. Erickson (Crestwood, NY: St Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1985), 71.

88 Schwöbel, “Christology,” 4.

and shaped concretely, and thrived. As the following chapters will indicate, it was the trinitarian theologies of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine in particular by which the characteristics of the eastern and western trinitarian traditions were shaped.⁸⁹ Hence, this work aims to contribute to the search for patristic ground toward a satisfying rapprochement on the *filioque* between East and West.

The main question of the present work is: what ground for rapprochement does the patristic era offer in the contemporary controversy between East and West on the *filioque*? To answer the main question, the following five sub-questions will need to be investigated: 1) What issues remain in the *filioque* controversy of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries? 2) How did Gregory of Nyssa conceive of the Triune God and the procession of the Holy Spirit? 3) How did Augustine conceive of the Triune God and the procession of the Holy Spirit? 4) How do the ideas of Gregory and Augustine compare? 5) How their ideas contribute to the contemporary controversy?

To answer these questions, the next chapter (chapter 2) will begin by surveying remaining issues in the contemporary controversy over the *filioque*. This

89 Regarding Augustine's significance, Schwöbel noted: "It would not be a gross exaggeration to see the mainstream of the history of western trinitarian reflection as a series of footnotes on Augustine's conception of the Trinity in *De Trinitate*." (Schwöbel, "Christology," 4–5). For an interesting comment from eastern theologians on the significance of Augustine in their own tradition, see George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou, "Augustine and the Orthodox: 'The West' in the East," in *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, eds. George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008), 1625: "It should not go unnoticed that each of the three 'Pillars of Orthodoxy' (Photius, Gregory Palamas, and Mark of Ephesus) who are frequently promoted by modern opponents of engagement with the West embraced Augustine as an authoritative father of the Church. Photius did so by reputation alone; Palamas carefully extracted what he found useful from *trin.*; and Mark took advantage of additional, more recently translated, materials in his campaigns against the innovations of the post-Augustinian West." For the growing recognition of the significance of Gregory of Nyssa's trinitarian theology, see Johannes Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance*, VCSup 46 (Leiden: Brill, 2000); Michel R. Barnes, *The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001); Sarah Coakley, ed., *Re-thinking Gregory of Nyssa* (Malden MA: Blackwell, 2003); Ayres, *Nicaea*, 344–363; Giulio Maspero, *Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Ablabium*, VCSup 86 (Leiden: Brill, 2007); "Trinity," in *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*, eds. Lucas F. Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, trans. Seth Cherney, VCSup 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 749–760; Morwenna Ludlow, *Gregory of Nyssa: Ancient and (Post)Modern* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 11–94; Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, *Gregory of Nyssa's Doctrinal Works: A Literary Study* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018); Anna Marmodoro and Neil B. McLynn, eds., *Exploring Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical, Theological, and Historical Studies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 199–234.

survey will concentrate on ecumenical occasions from the late twentieth century up to the present. It cannot be denied that the Church of the East and West and their respective theologians have contributed remarkably to the contemporary *filioque*-discussion from the late nineteenth to the middle of the twentieth century. When the present work aims to contribute to the contemporary controversy of the twenty-first century, however, its focus will be on the discussions that have taken place since the late twentieth century, since they point to both traditional and new problems related to the *filioque* that remain unsolved. In particular, two occasions and events related to them will be brought into relief, namely the consultation organized by the WCC in 1978–1979 and its “Klingenthal Memorandum,” as well as the Vatican Clarification from 1995 entitled “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit” and its reception in the study meeting held by the Pro Oriente foundation in Vienna in 1997 and among a number of theologians. On the basis of this analysis of these two occasions and related events, remaining theological issues for the rapprochement between East and West will be analyzed and summarized. Following this survey of the contemporary *filioque* controversy, two further chapters will offer an in-depth study of the trinitarian theologies of Gregory of Nyssa (chapter 3) and Augustine (chapter 4), to give an accurate presentation of their full thought on the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the third part (chapter 5), the results of the study of chapters 3 and 4 will be compared and analyzed with a view to the remaining issues identified in chapter 2.

What Is Still at Stake?

1 Introduction

The theological discussion surrounding the *filioque* stretches back to the beginning of the ninth century, when Photius ardently rejected the interpolated *filioque*.¹ Since that time, the conversation passed through various phases of historical, political, ideological, and theological change. Occasionally, these different phases provided opportunities for improving mutual understanding between East and West on their respective trinitarian theologies and conceptions on the procession of the Holy Spirit. In particular, a number of remarkable occasions presented themselves in ecumenical settings beginning as late as the late nineteenth century. Theologians of the two divided Churches have frequently communicated with each other and met to listen carefully to the arguments of their dialogue partners and so to learn what they had misunderstood about the other. This resulted in the twentieth-century developments in the doctrine of the Triune God witnessed in the Western Church.

Nevertheless, the *filioque*, which indeed contributed to the schism and has even frequently been identified as *the* problem due to the persistent antagonism on the matter between East and West, has remained a theological issue awaiting deeper discussion. Ecumenical dialogues and theological development have not only provided opportunities toward unity, but also complicated the tasks. Participants to the discussion have been required to re-explore and re-evaluate their own trinitarian traditions as well as the traditions of the others, to avoid conceptual confusion arising from the ecumenical efforts, to seek acceptable alternatives, to overcome existing conflicts on a number of theological issues and on the hermeneutics of creeds, and even to assess the twentieth-century developments in the doctrine of the Triune God from the perspective of their own tradition.

But what, then, is precisely still at stake? In the present chapter, several dogmatic issues that have arisen from contemporary debates will be examined, in particular two ecumenical occasions and their related debates. One of these occasions concerns the Klingenthal Memorandum (called Memorandum hereafter) of the Commission on Faith and Order of the World Council of Churches

1 See pp. 2–3 above.

(called FOC hereafter) which was published in 1981. Leading up to its publication,² the FOC had convened two consultations for the Memorandum in 1979–1980. The other occasion is the 1995 clarification of the Roman Catholic Church on the *filioque* entitled “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit” (called Clarification hereafter).³ Even if the Clarification was not prepared by way of a consultation, as was indeed the case for the Memorandum, it did lead to ardent discussions upon its publication. The following study of these two occasions and the ensuing debates will not only reflect remarkable progress toward union, but also reveal the complicated disagreements that still need to be overcome. The agreements reached will be evaluated as ecumenical consensus by which later discussions on the *filioque* can be stimulated. At the same time, the remaining disagreement, which will be defined, will require a study of the thought of the Church Fathers and in particular of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo (chapters 3 and 4), which the two traditions have used to develop their respective trinitarian theologies. Apart from these two ecumenical occasions and their related debates, this chapter will also examine the theological arguments used by theologians of different churches after 1995. The examination of the latter arguments will yield disagreements similar to those that will be derived from the study of the two ecumenical occasions, thereby reinforcing the need for the study of the patristic era.

2 Lukas Vischer, ed., *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical reflections of the filioque controversy*, FOP 103 (London: SPCK, 1981).

3 Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit,” *Catholic International* 7, no. 1 (1996): 36–43. Apart from these two occasions, also other ecumenical dialogues or consultations have taken place during recent decades. Three occasions in particular can be listed here: the Anglican-Orthodox consultations in 1956 and 1976; the Orthodox-Reformed Theological Consultation in 1988 and 1990; and the North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation from 1999 to 2003. For the first, see Ware Kallistos and Colin Davey, eds., *Anglican-Orthodox Dialogue: The Moscow Statement Agreed by the Anglican-Orthodox Joint Doctrinal Commission*, 1976 (London: SPCK, 1977); for the second, see Thomas F. Torrance, *Theological Dialogue between Orthodox and Reformed Churches* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1985); *Theological Dialogue between Orthodox and Reformed Churches* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1993); for the third, see North American Orthodox-Catholic Theological Consultation, “The Filioque: A Church-Dividing Issue?,” *SVTQ* 48, no. 1 (2004): 93–123. While these dialogues are all representative of ecumenical progress among the churches, David Guretzki was probably right when he remarked the following: “None of these consultations claimed to have dealt with the problem definitively.” David Guretzki, “The Filioque: Reviewing the State of the Question, with Some Free Church Contributions,” in *Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century*, ed. Myk Habets (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 44.

2 The Memorandum of 1981

2.1 *Aims and Influence*

The FOC held two consultations at Schloss Klingenthal near Strasbourg in 1978 (26–29 October) and 1979 (23–27 May) to discuss the issue of the interpolated phrase *filioque* in the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed (*Symbolum Nicaenum Constantinopolitanum* [= *Symb. Nicaen.*] of 381).⁴ In these two consultations, theologians of various denominational backgrounds were involved.⁵ On the basis of the results and findings of these meetings, a Memorandum was composed and sealed with the approval of the FOC. It recommended that “it be shared with the Churches”⁶ and that the Churches respond to it “in ways appropriate to their own historical and theological situations.”⁷ The Memorandum was published in 1981 together with the papers submitted in the consultations.⁸

The consultations and Memorandum addressed the issue of the *filioque* with a view to effecting ecumenical advance in the existing controversy. The intention was not, however, to offer a definite conclusion to the controversy. Rather, the aim was for both the Eastern Orthodox Church and the Western Churches to re-evaluate the original Greek text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* as the one valid creed. The Memorandum recommended “that the original form of the third article of the Creed, without the *filioque*, should everywhere be recognized as the normative one and restored ...”⁹ In this regard, it thus recommended the omission of the phrase *filioque* in the liturgy. The aim, however, was not just a literal restoration of the original text. Rather, the document sought to reconcile the different theological traditions that the East and the West had developed to understand the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* on the procession of the Holy Spirit. In other words, the document aimed to prove basic argumentation for a reconciliation between East and West.

4 According to Jürgen Moltmann's autobiography, this occasion was initiated at his suggestion to Lukas Vischer. Moltmann wanted to make a theologically relevant project in FOC. See Jürgen Moltmann, *A Broad Place: An Autobiography* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2009), 86.

5 The participating theologians were Markos A. Orphanos, Dietrich Ritschl, André de Halleux, Donald Allchin, Kurt Stalder, Alasdair Heron, Herwig Aldenhoven, Boris Bobrinskoy, Jean-Miguel Garrigues, Jürgen Moltmann, and Dumitru Stăniloae.

6 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, v.

7 Vischer, 18.

8 See note 2 above.

9 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 18.

The Memorandum went on to be of significant influence for later ecumenical movements.¹⁰ The position which Yves Congar took in the Vatican symposium on pneumatology in 1982 approached that of the Memorandum in terms of his argument for the omission of the *filioque*.¹¹ Following this symposium, the original text of *Symb. Nicaen.* without the *filioque* was recited during the Sunday Mass conducted by Pope John Paul II. More significantly, the Vatican Clarification owed a debt to the theological method and argumentation of the Memorandum and its consultations.

2.2 Approaches

To achieve the aforementioned aims, the Memorandum took three approaches: 1) a balanced survey of the history of the controversy; 2) a mutually complementary evaluation of the traditions of the two Churches; and 3) acceptance of diverse interpretations of the biblical texts used to bolster each of the two traditions.

First of all, the Memorandum surveyed the history of the *filioque* controversy in a generally balanced manner.¹² In an impartial way, it identified three historical occasions as being of crucial importance for reconciliation between the two traditions on this theme. First, it cautiously suggested why the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* had omitted to circumscribe the nature of the relationship between the Son and the Spirit: "This may be because of the conflict with various current heresies which subordinated the Spirit to the Son, and reduced him to the level of a mere creature."¹³ Additionally, it stated that the interpolation of the phrase by the Council of Toledo in 589 and in the Athanasian Creed was not designed to "oppose the teaching of the Church in East."¹⁴ Second, the Memorandum did not overlook the reason for Pope Leo III's (795–816) refusal to ratify the change introduced by Charlemagne and his theologians. Leo III "refused to sanction an addition to the wording of the Creed which had been

10 See Guretzki, "The Filioque," 43–44. He evaluated the consultations for the Memorandum as the most significant of a number of scholarly consultations in recent decades.

11 Yves Congar, "Actualité de la Pneumatologie," in *Credo in Spiritum Sanctum: Atti del congresso teologico internazionale di pneumatologia in occasione del 1600 anniversario del I Concilio di Costantinopoli e del 1550 anniversario del Concilio di Efeso*, ed. José Saraina Martínez, *Teologia e Filosofia* 6 (Città del Vaticano: LEV, 1983), 15–28.

12 See Bernd Oberdorfer, *Filioque: Geschichte und Theologie eines ökumenischen Problems*, FSÖT 96 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2001), 511.

13 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 14.

14 Vischer, 5: "Many scholars have thought that the main concern was to counter western forms of Arianism by using the *filioque* as an affirmation of the divine status of the Son."

drawn up by an Ecumenical Council and reaffirmed by others.”¹⁵ Last, it accurately recognized that the Photian tradition of ‘the Father *alone*’ was not so crucial in nature as a criticism of the western *filioque* tradition that the schism between the two Churches should have occurred immediately then. Rather, the Memorandum recognized the validity of Photian monopatrism based on the distinct approach the Greek Church Fathers took to the Triune God.

Following this impartial outline of the history of the controversy, the Memorandum attempted in the second place to evaluate the two traditions as being mutually complementary.¹⁶ It expressed itself positively on the diversity of the various approaches to and aspects of the Triune God visible in East and West. Noting both Augustine and the Cappadocians, it acknowledged the differences as being valid and complementary for the *filioque* controversy, and attempted to reconcile them with a view to ecumenical study. The balanced approach of the Memorandum will be described in greater detail in the following section, which will lay out how it understands and reconciles monopatrism and the *filioque* tradition.

Finally, the document accepted the diverse interpretations of the biblical texts which have been used to support the two traditions. In particular, the document addressed biblical passages reflecting the reciprocal nature of the relationship between Son and Spirit. On this basis, it stated that the Bible does not speak of a one-sided relationship between the two persons, but a reciprocal one.¹⁷ “In the New Testament, the relation between the Spirit and Jesus Christ is not described solely in a linear or one-directional fashion. On the contrary, it is clear that there is mutuality and reciprocity which must be taken into account in theological reflection upon the Trinity itself.”¹⁸ Additionally, the document argued, this relationship evident in the New Testament should be acknowledged as being of validity for the eternal being and essence of the Trinity “in

15 Vischer, 6.

16 Cf. V. Bolotov, “Thesen über das ‘*Filioque*’ von einem russischen Theologen,” *Revue internationale de Théologie* 6, no. 24 (1898): 681–712.

17 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 7–9. The biblical texts cited by the Memorandum are the following: Matt 1:18 and Luke 1:35 on the conception and birth; Mark 1:9–11 on the manifestation at the baptism in the Jordan; Luke 4:14 on the manifestation in the desert; Luke 3:22, 4:18 and John 1:32–33 on the resting of the Spirit upon Jesus Christ in fullness; Heb 9:14 on the passion and sacrifice on the cross; Rom 8:11 on the resurrection; John 3:5 on the new creation of humanity; Eph 2:15 on sharing in the humanity of Christ; John 15:26 on Christ’s promise of sending the Spirit; Rom 8:9 and Phil 1:19 on the expression “the Spirit of Jesus Christ himself”; Col 3:4 on Christ’s becoming our life through the Spirit; Eph 3:12 on Christ’s dwelling in our hearts through the Spirit; 1 Cor 12:3 on confessing Jesus as Lord through the Spirit.

18 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 9.

some sense": "It is impossible to accept that what is valid for his revelation of his own being in history is not in some sense also valid for his eternal being and essence."¹⁹

2.3 *Theological Argumentation*

When it restored the original Greek text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* as noted above, the Memorandum aimed to reconcile the two diverse traditions of East and West in their respective understanding of the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* on the procession of the Holy Spirit. To achieve a reconciliation that does not ignore the validity of the trinitarian-theological traditions of East and West, the memorandum identified the following issues as being of central importance: how to understand and define 1) the procession from 'the Father *alone*' and 2) the place of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. The first issue is connected to the validity of monopatristism on the eastern side, and the second to the validity of the *filioque* tradition.

In its attempt to approach each of the two traditions impartially, the Memorandum accepted the eastern tradition of 'the Father *alone*' from the perspective of the Greek Fathers' own approach to the Triune God. The Greek Fathers maintained the distinction between οὐσία and ὑπόστασις, and did not tie the distinctive properties of each of the three hypostases to the common nature. Hence, they underlined the non-interchangeable or non-confused properties of Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.²⁰ Being the sole principle (ἀρχή), source (πηγή), and cause (αἰτία) of the divine nature is the property of the Father who is ungenerated, and it is not transmitted to the other hypostases. The Memorandum acknowledged that the Photian formula, 'the Father *alone*,' should be understood as an expression of the monarchy of the Father, which attributes the sole principle only to the Father.

While accepting the validity of monopatristism, the Memorandum also attempted not to ignore the validity of the western tradition as it comes to clear expression in the *filioque*. First, the *filioque* firmly maintains the consubstantiality of the three hypostases; this was clearly stated in the Memorandum,²¹ and the Roman Catholic theologian André de Halleux, a participant at the consultations, offered a lucid explanation. In his paper, de Halleux gave an account of the Latin background of the *filioque* up to the end of the fourth century, drawing on Tertullian, Hilary of Poitiers, and Ambrose of Milan, and argued that phrases similar to the *filioque* that appear in the third and fourth centuries

19 Vischer, 14.

20 Vischer, 12.

21 Vischer, 11.

were designed to manifest and confess the Spirit's consubstantiality with the Father and the Son.²² Furthermore, he argued that consubstantiality was the motive for the third part of the *Symb. Nicaen.* attacking the Pneumatomachi of that time.²³

Secondly, the Memorandum argued that the *filioque* maintains the revealed and accepted *taxis* (τάξις) of the three hypostases: Father-Son-Spirit (Matt 28:19). On this point, the argumentation was represented by Jean-Miguel Garrigues, another Roman Catholic theologian who participated in the consultations, and by Jürgen Moltmann, one of the Protestant theologians there. Garrigues stated that the order Father-Son-Spirit is "the dogmatic core of the relationship of the Spirit to the Son in the Trinity," which "depends on the mystery of the Holy Spirit as the divine Third Person (cf. The sequence of the baptismal formula in Matt 28:19 which controls the Nicene-Constantinopolitan Creed)."²⁴ In other words, it was "universally recognized by the Fathers" that "the procession of the Spirit depends on the generation of the Word in the bosom of the Father."²⁵ The *filioque* tradition tried to keep the priority of the generation of the Son and to reflect the *taxis* in which the Spirit was revealed as the divine third Person in relation to the Son. Similarly, Moltmann stated that the *filioque* tradition presupposed the generation and existence of the Son prior to the procession of the Spirit.²⁶

While keeping this *taxis*, the Memorandum thirdly argued the validity of the *filioque* tradition for filling the blank in the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* As de Halleux argued, the *Symb. Nicaen.* probably omitted to give clear expression to the relationship between Son and Holy Spirit in the third article due to the existing controversy with the Pneumatomachi. Nevertheless, Garrigues' argument as quoted above suggested that it was generally accepted at the time that the procession of the Holy Spirit depends on the generation of the Son.

22 André de Halleux, "Towards an Ecumenical Agreement on the Procession of the Holy Spirit and the Addition of the Filioque to the Creed," in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 77–78. Also, see note 1 in chapter 1 above.

23 For a useful summary of studies on the formation of the *Symb. Nicaen.* and on the significance of its third article in connection with the Pneumatomachi, see Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, "Das trinitarische Dogma von 381 als Ergebnis verbindlicher Konsensusbildung," in *Glaubensbekenntnis und Kirchengemeinschaft: Das Modell des Konzils von Konstantinopel (381)*, eds. Karl Lehmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Dialog der Kirchen 1* (Freiburg im Breisgau; Göttingen: Herder; Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1982), 13–48.

24 Jean-Miguel Garrigues, "A Roman Catholic View of the Position Now Reached of the Filioque Controversy," in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 151.

25 Garrigues, 152.

26 Jürgen Moltmann, "Theological Proposals towards the Resolution of the Filioque Controversy," in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 168.

Regarding this controversy with the Pneumatomachi and general idea of the procession, the Memorandum explained, "the absence of any clear statement on the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit (in the *Symb. Nicaen.*) faces dogmatic theology with a problem which the West in the past attempted to solve by means of the *filioque*."²⁷ *Filioque* was thus probably a western solution to fill the void, based on the general notion of the procession being dependent on the generation of the Son.

Lastly, the Memorandum noted that the *filioque* tradition has kept a Christocentric spirituality. The *filioque* "gave expression to the deeply-rooted concern in western piety to declare that the Spirit is the Spirit of the Son,"²⁸ which "is fundamental to the New Testament witness and ... is a necessary bulwark against the dangers of christologically uncontrolled 'charismatic enthusiasm' ..."²⁹

How can monopatrism and the *filioque* tradition be reconciled if both are accepted as equally valid? First of all, the Memorandum assessed monopatrism as being of common validity to both the eastern and western traditions. After accepting the monopatrism of the Greek fathers as valid, it indicated that monopatrism was not ignored by the Latin fathers, in particular Ambrose of Milan and Augustine. It furthermore argued the following: "By describing the Son as the 'secondary cause' of the procession of the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of *filioque* gave the impression of introducing 'two principles' into the Holy Trinity it seemed to obscure the difference between the persons of the Father and the Son."³⁰ However, it continued as follows: "So far as western theology is concerned, the Spirit could then be seen as receiving his complete existence (*hypostasis*) from the Father ..."³¹

After accepting monopatrism as being of ecumenical validity, the Memorandum reconciled the validity of the *filioque* with monopatrism. On this point,

27 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 14.

28 Vischer, 11.

29 Vischer, 17. Also, see Gabriel Widmer, "La théologie réformée et le Filioque," in *Le 11e Concile Oecuménique: La signification et l'actualité du 11e Concile Oecuménique pour le monde chrétien d'aujourd'hui*, ed. COPE, Études théologiques 2 (Chambésy: COPE, 1982), 330: "Les théologiens réformés résistent aujourd'hui encore à la suppression du *Filioque* par crainte du spiritualisme. Dénouer, en effet, les liens qui relient le Saint-Esprit au Christ, c'est laisser la porte ouverte à toutes les formes d'illuminisme, d'enthousiasme, d'exaltation, voire de frénésie incontrôlables. Il faut, au contraire les resserrer: d'une part parce que l'Esprit dans sa triple action sanctificatrice, illuminatrice et glorificatrice actualise la triple action réconciliatrice, justificatrice et libératrice de Jésus-Christ ..."

30 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 13.

31 Vischer, 15.

Garrigues and Moltmann offered substantial arguments at the consultations, tying them to V. Bolotov's formula that "the Holy Spirit proceeded *from the Father of the Son*,"³² which the Memorandum likewise accepted.

Garrigues applied a linguistic approach to the *filioque* problem to shed light on the complementary nature of the two traditions. He distinguished between ἐκπορεύεσθαι and προΐέναι and identified the latter with the Latin verb *procedere*. The first of the two Greek verbs, he suggested, was used in particular to explain the hypostatic origin of the third person in the Trinity from the Father, and can be translated into Latin as *se exportare*. The second gave expression to "a homogeneous link of communion" among the three persons, and its use seems to be equivalent to that of the Latin verb *procedere*. As such, the phrase *filioque* together with the verb *procedere* seem to denote that "the divine nature advanced from the Father and the Son, in relation to whom it maintains him in consubstantial communion according to the order of the trinitarian *perichoresis* in which the divine nature is manifested."³³ From the distinction of the verbs, Garrigues argued that the monopatristism of the eastern tradition underlined the Spirit's hypostatic existence from the Father alone using the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι, while the western tradition maintained the consubstantial communion from both the Father and the Son using the verb *procedere*, which corresponds to what the Greek tradition had expressed with the verb προΐέναι.

Based on this complementary and reconciling reading of the two traditions, Garrigues highlighted the validity of the *filioque* tradition. As has been noted, Garrigues stated that the *taxis* Father-Son-Spirit forms the dogmatic core, and that the Church Fathers universally recognized that the procession of the Holy Spirit depends on the generation of the Son. Additionally, he argued, this dogmatic core addressed the question of "*how* this dependence works" in relation to the question concerning the blank left in the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* regarding the place of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. While the *filioque* tradition maintained monopatristism, he argued, it sought to fill the void and determine the role of the Son by accentuating the consubstantial communion also from the Son to the Holy Spirit, in keeping with the priority of the Son's generation in the *taxis*. In this sense, for Garrigues the *filioque* tradition gives the role of the Son in the procession a positive connotation. The eastern tradition, on the contrary, has described this role in negative terms in that it emphasizes by the Son's participation in the procession of the Holy Spirit that the procession is not a second generation.³⁴ For Garrigues, Bolotov's for-

32 Bolotov, "Thesen," 681–712.

33 Garrigues, "A Roman Catholic View," 159–160.

34 Garrigues, 157.

mula reflects the positive role of the Son in monopatristism. Hence, he concluded his paper using the formula as follows:

The Holy Spirit who comes forth in his personal originality as Spirit from the one sole Father of the Only-begotten (hypostatic existence, *exporeuomai, monarchia*) through and by reason of this unique Begotten (manifestation as the Third person), proceeds in origin from the two in the consubstantial *perichoresis* of the Trinity (consubstantial communion, *procedere, filioque*), while being, by his relation to the Son, what the Son is, just as the Son, by his relation to the Father, is what the Father is, that is to say, God.³⁵

Moltmann is another theologian who attempted to reconcile the two traditions by maintaining the validity of the *filioque* tradition, while paying full due to monopatristism. If the *Symb. Nicaen.* affirms that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, so Moltmann argued citing Bolotov's formula in a way generally similar to the way Garrigues used it, the creed intends to convey that the Spirit proceeds *from the Father of the Son* because God the Father is shown to be the Father only in the eternal begetting of the Son from the Father:³⁶ "If then God as Father breathes forth the Holy Spirit, the Spirit proceeds *from the Father of the Son*."³⁷

Notwithstanding this similarity, Moltmann did not follow Garrigues in focusing on the distinction between the use and connotations of the Greek and Latin verbs. Rather, he distinguished two realities in the Trinity which are never separated: the perfect divine *existence* of the Holy Spirit is distinguished from His relational form or inner-trinitarian personal form. On the basis of this distinction, Moltmann offered the following proposal: "The Holy Spirit receives from the Father his own perfect divine *existence* (ὑπόστασις, ὑπαρξις), and obtains (from the Father and) from the Son his relational (or inner-trinitarian personal) form (*Gestalt*, εἶδος, πρόσωπον)."³⁸ From this proposal of two distinguishable aspects of the Spirit's procession, Moltmann acknowledged that the former seems to have been maintained more clearly in the eastern tradition of monopatristism, while the latter is more clearly evident in the western *filioque* tradition. In this sense, as indeed also Garrigues insisted, the *filioque* articu-

35 Garrigues, 162–163; Jean-Miguel Garrigues, *L'Ésprit qui dit "Père": Le problème du Filioque* (Paris: Téqui, 1981), 101.

36 Moltmann, "Theological Proposals," 167.

37 Moltmann, 168.

38 Moltmann, 169.

lated the participation of the Son in more direct and positive terms, while the eastern tradition's formulation was indirect and negative.³⁹

2.4 *The Conclusion*

From this entire attempt at reconciliation, the Memorandum concluded the following:

While the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father alone, his procession is nevertheless connected with the relationship within the Trinity between the Father and the Son, in virtue of which the Father acts *as Father*. The begetting of the Son from the Father thus qualifies the procession of the Spirit as *a procession from the Father of the Son* The *filioque*, on this suggestion, would have valid meaning with reference to the relationship of the three hypostases within the divine Triunity, but not with regard to the procession of the complete and perfect hypostasis of the Spirit from the Father.⁴⁰

3 What Is Still at Stake? (1)

The acceptance of the original Greek text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* of 381 as the only valid one for all churches by the Memorandum and the consultations has been of fundamental significance. This re-evaluation proved to have enormous impact for later ecumenical movements, and in particular the Clarification. Moreover, the Memorandum and its consultations need to be recognized for their impartial approach to the diverse traditions and their attempts to reconcile these traditions in respect to the *filioque*.

This does not, however, mean that this ecumenical achievement did not leave any discord over crucial theological issues. In particular, the failure of the Memorandum and its consultations is evident in the absence of a satisfying proposal for the relationship between Son and Spirit in the procession of the Spirit. As Moltmann had argued at the consultations,⁴¹ the Memorandum itself acknowledged that the restoration of the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* alone does not suffice for true reconciliation if it fails to offer a clear definition of the place of the Son in the Spirit's procession.⁴² That is, unfor-

39 Moltmann, 169.

40 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 14–15.

41 Moltmann, "Theological Proposals," 165.

42 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 14.

tunately, a problem which this ecumenical event did not resolve. It is in fact one of three critical disagreements defying resolution in the Memorandum, notwithstanding the participants' ardent discussion, that will now be analyzed and summarized.

3.1 *The Role of the Son and Monopatrism*

As noted, the theologians at the consultations first failed to reach agreement on defining the participation of the Son in the Spirit's procession. The Memorandum and the participants in the consultations all agreed that the two churches' traditions have maintained the participation of the Son in the procession of the Spirit with their own, albeit varying, trinitarian thoughts and expressions. Unanimity was not, however, reached by the participants in the debates on the 'how.' As the following will reveal, the difference between East and West was intrinsically related to diverging ideas on the monarchy of the Father. This disagreement, however, manifested itself not only between eastern and western participants, but also among different theologians on one and the same side.

The cause for the diverging views on the role of the Son in the procession between the two sides was the divergence between the two traditions on the monarchy of the Father. In the past, eastern theologians had expressed their anxiety about the western tendency to understand also the Son as the cause of the Spirit's procession. But if the Son becomes the cause, it would seem that the hypostatic non-interchangeable attributes of the Father are now granted also to the Son. This is something that the monopatrism of the eastern tradition cannot accept. Although the Memorandum and the West's participants at the consultations tried to interpret the *filioque* so as to reconcile it with monopatrism, this anxiety on the part of the East remained. Boris Bobrinskoy in particular gave expression to this worry when he compared the phrases *filioque* and *per filium*. The latter, so he argued, is "capable of receiving an Orthodox interpretation" to signify that "The eternal Son is understood as the mediator or the gift of the Spirit and the place of his procession."⁴³ The former, on the other contrary, has been symbolic of the western tendency to attribute the cause or principle of the procession even to the Son, and as such cannot be reconciled with monopatrism. Consequently, Bobrinsky echoed the traditional distinction between monopatrism and the *filioque* tradition, while still recog-

43 Boris Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque Yesterday and Today," in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 145–146. He noted in particular John of Damascus (*De fide orthodoxa* [PG 94, 849B]) and the synodical letter of Patriarch Tarasius to the Fathers of the Seventh Ecumenical Council of Nicaea in 787 (Mansi 12, 1122) as examples of acceptance of the phrase *per filium* in the eastern tradition.

nizing that the Son bears a certain relationship to the procession of the Holy Spirit: “*The eternal Son is not extraneous to the procession of the Holy Spirit*. But Orthodox theology adds, (i) in an ineffable manner, (ii) without bring in the idea of causality, (iii) without calling into question the untransmittable chapter of the Father’s hypostatic property of being the one Source and Principle of the Divinity of the Son and of the Spirit” (emphasis original).⁴⁴ Dumitru Stăniloae, another eastern participant at the consultations, shared Bobrinskoy’s worries. Pointing to Gregory II of Cyprus, Stăniloae stressed the Byzantine tradition according to which the Father “is the originator (προβολεύς) of the Spirit in the double sense that he is the cause of the procession of the Spirit from himself, and the cause of his shining out from the Son.”⁴⁵ In this tradition, the Son is never called the cause or originator of the Spirit’s procession, while this was the very thing the *filioque* tradition seemed to be doing. Neither Bobrinskoy nor Stăniloae could agree with the role which the *filioque* seems to attribute to the Son as another cause, thereby undermining monopatristism.

Apart from this difference resulting from the unreconciled definition of monopatristism between representatives from East and West, also participants from the same side failed to reach a unified conclusion on the Son’s role in the procession of the Spirit. While Bobrinskoy and Stăniloae shared their anxiety regarding the *filioque* tradition, they each had different emphases when it comes to the role of the Son in the procession. Bobrinskoy, as noted, interpreted that role as one of a mediator or place, but he did not openly relate it to the manifestation of the Spirit through the Son. Stăniloae, on the contrary, did elaborate it more clearly in the expressions “repose” and “treasurer” of the Spirit, and in the idea of the manifestation (shining forth) of the Spirit through the Son. In the Byzantine line (especially that of the theology of Gregory II of Cyprus and Gregory of Palamas), Stăniloae argued that the Son as “treasurer” is the “repose” of the Spirit as treasure. The Spirit proceeds from the Father with a view to His “repose,” that is, the Son through whom the Spirit shines forth or is made manifest.⁴⁶ This notion does not conflict with monopa-

44 Bobrinskoy, 143; see Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition*, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1999), 276–278. Here he argued that, among the Cappadocians, Gregory of Nyssa was the one who “penetrated most deeply into the mystery of eternal relations of the Son and the Spirit” in terms of “a reciprocal concomitance, the Spirit accompanying the Son in an ineffable manner, outside all bilateral causation.” For Gregory’s trinitarian theology, see chapter 3 below.

45 Dumitru Stăniloae, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and His Relation to the Son, as the Basis of Our Deification and Adoption,” in Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 174–186.

46 Stăniloae, 181.

trism as he argued the following: "... The shining out from the Son marks a progress in the existence which the Spirit receives from the Father, one might say a fulfilment, the achievement of the end for which he came into existence."⁴⁷ Moreover, Stăniloae connected this manifestation with the sending of the Spirit as an uncreated energy from the perspective of Byzantine theology.

Similarly, it was clear that there were diverging ideas about or approaches to the role of the Son in the Spirit's procession in the common tradition among a number of western participants to the consultations. Reconciling the validity of the *filioque* tradition with monopatrism as described above, Garrigues connected the participation of the Son with the maintenance of the *taxis* Father-Son-Spirit and the emphasis on the consubstantiality of the Spirit. De Halleux similarly connected the role of the Son to the divine consubstantiality. Yet his approach did differ slightly from that of Garrigues. The latter had distinguished the two theologoumena of the two traditions, which ought to be complementary. While the eastern tradition underlined the Spirit's hypostatic existence from the Father alone with the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι, the western tradition maintained the consubstantial communion from both the Father and the Son with the verb *procedere*. This distinction failed to satisfy de Halleux, who argued that the Cappadocians had used the verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι for the hypostatic existence and for the consubstantial communion. As such, the patristic use of the Greek verb did not correspond precisely with the distinction as Garrigues had suggested it. The Cappadocians, so de Halleux argued, used it just so as to underline the monarchy of the Father and to distinguish His hypostatic and incommunicable property as cause from the other hypostases.⁴⁸ Moltmann too adopted a slightly different approach to an idea from that of these two Roman Catholic theologians on the role of the Son in the procession. As noted, he distinguished between what the Spirit receives from the Father and what He receives from both Father and Son. The former is His complete and divine existence (ὑπόστασις, ὕπαρξις), and the latter is His inner-trinitarian personal form (εἶδος, πρόσωπον). In this distinction, the role of the Son is related to the latter. In this way, Moltmann connected the involvement of the Son to the inner-trinitarian personal form of the Holy Spirit, rather than to his consubstantiality, as Garrigues

47 Stăniloae, 184.

48 De Halleux, "Towards an Ecumenical Agreement," 78–80. For a more in-depth study, see André de Halleux, "Orthodoxie et catholicisme: Du personnalisme en pneumatologie," *RTL* 6, no. 1 (1975): 3–30. It was reprinted in André de Halleux, *Patrologie et oecuménisme: Recueil d'études*, BETL 93 (Louvain: Peeters, 1990), 396–423.

and de Halleux did. For Moltmann, consubstantiality was probably implied in what the Holy Spirit receives from the Father alone.⁴⁹

In short, as all these discrepancies between East and West and among the theologians from the same side show, the definition of the 'how' of the Son's participation in the Spirit's procession remained an unresolved issue connected to diverse understandings of monopatrism after the Memorandum.

3.2 *The Taxis: Subordination of the Holy Spirit*

Second, the consultations for the Memorandum revealed that the two traditions have understood the *taxis* of the three hypostases in diverse ways. Briefly stated, the western understanding of the *taxis*, which underlines the priority of the generation of the Son, was criticized by the eastern participants who saw it as a sign of the Spirit's subordination to the Son. Criticizing this implicit subordinationism in the *filioque*, the eastern tradition has understood the *taxis* so as to highlight the concomitance of the existence of the Son and the Spirit from the Father.

This difference in understanding of the *taxis* was brought into relief by different interpretations of Bolotov's formula in particular. In the Memorandum, the formula "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father of the only begotten Son" was offered as a uniting form. It evaluated the formula as a fundamental one, which ecumenical dialogues could build upon to make progress in the controversy. However, this formula did not provide a unanimous interpretation of the trinitarian *taxis*, as theologians of both East and West interpreted it with different emphases from their own respective trinitarian tradition. On the western side, Garrigues accepted this formula as ecumenically valid so as to safeguard the *taxis* Father-Son-Spirit, which has been retained in the *filioque* tradition. In this sense, the formula was understood to express the priority of the generation of the Son. Moltmann too considered the formula valid from a similar perspective.

Their interpretation, however, was criticized as being exclusively western-oriented by both Stăniloae and Bobrinskoy. According to these eastern theologians, this formula, which had already been used by John of Damascus and was

49 Moltmann, "Theological Proposals," 167. "... the exclusive gloss 'from the Father *alone*' should be understood to refer only to the procession of the Spirit, i.e. to his divine existence (*hypostasis*), but not to his inner-trinitarian personal form (*Gestalt*) in his relation to the Father and to the Son. This is demonstrated by argument of the Eastern Church for the interpretative addition of the 'alone' itself: that God the Father is the one cause, ground and source of deity. This argumentation shows only that the Holy Spirit receives his divine *existence* and his divine *being* 'solely' from the 'source of divinity,' which is the Father" (emphasis original).

further developed by Byzantine theologians, represents the order Father-Spirit-Son. In his interpretation of passages in Palamas that are similar to the formula, Stăniloae openly said the following:

... we do not think that the *filioque* is contained in this formula (the quotation from Palamas given above would also exclude this) ... This formula which Father Garrigues considers to be a formula of concord simply underlines the fact that the Father causes the Spirit to proceed from himself in order to communicate him to his Son, in order to be more united with the Son by the Spirit. This formula emphasizes at the same time that the Son remains Son in relations to the Father, in his quality as the Father who is the overflowing source of the Spirit.⁵⁰

As such, the formula signifies the *taxis* Father-Spirit-Son, in that the Son is the place where the Spirit rests and in that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and rests on the Son.⁵¹

Moreover, reflecting again the *taxis* Father-Spirit-Son, the two eastern orthodox theologians accentuated that Bolotov's formula represents the simultaneity or concomitance of the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession.⁵² This, so they argued, is the tradition that the Cappadocians, John of Damascus, and Byzantine theologians had developed over against the possibility of the subordination of the Spirit's procession to the Son's generation inherent in the western *filioque* tradition.⁵³ In spite of its length, the following quotation from Stăniloae is crucial in that it clearly reveals his emphasis on concomitance in following the Byzantine tradition, especially Gregory II of Cyprus:

The fact that the procession of the Spirit is from the Father alone, but that the shining forth is from the Son, is a consequence of the procession from

50 Stăniloae, "The Procession," 176. About Palamas, he wrote the following: "St Gregory Palamas says: 'The Spirit has his existence from the Father of the Son, because he who causes the Spirit to proceed is also Father.' 'Recognize that it is not from anywhere else (that the Spirit has his existence) but only from him who also begets the Son' (P. Christou [ed.], *The Works of Gregory Palamas*, vol. 1 [Thessaloniki, 1962], 46)."

51 Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque," 143–144.

52 Stăniloae, "The Procession," 180–181; Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque," 145.

53 Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery*, 285–286: "At the end of the great christological period, St John of Damascus resumes the Irenaean ideas of the simultaneity of the begetting and the procession of the Son and of the Spirit—a simultaneity Irenaeus of Lyons expressed with the image of the two 'Hands' of the Father. This image excludes any chronological or conceptual anteriority of the begetting of the Son to the procession of the Spirit."

the Father alone, but united to the begetting of the Son, and this fact is expressed by Gregory of Cyprus by affirming that the shining out from the Son marks a progress in the existence which the Spirit receives from the Father, one might say a fulfillment, the achievement of the end for which he came into existence. This last affirmation is very bold. At first sight, it could give the impression that the Spirit receives his full existence insofar as he shines out from the Son. But if we remember that for Gregory of Cyprus only the Father is the cause of the Spirit's existence, and that for him the shining out of the Spirit from the Son is, in the last analysis, due to the Father, being a sort of crowning of the procession of the Spirit from the Father, then we see that the conception of Gregory of Cyprus opens to us a door of understanding. Without relinquishing the patristic teaching about the monarchy of the Father, this conception puts strong emphasis on the relation of the Spirit to the Son.⁵⁴

In short, Stăniloae stated that the generation or participation of the Son is concomitant or simultaneous to the procession of the Holy Spirit in that the former is the fulfilment of the latter.⁵⁵

These divergent interpretations of Bolotov's formula led the eastern participants in the consultations to criticize the unilateral understanding of the *taxis* of the Triune God represented in the Memorandum. Neither the *taxis* Father-Spirit-Son nor the notion of concomitance were clearly expressed in the

54 Stăniloae, "The Procession," 184.

55 In this regard, Oberdorfer's criticism against the "again Christo-centrism" of Stăniloae on this point needs careful reconsideration. It would seem that Oberdorfer did not sufficiently highlight Stăniloae's emphasis on the concomitance of the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession and on unseparated relationship between them. See Oberdorfer, *Filioque*, 515. Moreover, in recent decades Thomas G. Weinandy has offered a critical and creative study of the *taxis* from the perspective of the western tradition (in particular the trinitarian thought of Augustine and Aquinas). Weinandy distinguished "order" and "sequence" in the Triune God, and maintained the order and monarchy of the Father without falling into "trinitarian sequentialism." Nevertheless, his criticism on the eastern tradition's understanding of the *taxis* as "trinitarian sequentialism" needs careful revision. Contrary to Weinandy's claim, Bobrinsky and Stăniloae interpreted their tradition on the order as concomitance in a way similar to Weinandy himself. Pace Weinandy, Kathryn Tanner recognized similarity between him and the two eastern theologians. She was also aware of the similarity between the thought of John of Damascus and Gregory Palamas and that of Weinandy. For Weinandy, see Thomas G. Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 17–25; "The Filioque: Beyond Athanasius and Thomas Aquinas: An Ecumenical Proposal," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 185–197. For Tanner, see Kathryn Tanner, "Beyond the East/West Divide," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 199–200.

document.⁵⁶ As such, the eastern tradition of the *taxis* and of the concomitance of the two processions remains an issue for thorough study and reconciliation with the western tradition before greater harmony can be reached in the controversy surrounding the *filioque*.

3.3 *The Economic Trinity and the Immanent Trinity*

Lastly, the Memorandum and its consultation did not offer a unanimous definition of the relationship between the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity. The Memorandum argued that what is valid for God's revelation of His own being in history is in some sense also valid for His eternal being and essence.⁵⁷ What "in some sense" signified, however, remained vague. Moltmann, as a typical western theologian on this theme, reflected Karl Rahner's *These* when he remarked: "It follows that the divine Trinity cannot appear in the economy of salvation as something other than it is in itself ... This means that the relation between the Son and the Holy Spirit cannot be restricted to the temporal sending of the Holy Spirit through Christ. Rather there must be an inner-trinitarian basis for the temporal sending of the Spirit through Christ, the Son of God. Otherwise we should have to suppose some kind of contradiction in God himself."⁵⁸

56 Oberdorfer raised a similar criticism against the Memorandum. Oberdorfer, *Filioque*, 515. In fact, the absence of emphasis on the *taxis* Father-Spirit-Son in the document is regretful and even incoherent given its implicit recognition of this *taxis* as valid by its citation and interpretation of biblical passages in which this order is suggested. Interestingly, even though Wolfhart Pannenberg was not involved in the consultations, his criticism of Moltmann's view on the *filioque* reflects the criticism of the eastern participants. Moltmann's thought on the *taxis* Father-Son-Spirit and on the priority of the Son's generation were criticized by Pannenberg. See Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1988), 1:346n184; For Moltmann, see Jürgen Moltmann, *Trinität und Reich Gottes: Zur Gotteslehre* (München: C. Kaiser, 1980), 197 ff. In reality, as Daniel Munteanu explicitly pointed out, there is inconsistency in Moltmann's thought. As Pannenberg noted in his criticism, Moltmann emphasized the *taxis* and the priority of the Son's generation in his book *Trinität und Reich Gottes* and in his paper at the Consultations for the Memorandum. However, he also insisted on the simultaneity of the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession from the Father in his book (particularly p. 201). Munteanu has demonstrated that this same inconsistency can be found even in Moltmann's later *Der Geist des Lebens: Eine ganzheitliche Pneumatologie* (München: Chr. Kaiser, 1991), 84, 321–322. See Daniel Munteanu, "Die Filioque-Kontroverse als zeitgenössische Herausforderung der Trinitätslehre," *International Journal of Orthodox Theology* 1, no. 2 (2010), 176–179.

57 Vischer, *Spirit of God*, 14.

58 Moltmann, "Theological Proposals," 165. For Rahner, see Karl Rahner, "5. Der dreifaltige Gott als transzendenter Urgrund der Heilsgeschichte," in *Mysterium Salutis: Grundriss heilsgeschichtlicher Dogmatik*, eds. Johannes Feiner and Magnus Löhrer (Zürich: Benziger, 1967), 2:328.

On the other hand, a number of eastern participants could not agree with Moltmann given their apophatic theological perspective. To define “in some sense” has proved more complicated in the East than in the West.

The complexity of the eastern tradition’s stance on this theme was illustrated by the interpretation of John 15:26 offered by Stăniloae. He acknowledged that this biblical passage is not limited to the temporal sending of the Spirit through the Son. Nevertheless, he did not interpret it as indicative of the hypostatic procession of the Spirit, but as His energetic procession: “We shall see, a little further on, that according to St Gregory Palamas, the sending of the Spirit by the Son who receives from the Father, does not mean that the Son receives the Spirit from the Father only when he sends him out, but that he always has the Spirit within him, given by the Father. He has the Spirit as ‘treasurer’ (ταμίας).”⁵⁹ The term “treasurer” is thus related to the sending of the Spirit as the uncreated energy through the Son at Pentecost.⁶⁰

Given the distinguishable nuance between the two traditions on the theme of the relationship between “economic” and “immanent,” a clearer definition of “in some sense” is still required.

4 The Vatican Clarification of 1995

4.1 *Ecumenical Significance*

Apart from the Memorandum, the Vatican Clarification “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit” has a significance which cannot be overlooked in the ecumenical progress that has been made. In regard to the Clarification, Peter Gemeinhardt pointed to two elements⁶¹ that can be considered significant, even in comparison with the Memorandum. One of them is that the Clarification did not decidedly and explicitly recommend removing the interpolated phrase *filioque* in spite of its undeniable validity. This liturgical stance of the Clarification places it at odds with the Memorandum, which recommended that the phrase be removed from the altered text of the *Symb. Nicaen.*⁶² The other significant fact was Pope John Paul II’s stated

59 Stăniloae, “The Procession,” 179.

60 Stăniloae, 179.

61 Peter Gemeinhardt, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse zwischen Ost- und Westkirche im Frühmittelalter*, AKG 82 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2002), 16.

62 Kasper wondered why the *filioque* ought to be removed from the creed if it is no longer denounced as heresy by the Eastern Orthodox Churches. For Yves Congar, in contrast, this same situation was a factor behind his willingness to take it away. See Walter Kasper,

purpose to clarify the *filioque* tradition transmitted in the Latin *Credo* thoroughly, as being in full agreement with the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* from 381. The Clarification therefore attempted to defend the *filioque* tradition more positively than the Memorandum did. As will be shown below, in contrast with the Memorandum, the Clarification did stress the positive validity of the medieval councils and manifestly defended the validity of the Augustinian tradition.⁶³ This positive emphasis of the validity of the western tradition was also reflected in the Vatican's response to two traditional criticisms from eastern side against the West, namely the charge of essentialism and of subordinationism allegedly following from the *filioque*. Against these charges, the Vatican defended the trinitarian character of the *filioque* by offering a positive interpretation of the medieval councils and defending the validity of the Augustinian tradition. Aside from this element noted by Gemeinhardt, another element worth noting is the Clarification's linguistic approach. This approach, which Garrigues had presented in the consultations for the Memorandum, was not expressed explicitly in the text of the Memorandum itself. It was, however, accepted in the Clarification.

With these particular characteristics, the Clarification has been of influence on consequent ecumenical occasions and dialogues.⁶⁴ On the level of church

Jesus der Christus, 10th ed. (Mainz: Matthias-Grünewald-Verlag, 1986), 272; Yves Congar, *Der Heilige Geist*, trans. August Berz (Freiburg: Herder, 1982), 451.

63 In a study conference on the *filioque* held by the Vatican on 27–28 November 2014, Mauro Gagliardi understood the *filioque* as a '*depositum fidei*' in connection with the interpolation of the word *filioque* in the Creed in 1014. In his paper, he called the *filioque* a dogma of faith. For him, the two medieval councils (the second Council of Lyons, and the Fourth Lateran Council) were ecumenical. See Mauro Gagliardi, "Il *Filioque*: Teologia speculativa" in *Il Filioque: A mille anni dal suo inserimento nel Credo a Roma (1014–2014)*, ed. Mauro Gagliardi (Città del Vaticano: LEV, 2015), 248. Enrico Morini, however, at that same study conference considered the *filioque* a theologoumenon from a theological pluralist perspective. See Enrico Morini, "Il *Filioque* nella crisi foziana e negli avvenimenti del 1054," in Gagliardi, *Il Filioque*, 62–63.

64 About the Clarification, Guretzki remarked the following: "There is perhaps no clearer sign of the spirit of irenicism than was demonstrated at a more 'official' level by the public statements on the *filioque* between the Vatican and Bishop John Zizioulas (Metropolitan of Pergamon)." Guretzki, "The Filioque," 43. Zizioulas attended the study meetings for the Clarification held by Pro Oriente in 1998 and wrote his response to them in 2002. In this response, he evaluated the Clarification as promising and expected that a "rapprochement" between East and West would be possible. See John Zizioulas, "One Single Source: An Orthodox Response to the Clarification on the *Filioque*," Orthodox Research Institute, accessed October 9, 2020, http://www.orthodoxresearchinstitute.org/articles/dogmatics/john_zizioulas_single_source.htm.

orders, the influence was found in the Vereinigte Evangelisch-Lutherische Kirche Deutschlands (called VELKD hereafter) in 1997 in particular. The hesitation to delete the phrase in the “Stellungnahme der Kirchenleitung der VELKD zu einigen Fragen des Wortlautes des Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum” (June 26, 1997) is probably to be credited to the Clarification.⁶⁵ On the level of theological discussions, it evoked a productive debate among theologians of the Eastern and Western Churches hosted by the Pro Oriente foundation in Vienna in 1998. This debate revealed not only agreement on some issues, but also remaining differences both between and within the two traditions.

4.2 *Aims and Structure*

The English translation of the Clarification begins as follows:⁶⁶

In his homily delivered in St. Peter's Basilica June 29, 1995 in the presence of the Ecumenical Patriarch Bartholomew I, spiritual leader of the Orthodox world (see *CI*, September 1995, pp. 413–416), Pope John Paul II urged that “the traditional doctrine of the *Filioque*, present in the liturgical version of the Latin *Credo*, [be clarified] in order to highlight its full harmony with what the Ecumenical Council of Constantinople of 381 confesses in its creed: the Father as the source of the whole Trinity, the one origin both of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.” Published here is the clarification that the Pontiff has asked for, prepared by the Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity. It is intended as a contribution to the dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church carried out by the Joint International Commission.⁶⁷

65 For the text of the statement, see VELKD, “Stellungnahme der Kirchenleitung der VELKD zu einigen Fragen des Wortlautes des Nicaeno-Constantinopolitanum,” *VELKD-Informationen* 81 (1998): 17–21. For a theological evaluation, Oberdorfer, *Filioque*, 545–553; Gemeinhardt, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse*, 22 f.

66 The text of the Clarification was translated into several languages. The French version was published in Pontificium Consilium ad Christianorum Unitatem Fovendam, “Les Traditions Grecque et Latine Concernant La Procession Du Saint-Esprit,” *Irén* 68, no. 3 (1995): 356–368; English translation is found in Pontifical Council for Promoting Christian Unity, “The Greek and Latin Traditions Regarding the Procession of the Holy Spirit”; the German translation can be found in Alfred Stirmemann and Gerhard Wilflinger, eds., *Vom Heiligen Geist: Der gemeinsame trinitarische Glaube und das Problem des Filioque*, Pro Oriente 21 (Innsbruck: Tyrolia-Verlag, 1998), 23–33. Hereafter, the text will be cited as “Clarification”.

67 “Clarification,” 36.

This passage clearly enunciates the aim of the Clarification: to clarify the interpolated *filioque* “in order to highlight its full harmony” with the monopatristism recognized as the dogma confessed in 381.

The French original text of the document was composed of two large parts, marked off with a single dividing mark between paragraphs 11 and 12. With this sole exception, neither the original text nor its translated versions have other divisions or headings. This feature makes it difficult to identify the structure of the argumentation. The sole dividing marker in the original text therefore cannot be overlooked as superficial or meaningless. For, following the division, the Clarification approaches the theological significance of the *filioque* itself more positively which, as noted, was its stated aim.⁶⁸

4.3 *Theological Argumentation*

In quoting the declaration on the *filioque* of the Joint International Commission for the Theological Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church in 1982,⁶⁹ the Clarification begins with an acknowledgement of “the conciliar, ecumenical, normative, and irrevocable value” of the original Greek text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* as the expression of the one common faith of the Church and of all Christians.⁷⁰

After this acknowledgment of the value of the original text, the Clarification identified the doctrine expressed in the text as monopatristism on the point of the Spirit’s procession. The *Symb. Nicaen.* confesses that “The Holy Spirit therefore takes his origin from the Father alone in a principal, proper and immediate

68 David Coffey divided the Clarification into five parts by theological theme: 1) introduction in the first two paragraphs; 2) *ex Patre* from the third paragraph to the sixth; 3) *per Filium* from the seventh to the ninth; 4) *filioque* from the tenth to the eighteenth; 5) *tamquam ab uno principio* from the nineteenth to the last paragraph. See David Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification’ of the Doctrine of the Filioque,” *IJST* 5, no. 1 (2003): 4.

69 Even though the Commission in 1982 did not thoroughly discuss the *filioque*, according to “Clarification,” 36AB the Commission stated: “Without wishing to resolve yet the difficulties which have arisen between East and West concerning the relationship between the Son and the Spirit, we can already say together that this Spirit, which proceeds from the Father (John 15:26) as the sole source in the Trinity and which has become the Spirit of our sonship (Rom 8:15) since he is also the Spirit of the Son (Gal 4:6), is communicated to us particularly in the Eucharist by this Son upon whom he reposes in time and in eternity (John 1:32).”

70 “Clarification,” 36B–37A: “The Catholic Church acknowledges the conciliar, ecumenical, normative and irrevocable value, as expression of the one common faith of the Church and of all Christians, of the Symbol professed in Greek at Constantinople in 381 by the Second Ecumenical Council. No profession of faith peculiar to a particular liturgical tradition can contradict this expression of the faith taught and professed by the undivided Church.”

manner,” and that “the Father is the sole trinitarian cause (αἰτία) or principle (*principium*) of the Son and of the Holy Spirit.”⁷¹

The Clarification therefore acknowledged monopatrism as the ecumenical consensus of both traditions. In the Greek tradition this dogma was expressed in 381 using the term ἐκπόρευσις with regard to the procession of the Spirit. This did not place it at odds with the Latin tradition. The Clarification indicates that Augustine also confessed the Father’s monarchy with the word “*principaliter*” (*De trinitate* 15.47):⁷² the Spirit proceeds principally from the Father. For the three adjectives “principal, proper and immediate” used in relation to the Father, it was indebted also to Thomas Aquinas (*Summa theologiae* 1a, q. 36, a. 1–2) when it, as noted, said: “The Holy Spirit therefore takes his origin from the Father alone in a principal, proper and immediate manner.”⁷³ Moreover, the Clarification underlined that the Roman Catholic Church did not allow the interpolation of the phrase καὶ τοῦ Υἱοῦ in the Greek text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* in Latin liturgical usage.

Interestingly, the Clarification stated more explicitly than the Memorandum that the dogmatic core of the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* is the procession “from the Father alone” (*ek monou tou Patros*).⁷⁴ Even if the Memorandum had identified monopatrism as the common patristic tradition for East and West, it did not add the Greek word *monos* in its expression of what the third article intended, but rather carefully noted that the original text expressed the consubstantiality of the three hypostases.

Having identified monopatrism as the dogma of the *Symb. Nicaen.*, the Clarification went on to consider how the Greek and Latin traditions have understood the eternal relationship between Son and Spirit in the Spirit’s procession. The eternal relationship between the Son and Spirit, which “was professed together

71 “Clarification,” 37A.

72 “Clarification,” 37A. The Clarification translated this Latin word as “as principle” with the remark that “... the western tradition, following St. Augustine, also confesses that the Holy Spirit takes his origin from the Father *principaliter*, that is, as principle.” In other words, it interpreted the Latin word to signify that the Father is *principium* (principle) of the procession of the Holy Spirit. However, the debate over the precise significance of Augustine’s use of the word has not been settled, considering especially the other term *communiter* which he attributed to the Son in his account of the procession of the Holy Spirit. As will be detailed later on in this chapter (see pp. 49–52), orthodox theologians such as Jean-Claude Larchet critically evaluated the Clarification’s reading of Augustine’s term in the discussion about the Clarification. Chapter 4 of the present work is dedicated to an in-depth study of Augustine’s trinitarian theology.

73 “Clarification,” 37A.

74 “Clarification,” 37A.

by East and West at the time of the Fathers,” is “the basis that must serve for the continuation of the current theological dialogue between Catholic and Orthodox.”⁷⁵

In the Greek tradition, and more precisely among the Cappadocians, the eternal relationship was expressed using the phrase “διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον.” The Clarification claimed that the approach of the Cappadocians did not neglect the eternal relationship between Son and Spirit by this expression, while keeping the Greek verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι certainly to indicate the monarchy of the Father. For patristic support, the Clarification appealed to Gregory of Nazianzus,⁷⁶ Basil of Caesarea,⁷⁷ Maximus the Confessor,⁷⁸ John of Damascus,⁷⁹ and the Symbol of the Seventh Ecumenical Council by Tarasius.⁸⁰

In the Latin tradition, the Clarification continued, the relationship had to be expressed with the term *filioque* due to the threat of Arianism. Without doing any damage to the confession of the monarchy of the Father, the Latin tradition sought to confess the Son’s equal divinity with the Father much more explicitly against the Arian heresy. The Clarification insisted, however, that this approach was not limited to the western side. Rather, it was analogous to the Alexandrian

75 “Clarification,” 38A.

76 Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes theologicae* 31.9 (SC 230, 290–292) quoted in “Clarification,” 37B–38A.

77 Basil of Caesarea, *De Spiritu Sancto* 18.45 (SC 17bis, 408), quoted in “Clarification,” 38A: “Through the Son (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ), who is one, he is joined to the Father, who is one, and by himself completes the Blessed Trinity.”

78 Maximus the Confessor, *Questiones ad Thalassium* 63 (PG 90, 672C), quoted in “Clarification,” 38A: “By nature (φύσει) the Holy Spirit in his being (κατ’ οὐσίαν) takes substantially (οὐσιωδῶς) his origin (ἐκπορευόμεν) from the Father through the Son who is begotten (δι’ Υἱοῦ γεννηθέντος).”

79 John of Damascus, *Dialogus contra Manichaeos* 5 (PG 94, 1512B), quoted in “Clarification,” 38A: “I say that God is always Father since he has always his Word coming from himself, and through his Word, having his Spirit issuing from him.”

80 Mansi 12, 1122D, quoted in “Clarification,” 38A. According to the last part of the Clarification, it understood what the expression “διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ” signified in the Cappadocian approach as the instrumental role of the Son which defined the Father as Father of the Son. The Clarification explicitly said that the Holy Spirit takes his origin from the Father as Father of the only Son when it quoted Gregory of Nazianzus and explained the trinitarian relation in the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father (“Clarification,” 41B). Nevertheless, the document did not explicitly express what the precise nature of the eternal relationship between Son and Spirit was in the Cappadocian approach until the last part. Rather, it on the one hand probably linked the eternal relation expressed with the “διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ” to the consubstantiality that the Alexandrian approach expressed using the Greek verb προϊέναι. On the other hand, it seemed to use the phrase for the instrumental role of the Son which defines the Father as Father of the Son. The quotation from John of Damascus (see note 79 above) was related to the second possibility in particular.

approach in the Greek tradition, which used the other Greek verb προῖέναι to express that the Spirit proceeds (προεῖσι) from the Father and the Son.⁸¹ Quoting Cyril of Alexandria (*Thesaurus de sancta et consubstantiali trinitate* [PG 75, 585A]), the Clarification argued that the Greek verb indicates “the communication of the divinity to the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son in their consubstantial communion.”⁸² Likewise, the consubstantial communication from the Father and the Son to the Holy Spirit was what the Fourth Lateran Council confessed as dogma in 1215 (DH 804–805).⁸³

In regard to the Cappadocian and Latin-Alexandrian approaches, the Clarification appealed to the synthesis made by Maximus the Confessor in the seventh century. Reconciling the *filioque* and his own tradition, he had argued that “the *Filioque* does not concern the *ekporeusis* of the Spirit issued from the Father as source of the Trinity, but manifests his *proienai* (*procession*) in the consubstantial communion of the Father and the Son, while excluding any possible subordinationist interpretation of the Fathers Monarchy.”⁸⁴ In other words, the varying approaches of the two traditions were linked such that the Cappadocian approach (διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον) maintained the monarchy of the Father, while the other approach (προῖέναι and *procedere*), which included the *filioque* clause, safeguarded the consubstantiality. This is what the Lateran Council confessed as dogma.

Furthermore, the Clarification adopted a linguistic approach for circumscribing what the verbs and expressions of the Greek and Latin traditions signify about the eternal relationship between Son and Spirit without abandoning the monarchy of the Father. At the outset of the second part, the Clarification interpreted and explained the doctrinal meaning of the *filioque* itself as being fully harmonious with monopatrism. To this end, the Clarification took a lin-

81 “Clarification,” 39B.

82 “Clarification,” 39B. Additionally, the document quoted Athanasius (*Epistula ad Serapionem* 3.1.33 [PG 26, 625B]), Epiphanius of Salamis (*Ancoratus* 8 [PG 43, 29C]) and Didymus the Blind (*De spiritu sancto* 153 [PG 39, 1064A]). Epiphanius and Didymus explicitly linked “the Father and the Son by the same preposition *ek* in the communication to the Holy Spirit of the consubstantial divinity.”

83 “Clarification,” 40B–41A.

84 “Clarification,” 40A. Maximus the Confessor, *Ad Domnum Marinum Cyprī presbyterum* (PG 91, 136AB), quoted in “Clarification,” 39B–40A: “For the procession they (the Romans) brought the witness of the Latin Fathers, as well, of course, as that of St. Cyril of Alexandria in his sacred study on the Gospel of St. John. On this basis they showed that they themselves do not make the Son cause (*aitia*) of the Spirit. They know, indeed, that the Father is the sole cause of the Son and of the Spirit, of one by generation and of the other by *ekporeusis*—but they explained that the latter comes (*proienai*) through the Son, and they showed in this way the unity and the immutability of the essence.”

guistic approach, which Garrigues had originally developed and presented at the consultations for the Memorandum.

Like Garrigues (see pp. 34–35 above), the Clarification distinguished the meaning of the Greek verb ἐκπορεύεσθαι from the verb προϊέναι. The former, so it said, expressed that the Father is the only cause and principle in the procession of the Holy Spirit. The latter, by way of comparison, was used in the Alexandrian tradition and implied the communication of the consubstantial divinity. For this, the Vatican quoted one passage from Cyril of Alexandria in particular as patristic proof: “The Spirit proceeds (προεῖσι) from the Father and the Son; clearly, he is of the divine substance, proceeding (προϊόν) substantially (ὁμοιωδῶς) in it and from it.”⁸⁵ The Clarification explained that Cyril was here implying the communication of the consubstantial divinity. It then turned to Maximus the Confessor, whom it identified as one of the historical representatives who solved the *filioque* problem with such a linguistic approach.

On the basis of this linguistic analysis, the Clarification connected the *filioque* of the Latin tradition with the Alexandrian tradition. The precise meaning of *processio* or *procedere* was not synonymous with ἐκπόρευσις, but rather similar to προϊέναι. *Processio* signified “the communication of the consubstantial divinity from the Father to the Son and from the Father, through or with the Son, to the Spirit.”⁸⁶ *Processio* had already been widely in use prior to the *Symb. Nicaen.*, was accepted at the Ecumenical Council of Chalcedon in 451, and was expressed in the *Quicumque* (or *Athanasianum* [DH 75–76]) of the fifth century. Moreover, so the Clarification stated, the Papacy had recognized the dogmatic significance of the term as the communication of the consubstantial divinity as far back as the seventh century. As such, Pope Leo III “safeguarded the truth that the *filioque* contains,” even though he refused the confession of the *filioque* in the liturgy.⁸⁷ The dogmatic meaning was not lost even in the Middle Ages. Thomas Aquinas too, so the document argued, had understood *procedere* as the communication of the consubstantial divinity from the Father and the Son to the Spirit.⁸⁸

After affirming the validity of the *filioque* in terms of the consubstantial communion in the monarchy of the Father, the Clarification gave its argued

85 Cyril of Alexandria, *Thesaurus* (PG 75, 585A), quoted in “Clarification,” 39B.

86 “Clarification,” 39A.

87 “Clarification,” 39AB.

88 In “Clarification,” 39n3, the following texts are quoted: Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* Ia, q. 27, a. 3; Ia, q. 35, a. 2; Ia, q. 36, a. 2; Ia, q. 43, a. 2.

response to the two charges that the eastern side has typically launched against the western trinitarian tradition: essentialism, and the subordination of the Spirit to the Son.

The Clarification attempted to show that the charge of essentialism was incorrect. In doing so, it demonstrated that the Fourth Lateran Council confessed the communication of the consubstantial divinity to the Spirit not from “the divine essence,” but from “the persons” Father and Son.⁸⁹ In other words, it argued that the Council had not connected the procession to the one divine essence, but rather to the persons.⁹⁰ On this basis, the Clarification claimed that even the *tamquam ex uno principio* of the Second Council of Lyons in 1274⁹¹ was not connected to the one divine essence, but to the divine persons, thereby signifying the communication of consubstantiality according to the Latin-Alexandrian tradition.⁹² In these ways, so the Clarification concluded, Latin trinitarian thought is not essentialistic but personalistic.

89 “Clarification,” 40B–41A: “The substance does not generate, is not begotten, does not proceed; but it is the Father who generates, the Son who is begotten, the Holy Spirit who proceeds: so that there is distinction in persons and unity in nature. Although other (*alius*) is the Father, other the Son, other the Holy Spirit, they are not another reality (*aliud*), but what the Father is the Son is and the Holy Spirit equally; so, according to the orthodox and catholic faith, we believe that they are consubstantial. For the Father, generating eternally the Son, has given to him his substance (...) It is clear that, in being born the Son has received the substance of the Father without this substance being in any way diminished, and so the Father and the Son have the same substance. So, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, who proceeds from them both, are one same reality (DH 804–805).”

90 Gagliardi provided a similar evaluation in a study conference on the *filioque* held in 2015. See Gagliardi, “Il *Filioque*,” 276–277.

91 “Clarification,” 40A: “The Holy Spirit proceeds eternally from the Father and the Son, not as from two principles but as from one single principle (*tamquam ex uno principio*, DH 850).”

92 Additionally, the Vatican document connected this argument to paragraph 248 of the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, which reads: “... the eternal order of the divine persons in their consubstantial communion implies that the Father, as the ‘principle without principle’ (Council of Florence [1442]: DH 1331), is the first origin of the Spirit, but also that as Father of the only Son, he is, with the Son, the single principle from which the Spirit proceeds (Council of Lyons II [1274]: DH 850)” Roman Catholic Church, *Catechism of the Catholic Church* (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 59. For Catherine M. LaCugna’s critical explanation and evaluation of the Doctrine of the Trinity in paragraphs 232–257 of the *Catechism*, see Catherine M. LaCugna, “The Doctrine of the Trinity (Paragraphs 232–267),” in *Commentary on the Catechism of the Catholic Church*, ed. Michael Walsh (London: Geoffrey Chapman, 1994), 66–80. She insisted that the *Catechism* was not totally free from the scholastic division ‘*de deo uno*’ and ‘*de deo trino*’ causing the doctrine of the Trinity to be restricted to the eternal life of the Trinity *in se*, not *for us*, when it says in paragraph 234, “The mystery of the Most Holy Trinity is the central mystery of Christian faith and life. *It is the mystery of God in himself*.” LaCugna, 76 (italic by herself).

Eastern theologians had criticized also the subordination in the *filioque* tradition by which the Spirit is dependent on the Son for His hypostatic existence. To respond to the criticism, the Clarification first stressed once again that the Latin tradition indeed recognizes the hypostatic origin from the Father alone, albeit in the form of the confession of the communication of the divine essence from the Father and the Son.⁹³ The Clarification then added that the Father, from whom the Spirit proceeds, is the Father of the only begotten Son. The *filioque*, which emphasizes the consubstantial communication, indicates that the Spirit proceeds from the Father who begets the Son: "The Father only generates the Son by breathing (προβάλλειν) through him the Holy Spirit and the Son is only begotten by the Father insofar as the spiration (προβολή) passes through him. The Father is Father of the One Son only by being for him and through him the origin of the Holy Spirit."⁹⁴ In this way, by the *filioque*, the Father is characterized as the Father of the Son and the Son is recognized as the only begotten of the Father in the procession of the Holy Spirit.⁹⁵ Hence, if the *filioque* means the procession of the Spirit from the Father of the only begotten Son, the Clarification argued that the word *filioque* reveals the relationship between the three hypostases to be a trinitarian one, not a subordinate one. With this trinitarian interpretation, the Clarification reconciled the *filioque* with the monarchy of the Cappadocian approach, in that the "διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορεύόμενον" of the latter was interpreted to signify that the Spirit proceeds from the Father as the Father of the only Son.⁹⁶ Moreover, it gave a more trinitarian character than before to Bolotov's formula that "the Holy

93 "Clarification," 41B. The document quoted the following from *Summa theologiae* 1a, q. 32, a. 2: "The two relationships of the Son to the Father and of the Holy Spirit to the Father oblige us to place two relationships in the Father, one referring to the Son and the other to the Holy Spirit."

94 "Clarification," 42A. In note 9, the Clarification quoted Gregory of Nyssa and Maximus the Confessor as follows: "St. Gregory of Nyssa writes: 'The Holy Spirit is said to be of the Father and it is attested that he is of the Son. St Paul says: Anyone who does not have the Spirit of Christ does not belong to him (Rom 8:9). So the Spirit who is of God [the Father] is also the Spirit of Christ. However, the Son who is of God [the Father] is not said to be of the Spirit: the consecutive order of the relationship cannot be reversed (Fragment *In orationem dominicam*, quoted by St John Damascene [PG 46, 1109BC]).' And Maximus affirmed in the same way the trinitarian order when he writes: 'Just as the Thought [the Father] is principle of the Word, so is he also of the Spirit through the Word. And, just as one cannot say that the Word is of the voice [of the Breath], so one cannot say that the Word is of the Spirit (*Quaestiones et dubia* [PG 90, 813B]).'"

95 "Clarification," 41B.

96 "Clarification," 41B–42A.

Spirit proceeds from the Father of the only begotten Son,” which the Memorandum had notably accepted as early as 1981.⁹⁷

The Clarification bolstered the above trinitarian explanation signified by the *filioque* in the procession of the Spirit with an interpretation of a number of biblical texts and by an examination of the Augustinian tradition. In doing so, the Clarification revealed how it conceived of the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία.

Quoting various biblical passages,⁹⁸ the Clarification attempted to show how they depict the trinitarian relationship among the three persons in regard to the role of the Spirit in the Son’s mission and work in the οἰκονομία. Briefly stated, the Spirit who comes from the Father and rests in the Son “orients the whole life of the Son toward the Father.”⁹⁹ In addition, the work of the Spirit for our sonship in the οἰκονομία witnesses a trinitarian character: the Spirit invites us into the Son’s filial relationship with His Father (Gal 4:6).¹⁰⁰

From this οἰκονομία, the Clarification moved on to θεολογία, which reveals the trinitarian relationship among the three persons: “This role of the Spirit in the innermost human existence of the Son of God made man derives from an eternal trinitarian relationship through which the Spirit, in his mystery as Gift of Love, characterizes the relation between the Father, as source of love, and his beloved Son.”¹⁰¹ This statement echoed the tradition, which the Clarification called “Augustinian,” of the Holy Spirit as Gift of Love: “So a tradition dating back to St Augustine has seen in the Holy Spirit, through whom ‘God’s

97 In reality, Garrigues underlined the trinitarian character of the formula at the consultations and in his other papers, while the Memorandum appears not to have given expression to it. See Garrigues, “A Roman Catholic View,” 167–169; Garrigues, *L’Ésprit*, 107–109; also, see Jean-Miguel Garrigues, “Réflexions d’un théologien catholique sur le «Filioque»,” in *COPE, Le 11e Concile Oecumenique*, 293.

98 “Clarification,” 42AB. The following biblical passages were quoted or mentioned: Mark 1:12; Matt 12:28; Luke 1:35, 3:21–22, 4:1, 14, 10:21, 23:46; John 1:33; Acts 1:2; Rom 1:4, 8:11; Gal 4:4; Heb 9:14; 1 Pet 3:19.

99 “Clarification,” 42B.

100 “Clarification,” 43AB; cf. Kathryn Tanner, *Christ the Key*, Current Issues in Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 140–206; Tanner, “Beyond the East/West Divide.” Using biblical passages largely similar to those found in the Clarification, Tanner recently developed her notion of the concomitance of the intertwined relationship between Son and Holy Spirit, the distinctiveness of their respective contributions to the mission of the Father, the personal peculiarity of the three persons in *oikonomia*, the relationship among the three persons in *theologia*, and the two processions of the Son and the Spirit from the Father.

101 “Clarification,” 42B–43A.

love has been poured into our hearts' (Rom 5:5), love as the eternal Gift of the Father to his 'beloved Son' (Mark 1:11; 9:7; Luke 20:13; Eph 1:6).¹⁰² This trinitarian relation surrounding the Holy Spirit is the trinitarian character of what the *filioque* maintains, so the Clarification argued.¹⁰³

Interestingly, the Clarification insisted that the traditional understanding of the Spirit as Gift of Love did not belong to the Augustinian tradition exclusively; even Gregory Palamas probably accepted the Augustinian tradition into his monopatrism.¹⁰⁴ Palamas wrote: "The Spirit of the Word is like an ineffable love of the Father for the Word ineffably generated. A Love which this same Word and beloved Son of the Father entertains (*chretai*) toward the Father: but insofar as he has the Spirit coming with Him (*sunproelthonta*) from the Father and reposing connaturally in Him."¹⁰⁵

102 "Clarification," 42AB.

103 Regretfully, however, we cannot overlook the obscurity of the Clarification in its attempt to verify the validity of the *filioque* from biblical passages as well as from the Augustinian tradition. Namely, the biblical revelation and the Augustinian tradition were quoted by the Vatican document to reflect the *filioque* in such a way that Holy Spirit as Gift of Love is the third person by resting on the Son from the Father. But how this reflection is harmonious with the Clarification's own reconciling understanding of the *filioque* with monopatrism was not made explicit. In regard to this obscurity, the expectation expressed by Coffey seems not to be accurate also. He identified the support which the Clarification drew from the biblical passages and the Augustinian tradition with his mutual-love theory. However, the document did not explicitly depict the mutual relationship between Father and Son in terms of the Spirit as Love. It rather emphasized the giving of the Spirit as Love to the Son by the Father. For Coffey, see David Coffey, "The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son," *TS* 51, no. 2 (1990): 193–229; Coffey, "The Roman 'Clarification,'" 16–21. His theory will be discussed in greater depth in terms of his interpretation of Augustine's trinitarian thinking in the excursus in chapter 4 (pp. 242–252).

104 According to Reinhard Flogaus, the Clarification's understanding of the relationship between Palamas and Augustine was influenced by Jaques Lison's dissertation, *L'Esprit répandu: La Pneumatologie de Grégoire Palamas* (Paris: Cerf, 1994). See also Jaques Lison, "L'Esprit comme amour selon Grégoire Palamas: Une influence augustinienne?," *StPatr* 32 (1997): 325–331.

105 Gregory Palamas, *Capita physica* 36 (PG 150, 1144D–1145A), quoted in "Clarification," 42n11. Quoting the same passage from Palamas, Tanner drew a slight distinction between Augustine's idea and her own position for which she drew on Palamas. According to her, Augustine did not say (*De trinitate* 6.7 and 11) that "the Spirit is the love that comes forth from the Father to beget the Son," but that the Spirit is the love "that emerges from the relationship between Father and Son." Tanner, "Beyond the East/West Divide," 204–205. On the other hand, she suggested an interesting interpretation of the imagery of "mind, will, and knowledge" found in Augustine's *De trinitate* 9.18. This imagery, she argued, could be seen as corresponding not with Augustine's traditionally accepted notion of the Spirit proceeding from the Father and the Son, but with the trinitarian relationship as she attempted to designate it (Tanner, 205n17).

5 What Is Still at Stake? (11)

5.1 *The Debate over the Clarification*

The Clarification went on to elicit ecumenical debates between theologians of East and West. This debate was not limited to those who attended the study meeting hosted Pro Oriente in Vienna in 1997. Such theologians as David Coffey and Jean-Claude Larchet in particular have written several articles by which they involved themselves in discussions over the Vatican document. Even though they and others appreciated the ecumenical achievement of the Clarification on certain points and the enrichment it brought for a mutual understanding of the respective traditions, the ensuing debate and discussion revealed fundamental disagreements and issues even more sharply than the Memorandum had. One example is the way the confusion between the divine *οὐσία* and *ἐνέργεια* was brought into relief.

Before we study the disagreements, we should not neglect the remarkable level of agreement which the Clarification managed to elicit from the participants. Above all, the Clarification once again recognized the unanimous consent on the validity of the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* from 381 among both Eastern and Western Churches. At the outset, it thus insisted that the Greek text has “conciliar, ecumenical, normative and irrevocable value.”¹⁰⁶ The participants from various backgrounds who partook in the Pro Oriente debate were unanimous in their agreement. From the eastern side, John Zizioulas¹⁰⁷ and Daniel Ciobotea¹⁰⁸ expressed their agreement on this point. In particular, the latter emphasized that the *filioque* does not have the same authority and importance as the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.*, and that the priority of the original is only reasonable given that the *filioque* has never been accepted by the Eastern Church.

The participating theologians likewise affirmed monopatrism as their common patristic tradition. The Clarification gave strong expression to this affirmation when it stated that the dogmatic core of the third article in the *Symb. Nicaen.* was represented by the phrase “from the Father only.”¹⁰⁹ Although a

¹⁰⁶ “Clarification,” 36B–37A.

¹⁰⁷ John Zizioulas, “Das Dokument über die griechische und lateinische Überlieferung über den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus griechisch-orthodoxer Sicht,” in Stirnemann and Wilflinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 141.

¹⁰⁸ Daniel Ciobotea, “Das römische Dokument über den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus Rumänisch-Orthodoxer Sicht,” in Stirnemann and Wilflinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 151, 159.

¹⁰⁹ Ulrich Kühn, who was as a Lutheran participant at the study meeting, accepted the validity of monopatrism. However, he amended the biblical proof for monopatrism suggested by the Clarification. He argued that John 15:26 does not speak of the eternal relationship

number of western theologians were somewhat hesitant about this assertion (see pp. 57–58 below), most participants from East and West did consent to the Clarification's argument on the point of the monarchy of the Father.

In spite of the significant degree of agreement achieved by the Clarification, it also caused disagreement and raised critical issues that still remain without resolution. Interestingly, such issues arising from the Clarification and the discussions were remarkably similar to the traditional criticism uttered against the *filioque* tradition from the eastern side. Ever since Photius, the eastern tradition has criticized the West for four confusions: 1) confusion between the hypostatic and essential properties, 2) confusion among the properties of each divine hypostasis, 3) confusion between the divine οὐσία and the divine ἐνέργεια, and 4) confusion between οἰκονομία and θεολογία. By the time of the Pro Oriente debate, most of the eastern participants were concerned about these confusions. Moreover, Larchet wrote a critical evaluation of the Clarification from the particular point-of-view of these confusions.¹¹⁰ Apart from these traditional issues debated between East and West, also theologians on the same side at times revealed varying perspectives or emphases.

5.2 *The First and Second Confusions*

As noted above, the Clarification plainly stated that monopatrism is the commonly shared patristic tradition, and this sentiment was affirmed by several participants in the study meeting. However, it was also subjected to criticism from both sides, albeit for contrasting reasons.

From the western side, the criticism did not pertain to the understanding of monopatrism expressed in the Clarification, but rather to the assertion that the dogmatic core of the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* is its teaching “from the Father only.” In particular, Waclaw Hryniewicz, one of the Roman Catholic theologians who participated at the study meeting, did not consent to this assertion. He argued that the dogmatic core was not a certain mode of the Holy Spirit's origin, but rather the consubstantial divinity of the Spirit with the

between Father and Spirit, but only of the sending of the Spirit in the history of salvation from the Father through the Son. Instead, it is the whole message of the NT that reveals how the Son as Son of God primarily receives the Spirit of God. This message is the basis for monopatrism, so he argued. See Ulrich Kühn, “Wiederentdeckung der Wirklichkeit des Heiligen Geistes: Ein Votum aus lutherischer Perspektive,” in Stirnemann and Wilflinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 78.

110 Jean-Claude Larchet, “La question du *Filioque*: À propos de la récente ‘Clarification’ du conseil pontifical pour a promotion de l’unité des Chrétiens,” *Theologia* 70, no. 4 (1999): 761–812.

Father from whom He proceeds.¹¹¹ With the term ἐκπόρευσις, so he argued, the *Symb. Nicaen.* intended just to distinguish the Spirit from the creatures and the Son, but it did not define the ‘how’ of the procession. The ‘how’ was rather the theme discussed by the later theologians who went on to involve themselves in the debate surrounding the interpolated phrase. The primary concern of the *Symb. Nicaen.* therefore did not concern a choice for either monopatrism or filioquism. From side of the Reformed tradition, Hryniewicz’s argument received support from Ulrich Körtner.¹¹² In this regard, their judgment was reflective of the Memorandum and the statements of de Halleux and Moltmann in the consultations. Neither the Memorandum nor the latter two theologians had defined the ‘how’; they rather just suggested the consubstantiality.¹¹³

The eastern participants, on the other hand, did not criticize the Clarification for its view of the dogmatic core of the *Symb. Nicaen.*, but for its understanding of monopatrism. In their estimation, that understanding was inaccurate for the way it confused the hypostatic and essential properties, as well as the properties of the hypostases.

This criticism was voiced by Zizioulas and Larchet in particular. Both of them disagreed with the Clarification’s interpretation of Augustine’s use of the word *principaliter*. The Clarification argued that the western tradition had not been extraneous to monopatrism when Augustine used this word to emphasize that the Spirit proceeds *principally* from the Father. Zizioulas, however, said that Augustine’s use of *principaliter* did not reflect the notion intended by the eastern tradition in its confession of the Father as αἰτία. Augustine’s *principaliter*, he continued, implies that also the Son is a cause of the procession of the Spirit.¹¹⁴ As such, Augustine is said to have confused the hypostatic prop-

111 Waclaw Hryniewicz, “Versöhnung im trinitarischen Glauben? Zur römischen Klarstellung über den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes,” in Stirnemann and Wilflinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 54–55.

112 Ulrich Körtner, “‘Der Herr ist der Geist’: Das römische Dokument und sein Beitrag zum ökumenischen Gespräch aus reformierter Sicht,” in Stirnemann and Wilflinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 89.

113 See pp. 31–36 above. According to Bolotov, it was a dogma that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and is consubstantial with the Father and the Son. He categorized monopatrism as a theologoumenon. The Memorandum of 1981 followed Bolotov on this point.

114 Zizioulas, “Das Dokument,” 142–143. According to Zizioulas, the Clarification’s description of the Father as the “principle without principle” was no solution. It made room for the confession of the Son as a principle even if He has His own principle, namely the Father. Moreover, the confession of the Son as another αἰτία could be a path to the heresy of the confession of two Gods. On the contrary, the eastern tradition identified the one God as the person of the Father, based on the fact that the person of the Father is the only αἰτία in

erty of the Father with that of the Son. Larchet was fiercer than Zizioulas in expressing his doubt about the confusions that have long been at the center of the criticism from the eastern side. He pointed out that the Vatican's Clarification omitted Augustine's term *communiter*, quoting only his *principaliter*. Yet, so Larchet continued, the two are not separate, since in Augustine's trinitarian thought the former was implied by the latter. The two words signified a rigid filioquism, he claimed, which attributes αἰτία also to the Son.¹¹⁵ As such, while the Clarification may have attributed the hypostatic origin to the person of the Father, it at the same time affirmed that the Spirit receives the divine nature not only from the Father but also from the Son. This does not match the eastern notion of monopatrism, since the Father is considered by it to be the only cause not only of the hypostasis, but also of the divine nature.¹¹⁶ The Clarification thus appears to confuse the Father's own hypostatic property as αἰτία with the hypostatic properties of the other persons or with the essential properties that are common to the three persons.¹¹⁷

On this point of the confusion of properties, even the Clarification's attempt to defend the western tradition against the charge of essentialism failed to convince eastern participants. Larchet appreciated the fact that the document sought to avoid essentialism and to interpret the essentialistic tradition in a more personalistic sense than before. Nevertheless, to him the Clarification seemed still to be essentialistic in that it states that the Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son in terms of consubstantiality. This statement, he argued, should imply that the cause of the Spirit's procession is the common essence of Father and Son, and thus that the hypostatic propriety of the Father as αἰτία becomes common to the Son according to the common essence of the two persons.¹¹⁸ This is nothing but essentialism, and is caused by the confusion of hypo-

the Triune God. Hence, so Zizioulas insisted, the monopatrism of the Clarification is not identical with eastern monopatrism. See Zizioulas, 146–147.

115 Larchet, "La question," 766. Recently, Robert W. Jenson offered a similar criticism against Augustine. From the influence of neo-Palamite theology, he raised suspicions regarding the apparent weakness of a proper distinction between the divine persons in Augustine's theology. In particular, Augustine's *vinculum amoris* could be read to suppose co-equal *archai* of Father and Son for the Spirit. See Robert W. Jenson, "Lutheranism and the Filioque," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 161.

116 Larchet, "La question," 791.

117 See Bobrinskoy, "The Filioque," 143.

118 Larchet, "La question," 791. Even Jenson justified the suspicion of the East on essentialism in Augustine's thought due to the "extreme trinitarian apophatism" by which Augustine said that "the language we use to state the differences between the trinitarian persons has no available descriptive meaning and that we use it only so as not by silence to imply that the persons are simply not distinguished." Jenson, "Lutheranism," 161. In this regard,

static and essential properties. Even though he may have been less critical of Augustine than Zizioulas and Larchet,¹¹⁹ Ciobotea agreed with Larchet's charge of essentialism. Ciobotea argued that what is common among the hypostases is not communicated in the consubstantial communion. The consubstantial communion means just a mutual self-devotion in the existence of distinctive persons, not a mutual origin for the communication of the common divine substance.¹²⁰

Given these confusions, Larchet was also not convinced by the Clarification's argument that the *filioque* can be reconciled with monopatristism through the formula "the Spirit proceeds from the Father of the Son." He pointed out that this hardly was a new argument, and wrote that the Clarification was indebted to the Memorandum and to Garrigues on this point.¹²¹ As early as the fourteenth century, Gregory Palamas had already criticized the so-called 'Latinophrones' who offered similar arguments. The formula, so Gregory had argued, did not imply any involvement on the part of the Son in the procession. Rather, the expression 'the Father of the Son' itself indicated that the Father is the cause of the Son.¹²² As such, Larchet argued, the formula actually affirmed

he followed Colin E. Gunton's criticism on Augustine. See Colin E. Gunton, *The Promise of Trinitarian Theology* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991), 39–40. Richard Cross, however, has argued that their criticism is not entirely accurate: "It seems to me that there is no evidence at all in favor of any theologically significant version of Gunton's divergence claim, but demonstrating that would be the work of another article. What Augustine does not understand—and presents the Greeks as not understanding—is what species the divine persons have in common, since 'person/ὑπόστασις' is (on Augustine's analysis) a genus word. His hesitancy about the word "person" is simply a function of his reluctance to use a genus word without an available species word. And this is a technical philosophical concern that has no bearing on the theological question." Richard Cross, "Quid Tres? On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to Understand in De Trinitate 5 and 7," *HTR* 100, no. 2 (2007): 232. For an in-depth study of Augustine's notion of *persona*, see pp. 190–197 (especially, note 133) and p. 225, note 251 in chapter 4.

119 Ciobotea distinguished the Council of Lyons from Augustine's understanding of the *filioque*, and recognized in Augustine's thought the unrealized possibility of clearly distinguishing between the procession from the Father and the receiving from the Son without surrendering one's commitment to monopatristism. Ciobotea, "Das römische Dokument," 154.

120 Ciobotea, 158.

121 For Garrigues, see note 97 above. Gagliardi has similarly attempted to interpret the *filioque* with this formula, but he did not explicitly respond to Larchet's criticism on the similar argument found in the Clarification. See Gagliardi, "Il Filioque."

122 Larchet, "La question," 788. Prior to Gregory Palamas, a similar understanding of this formulation could be found in John of Damascus. According to Vladimir Lossky, in John of Damascus this expression does not relate to any involvement of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. Rather, the significance of the expression was similar to the one

that the Father is at once the only cause of both the Spirit and the Son, which was not what the Clarification intended.¹²³ The Greek Church Fathers as well as Gregory Palamas underlined that both the Son and the Spirit come from the Father, receiving their hypostases and divine nature only from Him, and that their generation and procession from the Father are direct, immediate, and without intermediary.¹²⁴ In the Trinity, the Father is the only αἰτία, and the Son's and Spirit's processions from Him are concomitant. As a hypostatic propriety of the Father, this causality is not communicated to the other persons.

5.3 *The Third Confusion*

When the Clarification reconciled the *filioque* with the Greek tradition of monopatrism, it argued that the Greek tradition did not neglect the role of the Son in the Spirit's procession but attributed the communication of consubstantiality to the role of the Son. Consequently, the phrase “διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ [ἐκπορευόμενον]” was interpreted to signify that the Spirit proceeds from the Father of the Son in the communication of the consubstantiality. As such, the phrase was evaluated as being in harmony with the *filioque*'s intention. Eastern participants, however, could not agree with this interpretation. While he was generally quite sympathetic to the Clarification, Zizioulas distinguished the meaning of this phrase from the signification of the *filioque*.¹²⁵ He critically stressed that the role of the Son in this phrase should be understood as mediation of the divine οὐσία, not as another αἰτία. As such, the mediating role of the Son is not identical with what the *filioque* confesses, since the latter had to place Father and Son together in the one spiration of the Spirit.

Ciobotea expressed himself more harshly than Zizioulas when he argued that the patristic passages quoted by the Clarification in support of its interpretation of the formula were not reflective of the communication of the consubstantiality from the Father and the Son. Rather, the passages underlined that the Holy Spirit has His origin from the Father in and for the Son and dwells in the Son.¹²⁶ In particular, he noted that John of Damascus had used that phrase to signify that the Holy Spirit as a substantial power comes from the Father

Palamas attributed to it. See John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.8 (PG 94, 821C, 824B, 829B). See Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 61.

123 Larchet, “La question,” 788.

124 Larchet, 789.

125 Zizioulas, “Das Dokument,” 143, 148. However, he appears not to have approached the misunderstanding of this formula on the point of the confusion between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια.

126 Ciobotea, “Das römische Dokument,” 155–156.

and dwells in the Son.¹²⁷ Even Gregory Palamas' passage, remarkably quoted in footnote 11 of the Clarification, should be understood from the perspective of John of Damascus' notion of a substantial power.¹²⁸

For an argument similar to that of Ciobotea, Larchet openly tied his critical idea to the confusion between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. He examined the patristic passages quoted in the Clarification in detail from their original context, and argued that the Clarification had not fully understood the Greek tradition.¹²⁹ John of Damascus, so he noted, had used the formula in the sense of the divine energies. When he used this formula and referred to the resting of the Spirit in the Son, John of Damascus was not referring to the ὑπαρξίς (mode of existence) of the Spirit,¹³⁰ but to the communication of the divine energies from the Father through the Son in the Spirit. Even Gregory of Nyssa, so Larchet continued, understood the mediation of the Son in the Spirit's procession as energetic.¹³¹ So too Cyril's use of the formula was no exception from Gregory and John.¹³² On this basis, Larchet concluded that the Greek patristic tradition of διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ ἐκπορευόμενον was connected to the perspective of the manifestation or communication of the Spirit as ἐνέργεια in both the immanent Trinity and the economic Trinity.¹³³ As the Spirit's ἐνέργεια is communicated in God's οἰκονομία, the formula signified for the Greek Fathers the energetic manifesta-

127 Ciobotea, 156; John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.7 (PG 94, 805B); *Dialogus contra Manichaeos* 5 (PG 94, 1512B).

128 Ciobotea's understanding of the passage in Palamas is identical to that of M. Edmund Hussey and John Meyendorff. See Hussey, "Palamite Trinitarian Models," *svtq* 16, no. 2 (1972): 83–89; John Meyendorff, *Trinitarian Theology East and West: St. Thomas Aquinas and St. Gregory Palamas* (Brookline, Mass: Holy Cross Orthodox Press, 1979), 40. Yet the Clarification saw it as proof of the acceptance of the Augustinian tradition in Byzantine theology. See pp. 54–55 above.

129 Larchet, "La question," 784–787; 792–808.

130 See also Zizioulas, "Das Dokument," 148.

131 André de Halleux, "Manifesté par le Fils' aux origines d'une formule pneumatologique," *RTL* 20, no. 1 (1989): 3–31. It was reprinted in de Halleux, *Patrologie et oecuménisme*, 338–366. Larchet's and de Halleux's interpretations of Gregory of Nyssa appear to be similar, but they are also controversial. See Giulio Maspero, "The Spirit Manifested by the Son in Cappadocian Thought," *StPatr* 67 (2013): 3–11. Likewise, the idea uncritically accepted by Coffey maintaining that Gregory, like other Greek Church Fathers following Origen (Coffey, "The Roman 'Clarification,'" 10–11), limited the doxology "from the Father, through the Son, in the Spirit" to God's economy against Pneumatomachians is not accurate. Gregory's trinitarian theology will be discussed in greater detail in the following chapter.

132 Larchet, "La question," 786.

133 Larchet, 786.

tion of the Spirit through the Son.¹³⁴ The Vatican Clarification, therefore, did not take sufficient account of the distinction between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια.

While he shared Ciobotea's criticism on the point of confusion, Larchet took a step forward with his criticism on Augustine. When Ciobotea accused the Latin tradition of confusing the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια, he nevertheless identified Augustine as an exception. Augustine, he suggested, had probably been able to distinguish the communication of the divine essence and that of the divine energies with his use of the two adverbs *principaliter* and *communiter*, even though his use of the one verb *procedere* for the two states of the procession from the Father and the procession from the Father and the Son remained unfortunate.¹³⁵ Larchet, however, was harshly critical of Augustine for having ignored the distinction between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια.¹³⁶ Augustine was thus an exception in that the common patristic tradition did indeed distinguish them. While he affirmed the Spirit as bond of love between Father and Son, Augustine could not distinguish the eternal procession of the Spirit and His energetic manifestation through the Son.¹³⁷ The Clarification, so Larchet argued, unfortunately followed the Augustinian exception which misunderstood the communication of the divine ἐνέργεια as that of the consubstantial divinity. Larchet added that the Spirit can only properly be said to proceed from the Father and the Son from the perspective of the divine energy even in the immanent Trinity.¹³⁸ The Augustinian tradition's acceptance of Palamas should therefore be understood from the perspective of the divine ἐνέργεια.¹³⁹ Palamas had indicated love to be a common divine ἐνέργεια that is communicated from the Father through the Son (or from the Father and the Son) in

134 Likewise, Lossky did not identify the phrase διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ with *filioque* and tied it rather with Palamas' idea of ἐνέργεια. See Josef Freitag, *Geist-Vergessen, Geist-Erinnern: Vladimir Losskys Pneumatologie als Herausforderung westlicher Theologie*, Studien zur systematischen und spirituellen Theologie 15 (Würzburg: Echter, 1995), 76–79; Oberdorfer, *Filioque*, 456–457.

135 Ciobotea, "Das römische Dokument," 154.

136 Such criticism on Augustine can also be found in Chrestos Yannaras. He is one of the contemporary orthodox scholars who have been very critical of the weakness in Augustine regarding the distinction between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια and its results in western culture. See Chrestos Yannaras, "Orthodoxy and the West," *GOTR* 17, no. 1 (1972): 115–131; Yannaras "Distinction between Essence and Energies and Its Importance for Theology," *SVTQ* 19, no. 4 (1975): 232–245.

137 Larchet, "La question," 801–802. Cf. David Bradshaw, *Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 222–229.

138 Larchet, "La question," 811.

139 Larchet, 802–803.

the Spirit, so insisted Larchet.¹⁴⁰ Gregory Palamas therefore resisted the influence of the Augustinian confusion, and rather kept the distinction between the divine essence and the divine energies that was common to the patristic tradition.¹⁴¹

5.4 *The Fourth Confusion*

The participants from East and West also failed to reach agreement on the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία.¹⁴² Theologians from the West consented to the close relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία and to the approach exhibited by the Clarification. The document said that the Spirit's work in the mission and work of Jesus Christ and for our sonship in the οἰκονομία is closely related to the Spirit's position in θεολογία. It tied the Augustinian theme of the Holy Spirit as Gift of Love to the relationship between the Spirit and the Son in οἰκονομία.

However, most of the eastern participants were not convinced by this close relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία. Zizioulas did not accept the immediate deduction from οἰκονομία to θεολογία which the Clarification had drawn. Unlike the document, Zizioulas argued that what Gregory Palamas had indicated when he spoke of the Spirit as the Love of the Father and the Son was not an inference from οἰκονομία. John of Damascus, he furthermore argued, similarly had not derived his formula from οἰκονομία.¹⁴³ The *filioque* or *spirituque* in οἰκονομία, he claimed, cannot be directly applied to θεολογία.¹⁴⁴ Larchet's argumentation on this point was clearer than that of Zizioulas, in that he refused to accept the inference from οἰκονομία to θεολογία due to his commitment to the apophatic theology of the eastern tradition.¹⁴⁵ Even though the Clarification

140 On this point, Larchet followed Amphilochius Radović's study on Palamas. For Radović, see Amphilochius Radović, *Le mystère de la sainte Trinité selon saint Grégoire Palamas*, trans. Yvan Koenig, Orthodoxy 9 (Paris: Cerf, 2012).

141 However, the relationship between Palamas and the Augustinian tradition is not a simple question. A recent study by Flogaus demonstrates how frequently Palamas directly or indirectly quotes Augustine. See Reinhard Flogaus, "Inspiration-Exploitation-Distortion: The Use of St Augustine in the Hesychast Controversy," in *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, eds. George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008), 63–80. See also Lison, "L'Esprit," 325–331.

142 Reinhard Slenczka gave an overview of typical contrasting views between East and West on this relationship. See Reinhard Slenczka, "Das *Filioque* in der neueren ökumenischen Diskussion," in Lehmann and Pannenberg, *Glaubensbekenntnis und Kirchengemeinschaft*, 80–99.

143 Zizioulas, "Das Dokument," 145.

144 Zizioulas, 157.

145 Larchet, "La question," 790.

in its final six paragraphs derived θεολογία from its analysis of the biblical passages for οἰκονομία, what it revealed comprehensibly in the οἰκονομία cannot be identified with the incomprehensible and impenetrable essence of God.¹⁴⁶

Yet there was disagreement over the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία not only between the two traditions. There was also discord amongst the eastern participants themselves, since a theologically positive evaluation of the immediate relationship was offered from their side as well. Ciobotea in particular was positive on this close relationship, expressing appreciation for the Clarification's attempt to describe the relationship between the three persons using the entire New testament.¹⁴⁷ While even Zizioulas criticized the immediate inference from οἰκονομία to θεολογία as described above, he did also confirm that the Spirit's works in the οἰκονομία are a common basis for a pneumatology of both Eastern and Western Churches.¹⁴⁸

5.5 *The Linguistic Approach*

Apart from the above disagreements relating to the four confusions that are typically mentioned, the Clarification also elicited a final disagreement on account of its linguistic approach. Yet in nature this last discrepancy was no different than the previous ones, since it was subjected to the accusation of witnessing all four confusions.

The Clarification had distinguished between the Greek words ἐκπόρευσις and προΐέναι, and then linked the Latin verb *procedere* to προΐέναι. This implied that *procedere filioque* does not relate to the hypostatic procession of the Spirit from the Father alone (for which the term ἐκπόρευσις applies), but to the communication of consubstantiality (which the Alexandrian tradition indicated using the term προΐέναι and the expression "through or from the Son"). This linguistic approach was considered valid by some of the western participants. In particular, Hans-Joachim Schulz saw it as the realization of the Pope's primary intention to reconcile the Latin phrase with the monopatrism of the original *Symb. Nicaen*.¹⁴⁹ So too Körtner accepted the approach as valid, albeit from the perspective of the thought of Karl Barth.¹⁵⁰ While Barth did not distin-

¹⁴⁶ Larchet, 776–777.

¹⁴⁷ Ciobotea, "Das römische Dokument," 160.

¹⁴⁸ Zizioulas, "Das Dokument," 145.

¹⁴⁹ Hans-Joachim Schulz, "Könnte das römische Dokument über den Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes zum Anlaß einer allgemeinen ökumenischen Klärung werden?" in Stirnemann and Willinger, *Vom Heiligen Geist*, 47.

¹⁵⁰ Körtner, "Der Herr," 92; see also Widmer, "La théologie réformée," 324–325; Karl Barth, *Kirchliche Dogmatik*, vol. 1, bk. 1, *Die Lehre vom Wort Gottes: Prolegomena zur Kirchlichen Dogmatik* (Zürich: TVZ, 1932), 496–511.

guish *processio* and ἐκπόρευσις, his idea of the *filioque*, so Körtner argued, was similar to what the Clarification had suggested to be the meaning of the *filioque* on the basis of this linguistic approach. In other words, perfect love as the common essence was what Barth signified with the *filioque*, and it also was what the Clarification intended to highlight as the Augustinian tradition by its linguistic approach. Besides these western theologians, a number of eastern theologians consented to this approach as well. Zizioulas admitted the validity of the linguistic approach and its theological consequence as expressed in the Clarification.¹⁵¹ Similarly, Ciobotea did not express himself harshly on this approach, and furthermore added another meaning for the verb προῖέναι. While not connecting it explicitly to the divine ἐνέργεια, Ciobotea said that the verb signified the indwelling of the Spirit in the Father and the Son as inter-personal gift and nexus between the Father and the Son.¹⁵²

Nevertheless, the linguistic approach still was not altogether uncontroversial. For the western theologians, it appeared to lack accurate analysis of the patristic tradition. In the eyes of the eastern theologians, on the other hand, the lack of analysis appeared to be connected to the four traditional confusions.

On the western side, André de Halleux, Yves Congar, and David Coffey can be named in particular. The first two had criticized the linguistic approach of Jean-Miguel Garrigues that was probably at the basis of the Clarification. Coffey followed them for his own criticism on the Clarification. As early as 1972, de Halleux had expressed his dissatisfaction with Garrigues' approach as it had appeared in an article in *Istina*.¹⁵³ He pointed in particular to a lack of accuracy in Garrigues' reading of the sources.¹⁵⁴ Although the Latin term *processio* was indeed not a synonym of the Greek ἐκπόρευσις, so de Halleux argued, it is not true that each of the two concepts points to one of two complementary aspects of the mystery—the former, that is, to the consubstantial communication, and the latter to the hypostatic existence.¹⁵⁵ Rather, each word signified both the hypostatic existence and the consubstantial communication. Agreeing with de Halleux, Congar in his *magnum opus* showed himself unconvinced

151 Zizioulas, "Das Dokument," 143.

152 Ciobotea, "Das römische Dokument," 155.

153 Jean-Miguel Garrigues, "Procession et ekporèse du Saint Esprit: Discernement de la tradition et reception oecuménique," *Istina* 17, no. 3–4 (1972): 345–366. This article was an improved version of the article which he had published in 1971 in *Contacts* 23 (1971): 283–309, and was reprinted in his book, *L'Esprit*, 57–88.

154 De Halleux, "Orthodoxie," 21–22. A similar criticism was also expressed in the paper he gave at the consultations for the Memorandum.

155 Gagliardi criticized the linguistic approach of the Clarification using an argument similar to that of de Halleux. See Gagliardi, "Il *Filioque*," 263–264.

of the distinction between what the Spirit receives from the Father and what he receives from the Father and from the Son.¹⁵⁶ He recognized that the two Greek words ἐκπόρευσις and προϊέναι have different connotations, albeit within the following limits: the first one indicates that the Father is the original source in the procession of the Spirit, and the second that the Son is involved and participates in the procession. He therefore could not consent to Garrigues' approach, except on that one point. The Latin tradition, so Congar argued, did not admit the distinction between what He receives from the Father alone and what the Spirit receives from the Father and the Son. Following de Halleux and Congar, Coffey confirmed that the Latin tradition, whose teaching was summarized in particular by the Council of Florence in 1438–1439, said that “the Spirit receives his essence, that is his consubstantiality, as well as his subsistence, that is his personhood, from both of the Father and Son (DH 1300).”¹⁵⁷ There is no difference “between handing on the divine nature and originating a divine person.”¹⁵⁸

Among eastern theologians, it was in particular Larchet who tied the inaccurate reading of the patristic tradition to the four confusions. According to him, a proper understanding of the complex and complementary use of the verbs can be obtained by acknowledging the distinctions between θεολογία and οἰκονομία and between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. He claimed that the Greek verb προϊέναι and “προιέναι from the Father through (or from) the Son” indicated the sending of the Spirit as grace or gift in οἰκονομία, as well as the manifestation of the divine energy from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit in θεολογία and in οἰκονομία. The Greek verb προϊέναι was usually not related to the communication of consubstantiality, for which the Clarification used the Latin verb *procedere*, but to the divine ἐνέργεια in θεολογία and οἰκονομία.¹⁵⁹ The Greek προϊέναι and the Latin *procedere* were therefore not synonymous. For a more accurate analysis of the verbs, the Clarification must avoid confusing divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια as well as οἰκονομία and θεολογία.

Apart from these two confusions, Larchet argued that the Clarification's linguistic approach had also introduced a confusion between the hypostatic and essential properties. In its text, the Clarification had distinguished between ἐκπόρευσις and *procedere*. Then it assigned the hypostatic origin from the Father

156 Yves Congar, *Je crois en l'Esprit Saint* (Paris: Cerf, 1980), 3:262–263.

157 Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification,’” 10.

158 Coffey, 10.

159 Larchet, “La question,” 779. In this similar argumentation, Anastasius the Librarian, who was the secretary and counselor of the Pope Nicholas I, Adrian II, and John VII, accurately explained Maximus the Confessor's intention. See Larchet, 806.

alone to the first verb, and the consubstantial communication from the Father and the Son to the second. Larchet, however, argued that the entire distinction was inaccurate, insisting that the hypostatic origin and consubstantiality came from the Father alone and were expressed in the Greek tradition with the term ἐκπόρευσις. The Father as αἰτία causes the hypostasis of the Spirit when He communicates the divine essence to the Spirit.¹⁶⁰ The Father's property of being αἰτία is not shared with the Son, and the hypostatic properties are not confused with the essential ones.¹⁶¹ Monopatrism means that the Son and the Spirit proceed from the Father essentially and hypostatically. The distinction between the hypostatic property of the Father and the essential properties must be kept.

In addition, Larchet singled out the more complex use of the Greek terms ἐκπόρευσις and προῖέναι and of the Latin verb *procedere* in the patristic tradition, challenging the simplified linguistic approach of the Clarification. The term ἐκπόρευσις, so he countered, was not only used to refer to the hypostatic procession of the Spirit from the Father in θεολογία, but also to the sending of the Spirit as gift or grace from the perspective of οἰκονομία or ἐνέργεια.¹⁶² So too the verb προῖέναι does have a restricted use applying only to the perspective of οἰκονομία or ἐνέργεια. This verb, Larchet continued, was sometimes used to indicate the hypostatic procession of the Spirit in θεολογία.¹⁶³ In fact, in his eyes even the Clarification's examination of its own tradition was not accurate. The use of the Latin verb *procedere* was wider than suggested, as it was used even as a translation of ἐκπόρευσις.¹⁶⁴ The Clarification's linguistic approach had therefore just oversimplified matters in regard to the complex use of the terms in question.

5.6 Summary

The fact that the Vatican Clarification achieved agreement on the issues of the validity of the original *Symb. Nicaen.* text (381) as well as the monarchy of the Father in the two traditions may not be overlooked. Nevertheless, both the Clarification and the debate around it revealed disagreements between the two

160 Larchet, 781–783.

161 Larchet, 779–780.

162 Larchet, 778.

163 Larchet, 778–779. According to him, even Gregory of Nazianzus, who classified the terms so as to distinguish the procession of the Spirit from the generation of the Son, applied the προῖέναι also to the Spirit's hypostatic existence from the Father. See Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes theologicae*, 20.11 (SC 270, 78), 30.19 (SC 250, 266), 39.12 (SC 358, 174).

164 Larchet, “La question,” 779.

traditions. In the above, they were described in relation to the charge of four confusions that the eastern tradition has typically seen implied in western filioquism.

- 1) In relation to the confusions between the hypostatic and essential properties as well as among the proprieties of each divine hypostasis, the monopatristism that the Clarification had posited drawing on Augustine's *principaliter* was not unanimously accepted. Both the Clarification's monopatristism and Augustine's thought were criticized for still being contaminated with the traditional confusions and for failing to overcome essentialism. Even the formula "the Spirit proceeds from the Father of the Son" failed to become a formula for reconciliation in that the Clarification's understanding of the phrase was still colored by the typical confusions.
- 2) In relation to the confusion between the divine οὐσία and ἐνέργεια, another disagreement was identified in the significance of the phrase "διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ [ἐκπορευόμενον]" and in the evaluation of the Augustinian tradition. The Clarification's attempt to apply the phrase "διὰ τοῦ Υἱοῦ" to the consubstantial communication did not pass unchallenged. Rather, its opponents asserted, the phrase ought to be connected to the energetic procession of the Spirit. Augustine's trinitarian thought as well as the entire Augustinian tradition were criticized also for failing to distinguish properly between the divine οὐσία and the divine ἐνέργεια.
- 3) In relation to the confusion of οἰκονομία and θεολογία, the eastern participants could not consent to the close relationship between the two. As such, the question of the definition of the relationship is still at stake.
- 4) Most participants in the debate refused to consent to the Clarification's linguistic approach. In their eyes, the documents had not accurately analyzed the complex use of the Greek and Latin verbs, in particular with regard to the four confusions.

In addition to these remaining disagreements between the two sides, one cannot neglect the fact disagreements on some issues remained even among theologians of the same tradition. On the eastern side concerned the evaluation of Augustine's trinitarian thought and the Augustinian tradition. Larchet in particular criticized Augustine harshly for the four confusions and their consequences, but especially Ciobotea did not consent to this harsh criticism and was positive on the validity of his theology. Furthermore, in contrast to Larchet, both Ciobotea and Zizioulas were more sympathetic to the close relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία and to the linguistic approach. Among the western participants, Hryniewicz did not agree with what the Clarification had asserted about the dogmatic core of the *Symb. Nicaen.*'s third article,

which in his eyes was not represented by the phrase “from the Father only.” For him, the question of ‘how to proceed’ had not been addressed by the original *Symb. Nicaen.*, which had focused instead just on the one divinity of the three hypostases.

Although the *filioque* problem has been discussed by a number of theologians following the 1995 Clarification, no convincing solution for the above disagreements has as yet been found. Rather, most problems have simply been repeated and rehashed. In fact, some of the disagreement have even been brought into greater relief than before, as will become evident in what follows.

6 What Is Still at Stake? (111)

6.1 *Monopatristism*

First of all, the monarchy of the Father has been to this very day a topic of constant discussion. As examined above, both ecumenical occasions, together with their related consultations and study meetings or discussions, were agreed on the validity of monopatrism as the patristic tradition, which forms a common ground for discussion between East and West. At the same time, these ecumenical occasions also revealed that the definition of monopatrism remained unsolved. This unsolved question has since been discussed repeatedly and in greater depth than before.

A remarkable approach was suggested by Thomas F. Torrance, one of the leading Reformed theologians of the late twentieth century. Torrance developed a fascinating notion of the ‘*monarchia* not of the Father but of the Triune God’ against the causality and subordinationism implied in both the eastern and western traditions.¹⁶⁵ In his eyes, the monarchy of the person of the Father unavoidably leads to a subordination of the Son and the Spirit to the person of the Father. For this reason, he rather insisted that *monarchia* is not related to the person of the Father, but to his being “in which all three divine persons share equally.”¹⁶⁶ This argument Torrance derived from his relational ontology.

¹⁶⁵ Torrance criticized the way the Cappadocians replaced the Nicene tradition, which derived the unity of God from “the being of the Father,” with another one, which derived the unity from “the person of the Father.” See Thomas F. Torrance, *The Trinitarian Faith: The Evangelical Theology of the Ancient Catholic Church* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1988), 237–238; Karl Barth, *Biblical and Evangelical Theologian* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1990), 131; *The Christian doctrine of God: one being three persons* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1996), 186–187.

¹⁶⁶ Thomas F. Torrance, *Trinitarian Perspectives: Toward Doctrinal Agreement* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1994), 112.

For Torrance, the divine persons are essentially constituted in their distinctive hypostases by the onto-relations among Them: "Onto-relations are being-constituting-relations."¹⁶⁷ Hence, the one οὐσία or being of the Triune God is not a static or abstract substance, but personally ontic-relational. With such a relational ontology, the person of the Father cannot be constituted without the ontic relations among the three persons and without the one and ontic relational οὐσία or being. Thus, the monarchy of the Father is not just applied to the person of the Father, but should be applied to the being of the Father, that is, the one Triune Godhead which is ontic-relational. In this regard, Torrance agreed with respect to the procession of the Spirit that "the Holy Spirit proceeds ultimately from the Triune Being of the Godhead."¹⁶⁸

Torrance's notion of the monarchy of the Triune God has not passed uncontested, however. While some theologians from both East and West have accepted the validity of his thought or developed similar notions, others have been critical and developing opposing ideas. In the East, for instance, Nicholas Loudovikos offered an interpretation similar to that of Torrance on the thought of Gregory of Nazianzus,¹⁶⁹ which nevertheless was rejected by Zizioulas and Andrew Louth.¹⁷⁰ More recently, Michel Stavrou has followed Zizioulas.¹⁷¹ Comparing the studies of Loudovikos and Louth on the trinitarian thought of Gregory of Nazianzus, Athanasios Vletsis also distanced himself from Torrance, suggesting that it would be more accurate for the monarchy to be applied to the person of the Father.¹⁷²

167 Myk Habets, "Getting Beyond the Filioque with Third Article Theology," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 224.

168 Torrance, *Trinitarian perspectives*, 113; Habets, "Getting Beyond," 227; Paul D. Molnar, "Theological Issues Involved in the Filioque," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 20–39.

169 Nikolaos Loudovikos, "Person Instead of Grace and Dictated Otherness: John Zizioulas' Final Theological Position," *Heyf* 52, no. 4 (2011): 684–699.

170 John Zizioulas, *Communion and Otherness: Further Studies in Personhood and the Church*, ed. Paul McPartlan (London: T&T Clark, 2006), 134–154; Andrew Louth, "St Gregory of Nazianzus on the Monarchy of the Father," in *Gott Vater und Schöpfer: Forscher aus dem Osten und Westen Europas an den Quellen des Gemeinsamen Glaubens*, eds. Ysabel de Andia and Peter Leander Hofrichter (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 2007), 109–115; Andrew Louth, *Introducing Eastern Orthodox Theology* (London: SPCK, 2013), 28.

171 Michel Stavrou, "The Divine Unity and the Relationship among the Persons of the Trinity in Orthodox Theological Tradition," in *Die Filioque-Kontroverse: Historische, ökumenische und dogmatische Perspektiven 1200 Jahre nach der Aachener Synode*, eds. Michael Böhnke, Assaad Elias Kattan, and Bernd Oberdorfer, QD 245 (Freiburg: Herder, 2011), 298–310.

172 Athanasios Vletsis, "Die Drei-einigkeit als 'Kreuz für den menschlichen Intellekt'? Die Bedeutung der Trinitätstheologie für die orthodoxe Theologie heute," in Böhnke, Kattan, and Oberdorfer, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse*, 214–215.

In the West, a theologian who has recently supported Torrance's position on the *filioque* problem is Paul D. Molnar.¹⁷³ Other theologians, however, have been critical of Torrance's thought by virtue of the influence of other contemporary theologians or their own studies of the patristic tradition. Some critically approached Torrance from the perspective of the careful approach that Wolfhart Pannenberg or Thomas Weinandy took to the monarchy of the Father.¹⁷⁴ Myk Habets, for instance, followed Pannenberg and Weinandy and maintained the monarchy of the person of the Father, even though he did not totally deny the legitimacy of what Torrance was attempting to do.¹⁷⁵ Others who failed to be convinced by Torrance were Guretzki and Benjamin Dean in their studies on Karl Barth's ideas on the Trinity and Christology.¹⁷⁶ Bruce McCormack too differed from Torrance in his approach to the monarchy of the Father, developing Barth's later Christology in the doctrine of reconciliation. While he did not directly criticize Torrance, he did accept Barth's argumentation: "We have not only not to deny but actually to affirm and understand as essential to the being of God Himself an above and a below, a prius and a posterius, a superiority and a subordination. His divine unity consists in the fact that in Himself He is both One who is obeyed and Another who obeys."¹⁷⁷ In this sense, McCormack understood and accepted Barth's position on the *filioque* that the Spirit proceeds not from the common being of the Triune God, but from "the one divine *Subject* precisely in His first two modes of being" (emphasis original).¹⁷⁸ In addition, Matthias Haudel has maintained the monarchy of the Father from the influence of eastern theologians (especially Zizioulas and Stăniloae) and from his reading of the patristic tradition. His study is interesting since he for his careful position and relational ontology leans especially on the Cappadocians, whom Torrance had criticized for subordinationism.¹⁷⁹

173 Molnar, "Theological Issues."

174 Pannenberg, *Systematische Theologie*, 1:283–364; Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit*; Weinandy, "The Filioque."

175 Myk Habets, "Filioque? Nein A Proposal for Coherent Coinherence," in *Trinitarian Theology after Barth*, eds. Myk Habets and Phillip Tolliday (Cambridge: James Clarke, 2012), 161–202; Habets, "Getting Beyond."

176 Guretzki, "The Filioque"; Benjamin Dean, "Person and Being: Conversation with T. F. Torrance about the Monarchy of God," *IJST* 15, no. 1 (2013): 58–77.

177 Karl Barth, *Church Dogmatics*, vol. 4, bk. 2, *The Doctrine of Reconciliation* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1958), 201, quoted in Bruce L. McCormack, "The Lord and Giver of Life: A 'Barthian' Defense of the Filioque," in *Rethinking Trinitarian Theology: Disputed Questions and Contemporary Issues in Trinitarian Theology*, eds. Robert Józef Wozniak and Giulio Maspero (London: T&T Clark, 2012), 247.

178 McCormack, "The Lord," 234–236.

179 Matthias Haudel, "Hermeneutische und Trinitätstheologische Grundlagen für das Ge-

Alongside these Protestant theologians, on the Roman Catholic side Mauro Gagliardi voiced his refusal to accept the kind of idea favored by Torrance at the conference for the study of the *filioque* held by the Vatican in 2014. Even though he accepted de Regnon's schema and strongly accentuated the western trinitarian tradition's greater emphasis on the unity of God than on the three persons, he did not deny the monarchy of the Father insofar as the Father is eternally Father of the Son. The Father as Father of the Son is *principium sine principio* for the procession of the Spirit, and the Son is the *principium de principio*. He affirmed that the western *filioque*, which seems to signify the procession of the Spirit from the Father of the Son, confirms the first person in the Triune God eternally as Father and substantially maintains the monarchy of the Father.¹⁸⁰

6.2 *Peculiar Personhood of the Holy Spirit*

When a new attempt like that of Torrance, together with the surrounding debates, is conducted for trying to understand the monarchy of the Father, it raises another question, namely concerning the peculiar personhood of the Holy Spirit in the Triune God. In connection with the *filioque* problem, this question has raised criticism in particular for Augustine and his idea of the *vinculum amoris*.¹⁸¹ In Augustine's thought the Spirit seems not to be considered as a person like the other two persons, but rather as love between the other two persons. Thus, if the Spirit is understood to proceed from the Father and the Son in the same manner, it is no longer possible to determine the peculiar personhood of the Spirit in the inner-trinitarian relations among the hypostases, given that He does not have a relationship with the Father that is distinguishable from that with the Son.¹⁸²

meinsame Verständnis der trinitarischen Beziehungen Ansätze zur Lösung des *Filioque*-Problems." In Böhnke, Kattan, and Oberdorfer, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse*, 272–297; for his profound study, see Matthias Haudel, *Die Selbsterschließung des dreieinigen Gottes: Grundlage eines ökumenischen Offenbarungs-, Gottes- und Kirchenverständnisses*, FSÖT 110 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2006).

180 Gagliardi, "Il *Filioque*," 268–282.

181 Bernd Oberdorfer, "Die Bedeutung der Trinitätstheologie heute in den westlichen Kirchen," in Böhnke, Kattan, and Oberdorfer, *Die Filioque-Kontroverse*, 234; Clark H. Pinnock, *Flame of Love: A Theology of the Holy Spirit* (Downers Grove: Inter Varsity Press, 1996), 40.

182 In this sense, the trinitarian thought of Barth was criticized by McCormack. Even though he has defended the *filioque* according to the later Christology of Barth as examined above, McCormack still criticized the weakness in Barth's trinitarian thought. His description of Spirit as 'love' between Father and Son or the 'act' of their communion seems to fail to achieve the aim of making the one divine Subject fully a Subject in the third mode. See McCormack, "The Lord and Giver," 237–238; Robert W. Jensen, "You Wonder Where

Recently, western theologians have tried to overcome this problem. Among them, Weinandy, Habets and John C. McDowell attempted to enunciate the peculiar personhood of the Spirit in connection with the *filioque* controversy in particular. Weinandy reflected on this problem when he tried to avoid 'trinitarian sequentialism' detected in the patristic tradition in regard to the Spirit's procession. Even though Athanasius made great progress in the battle against Arianism, Weinandy argued that he too could not avoid trinitarian sequentialism when he said that "the Father first begets the Son and only then does the Spirit proceed from the Son as his Image."¹⁸³ To avoid sequentialism and to attain the peculiar personhood of the Spirit in the procession, Weinandy assigned the Spirit as Love the role of conforming (or "*personing*") the other two persons as loving persons in the following:

The Spirit (of Love) proceeds from the Father simultaneously to his begetting of the Son. The Spirit does so as the one in whom the Father loving begets his Son and in so doing the Spirit conforms (persons) the Father to be the *loving* Father of and for the Son he is begetting. Moreover, the Holy Spirit proceeds simultaneously from the Son and in so doing conforms (persons) the Son to be the *loving* Son of and for the Father who begets him.¹⁸⁴

Habets accepted Weinandy's thought, and called it divine inter-subjectivity.¹⁸⁵

Aside from Weinandy and Habets, also McDowell attempted to find a solution. His approach was attractive since it was connected to the East's traditional theme of *theosis*. McDowell criticized Barth's and Torrance's restriction of the Spirit's role to a noetic or cognitive one as being inadequate, and regarded it as a role that comes in addition to the operations of the Logos incarnate.¹⁸⁶ Rather

the Spirit Went," *ProEccl* 2, no. 3 (1993): 302. I will study the theme of the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit in Augustine's trinitarian theology in greater detail in pp. 208–240 in chapter 4.

183 Weinandy, "The Filioque," 189.

184 Weinandy, 193 (emphasis original); see also, Weinandy, *The Father's Spirit*, 17.

185 Habets, "Getting Beyond," 220–227.

186 John C. McDowell, "On Not Being Spirited Away: Pneumatology and Critical Presence," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 172–173, 177. Rolad Spjuth said that the stress on immediate communion between God and human beings through revelation as a cognitive act "downplays the diachronically and historical *mediation* of divine presence in the body." Rolad Spjuth, *Creation, Contingency and Divine Presence in the Theologies of Thomas F. Torrance and Eberhard Jüngel*, *Studia Theologica Lundensia* 51 (Lund: Lund University, 1995), 218 (emphasis original). For a similar and profound criticism of the weakness of Barth's theology in crystalizing God's presence in history from the Reformed side, see Klaas

than a noetic role of the Spirit in the line of Rowan Williams,¹⁸⁷ McDowell accentuated a more active role of the Spirit for the transformation and transfiguration of which the doctrine of *theosis* speaks. The Spirit of Christ, he argued, is the Spirit of God which is “the eschatological opening of all things toward their fulfilling flourishing in communion with the ground of all being through the Logos incarnate.”¹⁸⁸ It takes place in the transformation and transfiguration of the world and in our histories by the Spirit.¹⁸⁹ Remarkably, McDowell connected his notion of the active role of the Spirit in *theosis* to Augustine’s idea of the *vinculum amoris*. While in his mind some passages of Augustine’s *De trinitate* remained somewhat opaque on this point, McDowell still suggested that Augustine understood the Spirit “as the *agency* of love who *actively* bonds Father and Son, a Giving Gift of One to the Other” (emphasis original).¹⁹⁰ The Spirit as the active agency of love leads God’s people by faith toward completion.

Even though the above theologians attempted to account for the peculiar personhood of the Spirit, the following questions still remain: Do these attempts correspond to the patristic tradition on which their arguments were based? How are the different solutions evaluated by East and West? Or could another solution, more satisfactory in regard to the patristic tradition, be suggested particularly in relation to the procession of the Holy Spirit?

7 Analytic Summary

Up to this moment, we have surveyed the contemporary discussions about the *filioque*, in particular the ecumenical occasions of the Memorandum and the Clarification, together with their consultation and study meetings. In addition, we have also considered theological developments after 1995. From this entire analysis, it has emerged that the two traditions can agree with each

Schilder, *Wat is de hemel?* (Kampen: J.H. Kok, 1935). This book was revised and reprinted in Schilder, *Wat is de hemel?* (Barneveld: Nederlands Dagblad, 2009).

187 Rowan Williams, *On Christian Theology*, Challenges in Contemporary Theology (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2000).

188 McDowell, “On Not Being Spirited Away,” 183.

189 McDowell, 183.

190 McDowell, 179. In footnote 60, he said, “It is not entirely clear, however, that the way Augustine utilizes the image of the Spirit as *vinculum* depicts the Spirit sufficiently as *agent*. Critics’ concern that the ‘bond’ image depersonalizes the Spirit is mitigated only when one depicts the Spirit’s *act* in the communicative conjoining as the work of the *Person* of God as Spirit” (emphasis original).

other on two elements: First, the Greek original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* was unanimously considered to be the only creed for the reconciliation of the two churches; second, the monarchy of the Father in the Triune God was accepted as a common patristic tradition. Along these two elements at least, future discussions on the interpolated phrase should be able to achieve further progress.

However, even with this achievement, a number of remaining disagreements that are still at stake were also revealed to exist. While the examined ecumenical occasions and debates occurred separately, most of the issues at their core proved similar. In fact, at the study meetings for or discussions about the Clarification, the remaining issues focused more sharply and fundamentally on the traditional criticism of the four confusions than before. Furthermore, the new attempts for the definition of monopatrism and the particular personhood of the Holy Spirit after 1995 have not only not achieved agreement, but even elicited new debate. The following issues derived from the analysis of the present chapter are still waiting for a satisfactory rapprochement between East and West, or even among theologians from the same side.

7.1 *Disagreement between East and West*

7.1.1 Monopatrism

While monopatrism has been assessed to be the common patristic tradition, there continues to be discord on its precise definition. First of all, the western definition which identifies the role of the Son in terms of consubstantiality or the communication of the same divinity in the Trinity has not proved convincing for eastern theologians. Monopatrism in the eastern tradition, so they argued, holds that the hypostasis of the Father is the only principle or cause of the procession of the Holy Spirit in terms of His consubstantiality and hypostatic existence. In this sense, their monopatrism does not allow any involvement of the Son for the consubstantiality and hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit. For eastern theologians, their own monopatrism does not correspond with the definition of monopatrism as it had been proposed for the reconciliation of monopatrism and the *filioque* based on Augustine's *principaliter* and on the distinction of the medieval councils between *principium sine principio* and *principium de principio*. Second, the old confusions with which the *filioque* tradition has long been charged have been raised once again in the contemporary discussion about monopatrism. The western tradition had been accused of confusing the hypostatic and essential properties, as well as the proprieties of each divine hypostasis. The contemporary discussion has aroused the anxiety of eastern theologians for these same confusions. Last, if the charge of the western version of monopatrism's confusions is legitimate, the theology of

the *filioque* cannot escape the charge of essentialism, regardless of the Clarification's attempt to underline and interpret it as personalism. On these three points, a reconciling definition of monopatrism has as yet not been achieved between the two traditions.

7.1.2 The Role of the Son in the Procession

The theologians from East and West were fully agreed on the patristic common tradition, which insists at once on monopatrism and on the involvement of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. However, they failed to reach agreement on how to define the role of the Son in that procession. First, the general idea of the western theologians on that role could not count on acceptance from their eastern opponents. The western participants generally insisted that the Son was involved in the procession of the Holy Spirit in terms of consubstantiality or the communication of the one divinity. This idea, however, not only damages monopatrism but also implies subordinationism between Son and the Spirit, so the easterners argued. The westerners emphasized the *taxis* Father-Son-Spirit, and connected this *taxis* to what the *filioque* had maintained by attributing the role of consubstantiality to the Son. This idea, however, sharply contrasted with the eastern tradition which had emphasized monopatrism and the concomitance of the Son's generation and the Spirit's procession only from the Father. In this tradition, another *taxis*, namely that of Father-Spirit-Son, also obtains. Second, the other confusion with which the East has traditionally criticized western trinitarian thought was once again evoked. As such, Augustine and all western trinitarian theology following him has been accused of confusing οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. The eastern participants in the contemporary discussions also charged that the western theologians' notion of the role of the Son was unacceptable with a view to the confusion. Keeping the distinction between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια, most eastern theologians attributed the role of the Son to the communication of ἐνέργεια in θεολογία as well as οἰκονομία.

7.1.3 The Relation between οἰκονομία and θεολογία

All of the participants to the debates from the East and the West were agreed on the close relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία. In particular, most western participants emphasized the relationship in order to affirm the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. Most eastern theologians generally accepted and emphasized this relationship. Nevertheless, the precise definition of the relationship has proved not to be a simple question. Even though all theologians accepted that οἰκονομία reveals θεολογία, those from the East generally insisted that the relationship should be defined more subtly in terms of the

distinction between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. While the Memorandum claimed that οἰκονομία and θεολογία are related “in some sense,” the “in some sense” has to date defied clear definition.

7.1.4 The Hypostatic Property of the Holy Spirit

In relation to the *filioque* problem, also the property of the Holy Spirit has been a subject of discussion. In particular, Augustine's theme of *vinculum amoris*, which has been developed in the West, has been considered a typical error for the articulation of the Spirit's hypostatic property. Contemporary eastern theologians have criticized it for the de-personalization of the Holy Spirit as just the love between the two divine persons, Father and Son. This criticism has recently been accepted even by western theologians who criticized their own tradition as it was found in Augustine or in the work of their contemporaries. On the other hand, theologians such as Habets, McDowell, Weinandy, and Williams have attempted to reinterpret Augustine's *vinculum amoris* in order to derive the personal property of the Holy Spirit from it. Nevertheless, the following three questions still remain: First, how accurately their reinterpretation of Augustine's *vinculum amoris* corresponds to his own theology; second, how their apology for Augustine can be reconciled with the Greek patristic tradition; third, what is a more satisfying alternative to the Greek and Latin patristic tradition, particularly in connection with the *filioque* controversy.

7.2 *Disagreement within the Same Tradition*

Theologians from the same tradition have also not been in unanimous agreement amongst themselves. In particular, the issue of the definition of the role of the Son has caused disagreement among western theologians. Garrigues' linguistic approach was thus criticized by de Halleux and Congar. While Garrigues accentuated the consubstantiality, Moltmann accepted the personal existence of the Holy Spirit in terms of the role of the Son.

In addition, there has been disagreement concerning the dogmatic core of the third article of the *Symb. Nicaen.* The Vatican Clarification claimed that the key dogma of the third article was the procession “from the Father only” in relation to the “how” of the procession of the Holy Spirit. Hryniewicz and Körtner, however, did not accept this claim, following in this line the views expressed by de Halleux and Moltmann at the consultations for the Memorandum.

Similarly, there has been disagreement among the eastern theologians. While he critically underlined the mediating role of the Son, Zizioulas accepted the western reconciliation that the Clarification assigned to the Son the role of consubstantiality or of communicating the one divinity to the Holy Spirit.

Most other eastern participants, however, could not agree, providing their own ideas on the role of the Son which had different accents on their own tradition.

In addition, eastern theologians have responded in slightly different ways on the issue of the close relation between οἰκονομία and θεολογία. While the claim that οἰκονομία reveals θεολογία was acceptable also to eastern discussants, most could not agree with the attempt to exhaust the apophaticism of θεολογία by way of οἰκονομία. Larchet in particular was an acute critic of this exhaustion, and decisively limited the biblical revelation for the procession of the Holy Spirit to ἐνέργεια in οἰκονομία and θεολογία. Not all eastern participants followed him, however. Zizioulas and Ciobotea, for instance, were much more sympathetic to the close relationship suggested by their opponents. In this regard, the eastern theologians more interestingly had a different evaluation of Augustine's theology in terms of the distinction between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. While Larchet harshly criticized him for the absence of the distinction, Ciobotea refused to follow him in this.

7.3 Ad Fontes

How, then, can the two traditions reach a satisfactory reconciliation on the issue of the *filioque* and the procession of the Holy Spirit? As the entire analysis of the present chapter has shown, the primary cause for the disagreements between East and West, and even among theologians of the same tradition, has been the diverse understanding and assessment of the trinitarian theology of the Church Fathers. The Cappadocians have been at center among the Greek tradition. Their trinitarian theology has been seen as the base and barometer for assessing the succeeding development in the eastern tradition. On the other hand, Augustine has been the western counterpart who has either been harshly criticized or sympathetically evaluated. For this reason, the following chapters will be dedicated to the study of these Church Fathers. For the Cappadocians, the next chapter will study Gregory of Nyssa. As Bobrinskoy has pointed out,¹⁹¹ he was the most speculative theologian among the Cappadocians when it comes to the eternal relations between the Son and the Holy Spirit, and one of the typical figures for the formation of the eastern tradition. In particular, as Bolotov had already indicated and more recently also Manlio Simonetti has done,¹⁹² Gregory's idea of the procession of the

191 Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery*, 278.

192 Bolotov, "Thesen," 696; Manlio Simonetti, *La crisi ariana nel IV secolo*, SEAug 11 (Roma: IPA, 1975), 500.

Holy Spirit, which was expressed in the concept of *μεσιτεία*, undoubtedly contributed significantly to the official teaching of the Eastern Church on the procession.¹⁹³

- 193 Recently, Giulio Maspero, following Werner Jaeger, Jean Daniélou, and Michael A.G. Haykin, has claimed that Gregory of Nyssa was the author of the original text of the *Symb. Nicaen.* See Giulio Maspero, *Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Ablabium*, VCSup 86 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 152–153; Werner Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssa's Lehre vom Heiligen Geist* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 51–77; Jean Daniélou, “Bulletin d’histoire des origines chrétiennes: Werner Jaeger. *Gregor von Nyssa's Lehre vom Heiligen Geist*,” *RSR* 55 (1967): 118; Michael A.G. Haykin, *The Spirit of God: The Exegesis of 1 and 2 Corinthians in the Pneumatomachian Controversy of the Fourth Century*, VCSup 27 (Leiden: Brill, 1994), 199–201. For the significance of Gregory’s thought of the procession of the Holy Spirit in the Greek Church Fathers, see Manlio Simonetti, “La processione dello Spirito Santo secondo i padri greci,” *Aev* 26, no. 1 (1952): 33–41; Giulio Maspero, “La processione dello Spirito Santo da Origene a Gregorio di Nazianzo: La tensione ermeneutica nella discussione sul Filioque,” in *Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos: The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century*, eds. A. Bucossi and A. Calia (Leuven: Peeters, 2020), 31–63. For Gregory’s influence on the thirteenth-century discussions about the *filioque* by eastern theologians like John Bekkos, Constantine Meliteniotes, Gregory II of Cyprus, and Gregory Palamas, see Theodoros Alexopoulos, “Die Berufung der byzantinischen Filioquisten des 13ten Jahrhunderts auf Gregor von Nyssa zur Begründung des Filioque. Analyse eines Zitats aus Ad Ablabium (τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου),” in *Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarianism*, eds. Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus, VCSup 106 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 609–621.

Gregory of Nyssa

1 Introduction

The previous chapter examined the contemporary discussions on the *filioque*. The substantial issues were analyzed and summarized, and the need arose for a study of the theologies of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine on which the trinitarian theologies of the East and the West have built. Against the background of the issues that proved to be still at stake, the present chapter will focus on Gregory. The contemporary issues will not be allowed to dominate the patristic approach to his theology, but the study of the present chapter will still be conducted implicitly and explicitly in connection with the main question of the present project.

The focus of the present chapter will be Gregory's thought on the Triune God, with his *Contra Eunomium libri* 1–3 (GNO 1, 22–225; 226–409; GNO 2, 3–311) as the main text for discussion. This treatise undoubtedly expresses his mature ideas on the mystery of the Trinity. His tremendous construction of trinitarian theology, however, was not limited to this trilogy, and so also his *Refutatio confessionis Eunomii* (GNO 2, 312–410), as well as other minor trinitarian writings and spiritual treatises will need to be investigated.¹ In addition to these dogmatic treatises, also Gregory's ascetical works will be analyzed for the trinitarian basis for his spiritual theology and in particular the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit.

The argumentation of this chapter is divided into four parts. First, a theological introduction to Gregory's thoughts will be provided. It will explain his theological epistemology in relation to basic ideas that require study for an accurate understanding of his trinitarian polemics with Eunomius and the Pneumatomachi in *Contra Eunomium* and in other trinitarian works. Following the theological introduction, this chapter will lay out his notion of the monarchy of the Father. In this connection, we will in the third place carefully

1 For the chronology of his works, see Jean Daniélou, "La chronologie des oeuvres de Grégoire de Nysse," *StPatr* 7 (1966): 159–169; Gerhard May, "Die Chronologie des Lebens und der Werke des Gregor von Nyssa," in *Écriture et culture philosophique dans la pensée de Grégoire de Nysse*, ed. Marguerite Harl (Leiden: Brill, 1971), 51–67; Pierre Maraval, "Chronology of Works," in *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*, eds. Lucas F. Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, trans. Seth Cherney, VCSup 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 153–169.

articulate Gregory's view on the role or place of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. His subtle approach will be explained in relation to the involvement of the Son in the Spirit's procession without abandonment of the Father's monarchy. Lastly, this chapter will offer an account of the close relationship between the hypostatic property of the Spirit and Gregory's trinitarian thought on the basis of the analysis and summary in the first three parts.

2 Introduction to Gregory's Trinitarian Thought

Before proceeding to a study of more properly dogmatic themes that relate immediately to the trinitarian controversies of Gregory's time, it will first be necessary to gain an understanding of his epistemological foundation. The analysis of his epistemology will offer an incisive view of what he wrote and accentuated in the trinitarian controversy, since his argumentation was based on his theological epistemology. This analysis is required not only because Gregory's epistemology itself was the basis for his trinitarian argumentation, but also because it was one of the main issues on which he criticized Eunomius and other trinitarian heretics. Additionally, the study of his theological epistemology is in significant measure relevant to some of the substantial issues of the contemporary *filioque* discussion summarized in the previous chapter. Gregory's epistemology explains how he conceived of the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια and between οἰκονομία and θεολογία.

2.1 ἐπίνοια

Throughout the entire *Contra Eunomium*,² Gregory criticized Eunomius' statement that the Son is not the same divine being as the Father, but was created before all the other creatures. Eunomius had established this statement according to his view on ἐπίνοια (concept or conceptual thought), which Gregory could not accept as an appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity.³

2 For the English translation of Gregory's trilogy, the present work is indebted to Stuart G. Hall's translation in Lucas Francisco Mateo-Seco and Juan L. Bastero, eds., *El "Contra Eunomium I" en la producción literaria de Gregorio de Nisa* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 1988), in Lenka Karfíková, Scot Douglass, and Johannes Zachhuber, eds., *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium II; An English Version with Supporting Studies*, VCSup 82 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), and in Johan Leemans and Matthieu Cassin, eds., *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium III; An English Translation with Commentary and Supporting Studies*, VCSup 124 (Leiden: Brill, 2014). The first book was revised in Miguel Brugarolas, ed., *Gregory of Nyssa: Contra Eunomium I; An English Translation with Supporting Studies*, VCSup 148 (Leiden: Brill, 2018).

3 For the philosophical background to the controversy between Gregory of Nyssa and Euno-

According to Gregory, Eunomius identified ἐπίνοια, which is attributed to God, with the divine being itself. In particular, he simply identified the concept “unbegotten” with the divine being of God.⁴ On the basis of this identification, Eunomius denied that the divinity of the Son is the same as that of the Father, since the Son is not called “unbegotten” but “begotten.” For him, the term “unbegotten,” which he identified with the divine being, is not a human concept but a term that came immediately from God himself.⁵

This view had its origins in Eunomius’ general understanding of the concept of ἐπίνοια. Eunomius thought that God created and provided names or terms for each created reality when He created his creatures.⁶ On this account, terms or concepts are immediately connected to God’s providence.⁷ The concept “unbegotten” itself, then, was provided before the creation of the human being by the providence of God, who is “unbegotten.”

Gregory, on the contrary, claimed that a term attributed to the Trinity is not the divine being (οὐσία) itself, but a *human* ἐπίνοια, ‘concept’ or ‘conceptual thought.’ A conceptual thought which God implanted in the human being⁸ finds or makes diverse words, names, and titles that can be attributed to God to express what the divine being is. The term “unbegotten” as well as every other term attributed to Him is not the divine being itself, but expresses how the divine being is conceptualized by human thought (διάνοια).⁹ Gregory wrote: “... it [conceptual thought] is the linguistic ability (λογικὴ δύναμις) implanted in us by God that invented the interpretative sounds of their names [the sounds which make known or signifies those which exist] (τάς ἐρμηνευτικὰς τῶν ὄντων φωνὰς) ... The cause of our giving names to God who is by his nature what he is, is by general consent attributable to God himself ... The power of giving names of one sort and another to all the things that come into our mind, lies in our

mius on the notion of ἐπίνοια, see Theo Kobusch, “Die Epinoia: Das menschliche Bewusstsein in der antiken Philosophie,” in Karfiková, Douglass, and Zachhuber, *Contra Eunomium* 11, 3–20.

4 Eunomius, *Apologia* 7–11 (Richard P. Vaggione, trans., *The Extant Works*, OECT [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987], 40–46); Gregory, *Eun* 2.12–23, 141, 158, 177, 377–386, 504–523, 623 (GNO 1, 230–233, 266, 271, 276, 336–339, 373–379, 408).

5 *Eun* 2.159 (GNO 1, 271, 11–22); L. Abramowski, “Eunomios,” in *RAC* 6, 945 ff.

6 *Eun* 2.196–198 (GNO 1, 281–283).

7 *Eun* 2.125, 196 (GNO 1, 262, 281).

8 *Eun* 2.185–186, 395 (GNO 1, 278, 341–342).

9 Lenka Karfiková, “Ad Ablabium, Quod Non Sint Tres Dei,” in *Gregory of Nyssa: The Minor Treatises on Trinitarian Theology and Apollinarism*, eds. Volker Henning Drecoll and Margitta Berghaus, VCSup 106 (Leiden: Brill, 2011), 150: “Die Unendlichkeit oder Unbegrenztheit ist damit nicht nur eine der göttlichen Eigenschaften, sondern die paradoxe ‘Definition’ selbst, der einzig angemessene ‘Begriff’ des Göttlichen.”

nature.”¹⁰ Otherwise, if names or concepts were to be identified with the divine nature itself, as Eunomius had done, it would make an idol (εἰδωλον) of God.¹¹

There was also another, related reason by which Gregory disavowed Eunomius’ idea concerning the term. Human conceptual thoughts are not human ideas reflecting on “what God is,” but also, more appropriately, those reflecting on “what God is not.” The technical term for the latter is “privative” (στερητικὰ) or “negative” (ἀφαιρετικὰ) words.¹² This category includes the term “unbegotten,” indicating “not what He is, but what He is not.”¹³ Consequently, for Gregory it was not acceptable to identify a term that shows “what He is not” with “what He is.”

2.2 The Uncreated Being and Created Beings

Gregory’s criticism of Eunomius’ idea of ἐπίνοια was established on the basis of his fundamental distinction between the uncreated being and created beings for his understanding of the Trinity and His relationship to His creation.

¹⁰ *Eun* 2.395–396 (GNO 1, 341,29–342,11). As noted above (see note 2), the present translation comes from Hall. Raymond Winling and Claudio Moreschini, however, show other possibilities in their translations. Both offered a similar translation of ἡ λογικὴ δύναμις as “la faculté de la raison” and “la capacità razionale.” See Raymond Winling, *Grégoire de Nysse: Contre Eunome II*, SC 551 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2013), 365; Claudio Moreschini, trans., *Gregorio di Nyssa: Opere dogmatiche*, PenOcc (Milano: Bompiani, 2014), 1167. However, their translation is not explicit enough for reflecting Gregory’s argument against Eunomius on ἐπίνοια. Hall’s translation did manage to be more explicit on this point. Likewise, Karfiková provided a translation (“Sprachfähigkeit”) similar to Hall’s for the same passage of *Eun* 2.395, where she did not neglect the comprehensive connotation of the term. As such, the term signifies “die Fähigkeit des Denkens und der Sprache.” See Lenka Karfiková, “Der Ursprung der Sprache nach Eunomius und Gregor vor dem Hintergrund der antiken Sprachtheorien (CE II 387–444; 543–553),” in Karfiková, Douglass, and Zachhuber, *Contra Eunomium II*, 285. Hall’s translation of “τὰς ἐρμηνευτικὰς τῶν ὄντων φωνάς” needs revision since the word ἐρμηνευτικὰς is probably better translated just as “making known” or “signifying,” as in Winling and Moreschini.

¹¹ *Vit Moys* 2.165 (GNO 7/1, 87.23–88.5).

¹² *Eun* 2.580 (GNO 1, 395,25–26); see also *Eun* 2.563, 565 (GNO 1, 391). Eunomius refused the concept of privation in relation to his identification of “unbegotten” with the divine nature. In other words, the term “unbegotten” was not defined by Eunomius as privation although the term signified “being deprived of begottenness.” Otherwise, Eunomius’ identification would have had to posit privation in the divine nature (*Apologia* 8 [Vaggione, *The Extant Works*, 40–42]). However, following Basil (*Contra Eunomium* 1.8 [SC 299, 201]), Gregory avoided all technical discussion about privation in relation to the terms attributed to God in that he did not identify any human concepts with the divine nature itself. For Gregory, so-called privative words such as ‘unbegotten’ are not identified with the divine nature, but signify just what God is not. See Winling, *Contre Eunome II*, 484.

¹³ *Eun* 2.192 (GNO 1, 280,27–29).

Gregory's concern for the distinction between the uncreated being and created beings can be found throughout all treatises in a variety of words and expressions. In particular, *In canticum canticorum* (GNO 6) 6 shows how he exactly conceived of the distinction. In the interpretation of Song 3:1–8, Gregory related philosophy (φιλοσοφία) to the distinction. For him, philosophy signifies in *In canticum canticorum* 6 what the Bride in Song teaches about “how lovers of the transcendent Beauty are to relate themselves to the Divine.”¹⁴ This philosophy relied on the distinction between the uncreated being and created beings.

Gregory's explanation of the distinction is in fact reflective of a Platonic dualism.¹⁵ He wrote: “The nature of things that exist is divided, at the highest level of generality, into two kinds. On the one hand, there is that which is perceptible and material, on the other, that which is intelligible and nonmaterial.”¹⁶ This statement was similar to the division he drew in his *Apologia in Hexaemeron*, where he defends and develops the interpretation of his brother Basil of Caesarea in the *Homiliae in Hexaemeron*.¹⁷ In this treatise, Gregory relates the first chapter of Genesis to the perceptible and material realm, which is the world of “things that appear,” while the intelligible realm is connected to the “third heaven,” into which Paul entered (2 Cor 12:2).¹⁸ In these statements from Gregory, as Norris has explained by way of comparison with Plato and later Platonism, the intelligible realm is not just ideas or forms, but contains ideas or forms “as known.” In other words, the intelligible realm is a “dimension of reality in which knower and known, intellect and intelligible, subject and object, approximate unity.”¹⁹

This distinction of obvious Platonic heritage, however, was modified by Gregory into a Christian doctrine of creation. After he had drawn a distinction

14 *Cant* 6 (GNO 6, 172,22–173,1): “For the Bride's narrative, in which she tells about things that have happened to her, is philosophy, in that she teaches how lovers of the transcendent Beauty are to relate themselves to the Divine (φιλοσοφία γάρ ἐστι τὸ τῆς νύμφης διήγημα, δι' ὧν τὰ περὶ ἐαυτῆς διεξέρχεται, ὅπως χρὴ περὶ τὸ θεῖον ἔχειν τοὺς ἐραστάς τοῦ ὑπερκειμένου κάλλους δογματιζούσης).” For the English translation of *Cant*, I am indebted to Richard A. Norris Jr., trans., *Homilies on the Song of Songs*, WGRW 13 (Atlanta, GA: SBL, 2012).

15 More precisely, according to Richard A. Norris Jr., Plato did not understand ideas or forms as infinite (ἄπειρος) and boundless (ἀόριστος) in that “for him [Plato] intelligibility is *stability in a definable identity that the mind can grasp clearly*” (emphasis original). Plotinus was the one who attributed the word infinite (ἄπειρος) to the intelligible realm. See Norris, 185.

16 *Cant* 6 (GNO 6, 173,7–9).

17 Stanislas Giet, *Homélies sur l'Hexaéméron*, 2nd ed., sc 26 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1968).

18 *Hex* (PG 44, 120D–121C); see Norris, *Homilies*, xxiv–xxv.

19 Norris, xxvi.

between the perceptible and material realm over against the intelligible and nonmaterial realm, he in turn immediately divided the intelligible nature into two kinds as follows:

... the intelligible nature is also divided into two kinds. The first is uncreated and is that which brings intelligible realities into being. It is what it is eternally and is in every respect self-identical The second, however, has been brought into existence by an act of creation. It looks eternally upon the First Cause of the things that are and is preserved in every respect in the good by its participation in what transcends it (cf. Phil 3:3).²⁰

In this way, Gregory Christianized the Platonic division: the Creator and His creatures, which are intellectual, intelligible, and nonmaterial, as well as perceptible and material.²¹

Gregory's division between the Creator and His creatures was discussed at great length in his trinitarian polemics with Eunomius. The first key word here is διάστημα, which can be translated as "interval" or "lying between." This is the most substantial concept by which the uncreated and divine being was profoundly distinguished from created beings in Gregory's trinitarian thought. When Gregory in *Contra Eunomium* 1 soundly criticized Eunomius for his argument on the Father's "being senior," he used and defined the term as "lying between" (μεσότης)²² or "interval in between" (διάστημα κατὰ τὸ μέσον).²³ The concept of διάστημα signified a temporal or spatial interval existing between a beginning and an end and being finite between two ends.²⁴ As such, being senior or younger signifies a temporal interval between two objects that are measured by each other, between which the temporal distance exists.

Using this concept of διάστημα, Gregory identified an inner contradiction in Eunomius' thought. Eunomius had claimed that the Father is senior to the Son because He as God is truly eternal and the Son is not so, but rather created by the Father before creation. On the basis of this false statement, Eunomius denied the co-eternity of the Son with the Father in the Trinity and emphasized the true eternity of the Father as God. Gregory argued that this statement

20 Cant 6 (GNO 6, 174,1–6).

21 Gregory followed his brother Basil on this point. See Elias D. Moutsoulas, "La Pneumatologie du *Contra Eunomium* 1," in Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* 1, 562. For Basil, see Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* 2.31 (SC 305, 128–132).

22 Eun 1.345 (GNO 1, 129,6).

23 Eun 1.355 (GNO 1, 132,5).

24 Eun 1.353 (GNO 1, 131,13–20).

of Eunomius contradicted his own argumentation on the Father being truly eternal. If the Father could be said to be senior to the Son, as Eunomius said, the eternal life of Father should be measured in terms of a temporally finite distance between a temporal point in His eternity and a certain time of the beginning of the Son's existence. As such, the first point in the Father's eternity ought to signify a temporal point when the Father began to exist, so that the life of the Father can be measured and said to be "senior to" that of the Son. Hence, Eunomius' argumentation placed the Father's eternity in a διάστημα. In this sense, Gregory affirmed that Eunomius' argument not only denied the eternity of the Son, but also that of the Father, in contradiction with the very point Eunomius had been trying to make.

Criticizing Eunomius in this way, Gregory distinguished and defined the uncreated being and created beings clearly using the term διάστημα.²⁵ This term was assigned only to created beings lying between ends, that is, lying in finiteness, and was not be applied to God, who is beyond any kind of "lying between." Being uncreated signifies being without διάστημα. In this regard, for Gregory a term like "infiniteness" is synonymous with "no διάστημα"²⁶ in that "infiniteness" means "without finite ends" and "extended in all directions, non-circumscribed by any limit."²⁷ The uncreated being as "no διάστημα" is infinite.

The notion of "without διάστημα" or "infiniteness" included another characteristic of the divine being distinguishing him from the created beings: simplicity.²⁸ Eunomius used the term "greater (or more) or less" in relation to goodness in order to indicate the subordination of the nature of the Son to that of the

25 As David L. Balás has correctly noted, a proper distinction between Creator and creatures is fundamental to the difference between Gregory and Eunomius. David L. Balás, "Eternity and Time in Gregory of Nyssa's *Contra Eunomium*," in *Gregor von Nyssa und die Philosophie: Zweites internationales Kolloquium über Gregor von Nyssa*, eds. Heinrich Dörrie, Margarete Altenburger, and Uta Schramm (Leiden: Brill, 1976), 128–153.

26 The tremendous work of Ekkehard Mühlenberg is still highly valuable for this issue. Ekkehard Mühlenberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der klassischen Metaphysik*, FKG 16 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966).

27 *Eun* 1.345 (GNO 1, 129, 11–13). For Gregory, the word of ἀπερίγραφος or ἀπερίγραπτος, which means "not being circumscribed," was not just attributed to the Father but to the common divinity in which the three hypostases share equally. In this sense, the term περιγραπτός did not signify any subordination in terms of the divine nature when it was used for the definition of the hypostatic property of the persons in the Trinity. See Chistoph von Schönborn, "La 'Lettre 38 de saint Basile' et le problème christologique de l'iconoclisme," *RSPT* 3 (1976): 446–450; Jean Daniélou, "La notion de personne chez les père grecs," in *Bulletin des amis du Cardinal Daniélou* 19 (1983): 3–10; Giulio Maspero, *Trinity and Man: Gregory of Nyssa's Ad Ablabium*, VCSup 86 (Leiden: Brill, 2007), 117–125.

28 Andrew Radde-Gallwitz, *Basile of Caesarea, Gregory of Nyssa, and the Transformation of Divine Simplicity*, OECs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 175–224.

Father. However, Gregory argued, if God has no διάστημα and is infinite, the “greater or less” in goodness cannot be attributed to the divine being. God has no διάστημα and no limitation in being goodness.²⁹ It is not possible for God to become more or less in goodness, but the divine being itself is Goodness itself.³⁰ Consequently, the divine being is “simply” goodness itself, and anything opposite to goodness cannot exist in the divine infinite being.³¹ Simplicity signifies that there is no opposition or contradiction, no composition, and then no changeability in the divine nature which has no διάστημα and is infinite.³²

In this regard, simplicity correlates to the theme of participation. The created beings are not simple in goodness, but a compound of goodness and its opposite, that is, evil. This means that they can be said to be greater or less in goodness by participation in it. Without participation in goodness, they remain in opposition to it. On the contrary, the divine being is totally free from any participation in it, since God Himself is simple and the goodness itself.³³ Participation can be attributed to created beings, not to the divine being.³⁴

29 *Eun* 1.168–169 (GNO 1, 77,7–22). For the philosophical background in Aristotle and Porphyry to Gregory’s ideas on substance and the “more or less” (which signifies variation of degree) in terms of the difference between substance and accidents, see Giulio Maspero, “Trinitarian Theology in Gregory of Nyssa’s *Contra Eunomium* 1: The Interplay between Ontology and Scripture,” in Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* 1, 452–454. Maspero argued that this philosophical background forms the reason why Gregory criticized Eunomius’ argument on the grounds that it did not correspond either with Scripture or with common notions (*Eun* 1.186 [GNO 1, 81,17–18]).

30 *Eun* 1.233–234 (GNO 1, 95,5–20, especially 95,12–15).

31 *Eun* 3.7.60 (GNO 2, 236,3–13).

32 Basile Krivochéine, “Simplicity of the Divine Nature and the Distinctions in God, According to St Gregory of Nyssa,” *SVTQ* 21, no. 2 (1977): 91–93, 103–104. He emphasized that the definition of simplicity as “absence of distinction” was “an idea familiar to medieval Latin scholasticism, but is alien to the thought of Gregory of Nyssa.” In particular, he emphasized that Gregory’s idea of simplicity did not contradict his distinction between nature and activity. He correctly noted: “The distinction between the incognoscible nature and the distinguishable energies which allow us some form of knowledge of and participation in God, constitutes a fundamental feature of Gregory’s theology For Gregory these distinctions between nature and energy do not destroy the divine simplicity, for the energies are not mutually contradictory and do not make the nature into a composite” (104). In the patristic tradition, Georgios I. Mantzaridis’ notion of simplicity is similar to that of Krivochéine. See Georgios I. Mantzaridis, “Simplicity of God According to St Gregory Palamas,” in *Triune God: Incomprehensible but Knowable; The Philosophical and Theological Significance of St Gregory Palamas for Contemporary Philosophy and Theology*, ed. Constantinos Athanasopoulos (Newcastle-upon-Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016), 19–27.

33 *Eun* 1.233–234, 270, 282–293 (GNO 1, 95, 105, 109–110).

34 *Eun* 1.275 (GNO 1, 106–107). In this sense, creatures, and in particular those that are intellec-

Besides the themes of simplicity and ‘no participation,’ also the concept of the eternity of the divine being was deduced from the concept of *διάστημα*. The concept of eternity was treated particularly at the end of the first book of *Contra Eunomium*. Eunomius identified ‘unbegotten’ with the term eternity. Yet Gregory could not agree, since ‘unbegotten’ does not fully denote the eternity. If the divine being does not exist in any kind of *διάστημα* and is infinite, the eternal life of God cannot be confined by any kind of end or beginning.³⁵ The concept of ‘unbegotten,’ however, just denotes ‘no beginning’ in the divine life. The life of God should be said to be endless. Hence, the eternity of God cannot be defined by ‘unbegotten,’ but must be expressed as ‘without *διάστημα*.’ In other words, eternity means “without any temporal distance” and as such is timelessness.³⁶

Angels, which were created as intellectual creatures, have the same limit in these divine characteristics as human beings do. Even though they are superior to human beings in their capacity to seek out “sublime things by sheer unimpeded power of knowledge” “with no intervening sense-organs,” Gregory said, “their ability also falls almost as far short of understanding the divine as does ours.”³⁷ In short, they are finite, and the Creator is infinite.³⁸

Gregory thus distinguished what the uncreated being is from what created beings are using the themes of *διάστημα*, infiniteness, simplicity, participation, and eternity. God exists without *διάστημα* and He is infinite, simple in goodness without more or less participation in it, and eternal in timelessness.³⁹

tual, exist on the border between goodness and its opposite. Gregory’s spiritual theology can be captured by the ontological distinction between God and His creatures in terms of simplicity and participation.

35 *Eun* 1.670–672 (GNO 1, 218–219).

36 There has been discussion among patristic scholars on whether Gregory’s concept of eternity signifies timelessness or infinite time. A logical nexus in Gregory’s thought needs to be considered among the terms *διάστημα*, infiniteness, and time. At bottom, the concept of infiniteness is comprehended by the concept of *διάστημα*: infiniteness means that there is no *διάστημα*. Similarly, *διάστημα* is for Gregory the characteristic of time or, more precisely, probably a synonym of time itself. Hence, “no *διάστημα*” signifies “no temporal distance,” and then “no time.” See Mühlhberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes*, 147–205; Hans Boersma, “Overcoming Time and Space: Gregory of Nyssa’s Anagogical Theology,” *J ECS* 20, no. 4 (2012): 575–612.

37 *Eun* 2.69 (GNO 1, 246,7–16).

38 *Eun* 2.70 (GNO 1, 246,16).

39 Regarding Gregory’s ontological distinction between the uncreated Being and created beings, Alden A. Mosshammer claimed that his notion does not have any counterpart in the Greek philosophical tradition. See Alden A. Mosshammer, “The Created and the Uncreated in Gregory of Nyssa’s *Contra Eunomium* I 270–295 (GNO 1, 105–113),” in Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* I, 384–411. For a good study of the same idea in regard to *Eun*

2.3 *θεολογία and οἰκονομία*

From the distinction between Creator and His creatures, the names or concepts that proved problematic in the trinitarian debates must be understood appropriately in relation to what the divine being is. For Gregory, *θεολογία* means interpreting and understanding names or concepts attributed to the divine being by human *ἐπίνοιαι* in a way appropriate to what the divine being is.

Two examples can be provided here, both of which were substantial concepts or names in the fourth century trinitarian debates. The first is the term ‘begetting.’ Eunomius identified this term with other words like creating or producing, and subordinated the Son to the divine nature of the Father because the latter is unbegotten but the former begotten and created. Gregory charged, however, that Eunomius’ argumentation was a typical error in Bible interpretation. When used under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, the term begetting is not a term attributed to created beings.⁴⁰ Rather, it must be understood in concordance with “what the divine being is.”⁴¹ As such, so Gregory continued, begetting has a totally different significance here compared to when it is used in connection with material creation or corporeal production. Besides, the word ‘son’ should be attributed to the Son in a way appropriate to the divine nature. When Gregory criticized Eunomius for his corporeal understanding of the word son in relation to ‘passion,’ he said: “Truth will surely answer you on his behalf, that the mystery of the study of God (*θεολογία*) is one thing, the study of the nature of bodies in flux quite another. They are separated by a large gap. Why do you link incompatible things together in your book? Why do you soil what is pure with sordid argument? Why verbalize the incorporeal with the passions of the body? Do not discuss the nature of things above on the basis of those below.”⁴² In contrast with Eunomius, Gregory did *θεολογία* to interpret the terms attributed to the divine being in a manner appropriate to what the divine being is.

In Gregory’s mind, therefore, Eunomius failed in doing *θεολογία* with concepts attributed to the divine being.⁴³ This failure led to a related mistake in his comprehension of *οἰκονομία*. Eunomius tried to deduce from *οἰκονομία* that

2 and 3, see Xavier Batllo, “Une évolution de Grégoire? La distinction *κτιστόν/ ἄκτιστον* du CE I au CE III,” in Leemans and Cassin, *Contra Eunomium III*, 489–499.

40 *Eun* 3.6.28–29, 6.30–31 (GNO 2, 196–197).

41 *Eun* 3.6.30–40 (GNO 2, 196–200).

42 *Eun* 3.2.24 (GNO 2, 60, 3–9).

43 For a similar difference between Basil of Caesarea and Eunomius in their respective understanding of *θεολογία*, see Giulio Maspero and Orlando Solano Pinzón, “Essere, storia e misericordia: L’oikonomia nella discussione tra Gregorio di Nissa e Eunomio,” *Theologica Xaveriana* 186 (2018): 8–9.

the nature of the Son was not divine but changeable and material. In the eyes of his opponent, however, this claim confirmed that he had failed in understanding what God's οἰκονομία is and in doing θεολογία in connection with οἰκονομία.

For Gregory, οἰκονομία was basically a Christo-centric concept. The incarnation and the passion on the cross of the Son belonged to οἰκονομία. The term "being created" of Prov 8:22 was thus interpreted as οἰκονομία of incarnation,⁴⁴ and the passion on the cross was called οἰκονομία.⁴⁵ In this regard, the term was not related immediately to the divine nature, but rather deeply connected to "having become the human being" by God's love toward humankind (φιλανθρωπία).⁴⁶ The cause of God's οἰκονομία for human beings is not any changeable nature, but God's φιλανθρωπία and the free choice from the love. Gregory wrote the following:

But just as he is called God and Man, Son of God and Son of Man, form of God and form of a slave, being some of these in his transcendent nature, and becoming the others by the dispensation of his kindness to men (κατὰ τὴν φιλάνθρωπον οἰκονομίαν), so also, being only begotten God, he becomes the Firstborn of all creation, only begotten as he who is at the paternal breast, but, in those who are being saved through the new creation, Firstborn of creation both in deed and in name.⁴⁷

The teaching of the Gospel, so Gregory insisted, is no different from his own argumentation as follows:

The teaching of the Gospel about the Lord being a mixture of the exalted and divine with the lowly and human, we attach each kind of idea to one or other of the elements observed in the mystery, as appropriate, the human to the human, the exalted to the Godhead; and we say that, inasmuch as the Son is God, he is of course impassible and pure, but if any suffering is attributed to him in the Gospel, he carried out such an act through the humanity, which was of course susceptible of suffering.⁴⁸

In this regard, the biblical discourse of οἰκονομία is not immediately related to what the divine nature of the Son is. Rather, the divine nature is an object of

44 *Eun* 3.1.50, 3.34; *Eun* 1.298–303.

45 *Eun* 3.3.38, 4.49 (GNO 2, 120–121, 153).

46 *Eun* 3.10.30 (GNO 2, 301,22).

47 *Eun* 3.2.55 (GNO 2, 70,22–71,2).

48 *Eun* 3.4.8 (GNO 2, 136,8–22); see also *Or cat* 32 (GNO 3/4, 79,3–12).

θεολογία. By doing θεολογία “in” οἰκονομία, the divine nature of the Son should be recognized as being common to the Father also “in” His οἰκονομία. Gregory wrote:

... it is possible to apply a kind of scientific rule to sort out the meanings of the divine names. Some of them indicate his exalted and ineffable glory, others show the variety of his providential care (τῆς προνοητικῆς οἰκονομίας); so that if (hypothetically speaking) there were no beneficiary, those words would not be applied to him, which describe his beneficence. Those names which express what is proper to God, are properly and correctly applicable to the only begotten God, even without reference to his governance (τῶν οἰκονομουμένων).⁴⁹

Yet Eunomius did not try to understand οἰκονομία as Gregory did, and deduced from it that the nature of the Son is not totally divine but changeable and material. Gregory, on the contrary, claimed that christological οἰκονομία should not be interpreted to suggest any difference between the nature of the Son from the nature of the Father, but rather to demonstrate the divine common love for mankind (φιλανθρωπία) which belongs to both the Father and the Son by doing θεολογία.

2.4 *ἐνέργεια and Names*

Until now, the basic themes of Gregory's theological epistemology have been studied: ἐπίνοια, distinction of the uncreated being and created beings, and θεολογία and οἰκονομία. All of these themes are interconnected. Human discourse on God is not identified with the divine being itself but is a conceptual thought about it. While Eunomius stated that terms for realities were created and provided by the creator, for Gregory there was no doubt that God created realities, but that their names or titles depend on the human ability of ἐπίνοια. In this regard, human discourse about God is limited by the capacity of the human intellect. The reason for this argument clearly traces back to Gregory's definition of what the divine being is and its distinction of what created beings are. An infinite, simple, and eternal being without any kind of διάστημα cannot be grasped by a finite, compound, and temporal intellect that is limited to every kind of διάστημα. The infinite being is incomprehensible for the limited intellect. Likewise, the distinction between the divine being and created beings must be seriously reckoned with in discourse on God's οἰκονομία. The divine

49 Eun 3.1.131–132 (GNO 2, 48,1–9).

nature of the Son in οἰκονομία was not damaged by His works in the human flesh for our salvation from His φιλανθρωπία, but is accurately recognized and confessed by doing θεολογία.

What, then, was an appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity according to Gregory? Briefly stated (see pp. 107–109 below for a more detailed analysis), for him it is an upward progress of the human mind to superior understanding of what the divinity is. This progress proceeds through names or titles revealed about God's ἐνέργεια toward a more appropriate understanding of what the Trinity is. That progress was called “anagogic” (ἀναγωγικός), where the word “anagogic” for Gregory literally signified “going up to.”⁵⁰ This approach was based on the relationship between ἐνέργεια and names or titles.

2.4.1 ἐνέργεια

Even if the infinite being is beyond the finite intellect, for Gregory God is not hidden from human sight. The divine being in fact cannot be hidden, since God acts for human beings from His love for them (φιλανθρωπία).⁵¹ God is the one who does his ἐνέργεια, which can be translated and comprehended as a movement of nature (φύσεως κίνησις),⁵² for the human being. He becomes an object of the human mind in terms of His ἐνέργεια.⁵³ For this argument, we need to grasp Gregory's general idea of the distinction and relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια based on his critical approach to Eunomius' concept of the distinction and relationship.

50 In particular *Or cat 2* (GNO 3/4, 12,4–8); Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 211. For the influence of Origen on Gregory, see James H. Srawley, ed., *The Catechetical Oration of Gregory of Nyssa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903), 13: “It is used by him [Origen] to denote the process by which the reader of Scripture ascends from the literal and moral meaning of Scripture to its spiritual significance.”

51 *Eun* 2.417–419 (GNO 1, 348,10–21).

52 *Eun* 2.211 (GNO 1, 211,15).

53 *Eun* 2.12–13, 149 (GNO 1, 230,24–30, 268,25–269,2); *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 48,22–49,1, 50,20–51,16). For the translation of this Greek word, I follow Hall who comments: “One might use, as Moore did, the English word ‘energy.’ I have rejected this, on the ground that ‘energy’ is not what the Greek means by ἐνέργεια. I note that it is not among the meanings given for ἐνέργεια in the *Patristic Greek Lexicon*. ‘Energy’ is in English a metaphor borrowed from mechanics, and its primary meaning is given in the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* of 1982 as ‘force, vigour (of speech, action, person),’ and only secondarily ‘active operation,’ which comes near the Greek. In fact, it means what δύνάμις means in Greek, thus moving into the wrong theological dimension, where *potentia* and *actus* are opposites and not synonyms. If transliteration is thought desirable, the Greek should be represented by *energeia* to make the point clear.” Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium I*, 71.

Gregory provided a critical summary of Eunomius' comprehension of the relation between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια within the Trinity in *Contra Eunomium* 1.205–222 and 242–260. Eunomius probably conceived ἐνέργεια as powers that produce something (τὰς ἀποτελεστικές δυνάμεις),⁵⁴ or as an activity or movement “formed by part of the whole power of the agent”⁵⁵ “deliberately and voluntarily” (προαιρετικῶς καὶ αὐτεξουσίως)⁵⁶ “from deliberate decision” (ἐκ προνοίας),⁵⁷ and externally accompanying (ἔξωθεν παρεπομένην) οὐσία.⁵⁸ From there, Eunomius thought that activity was substantially separated from οὐσία, and distinguished ontologically between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. He even introduced this notion into his view on the Trinity. If the activity of creating or making is not the same ontologically as the being (οὐσία) of the Father, so he claimed, the creation of the Son is not immediately from the Father but from the activity of creating or making. Moreover, activity is not the same as its result.⁵⁹ Consequently, the Son becomes ontologically different from the Father and His activity of creating or making.

Gregory disavowed Eunomius' interpolation in terms of the intra-trinitarian relationship. The following passage gives explicit expression to his criticism of Eunomius:

What then is this activity which accompanies the God of the universe, but is thought of as before the only begotten and defining his being? A kind of [quasi-]substantial power, which subsists by itself and apparently operates by voluntary motion (δυνάμεις τις οὐσιώδης καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑφεστῶσα καὶ τὸ δοκοῦν ἐργαζομένη δι' αὐτεξουσίου κινήματος). This therefore is father to the Lord. And why should the title ‘Father’ continue to be bruited about for the God over all, if it is not he, but some activity externally accompanying him, that produced the Son?⁶⁰

54 *Eun* 1.206 (GNO 1, 86,22–24). For the philosophical background of the Aristotelian concept of ἐνέργεια (Aristotle, *Metaphysica* 8.6.1), see Raymond Winling, *Grégoire de Nysse: Contre Eunome I* 147–691, SC 524 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 2010), 46: “Le mots ἐνέργεια a comme sens premier celui de «force en action» par opposition à «force en puissance».”

55 *Eun* 1.244 (GNO 1, 98,9–16): “... μάλλον δὲ οὐχὶ δύνανται, ἀλλὰ δυνάμει ἐνέργειαν, καθὼς αὐτὸς ὀνομάζει, ἵνα μὴ πάσης τῆς τοῦ ἐνεργούντος δυνάμει ἐργον ᾗ τὸ ἀποτέλεσμα, ἀλλὰ τινος μερικῆς ἐνεργείας τοσοῦτον ἐκ τῆς πάσης δυνάμει κινήσεως ...”

56 *Eun* 1.208 (GNO 1, 87,17–18).

57 *Eun* 1.209 (GNO 1, 87,19–20).

58 *Eun* 1.247 (GNO 1, 99,11–12).

59 *Eun* 1.211 (GNO 1, 88,14–17).

60 *Eun* 1.246–247 (GNO 1, 99,5–12).

If Eunomius' argumentation is accepted, the activity which produced or created the Son becomes external to οὐσία and by itself substantial. In this regard, the Father did not become Father of the Son, but the activity of creating was father, argued Gregory. This thought radically supported Eunomius' statement that the Son is not the same divine being as the Father but a creature. If this argumentation is pushed further, so Gregory continued, "the Holy Spirit will surely no longer be understood as in third place, but in fifth, since on Eunomius' reckoning the activity which accompanies the only begotten, and by which the Holy Spirit was constituted, must surely be counted in between."⁶¹

Eunomius' mistake, however, had been to misunderstand the begetting of the Son from the Father. The eternal begetting of the Son from the Father can never be interrupted by any kind of substantial activity which is external to the οὐσία of the Father. More precisely, there is not a single kind of ἐνέργεια that exists in the intra-trinitarian relationship. Gregory wrote as follows:

Eunomius however, as though he were mentioning plants or seeds or something else in creation, links the action of the Creator to the existence (ὕπoστασις) of the only begotten. If it had been a stone or a stick or something similar that was under consideration, it would be logical to think of the prior existence of the Creator's action; but if our opponents concede that the Only-begotten God is Son and exists by begetting, why are the same words applied to him and to the lowest parts of creation, and why do they reckon that what is truly said of the ant and the gnat, may be religiously used also of the Lord?⁶²

Gregory rather identified "begetting" with the hypostasis of the Father. When he criticized Eunomius' statement that "For he [the Son] who has his being from begetting, before he was begotten, was not,"⁶³ he observed the following: "He who has his being from begetting,' he [Eunomius] says, 'before he was begotten, was not.' If he says 'begetting' as substitute for 'Father', I too assent, and no one will contradict. For it is possible to say the same thing with either word, whether by saying that Abraham begot Isaac, or by saying instead of 'begot' that he 'became the father' of Isaac."⁶⁴ Hence, for Gregory Eunomius' distinction between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια was not relevant to the intra-trinitarian

61 *Eun* 1.249 (GNO 1, 99,20–24); cf. Eunomius, *Apologia* 25.4–5, 25,23–25, 28,14–15 (Vaggione, *The Extant Works*, 66, 68, 74); Moutsoulas, "La Pneumatologie," 558.

62 *Eun* 3.2.129 (GNO 2, 94,13–23).

63 *Eun* 3.8.27 (GON 2, 248,25–27).

64 *Eun* 3.8.30 (GNO 2, 250,1–7).

relationship, of which one can only speak according to the one divinity and hypostasis. Eunomius was accused of interpolating ἐνέργεια into the hypostatic relationship between Father and Son. As Bernard Pottier has correctly indicated, the term ἐνέργεια was not accepted by Gregory for the Trinity *in se*.⁶⁵

Moreover, ἐνέργεια cannot be commensurate with what the divine being is. As Gregory said in *Contra Eunomium* 3.8.26, ἐνέργεια surely is “attached equally to the one enacted upon and to the one acting, just as in any construction it is possible to observe the action alike in what is being made and in the maker, inseparable from the craftsman and at the same time exhibited in the construction of the products.”⁶⁶ Again we wrote the following:

An activity that brings something into effect cannot subsist simply by itself, without any recipient of the movement which action causes, as when we say that the smith is active in some way, and that the material supplied is acted upon by his craft. These must therefore have a relation to each other, being the active and the passive potency, and if either of them is removed by the argument, the remaining one could not subsist by itself. If there is no passive, there will be no active.⁶⁷

In other words, activity involves a distinction between the acting one and the one that is passively acted upon. If this distinction is attributed to the relationship between Father and Son by the use of the term ἐνέργεια within the Trinity, so Gregory insisted, it means that the Father is active and the Son a passive effect of the active acting of the Father. In his eyes, however, it is ridiculous for the divine being of the Son to be said to be passive.⁶⁸ Therefore, the term ἐνέργεια, if it could be used for the intra-trinitarian relation, signifies no more than the hypostatic existence as Father for the intra-trinitarian relationship between Father and Son, without any distinction between ‘active’ and ‘passive’ as commonly connoted by the term.

Even if ἐνέργεια and its distinction from οὐσία were not relevant to the intra-trinitarian relationship, for Gregory the ‘how’ of defining the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια is important for understanding God’s οἰκονομία. On this point, his idea relates to his criticism of Eunomius’ thought on how ἐνέργεια exists. As summarized by Gregory, Eunomius seems to have thought that

65 Bernard Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ selon Grégoire de Nysse* (Namur: Culture et Vérité, 1994), 116.

66 *Eun* 3.8.26 (GNO 2, 248,10–15).

67 *Eun* 2.372–373 (GNO 2, 335,8–15).

68 *Eun* 2.376–377 (GNO 1, 336).

ἐνέργεια exists by itself separated from οὐσία, given Gregory's criticism that he conceptualizes the activity of begetting as father for the Son. From there Gregory points out a potential heretical consequence arising from Eunomius' idea as follows:

The doctrine that all things came to be through the Son will in these ways be proved untenable, some other subsistent (ὑπόστασις) senior to the only begotten having been prefabricated by the modern theologian, and the cause of the creation of all things will presumably be attributed to that, since the construction of the only begotten himself according to Eunomius' argument depends on that activity.⁶⁹

If Eunomius' idea is accepted, the doctrine of creation collapses: The Son cannot be the Creator at all, but the activity of which Eunomius thought that it caused the Son to exist. Against this ridiculous consequence of Eunomius' idea, Gregory claimed that while ἐνέργεια as movement of οὐσία is not the same as οὐσία, the distinction between ἐνέργεια and οὐσία is not so ontologically meaningful that ἐνέργεια can have a separated substance so as to be creator for creatures.

Nevertheless, even for Gregory, ἐνέργεια could neither be nothing by itself nor totally non-substantial or non-existent, since a result of ἐνέργεια must be something that exists. This concern was expressed in Gregory's comment, which follows the just quoted passage of *Contra Eunomium* 1.250, on an anticipated argument from Eunomius, which seeks to avoid the absurd possibility of the activity of begetting being the Creator of all creatures:

But if to avoid these absurdities he [Eunomius] says that activity, whose effect he posits to be the Son, is something non-hypostatic (ἀνυπόστατόν), he must again tell us how what is not follows from what is, and how what does not subsist produces what does. On this argumentation the nonexistent will be found to come after God, while things which are not become the cause of things that are, and things which in their own nature do not subsist prescribe the nature of those which do, and the power which effects and fabricates the whole creation will be circumscribed by what is by definition nonexistent.⁷⁰

69 *Eun* 1.250 (GNO 1, 99,20–100,6).

70 *Eun* 1.251 (GNO 1, 100,6–15).

In other words, in this comment Gregory thought that if the results of ἐνέργεια are hypostatic or substantial, an activity itself should be substantial in a certain way even if it is not substantial by itself. Therefore, when Gregory's ideas in the above passages of *Contra Eunomium* 1.250 and 251 against Eunomius are put together, it means that ἐνέργεια does exist as substantial (and not "non-hypostatic" [ἀνυπόστατόν]), albeit not by itself but by οὐσία.

In light of the above, Gregory's concrete understanding of the dynamic relation between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια can be explained by the definition of ἐνέργεια as movement of nature (φύσεως κίνησις).⁷¹ In recent times, most notably Johannes Zachhuber and Giulio Maspero have examined the importance of the term φύσις (nature) in Gregory's theology.⁷² Their common insight on the term is probably captured well in the following statement from Maspero: "Thus the Gregorian concept of φύσις goes well beyond any philosophical elaboration, reuniting in itself the ontological profundity of οὐσία in its intensive dimension, universal openness in its extensive dimension, and intimately tied to this, a properly historical dimension. These together allow for a profound, properly theological, harmonization with the notion of hypostasis."⁷³ In other words, the term φύσις for Gregory does not signify only a specific essence (οὐσία), which is "the intensive dimension" and exists in ὑπόστασις. Rather, it connotes also the totality of a class or species of such individuals.⁷⁴ Hence, Gregory spoke of the distinction between ὑπόστασις and φύσις as follows:

71 *Eun* 1.211 (GNO 1, 211,15).

72 Johannes Zachhuber, *Human Nature in Gregory of Nyssa: Philosophical Background and Theological Significance*, VCSup 46 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 64–70 and *passim*; "Once Again: Gregory of Nyssa on Universals," *JTS* 56, no. 1 (2005): 75–98; Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 1–27 and *passim*.

73 Maspero, 26. As Maspero explained, Reinhard M. Hübner and David L. Balás took a similar approach to the distinction between οὐσία and φύσις. See Reinhard M. Hübner, *Die Einheit des Leibes Christi bei Gregor von Nyssa: Untersuchungen zum Ursprung der physischen Erlösungslehre* (Leiden: Brill, 1974); David L. Balás, "The Unity of Human Nature in Basil's and Gregory of Nyssa's Polemics against Eunomius," *StPatr* 19 (1976): 275–281; "Plenitudo Humanitatis: The Unity of Human Nature in the Theology of Gregory of Nyssa," in *Disciplina Nostra. Essays in Memory of Robert F. Evans*, ed. Donald F. Winslow (Cambridge, MA: Philadelphia Patristic Foundation, 1979), 115–131.

74 Zachhuber, *Human Nature*, 78. Considering these two perspectives on the significance of φύσις, Maspero like Balás distinguished slightly between the two terms φύσις and οὐσία, arguing that the latter is not synonymous with the former in the second aspect of the totality. For Balás, see note 73 above. Zachhuber, by way of contrast, claimed that the two terms φύσις and οὐσία probably were indeed synonymous also in the second perspective. Zachhuber, *Human Nature*, 122.

But it does not follow that if anyone is a man he is therefore Luke or Stephen: but the idea of the persons admits of that separation which is made by the peculiar attributes considered in each severally, and when they are combined is presented to us by means of number; yet their nature is one, at union in itself, and an absolutely indivisible unit, not capable of increase by addition or of diminution by subtraction, but in its essence being and continually remaining one, inseparable even though it appear in plurality, continuous, complete, and not divided with the individuals who participate in it. And as we speak of a people, or a mob, or an army, or an assembly in the singular in every case, while each of these is conceived as being in plurality, so according to the more accurate expression, man would be said to be one, even though those who are exhibited to us in the same nature make up a plurality.⁷⁵

In this regard, Maspero again claimed in respect to the universal nature of human beings that “One could thus propose the hypothesis by which the concept of universal nature is a highly original Nyssian synthesis of a Platonic element—the intensive aspect, immutable and always identical to itself, that is, of the φύσις considered as κατ’ οὐσίαν—and of a second element of Aristotelian origin—the extensive aspect, that is the totality of all men.”⁷⁶

75 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 40,24–41,12); see also *Op hom* 17, 23 (PG 44, 188–191, 209–212); Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 55. For the English translation of *Abl*, I am indebted to *On “Not Three Gods.” To Ablabius, in Select Writings and Letters of Gregory, Bishop of Nyssa*, trans. William Moore and Henry Austin Wilson, *NPNF* 2, vol. 5 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1979), 331–336.

76 Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 17. Similar ideas on the concept of universal nature were found in Harold F. Cherniss, *The Platonism of Gregory of Nyssa* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1931), 33; Hübner, *Die Einheit*, 83–87; Balás, “Plenitudo Humanitatis,” 119–121; Zachhuber, *Human Nature*, 114–118; Zachhuber, “Once Again,” 75–78. In this regard, Maspero pointed to the weakness of Pottier’s position. Pottier had suggested that in Gregory the Aristotelian distinction between the first οὐσία, which is a concrete individual, and the second one, which is a species, does not obtain for God due to His immateriality: “The concept of *ousia* is theological and not philosophical: it would resume in itself the characteristics of both the first substance and the second one.” Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 16; Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ*, 95–97, 106. When Pottier simply identified the two substances in Gregory’s theology, Maspero said that his position fails to recognize the extensive dimension, that is, the totality of a class or species, which the Peripatetic school attributed to Aristotle’s second substance and which Gregory expressed using the term φύσις. Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 16–17. Karfiková’s position differs from Maspero and Zachhuber in acknowledging the collective aspect of the universal nature. Nevertheless, she claimed, the aspect did not signify the sum total of historical people who would come after each other in the temporal sequence. It was rather connected to the fact that God sees human nature collectively all

Moreover, in its historical dimension nature is dynamic. This dimension is related to the functional dimension of nature. For Gregory, nature does not exist statically, but moves itself. In other words, nature exists in movement. For instance, human nature is not static but in progress toward God, as will be explained in greater detail later on in this chapter (see pp. 157–166 below). This dynamic dimension of nature is likewise attributed by Gregory to the divine nature. For the divine nature, activity is movement that flows from nature. For this point, there are two crucial passages in Gregory's corpus. The first reads:

If we cannot first explain what is being said about God before we think it, and if we think it by means of what we learn from his actions, and if before the act there exists the potency, and the potency depends on the divine will, and the will resides in the authority of the divine Nature—does that not make it clear to us that it is a matter of applying to the realities the terms we use to indicate what happens, and the words are a kind of shadow of the realities, matching the movements of things which exist?⁷⁷

The context of this passage is Gregory's criticism of Eunomius' idea on the relation between names and οὐσία. As noted, Eunomius saw an immediate correspondence between each name and the οὐσία called by that name. Gregory, however, rejected this notion and claimed that names or terms are made by conceptual thought. In relation to this criticism, Gregory added the argument that what the human mind primarily perceives or thinks about the divinity is not the divine nature but the divine activities. Gregory also revealed what he thought to be the process from the divine nature to the activity: the divine nature, its authority or the divine will, power, and activity.

In this linear process, the last element (i.e., activity) is revealed to be intrinsically related to the divine nature. In the second key passage, Gregory expressed this as a flowing from nature as follows:

The scriptural creation narrative, however, is a sort of introduction to theology for beginners, presenting the power of the divine Nature by things more easily understood, and easiest to take in for learning ideas is sense-perception. That is why, by putting first, "God said this should be," Moses presents the power of his initiating will, and by adding, "And it was so,"

at once. Karfiková, "Ad Ablabium," 141–142; cf. Richard Cross, "Gregory of Nyssa on Universals," *VC* 56, no. 4 (2002): 372–410.

77 *Eun* 2.150 (GNO 1, 269, 6–14).

he indicates that in the case of the divine Nature there is no difference between will and act. He is teaching that in God's case the thought leads straight to the act, and that the action does not follow after the thought, but the two are to be reckoned simultaneous and of a piece, the mental act and the power which completes the deed. The account allows no thought of anything between the purpose and the execution, but just as the light shines together with the kindling of the flame, coming from it and shining simultaneously with it, in the same way, while the existence of things created is the work of the divine will, yet it does not come after the decision in second place. It is not like other beings whose nature includes the power to act, where one observes both the potential and the accomplished action. We say for instance that the one who is skilled in the science of shipbuilding is potentially a shipbuilder, but he is effective only when he displays his science in practice. It is not however like that with the blessed Life: rather, in that Life what is thought is in its entirety action and performance, the will passing instantly to its intended goal.⁷⁸

After accusing Eunomius of remaining trapped in corporeal or material thinking in relation to God and Moses' description in Gen 1, Gregory offered an interpretation of what he thought Moses actually intended to teach in the quoted passage. The point of the passage is that in the divine nature there is no difference between will and act and between thinking and power to act.⁷⁹ In other words, there is no "potential" in God, in contrast to human nature where there is indeed a distinction between potency and act. The divine nature is compared to light, which by nature shines from the simultaneous kindling of the flame. In short, activity flows from nature as movement of nature.⁸⁰

78 *Eun* 2.228–230 (GNO 1, 292,10–293,9).

79 Krivochéine, "Simplicity," 83; Elias D. Moutsoulas, "«Essence» et «énergies» de Dieu selon St. Grégoire de Nysse," *StPatr* 18 (1989): 517–528.

80 The simultaneity of will and act in the divine nature was emphasized by Gregory even in connection with the begetting of the Son from the Father. As Gregory of Nazianzus said in *Orationes theologicae* 29.6–7, there can be no moment intervening between the moment when the Father willed to generate the Son and when the Son did not yet exist. In this sense, the theme of the will does not play a role in relation to the generation of the Son (not only in Gregory of Nazianzus, but also in Epiphanius, *Ancoratus* 52; Ambrose of Milan *De fide* 4.9.103; Pseudo-Athanasius, *De trinitate* 10.137). While Gregory of Nyssa was profoundly cautious of any possibility of διάστημα in the Trinity, he did boldly claim that the theme of will did not need to be eliminated from the relationship between the Father and the Son in that there was no other cause than the Father for the generation and He was not forced by some other necessity. Otherwise, the generation can be understood in a Neoplatonic sense (*Eun* 3.6.16, 18). Together with this bold claim, however, Gregory

The message of the two passages above corresponds neatly with Gregory's notion of there being no intermediary being between God and his Creature. If ἐνέργεια becomes something substantial apart from οὐσία, it exists as intermediary between God and His creature.⁸¹

emphasized that the complete simultaneity in eternity, which means “no διάστημα,” prevents his understanding from being identified with the heretical view on which Gregory of Nazianzus had expressed himself so cautiously (*Eun* 3.6.17–18). Manlio Simonetti, *La crisi ariana nel IV secolo*, SEAug 11 (Roma: IPA, 1975), 472–473; Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 1544–1545.

- 81 Recently, Pottier and Karfiková recognized that ἐνέργεια is connected to the divine nature through power. See Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ*, 107–118; Karfiková, “Ad Ablabium,” 152–154. In particular, Pottier emphasized that ἐνέργεια was attributed by Gregory to the οἰκονομία of the Triune God toward His creature, and that δύναμις was strongly connected to the divine nature and attributed to the intra-trinitarian relation. When Karfiková criticized the position of Krivochéinea and Moutsoulas for the influence of the Palamite theology in their idea and accepted Pottier's idea, she said: “Das, was die göttliche Natur umhüllt oder umgibt, können daher kaum die Tätigkeiten selbst sein, sondern vielmehr das, was aufgrund dieser Tätigkeiten erkannt wird, nämlich die göttliche Macht (die Natur selbst bleibt unerkennbar)” (153). The position of Pottier and Karfiková must, however, be reexamined if their argument probably signifies that ἐνέργεια is something ontologically different from δύναμις. If their view sharply distinguishes δύναμις and ἐνέργεια in that the latter is limited just for created beings and the former attributed only to the uncreated οὐσία, and if their emphasis on this distinction sounds ontological, it seems not to correspond with Gregory's insistence on there being no intermediary in the relationship between God and His creatures because their emphasis on the distinction turns ἐνέργεια into something intermediate between God's dynamic and His creature. In this regard, Maspero's position is more convincing. In his conclusion on the relationship between Gregory and Palamism, he did not deny the skepticism of Endre von Ivánka, but remarked similarity between them. For Gregory and Palamas, ἐνέργεια is the “natural” activity of the divine οὐσία, and there is no anything intermediate between the active God and His creature. In this regard, δύναμις and ἐνέργεια is not distinguished by his reading of Gregory as sharply as Pottier and Karfiková did. See Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 52. For Ivánka, see Endre von Ivánka, *Plato Christianus: Übernahme und Umgestaltung des Platonismus durch die Väter* (Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1964), 430–432. Additionally, when Michel R. Barnes examined the technical sequence of the causal language (φύσις—δύναμις—ἐνέργεια), he offered a more precise account of the ontological sequence among these terms in Gregory than Pottier and Karfiková. In his reading, Gregory uses the term δύναμις to indicate that the unitary and simple divine δύναμις, being intrinsic to the divine φύσις, causes ἐνέργεια to characterize the essence of the nature itself *ad extra*. In this understanding, as Lewis Ayres comments, δύναμις is interchangeable with φύσις, and ἐνέργεια *ad extra* is not ontologically distinct from φύσις—δύναμις. See, Michel R. Barnes, *The Power of God: Δύναμις in Gregory of Nyssa's Trinitarian Theology* (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2001), 298–305 (especially, 296, 301–302); “The Background and Use of Eunomius' Causal Language,” in *Arianism after Arius: Essays on the Development of the Fourth Century Trinitarian Conflicts*, eds. Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 217–236; “Eunomius of Cyzicus and Gregory of Nyssa: Two Traditions of Transcen-

Gregory expressed his concept of ἐνέργεια as movement of nature (φύσεως κίνησις) using the preposition περὶ (about or around) followed by a noun in the accusative. God's ἐνέργεια is "about or around the divine nature" or "about or around God" (περὶ τὸν θεόν).⁸² In these expressions, περὶ and the nouns in the accusative case did not only have a noetic connotation. Gregory emphasized that the human intellect does not know the divine being itself, which is incomprehensible, but rather thinks "about" ἐνέργεια of God. In this usage, the phrase with περὶ and the accusative case is related to cognitive function. The cognitive function of this phrase, however, is based on the ontological function of this phrase in Gregory's theology. The noetic aspect of 'about the divine nature' is intrinsically connected to the ontic aspect of 'around the divine nature.'

A specific passage indicative of the ontological connotation of the phrase περὶ and nouns in the accusative case is found in *Contra Eunomium* 3.6.3. This passage is interesting since it ties the phrase immediately to the divine nature which was revealed in Exod 3:14. Gregory wrote the following:

The word of the Holy Scripture suggests one way of knowing true godhead (θεότης), which Moses is taught by the heavenly voice, when he hears him who said, 'I am he who is' (Exod 3:14). We therefore think that that alone should truly be considered divine, which is deemed to be in existence eternally and infinitely, and everything attributed to [considered about or around] it is always the same, without addition or subtraction (πάν τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρούμενον αἰὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχει, οὔτε προσγινόμενον οὔτε ἀπογινόμενον).⁸³

Here Gregory described what the biblical passage teaches about the divinity: the true divinity is that which itself is "in existence eternally and infinitely," and everything which is considered about or around the divinity is "always the same, without addition or subtraction." In other words, things considered about or around the godhead (πάν τὸ περὶ αὐτὸ θεωρούμενον) have ontologically similar value to the divine nature which is eternal and infinite. The phrase constructed with the preposition περὶ and an accusative pronoun in this passage consequently signifies things that are similarly divine and subsist *around*

dental Causality," VC 52 (1998): 59–87; Lewis Ayres, *Nicaea and Its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 351–355; Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 411n67.

82 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 42,19–43,2).

83 *Eun* 3.6.3 (GNO 2, 186,9–15).

the divine nature. The preposition signifies the natural affinity or intrinsic tie between the two entities written before and after it.⁸⁴

In another passage in *Contra Eunomium* 3.5.60, Gregory explained the ‘how it exists’ (i.e. manner of being) of ‘what is’ as follows:

Every title you can utter is about that which is (περὶ τὸ ὄν)—‘good’, ‘unbegotten’, ‘imperishable’—it is not itself that. In each of these the ‘is’ (τὸ ἐστὶν) is not absent (ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐστὶν ἐκάστῳ τούτων οὐκ ἀπολείπεται). Since then this one, who is good, is also unbegotten (as he is), anyone who promises to give the definition would be wasting his time talking about the attributes, while keeping silent about the being itself, which he promises to explain in his account. To exist unbegotten is one of the attributes of him who is, but the definition of being is one thing, the definition of the manner of being, another (ἄλλος δὲ τοῦ εἶναι καὶ ἄλλος τοῦ πως εἶναι ὁ λόγος).⁸⁵

Gregory related every title to the περὶ phrase and insisted that the phrase signifies “about that which is (περὶ τὸ ὄν)” and “the manner of being (πως εἶναι),” not ‘what it is.’⁸⁶ Nevertheless, he also insisted that “the ‘is’ (τὸ ἐστὶν)” is not absent in titles and the περὶ phrase. Even if this phrase does not express what τὸ ἐστὶν is, it does reveal τὸ ἐστὶν in terms of the ‘how.’ What the περὶ phrase signifies is thus intrinsic to τὸ ἐστὶν.

Gregory usually used the term ἐνέργεια in the expression “ἐνέργεια for our life.”⁸⁷ In other words, he used the term *ad extra*.⁸⁸ What Gregory signified with the expression is summarized in the beginning of the last chapter to the entire *Contra Eunomium* treatise, where he offers an interpretation of the Lord’s

84 Interestingly, Maspero took a similar approach to this passage. See Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 33–34.

85 *Eun* 3.5.60 (GNO 2, 182.4–13).

86 For the discussion about the philosophical background of the term πως εἶναι, see Karfiková, “Ad Ablabium,” 159–165. Bernard Sesboüé and Moreschini both insisted on the Stoic background to Gregory’s use of the term. See Bernard Sesboüé, trans., *Contre Eunome I*, SC 299 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1982), 81, 255n2; Claudio Moreschini, trans., *Opere di Gregorio di Nissa* (Torino: UTET, 1992), 537n30. In contrast, Aristotelian philosophy was identified as the background by André de Halleux. André de Halleux, “Manifesté par le Fils’ aux origines d’une formule pneumatologique,” *RTL* 20, no. 1 (1989): 3–31 (esp. 29n122); cf. Manlio Simonetti, “Genesi e sviluppo della dottrina trinitaria di Basilio di Cesarea,” in *Atti del congresso internazionale su Basilio di Cesarea, la sua età e il basilianesimo in Sicilia* (Messina: Centro di studi umanistici, 1983), 178.

87 *Eun* 2.149 (GNO 1, 268.28–29).

88 For a similar idea, see Pottier, *Dieu et le Christ*, 107–118.

words to Mary in John 20. Interpreting the biblical passage, *Contra Eunomium* 3.10.1–17 says that ἐνέργεια for our life signifies the recovering of the heavenly position of the human being. After the fall, human beings were lost from their position as ‘image of God’ and did not have any capacity or ability to recover it. God returns human beings to their original position by God’s ἐνέργεια for our life. This ἐνέργεια was immediately connected to christological οἰκονομία. Criticizing Eunomius for his misunderstanding of Peter’s sermon in Acts 2:36, Gregory argued that the recovery of the heavenly place of the human being was made possible by the christological οἰκονομία.⁸⁹

This ἐνέργεια for our life is natural ἐνέργεια as well as ἐνέργεια from the free will (*proairesis*). In other words, God’s “natural” ἐνέργεια for human beings is caused by His “love toward mankind” (φιλανθρωπία)⁹⁰ which belongs to the divine nature. In God the activity can neither be separated from the divine nature nor different from the free will of the divine Being.⁹¹ God’s ἐνέργεια is intrinsic to His nature and its movement from φιλανθρωπία.

To summarize the extensive discussion on the notion of ἐνέργεια thus far, Gregory thought that God is known by His ἐνέργεια for human beings. It exists from His φιλανθρωπία to recover the original human position as image of God, and subsists around God’s οὐσία, not by itself. It is a movement of the divine nature and is so intrinsic to nature that it cannot be conceived as anything intermediate between God himself and His creatures. If the term has to be used in relation to the *in se* of the Trinity, it is identical with a hypostatic existence. Otherwise, the Son becomes a passive creature.

2.4.2 Names

God’s ἐνέργεια is revealed in the Bible by way of names or titles. According to Gregory, the saints of the Bible did not speak of what the divine being is, but spoke about or around God (περὶ τὸν θεόν), that is, God’s ἐνέργεια with diverse names or titles.⁹² Names or terms themselves are thus connected to “περὶ τὸν θεόν.” Gregory insisted the following:

But all the terms that are employed to lead us to the knowledge of God have comprehended in them each its own meaning, and you cannot find any word among the terms especially applied to God which is without a distinct sense. Hence it is clear that by any of the terms we use the

89 *Eun* 3.4.63–64, 10.11–15 (GNO 2, 158–159, 293–295).

90 *Eun* 3.10.11 (GNO 2, 293.19).

91 *Eun* 3.6.19–21 (GNO 2, 192–193).

92 *Eun* 2.102, 581–587 (GNO 2, 256, 395–397).

Divine nature itself is not signified, but some one of its surroundings is made known (ὥς ἐκ τούτου δείκνυσθαι μὴ αὐτὴν τὴν θεῖαν φύσιν ὑπὸ τίνος τῶν ὀνομάτων σεσημειῶσθαι, ἀλλὰ τι τῶν περὶ αὐτὴν διὰ τῶν λεγομένων γνωρίζεσθαι).⁹³

Throughout his works, Gregory lists names or titles revealed by Scripture to indicate God's activity for the human race. Among them, the name 'God' is offered as a typical example to demonstrate his understanding of the relationship between ἐνέργεια and the names attributed to God:

Even the word 'God' (θεὸς) we understand to have become prevalent because of the activity of oversight. Because we believe that the Divinity (θεῖον) is present to all things and watches (θεᾶσθαι) all things and penetrates all things, we indicate such an idea with this title, led in this direction by the word of Scripture. The one who says, "My God, look at me," (Ps 21:2 LXX) and, "See, O God," (Ps 83/84:10[9]) and "God knows the secrets of the heart," (Ps 43:22, 44:21) is plainly interpreting the sense inherent in this title, that God (θεὸς) is so called from his watching (θεᾶσθαι).⁹⁴

And again he wrote:

The very title of Godhead (τὸ τῆς θεότητος ὄνομα), however, whether it represents the power of oversight or foresight (εἴτε τὴν ἐποπτικὴν εἴτε τὴν προνοητικὴν ἐξουσίαν σημαίνει), it possesses in a way that befits the human. For he who gives beings the ability to exist, is the God and overseer (θεὸς καὶ ἐπόπτης) of the things made by him.⁹⁵

Just like the name God, all the names and titles in the Bible indicate God's ἐνέργεια ("περὶ τὸν θεόν"). The divine nature, by way of comparison, is beyond every name and title: "To believe him to be above every name is the only fitting way to name God [the only fitting name of God] (Phil 2:9)."⁹⁶

93 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 43,9–15).

94 *Eun* 2.585 (GNO 1, 397,8–16). For the Stoic background to Gregory's idea of the name "God," see Ilona Opelt, "A Christianization of Pagan Etymologies," *StPatr* 5 (1962): 532–540.

95 *Eun* 3.10.10 (GNO 2, 292,23–293,1).

96 *Eun* 2.587 (GNO 1, 397,26–28): "μόνον ἐστὶ θεοῦ προσφυές ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων αὐτὸν εἶναι πιστεύειν ὄνομα."

2.5 *Anagogic Analogy and Faith*

From the relation between ἐνέργεια and the divine names, Gregory claimed that the object of the human intellectual mind (διάνοια) and conceptual thought (ἐπίνοια) are names and titles revealed about God's ἐνέργεια, not the divine nature which is beyond every name. The biblical revelation itself was accommodated to the ability of human thinking. In his interpretation of Heb 1:1, Gregory observed the following:

Rather, just as we signal to deaf people what has to be done by using gestures and hand-signals, not because we ourselves have no voice of our own when we do this, but because it is quite useless to give verbal instructions to those who cannot hear, so, the human race being in a way deaf and unable to understand anything sublime, we hold that the grace of God, which speaks "in diverse parts and manners" in the prophets (Heb 1:1), and frames the verbal expressions of the holy prophets to suit our mental grasp and habit, by these means leads us on to the apprehension of sublime things, not giving instructions in accordance with his own majesty—how should the great be confined in the little?—but in a form which comes down to the level of our small capacity.⁹⁷

Agreeing with his brother, Gregory claimed that our Lord accommodates himself in the same way: "In a similar way, he [Basil] says, the Lord also is by himself whatever he is in nature, and when he is simultaneously named in accordance with his various activities, he does not possess a single title covering them all, but is accorded the name in accordance with each idea which arises in us from those activities."⁹⁸

This accommodation in Scripture was defined by Gregory as the Holy Spirit's οἰκονομία of love toward mankind (ἡ φιλόανθρωπος τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος οἰκονομία)⁹⁹ to cause human intellect and conceptual thought to cooperate in taking an anagogic process of ἀναλογία. While Gregory's use of the term ἀναλογία defies simple categorization and definition,¹⁰⁰ the following passage

97 *Eun* 2.242 (GNO 1, 297,2–15). Here, a classic version of God's revelation as *accommodatio* is found. Recently, Maspero and Solano have underscored the relationship between φύσις, οἰκονομία, and παιδεία in Gregory's theology. Maspero and Pinzón, "Essere, storia e misericordia." See *Eun* 2.424–425 (GNO 1, 350,20–21).

98 *Eun* 2.353 (GNO 1, 329,7–12).

99 *Eun* 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–10).

100 According to Hubertus R. Drobner, the fundamental meaning of analogy in Gregory's treatises denotes "the operations of consideration, reflection, and (mathematical) calculation." It also denotes "derivatively the relations of ratio, correspondence and (even

reveals what Gregory signified with this term in the trinitarian controversy against Eunomius and other heretics:

It does the same on other occasions, when it [οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit] describes the Divinity corporeally, talking about eye, eyelids, ear, fingers, hand, right hand, arm, feet, sandals and the like in connection with God. None of these can be understood (καταλαμβάνεται) in its literal sense of the divine nature, but by elevating (ἀνάγουσα) the instruction, through words familiar in human speech, towards what is easy to envisage, it outlines subjects beyond verbal description, as in a process of analogy (ἀναλογικῶς) we are raised up (ἀναγομένων) by each of the things said about God to a kind of superior understanding (πρὸς τινα ὑψηλοτέραν ὑπόνοιαν).¹⁰¹

Analogia belongs to the οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit in which He uses terms, words, or names familiar to human nature for raising up (ἀνάγειν) the human mind toward a superior understanding (πρὸς τινα ὑψηλοτέραν ὑπόνοιαν) of what the divinity is. In relation to revealed names and terms for divine ἐνέργεια, οἰκονομία as *analogia* encourages the human intellect and conceptual thought to cooperate in order to make progress in this anagogic progress, which literally means upwards progression toward superior understanding. Human intellect and conceptual thought are encouraged by the Spirit's οἰκονομία to understand and conceptualize what the names and terms signify in a way appropriate to what the divinity is.¹⁰²

This progress of anagogic analogy which is the Spirit's οἰκονομία is carried out by faith, so Gregory insisted. In *Contra Eunomium* 2.85 ff., he interpreted the narrative of Abraham allegorically in relation to what Paul said, "walking by faith and not by sight" (2 Cor 5:7). According to Gregory, the narrative did not simply denote "a geographical move (τοπική τις μετάστασις)."¹⁰³ Rather, he said, "Abraham left his own native land, I mean the lowly and earthly way of thinking, and so far as possible lifted his mind above its ordinary material limits, forsaking the soul's affinity with the physical senses, so that he might not, obstructed by anything immediately apparent to sense, be impaired in his perception of invisible things."¹⁰⁴ This epistemological movement corresponded to

mathematical) proportion." Finally, it denotes a "comparison in itself." Hubert R. Drobner, "Analogy," in Mateo-Seco and Maspero, *The Brill Dictionary*, 30.

101 *Eun* 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,10–19).

102 *Eun* 2.304 (GNO 1, 315,23–29).

103 *Eun* 2.86 (GNO 1, 251,29).

104 *Eun* 2.86 (GNO 1, 252,1–7).

what Paul was talking about. The turning point of this movement was faith. In this sense, faith is compared with gnosis. The latter means a sort of experimental knowledge of or scientific investigation into visible, material, and corporeal things by the corporeal senses.¹⁰⁵ On the other hand, faith is related to the unseen, invisible, and nonmaterial, and means an assurance guaranteeing the unseen which is hoped for but not yet possessed.¹⁰⁶ Then, it is not gnosis about the material and visible, but faith in the unseen, invisible, and nonmaterial that guides human intellect and conceptual thought to achieve the progress of anagogic analogy toward a superior understanding of the divinity which is hoped for but not yet in possession.

In that sense, this faith contrasts with Eunomius' powerful reliance on reasoning and knowledge. Even though 1 Tim 6:16 says that no man has ever seen nor can see, Eunomius and his followers thought that they could see and measure God, who is invisible and incomprehensible, by knowledge derived from reasoning.¹⁰⁷ Eunomius, however, failed to follow faith and to do *θεολογία* in the *οικονομία* of the Holy Spirit from his false reasoning conceived the Son as a creature subordinated to the Father. On the contrary, Gregory claimed, faith in a transmitted doctrine, which the Logos in particular taught and transmitted by the baptismal formula (Matt 28:19) in terms of the Trinity and of the divine *οικονομία* of the transformation of human beings into the divine immortality,¹⁰⁸ carries and encourages the human intellect and conceptual thought to comprehend God's *ἐνέργεια* and its names and titles in a manner appropriate to what the divinity is.¹⁰⁹

3 The Monarchy of the Father

The previous section offered an analysis of Gregory's theological epistemology as an introduction to his trinitarian theology. It examined his ideas on

¹⁰⁵ *Eun* 2.93 (GNO 1, 254,3–4).

¹⁰⁶ *Eun* 2.93, 94–96 (GNO 1, 254,4–13, 17–30).

¹⁰⁷ *Eun* 3.8.11 (GNO 2, 242,18–25).

¹⁰⁸ *Ref Eun* 4, 17 (GNO 2, 313,5–314,12, 319,9–15). According to the latter passage, as Maspero and Pinzón have accurately indicated, *θεολογία* is delimited by *διδασκαλία τῆς εὐσεβείας*, which was the transmitted faith. See Maspero and Pinzón, “Essere, Storia e Misericordia,” 17–18.

¹⁰⁹ *Cant* 6 (GNO 6, 180,11–15): “Philosophical treatment of these matters transposes the surface meaning of the thoughts into the key of the pure and the immaterial and sets forth the teachings of the faith, using the enigmas provided by the events narrated in order to arrive at a clear grasp of what is revealed.”

two issues in the contemporary *filioque* discussions, namely the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια and the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία. In what follows, Gregory's trinitarian theology will be studied with regard to the other two issues of the contemporary discussion that have been identified earlier in this study: the definition of the Father's μοναρχία, and the Son's role in the procession of the Holy Spirit.

3.1 *The Father as αἰτία*

After the introduction to book one of *Contra Eunomium*, Gregory began his dogmatic argumentation against Eunomius with a criticism of the way his opponent named the three hypostases. Gregory charged that Eunomius was newly inventing names for the three hypostases:¹¹⁰ “Highest and most authentic being,” “one which exists because of that being and after that being has supremacy over the rest,” and “(one) which is in no way aligned with them but subject to them both,” instead of using the names Father, Son, and Spirit.¹¹¹ Such

110 *Eun* 1.151, 159. The philosophical background to Eunomius' new invention of the names is not clear, even though it has been studied by theologians such as Daniélou, John. M. Rist, and L.R. Wickham. For Daniélou, see Jean Daniélou, “Eunome l'Arien et l'exégèse néoplatonicienne du Cratyle,” *REG* 69 (1956): 412–432; for Rist, see John. M. Rist, *Epicurus: An Introduction* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972); “Basil's Neoplatonism. Its Background and Nature,” in *Basil of Caesarea, Christian, Humanist, Ascetic*, ed. P.J. Fedwick (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1981), 137–220; for Wickham, see L.R. Wickham, “The Syntagmation of Aetius the Anomean,” *JTS* 19, no. 2 (1978): 532–569. Recently, Maspero examined Gregory's quotation (*Eun* 1.151–154) of Eunomius' new invention of the names for the Trinity and his comprehension of the relationship within the Trinity, and claimed that Eunomius inserted the expression “reciprocal relation” (ἡ σχέσις πρὸς ἀλλήλα), which Basil of Caesarea had used, into a framework of Neoplatonic metaphysics. Eunomius interpreted the reciprocal relationship among the three hypostases as a necessarily hierarchic relation according to ontological differences. See Maspero, *Essere e relazione. L'ontologia trinitaria di Gregorio di Nissa*, Collana di Teologia 79 (Rome: Città Nuova, 2013), 142–143. He also recognized the importance of the passage from *Eun* 1.151–154 for the entire controversy between Gregory and Eunomius, and provided a useful analysis of the logical sequence implied by Eunomius' argument as summarized: “This text can be outlined according to three steps. In the first place (a) Eunomius speaks of the distinction between the primary, or first, substance, which is such in a proper sense and to the greatest degree, and the other two, of which the second is coordinated to the first, whereas the third is not coordinated but subordinated both to the first—in that it deals with the cause—as well as the second—through operation. Hence, (b) he introduces the role of operations with their function as necessary connection between substances and works, which follows a descending gradation. Eunomius thereby explains (c) the reciprocal relationship (πρὸς ἀλλήλα σχέσις) that provides the basis for such a bond and allows cognitive movement from substance to operations and vice versa.” Maspero, “Trinitarian Theology,” 445.

111 *Eun* 1.155 (GNO 1, 73, 20–26): “εἶπε τῶν καθ' ἑαυτὸν δογμάτων συμπληροῦσθαι τὸν λόγον ἐκ

naming, Gregory insisted, corresponds with neither the Lord's teaching in Matt 28:19¹¹² nor the confession of a general council, which seems for Gregory to be the Council of Nicaea in 325.¹¹³

As a matter of fact, as Epiphanius indicated in *Panarion* 76.54.32–33, Arianism had a new baptismal formula in place of the one found in Matt 28:19.¹¹⁴ In *Contra Eunomium* 3.9.61, Gregory quotes the formula by which Eunomius was probably baptized. In the following, this new formula has been italicized: "He says, repealing the law of the Lord (and the law means the tradition of divine initiation), that baptism should not be done into the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, as he commanded his disciples when he passed on the mystery to them, but should be *into the Designer and Creator, and not only the Father of the only begotten, but (he says) his God.*"¹¹⁵ From this new formula, so Gregory hypothesized, Eunomius probably invented the new names.

In his criticism of the new names, Gregory focused on the one divine nature shared by the three hypostases. This nature was expressed in the names which the Lord revealed in Matt 28:19, but denied by Eunomius through his invention of new names: "But I [Gregory] think the reason for this new invention of names is obvious to everybody: all men when they hear the titles 'father' and 'son' immediately recognize from the very names their intimate and natural relation to each other. Community of nature is inevitably suggested by these titles."¹¹⁶ What John 10:30 signifies is similar. In *Contra Eunomium* 1.498, Gregory

τῆς ἀνωτάτης καὶ κυριωτάτης οὐσίας καὶ ἐκ τῆς δι' ἐκείνην μὲν οὔσης, μετ' ἐκείνην δὲ πάντων τῶν ἄλλων πρωτευούσης καὶ τρίτης γέ φησι τῆς μηδεμιᾶς τούτων συνταττομένης, ἀλλὰ τῇ μὲν διὰ τὴν αἰτίαν, τῇ δὲ διὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν ὑποταττομένης." For Gregory and Basil of Caesarea, the term pejoratively signified a discourse or a systematic arrangement of words like the Sophists' dialectic and rhetorical techniques in contrast with Pythagorean-Platonic philosophy. As such, Gregory called it a "system of blasphemy" (τεχνολογία τῆς βλασφημίας, *Eun* 1.155 [GNO 1, 73.16]). See Winling, *Contre Eunome* 1 147–691, 12n2; Miguel Brugarolas, "Divine Attributes and God's Unity in the *Contra Eunomium* 1 of Gregory of Nyssa," in Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* 1, 416n20; E. Vandenbussche, "La part de la dialectique dans la théologie d'Eunomius 'le technologue,'" *RHE* 40 (1945): 47–72. For Basil of Caesarea, see Basil, *Contra Eunomium* 1.9 (SC 299, 200); *De spiritu sancto* 4.6, 6.13 (SC 17bis, 279, 288); cf. Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes theologicae* 29.21, 31.18 (SC 250, 244, 310).

112 *Eun* 1.156 (GNO 1, 74.1–6); *Ref Eun* 5–6 (GNO 2, 314.24–315.3).

113 *Eun* 1.158 (GNO 1, 74.16–23). Gregory called it κοινὸν συνέδριον.

114 Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 711n68. For a more detailed study of the baptismal practice, see Vaggione, *Eunomius of Cyzicus and the Nicene Revolution*, OECs (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 330–345.

115 *Eun* 3.9.61 (GNO 2, 287.12–17); *Eun* 1.54 (GNO 1, 40.16–23). This baptismal formula, which was probably based on John 20:17, omits the name of the Holy Spirit. See Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 1688n65.

116 *Eun* 1.159 (GNO 1, 75.1–7).

interprets this verse against Sabellius and Arius, arguing that the verse signifies the community of being and mutual natural affinity.¹¹⁷

In regard to his criticism of Eunomius on the point of the one divine nature, it is Gregory's views on the monarchy of the Father that come to the fore. Gregory understood the Father to be the "cause" (αἰτία) by whom the other hypostases, as being caused, share with or participate in the same divine nature of the Father.¹¹⁸ This view deserves to be explained in greater detail.

Contra Eunomium 1.361 comes in the context of Gregory's discussion of the distinction between the uncreated being and created beings, as examined above (see pp. 84–89). Against Eunomius' insistence that the Son is begotten and created, Gregory argued that the divine nature is uncreated and that the Son is uncreated by virtue of the fact that He has His hypostasis from the Father who is the cause. He wrote: "All the voices of religious men however confess that all beings exist either through creation or before creation, and that the divine nature is according to the faith uncreated, and in it the doctrine of religion teaches that one has existence inseparably as cause, the other as caused, whereas creation is thought of in terms of temporal extent."¹¹⁹ Briefly stated, the Son as caused exists uncreated as having the cause of His hypostasis from the Father as αἰτία (or here, more precisely, αἴτιον).

A similar relationship between Father and Son was expressed in *Contra Eunomium* 1.296. The Son is not created but uncreated in terms of the "ineffable and inexplicable manner of His birth or coming-forth" "from" the Father.¹²⁰ In other words, the Son is equally eternal with the Father because He is "eternal from eternal,"¹²¹ that is, "from the Father."¹²² The Son is "light from light, life from life, good from good, wise, just and mighty and in every other attribute similarly derived as like from like."¹²³ The "from" in each case does not signify a natural subordination to the Father, but rather a natural affinity with the Father. The Son as caused shares in the divine being of the Father as cause.

A logical nexus between the connotations of the names 'father' and 'son' corresponds with the natural affinity between Father as cause and Son as caused. Gregory argues that the title son signifies a natural affinity in connection with

¹¹⁷ *Eun* 1.498 (GNO 1, 170,13–17).

¹¹⁸ Gregory uses κοινωνεῖν for the community of the one nature in the Triune God. Even μετα-χεῖν is used. However, these terms admit no notion of 'more or less' due to the simplicity of the divine being.

¹¹⁹ *Eun* 1.361 (GNO 1, 133,27–134,4).

¹²⁰ *Eun* 1.296 (GNO 1, 114,5–7).

¹²¹ *Eun* 1.688 (GNO 1, 224,4–5).

¹²² *Eun* 1.689 (GNO 1, 224,9–10).

¹²³ *Eun* 1.688 (GNO 1, 224,2–5).

the two natures in Jesus Christ in the Gospel of John. it signified natural affinity in both the expressions “Son of God” and “Son of Man”: the latter shows “the natural affinity” of the flesh “with that from which it was taken,” and the former points to “the true and genuine relation to the God of the universe” and “the natural intimacy” (τὸ κατὰ τὴν φύσιν οἰκεῖον).¹²⁴ This explanation has echoes in *Contra Eunomium* 3.1.91 where Gregory affirmed that the title son signified “sharing of nature.” Furthermore, as biblical proof for his argumentation, Gregory pointed to 1 Tim 2:5 on the Mediator of God and man and commented the verse as follows: “The same one both is Son of God and became Son of Man by economy, so that by his own sharing in each he might join together elements distinct in nature. If it were the case that in becoming Son of Man he did not participate in human nature, it would follow that in being Son of God he does not share in the divine being (κοινωνεῖν τῆς θείας οὐσίας).”¹²⁵ In this way of doing θεολογία, the title son acquired the most majestic interpretation “when it expresses his lawful kinship with his Begetter.”¹²⁶

Like the title son, the title father has the connotation of natural affinity between cause and caused. Against Eunomius who preferred ‘unbegotten’ to the title ‘father’ in order to suppress the connotation of natural affinity, Gregory explains three categories of connotations that words have in *Contra Eunomium* 1.568–569.¹²⁷ First of all, “some nouns are absolute and unrelated” and by these nouns “some can be said absolutely, just simply mentioned by themselves.” Next, “others are used to express a relation.” Lastly, among the second, “there are some ... which ... express the simple [absolute and unrelated] meaning, but often change to become relational.”¹²⁸ Among the three categories, the last one attracted Gregory’s attention as a suitable option for explaining the connotation of the title Father. Even if the title connotes itself as absolute and unrelated to anything and is mentioned just simply by itself, it can also connote a relation

124 *Eun* 1.298 (GNO 1, 114, 11–17).

125 *Eun* 3.1.92–93 (GNO 2, 35, 16–22).

126 *Eun* 3.1.138 (GNO 2, 49, 27–50, 2).

127 For the background to these passages, see Moreschini, “Su alcuni aspetti della discussione teologica nel cristianesimo antico: Il Contro Eunomio di Gregorio di Nissa,” *Humanitas: Rivista bimestrale di cultura* 49, no. 5 (1994): 168, quoted in Maspero, *Essere e relazione*, 151. Moreschini has argued that Gregory was indebted to grammatici such as Dionisio Trace (*Are gramatica* 35.4).

128 *Eun* 1.568–569 (GNO 1, 190, 19–25): “τίς γὰρ οὐκ οἶδεν, ὅτι τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἀπόλυτά τε καὶ ἄσχετα, τὰ δὲ πρὸς τινα σχέσιν ὀνομασμένα ἔστιν; αὐτῶν δὲ τούτων πάλιν ἔστιν ἃ κατὰ τὴν τῶν χρωμένων βούλησιν ἐπιρρεπῶς πρὸς ἑκάτερον ἔχει, ἃ ἐφ’ ἑαυτῶν μὲν λεγόμενα τὴν ἀπλήν ἐνδείκνυται δύναμιν, μετατιθέμενα δὲ πολλὰκις τῶν πρὸς τι γίνεταί.” See also *Or cat* 1 (GNO 3/4, 10, 26–11, 4).

to the Son.¹²⁹ In terms of this relational connotation, Gregory says, "... the term 'Father' means only that the only begotten does not exist without a prior principle (τὸ μὴ ἀνάρχως εἶναι), so that he has in it the cause of his being (ὥς τὴν αἰτίαν μὲν ἔχειθεν ἔχειν τοῦ εἶναι) ..." ¹³⁰

Likewise, the term 'unbegotten' itself, with which Eunomius identified the title 'father' and the divine nature, has both an absolute or unrelated connotation and a relational one. The first signifies that there is no higher cause¹³¹ and that something is not begotten.¹³² In relation to the Trinity, it refers to the divine nature which exists from no other.¹³³ Eunomius emphasized this connotation and insisted that only the Father, who is called unbegotten, is the true God who is absolute and unrelated by nature to the Son who is created.¹³⁴ Thus, Eunomius denied the relational connotation of the term to the Son. Gregory, on the contrary, emphasized the relational connotation of this term in connection with the Son within the Trinity. The word 'unbegotten' was a negative form of the term 'begotten' which is ascribed to the Son in relation to His begetter, the Father. A negative form of a relative word has only a relative connotation. The term 'unbegotten' is not used absolutely and independently, but relative to the term 'begotten'.¹³⁵ For this reason, Gregory rejected Eunomius' argument which attributed the absolute and unrelated connotation of this term to the Father and emphasized the causal relationship between 'unbegotten' and 'begotten' in regard to the natural affinity.¹³⁶

As Gregory described the Father as αἰτία for the community of the divine nature of the Son with the Father, he clearly also attributed the αἰτία for the Holy Spirit to the Father. *Contra Eunomium* 1.280 is one passage where this

129 Cf. Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* 1.5.63–69 (SC 299, 174–176). For the similarity between Basil and Gregory on this point, see Maspero, *Essere e relazione*, 150; Boris Bobrinskoy, *The Mystery of the Trinity: Trinitarian Experience and Vision in the Biblical and Patristic Tradition*, trans. Anthony P. Gythiel (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1999), 263.

130 *Eun* 1.628 (GNO 1, 207, 17–20).

131 *Eun* 1.552 (GNO 1, 186, 12).

132 *Eun* 1.644 (GNO 1, 211, 24–25).

133 *Eun* 1.552 (GNO 1, 186, 7).

134 *Eun* 1.552 (GNO 1, 186, 3–10).

135 *Eun* 1.650 (GNO 1, 213, 13–19).

136 When the term 'unbegotten' was used with an absolute and unrelated connotation, it signified God over all. Consequently, this term was not strictly attributed to the Father, but should be attributed also to the Son who is invisible, impassible, and incorporeal just like the Father (*Eun* 1.645 [GNO 1, 211, 27–212, 8]). The Son shares in the divine being of the Father. In addition, Gregory did not explain the absolute connotation of the term in relation to the divine being itself, but to the "eternity" of the divine being (*Eun* 1.666–684 [GNO 1, 222, 27–223, 4]).

comes to clear expression. To arrive at a theologically sounded reading of the passage, we first need to apply a text-critical study to the passage in which a sentence clearly indicating the Father as the αἰτία of the Holy Spirit is often omitted.

In his English translation, Stuart G. Hall translated this passage as follows:

To be neither unbegotten nor only begotten, but certainly to be, provides his special personal difference from the others mentioned. Connected with the Father in uncreatedness, he is conversely separated from the Father by not being Father as he is. His connection with the Son in uncreatedness [καὶ ἐν τῷ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὄλων ἔχειν] is not continued when it comes to the personal characteristic, since he did not come to be only begotten from the Father and has been manifested through the Son himself.¹³⁷

For the omission of the phrase in brackets, Hall followed Werner Jaeger, who in his edition placed the sentence “καὶ ἐν τῷ τὴν αἰτίαν τῆς ὑπάρξεως ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ τῶν ὄλων ἔχειν” in brackets and commented that it probably represents a later interpolation, given that Gregory’s time was still far removed from the ardent discussions on the *filioque* of the late medieval period.¹³⁸

Jaeger’s argument seems reasonable, and Hall’s translation acceptable, in that the *filioque* was indeed not a theme in the fourth century trinitarian controversy. The omitted phrase can, however, stand if this passage is read in connection with the following passage in *Contra Eunomium* 1.378:

In the latter [in the uncreated and pre-temporal being] the Father is perceived as unbegotten and unbegun and forever Father; directly and inseparably from him the only begotten Son is simultaneously conceived with the Father; through him and with him, before any empty anhypostatic

137 *Eun* 1.280 (GNO 1, 108,11–109,1). The quoted English translation is from Hall in Mateo-Seco and Bastero, *El “Contra Eunomium 1” en la producción literaria de Gregorio de Nisa*. In the revised version of this book (2018), Hall did not totally omit the sentence but translated it and placed the text in brackets, as Werner Jaeger had done in his edition: “... [and in having the cause of his existence from the God of the universe,] ...” See Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* 1, 123.

138 GNO 1, 108: “*Videntur a Byzantino lectore hoc loco inculcata esse, cum Gregorii doctrinam de processione spiritus sancti non satis orthodoxe definitam esse et cum ‘filioque’ conspirare quodam modo sentiret. etenim apud Basilium illa doctrina nondum satis clare expressa post eum a Nazianzeno, ut videtur, ad tria illa notissima ἰδιώματα ἀγεννησίας γεννησίας ἐκπορεύσεως redacta est.*”

concept can intervene, the Holy Spirit is also immediately apprehend in close connection, not falling short of the Son as far as existence is concerned, so that the only begotten might ever be thought of apart from the Holy Spirit, but himself [the Holy Spirit] having the cause of his being in the God of the universe; hence he [the Son] is the only begotten Light which shone through the True Light, cut off from the Father or the only begotten neither by interval nor by otherness of nature.¹³⁹

Both this passage and the debated passage from *Contra Eunomium* 1.280 express themselves in similar ways on the natural affinity in the Trinity and on the relationship between the three hypostases in terms of the distinction by διάστημα. Moreover, in both passages the relationship among the three hypostases is described using similar expressions.

As a result, what Gregory writes about the Holy Spirit in both passages needs to be compared. In both passages, the Holy Spirit is connected with the Son in terms of ‘uncreatedness’ or being without διάστημα. And the Holy Spirit is manifested through the Son when the Holy Spirit is neither unbegotten nor only begotten. In this similarity, *Contra Eunomium* 1.378 explicitly expresses that the Holy Spirit has the αἰτία of his existence (ὑπαρξίς) from the Father and that the Father is the cause for both the Son and the Holy Spirit. With this explicit explanation, as Raymond Winling has correctly pointed out, the passage in *Contra Eunomium* 1.378 offers supplementary details to the argument of the other passage in regard to the relation of origin.¹⁴⁰ Given the similarities and complementary relation between the two passages, Jaeger went too far in his argument and in omitting the disputed passage.¹⁴¹ In both passages, it is indubitable that for Gregory the Father is the cause also of the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit.

In addition to *Contra Eunomium* 1.280 and 378, Gregory’s analogy of ‘sun-sunray-light’ for the three hypostases in *Contra Eunomium* 1.532–534 (GNO 1, 180,10–181,11) is valuable for the present analysis of the causal relationship between Father and Spirit. While he frequently used a similar analogy through-

¹³⁹ *Eun* 1.378 (GNO 1, 138,5–15).

¹⁴⁰ Winling, *Contre Eunome* 1 147–691, 165n1.

¹⁴¹ Moutsoulas’ comment on the edited passage of *Eun* 1.280 fully reflects the argumentation here. He said also with reference to *Eun* 1.378, “Dans le texte de Grégoire nous lisons que la cause de l’existence de l’Esprit se trouve dans le Père. Cela W. Jaeger le laisse tomber bien qu’il soit présent dans tous les manuscrits. Nous ne connaissons pas la raison. Non seulement cet enseignement est en accord avec toute la doctrine de Grégoire, mais il y a d’autres passages chez Grégoire où la même chose est dite expressément.” Moutsoulas, “La Pneumatologie,” 563.

out the entire *Contra Eunomium*, these passages explicitly show how he with the analogy considered the Father as the cause for both the Son and the Holy Spirit. From the long passage, we will for now cite only a brief excerpt that follows on an account of the relationship between the unbegotten Light or Sun and the only begotten Sun:¹⁴² “Again there is in the same way a third such Light, sundered by no interval of time from the begotten Light, but shining through him, which has the cause of its existence in the primary Light [the unbegotten Light], yet a Light which itself in the same way as the one previously envisaged shines and illuminates and performs all the other functions of light.”¹⁴³ In this passage, Gregory affirms analogically that the third Light, which is the Holy Spirit, has His αἰτία from the unbegotten Light, which is the Father. There are no exceptions to this in other, similar analogies of light Gregory uses in his treatises. For him, the Father is the only cause for the Holy Spirit and for the Son.

3.2 τὰξις

With the monarchy of the Father, Gregory understood the original relationship between Father and Son and between Father and Spirit, and confirmed the community of the divine nature among the three hypostases. The natural affinity among the hypostases is caused by the Father in terms of the causal relationship. At the same time, Gregory’s clear monopatristism did not intend to introduce any kind of subordinationism between Father and the other two hypostases in the Trinity. Otherwise, his brilliant argumentation would be nothing less than a modified version of Arianism or Eunomianism. Gregory’s monopatristism aimed rather to achieve a hypostatic distinction of the Father in the Trinity by μοναρχία.

As we have already explained above, Gregory clearly distinguished the uncreated being and the created beings using the notion of διάστημα. In the uncreated, no διάστημα of any kind is found. The community of the divine being by the monarchy of the Father signifies then that the causal relationship between the Father and the other hypostases is beyond any kind of διάστημα.¹⁴⁴ While creation is limited by temporal διάστημα and sequence (ἀκολουθία), the divine being is beyond them. In eternity, more precisely in timelessness, the Son has his existence from the Father as cause, not in terms of temporal extent but of ἀδιαστάτως. Therefore, the three hypostases must be *simultaneously* (ἀδια-

142 *Eun* 1.532–533 (GNO 1, 180,10–20); *Eun* 3.6.11–14 (GNO 2, 189,23–190,27).

143 *Eun* 1.533 (GNO 1, 180,20–181,5).

144 *Eun* 1.361 (GNO 1, 133,27–134,8).

στάτως; literally translated in “without διάστημα”) conceived and contemplated whenever the Father is considered as the cause of the beings of the Son and the Holy Spirit.¹⁴⁵

In this regard, the term τάξις did not signify an ordering implying any kind of διάστημα in the Trinity. Instead, the τάξις, by which the hypostases are aligned sequentially by the Logos in Matt 28:19 (*Contra Eunomium* 1.197), signifies two perspectives of eternal simultaneity: sharing in the same divine nature, and being distinguished in terms of hypostasis.¹⁴⁶ Even when Gregory considered the τάξις “according to the logical consequence” (κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον), the consequence did not imply any kind of διάστημα or subordination, but denoted φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία for the human weakness to grasp the mystery of the causal relationship between the three hypostases who exist simultaneously without διάστημα.¹⁴⁷

Consequently, even if the three hypostases are expressed in the sequential τάξις, they should be contemplated in an absolutely simultaneous manner since there is no διάστημα of any kind in the Trinity. In other words, the preposition “from” in Gregory’s trinitarian thinking at the same time signifies the preposition “with.” About the Son he wrote: “Rather we should, while we confess ‘from him [the Father]’, bold though it seem, not deny ‘with him’, being led toward this thought by what is written in Scripture (Wis 7:26).”¹⁴⁸ So too in regard to the Holy Spirit, Gregory emphasized the preposition “with” in relation to the Father and the Son.¹⁴⁹ The Holy Spirit who has the cause of his existence from the Father exists simultaneously *with* the Father and the Son in eternity.

Therefore, considering the absolute concomitance or simultaneity among the three hypostases in monopatristism as explained above, Gregory aimed to offer a definition of the property of the Father’s hypostasis:¹⁵⁰

So, just as in saying that he is Judge we recognize through judgement a certain activity associated with him, and through ‘is’ we turn our mind to the subject, clearly learning thereby not to define the principle of his being by the activity, so that when we say that he is begotten or unbegotten, we divide our thought between two ideas, by ‘is’ perceiving the subject, and

145 *Eun* 1.378–379, 382 (GNO 1, 148, 149).

146 *Eun* 1.413 (GNO 1, 147,5–13); Maspero, *Essere e relazione*, 148–149.

147 *Eun* 1.356, 691 (GNO 1, 132,16–25, 224,21–23).

148 *Eun* 1.357 (GNO 1, 132,25–28); Maspero, “Trinitarian Theology,” 480.

149 *Eun* 1.378 (GNO 1, 138,5–15).

150 Cf. Vladimir Lossky, *Orthodox Theology: An Introduction* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir’s Seminary Press, 1978), 47: “Besides, in God there is no extraposition of cause and effect, but *causality within one and the same nature*” (italic by himself).

by 'begotten' or 'unbegotten' apprehending what attaches to the subject Every title you can utter is about that which is—'good', 'unbegotten', 'imperishable'—it is not itself that To exist unbegotten is one of the attributes of him who is, but the definition of being is one thing, the definition of the manner of being, another.¹⁵¹

Again, in another place:

And saying 'cause' and 'from the cause', we do not designate with these names a nature—in fact, one could not adopt the same explanation for a cause and for a nature—but we explain the difference according to the mode of being (κατὰ τὸ πῶς εἶναι). For, saying that the one is in a caused mode, while the other is without cause, we do not divide the nature according to the understanding of the cause, but we only demonstrate that neither is the Son without generation nor is the Father by generation Therefore, affirming in the Holy Trinity such a distinction, so as to believe that one thing is that which is cause and another that which is from the cause, we will not any longer be able to be accused of confusion in the commune of nature the relationship of the hypostases.¹⁵²

And elsewhere:

As the being without cause, which belongs only to the Father, cannot be adopted to the Son and the Spirit, so again the being caused, which is the property of the Son and of the Spirit, cannot, by its very nature, be considered in the Father.¹⁵³

The Father who is unbegotten as the cause exists absolutely simultaneously with the other two hypostases who exist as caused from and with the Father. In the Trinity, which is beyond any διάστημα, the causality signifies the property of the Father's hypostasis distinguished from the other two hypostases. In this sense, the Father stands in the first place of the τάξις.

¹⁵¹ *Eun* 3.5.58, 60 (GNO 2, 181,13–21, 182,4–13).

¹⁵² *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,11–57,7). About κατὰ τὸ πῶς εἶναι, see Karfiková, "Ad Ablabium," 160–164; Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 1938n43.

¹⁵³ *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 42,18–21).

3.3 *Consubstantiality and Hypostasis*

Up to this point, we have noted how Gregory understood the Father as αἰτία for the Son and for the Holy Spirit. Yet a question arises in relation to the monarchy of the Father: Is the Father the cause for both consubstantiality and hypostatic being, or for only one of them? This question receives greater color given the interests of contemporary discussion on the *filioque*. As examined and summarized in the previous chapter, some theologians try to account for the validity of the *filioque* in their distinction between consubstantiality and hypostatic existence in the Trinity and to tie consubstantiality to the monarchy of the Father and the hypostatic existence to the *filioque*. However, this question also relates closely to the trinitarian discussions of the fourth century, even though relative perspectives or accents differ. While the contemporary discussion asks whether or how the Father could be said to be the cause even for the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit, the discussion in Gregory's time concerned whether the Father could be cause for the consubstantiality of the Spirit.

For answering this new question, Gregory's idea on the simplicity of the divine being proves crucial. As explained above, simplicity is one of the typical characteristics distinguishing the divine nature from creatures. If God is simple, any kind of 'more and less' cannot be admitted to the divine nature, nor conceived for any of the three hypostases. Otherwise, God is not simple but some mixture, combination of qualities, or composition, and becomes more or less in terms of virtues by acquiring them through participation, such that one of the hypostases in the Trinity can be considered superior or inferior to the others. Moreover, if a 'more and less' of any kind is attributed to the hypostases, one of them will no longer be divine in the strict sense of the term.

Given the simplicity of God in the Trinity, from the perspective of Gregory's trinitarian thought the divine being and the hypostatic existence cannot be conceived separately in each of the hypostases. It was correct for the divine being and hypostases to be spoken of distinguishably in order to express the hypostatic distinction in the consubstantiality against every form of Sabellianism. Nevertheless, it is not correct for being hypostatic to be conceived as something apart from being consubstantial in the Trinity's simplicity. For each hypostasis in the mystery of the Trinity, being God is the same as being hypostasis in that each hypostasis is true God, beyond any 'more or less' participation in the divine nature. Hence, in Gregory's trinitarian theology, the monarchy of the Father signifies that the Father is the cause for both consubstantiality and hypostatic existence.

We do well here to analyze what Gregory signified with the term ὑπαρξίς in relation to the causal relationship between the Father and the other

hypostases.¹⁵⁴ This term, which can be translated as existence, was used when he explained and defended the mode or way of the existence of the Son and the Spirit from the Father against Eunomius, who attempted to subordinate Them in nature to the Father who is unbegotten. In Gregory's entire argument, the term points primarily to the fact that the Son and the Spirit come into existence from the Father as their only cause. In other words, it indicates the coming into hypostatic existence of the two hypostases from the Father. In *Contra Eunomium* 1.280, 378, and 691, for instance, Gregory emphasizes that the Son and the Spirit each in the same way took the cause of their "existing" from the Father.¹⁵⁵ In contrast with created beings, which are confined by temporal interval, God "exists" beyond temporal interval and in eternity.¹⁵⁶ Gregory emphasized that the existence of the Son and the Spirit from the Father has no relation to any temporal interval, and that They come into existence from the Father without temporal interval.¹⁵⁷ As such, the term ὑπαρξίς points to the existence into which They come from the Father without interval.

ὑπαρξίς did not, however, just indicate coming into existence from its cause. Gregory's arguments against criticism of Eunomius in relation to the way of the existence were intrinsically related to the consubstantiality among the three hypostases. Where Eunomius failed was that he could not understand the way of the Son's existence from the point-of-view of the one divinity which He has from the Father. If he had recognized that one divinity, he would not have explained the existence of the Son in terms of material and temporal begetting or the generation of created beings. In regard to such an explanation of that existence, Gregory accused Eunomius of staining the divine nature.¹⁵⁸ The point for Gregory was to find a way to explain the *pre-eternal* existence of the only begotten God (τὴν προαιώνιον τοῦ μονογενοῦς θεοῦ ὑπαρξίν).¹⁵⁹ Hence, the term ὑπαρξίς was designed to connote the *divine* existence of the hypostases in the Trinity.

Moreover, the fascinating analogies of 'sun-sunray-light' and 'sun and sun's disc' for describing the causal relationship within the Trinity explicitly shows that Gregory used ὑπαρξίς for the consubstantial existence. As explained above,

154 Cf. John of Damascus, *De fide orthodoxa* 1.8; Vladimir Lossky, *The Mystical Theology of the Eastern Church* (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1976), 59–60.

155 *Eun* 1.280, 378, 691 (GNO 1, 108,16–109,1, 138,5–15, 224,21–225,5).

156 *Eun* 1.343, 436 (GNO 1, 128,22–27, 153,16–21).

157 *Eun* 1.355 (GNO 1, 132,2–11).

158 *Eun* 3.2.5, 6.68 (GNO 2, 53,19–25, 210,11–22).

159 *Eun* 3.7.30 (GNO 2, 226,2–3).

the analogies are found in *Contra Eunomium* 1.532–533 (GNO 1, 180,10–20) and in *Contra Eunomium* 3.6.11–14 (GNO 2, 189,23–190,27).¹⁶⁰ In these passages, Gregory uses ὑπαρξίς to indicate that the Son and the Spirit exist from the Father without temporal interval. At the same time, he signified with the term that the caused and distinguished hypostases exist in the same divinity as that of the Father. More precisely, the fact that the Son has existence from the Father means that He as the only begotten exists like the Father in every respect, except being Father. Likewise, the existence of the Holy Spirit from the Father through the Son means his consubstantiality with Them. In this sense, the term in the analogy points to the consubstantial existence originating from the Father.

The conclusion of this entire analysis of the term ὑπαρξίς is that the Father is the cause for the hypostatic existence and consubstantiality of the Son and the Spirit when the term is intended to signify both and when the Father is the only cause for the ὑπαρξίς of the other hypostases.

4 The Role of the Son

Related to the question of how the monarchy of the Father is understood, the role or place of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit represents the most crucial issue in the contemporary *filioque* debate. The contemporary theologians who have involved themselves in the controversy have provided their own definitions as analyzed in the previous chapter. A convincing agreement, however, has not yet been reached.

The reason for this failure does not just depend on the difficulty of finding theological terms or concepts for expressing the Son's role. The reason is rather located in the fact that this issue is strictly connected to the way in which the monarchy of the Father can be suitably defined and maintained. Making room for the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit without undermining the property of the hypostasis of the Father as αἰτία has not proved simple. Whenever the Son has been said to be involved in the procession of the Holy Spirit in a certain way, any such attempt has been criticized for turning Him into another αἰτία for the procession of the Holy Spirit and therefore undermining monopatristism.

It has been demonstrated convincingly that Gregory firmly insisted on the monarchy of the Father. At this point, the following questions arise: How did

¹⁶⁰ See pp. 116–117 above; for the quotation of *Eun* 3.6.11–14, see pp. 154–155 below.

Gregory conceive of the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit? And how did he relate his thinking to his obvious monopatrism?

4.1 *The Involvement Required*

To investigate Gregory's ideas on the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit, we need to consider the context of theological controversy in which his arguments were made: the one divinity of the Son and of the Holy Spirit had to be defined against the teachings of the Eunomians and the Pneumatomachi. Gregory's argumentation indeed insisted that the two hypostases share in the same divine nature as that of the Father through the modes of generation and procession from the Father eternally without any διάστημα. Such an argument for the consubstantiality among the three hypostases did not, however, put an end to all crucial controversies regarding the Trinity. Other arguments were necessary to distinguish the three hypostases from each other without giving up their consubstantiality. Otherwise, Gregory's view would seem to fail in contemplating the Triune God correctly and completely. To achieve this, Gregory had to reflect on the Son's involvement.

The need for the Son's involvement for the hypostatic distinction was clearly expressed by Gregory in one of the last passages of *Ad Ablabium, Quod non sint tres dei* (GNO 3/1, 37–57).¹⁶¹ In this treatise, which was probably written at least after the controversies against the Pneumatomachi, Gregory defended himself from the charge that his theology claimed three Gods instead of the one Trinity. In response, he argued that names or terms that were attributed to the three hypostases did not signify the natural difference among them, since they signified the same nature from which they could exist. At the same time, Gregory insisted that a distinction between the three hypostases must be maintained. This distinction is not related to the same divine nature, but to the hypostatic distinction of the Trinity. That distinction does not abandon the one divinity which the same names or terms reveal for each of the three hypostases.

For Gregory, this distinction must be made in two steps: first, the distinction between αἰτία or αἴτιον and αἰτιατόν, and then the distinction between two αἰτίαι. In regard to the first distinction, Gregory clearly stated the following:

If then one will falsely accuse the reasoning to present a certain mixture of the hypostases and a twisting by the fact of not acceptance the difference according to nature, we will respond to this accusation that, affirming the

¹⁶¹ Maspero and Karfíková provided a useful analysis and outline of Gregory's argument in this treatise. See Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, xiv–xix; Karfíková, "Ad Ablabium," 167–168.

absence of the diversity of nature, we do not negate the difference according to that which causes and that which is caused. And we can conceive that the one is distinguished from the other uniquely since we believe that the one is that which causes and the other what which is derived from the cause.¹⁶²

The Father is the only cause for the other two persons. The latter two are caused (αἰτίατα) and the former is αἰτία or αἴτιον. This distinction is not related to the common nature, but to the difference according to the modes of being: “And saying ‘cause’ and ‘from the cause,’ we do not designate with these names a nature—in fact, one could not adopt the same explanation for a cause and for a nature—but we explain the difference according to the mode of being.”¹⁶³

Without a second distinction, however, the first distinction fails to obtain the full distinction between the three hypostases. Even though the Father is distinguished from the other two hypostases, the distinction between the other two cannot be conceptualized using the first distinction alone. In *De oratione dominica* (GNO 7/2, 1–74), Gregory stated this point as follows: “On the other hand, the being not ungenerated is common to the Son and the Spirit; one must again search for the pure difference in the properties, so that what is common be safeguarded, yet what is proper be not mixed.”¹⁶⁴ For a full distinction, a second distinction between the two αἰτίατα is required.

This two-step-distinction for distinguishing the three hypostases in the Trinity occurs frequently in *Contra Eunomium*. At the end of book one (*Contra Eunomium* 1.685–691), Gregory remarked in summary, first, that the Son is eternal and distinguishable in relation to the Father, and, then, that also the Holy Spirit is distinguishably co-eternal with the Son and the Father. In this con-

162 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 55,21–56,4). On this passage, Maspero commented that Gregory overcame the weakness of Athanasius’ explanation of the two processions using the theme of image. According to Athanasius’ account, the two processions of the Son and the Spirit from the Father were not clearly distinguished from each other, such that the Father could be considered the grandfather of the Spirit. Hence, the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit was required by Gregory to overcome that weakness. See Giulio Maspero, “The Fire, the Kingdom and the Glory: The Creator Spirit and the Intra-Trinitarian Processions in the Adversus Macedonianos of Gregory of Nyssa,” in Drecoll and Berghaus, *The Minor Treatises*, 244–246, 256–257. For Athanasius, see *Epistula ad Serapionem* 1.15, 2.14, 3.1 (Kyriakos Savvidis et al., *Athanasius Werke* 1, vol. 1 [Berlin: De Gruyter, 1996], 489,1–491,27, 558,1–553,29, 567,1–568,19).

163 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,11–14); also, see p. 119 above.

164 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 42,21–25). The English translation for *Or dom* has been taken from Hilda C. Graef, trans., *St. Gregory of Nyssa: The Lord’s Prayer, the Beatitudes*, ACW 18 (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1954).

text, also the analogy of 'sun-sunray-light' is worthy of consideration. Gregory preferred to use this analogy for signifying the one divinity and hypostatic distinctions among the three hypostases based on Wis 7:26 and John 1:1–5. This analogy took the same sequence from "between Father and Son" to "among the three hypostases" including the Holy Spirit in *Contra Eunomium* 1.532.¹⁶⁵ The same two-step-sequence occurs also in *Contra Eunomium* 1.278–281 and 378 for defining the particularities of the three hypostases. Gregory distinguished first between Father and Son. After that, he in a second step distinguished the particularities of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.

This two-step-distinction was neither arbitrary, nor caused by a temporal interval between the steps. There is, after all, no διάστημα of any kind in the Trinity. Rather, the two steps correspond to a substantial sequence of Gregory's argument in his controversial context. Given the ardent discussions against Eunomius and his followers, Gregory needed to emphasize the common divine being and hypostatic distinction of the Son in relation to the Father most of all. After that, he extended his argumentation to the same divine being and the hypostatic distinction of the Holy Spirit from Father and Son.

At a deeper level, the two-step-distinction was probably a consequence of Gregory's serious contemplation of the revealed τάξις among the three hypostases in Matt 28:19. As explained above, the revealed names Father-Son-Spirit constituted for Gregory the principle on which he built his criticism of Eunomius. With these names, so he argued, the biblical revelation taught the order among the three hypostases: first is the Father, and then is the Son, and last is the Spirit. This τάξις, Gregory continued, could not be inverted: "One cannot invert this relational succession (ἡ σχετικὴ αὕτη ἀκολουθία) [the τάξις] so as to be able to indifferently invert with analysis the affirmation, and, as we say that the Spirit is of Christ [cf. Rom 8:9], thus call Christ [as if he were] of the Spirit." Subsequently, he claimed: "Therefore the Spirit who is from God is also the Spirit of Christ [cf. Rom 8:9]. Instead the Son, who is from God, is not from the Spirit and is not said to be from the Spirit."¹⁶⁶ This non-inverted τάξις reflects

165 See also *Eun* 1.358; 2.293; 3.1.14, 8.36, 8.40, 8.56–57. A comparable analogy of 'sun and sun's disc' was attributed explicitly to the relationship between the Father and the Son in *Eun* 3.6.13. In this passage, the Holy Spirit is not mentioned, and "the brilliance of light" from the disc of the sun is the glory of the Father when Gregory argues that the Son is the "image" of the Father in connection with the consubstantiality.

166 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 43.5–9). Gregory emphasized in the whole passage of *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 43.2–9), which includes the quotations, that the revealed τάξις is not inverted. As Maspero has correctly noted, the passage from *Or dom* shows that the τάξις has ontological value for Gregory in distinguishing the hypostatic properties among the three hypostases in that it signifies the causal relationship between the three hypostases who exist distinguish-

the two-step-distinctions in that by order the first two hypostases are first considered to be distinguished from each other, and thereafter the distinction of the Spirit from the first two is recognized.

In the two-step-distinction intrinsic to the τάξις revealed by the Logos and to the polemical context in which Gregory was writing, he had to distinguish between Son and Spirit on top of the first distinction between αἰτία or αἵτιον and αἰτιατα. For this second distinction, he required the involvement, or more precisely the mediation (μεσιτεία), of the Son:

And in that which is originated from a cause we conceive yet another difference: one thing it is, in fact, to be immediately from the first, another to be through that which is immediately from the first (τὸ μὲν γὰρ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου, τὸ δὲ διὰ τοῦ προσεχῶς ἐκ τοῦ πρώτου). In this way the being only begotten remains incontestably in the Son and there is no doubt that the Spirit is from the Father, since the mediation (μεσιτεία) of the Son maintains in Him the being of only begotten and does not exclude the Spirit from the natural relation with the Father.¹⁶⁷

ably in terms of the causality. In other words, the τάξις denotes that the Father as cause is Father, and that the others are caused. For Maspero, see Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 158–159. On this basis, Maspero revised the translation of Giuliana Caldarelli. The latter translated the “ἡ σχετική αὐτῇ ἀκολουθία” just as a purely logical succession. See Giuliana Caldarelli, trans., *S. Gregorio di Nissa: La preghiera del Signore* (Milano: Edizioni Paoline, 1983), 84. The reprinted version of the same book in which Gabriele Pelizzari’s revision of comments appeared did not change this understanding. See Caldarelli, trans., *S. Gregorio di Nissa: La preghiera del Signore* (Milano: Paoline Editoriale Libri, 2014), 88. Lucio Coco, in contrast, recognized the ontological meaning of the phrase and translated the phrase as “this relational consequence (questa relativa conseguenza).” Lucio Coco, trans., *Gregorio di Nissa: La preghiera del Signore*. Collana di testi patristici 244 (Rome: Città Nuova, 2016), 63. Graef also translated the phrase like Maspero and Coco, since she thought that the genitive, “of Christ,” of Rom 8:9 in Gregory’s quotation signifies a causal relationship. See Graef, *St. Gregory of Nyssa*, 55.

- 167 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,4–10). The translation has been taken from Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 153. Maspero recognized again that the Son occupies the central point for the distinction with reference to the same passage and that this corresponds with Gregory’s trinitarian structure for οἰκονομία, ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα (*Abl* [GNO 3/1, 48,23–24]). See Maspero, “La processione dello Spirito Santo da Origene a Gregorio di Nazianzo: La tensione ermeneutica nella discussione sul Filioque,” in *Contra Latinos et Adversus Graecos: The Separation between Rome and Constantinople from the Ninth to the Fifteenth Century*, eds. A. Bucossi and A. Calia (Leuven: Peeters, 2020), 49–50. Karfiková accentuated the preposition πρὸς for the Holy Spirit (in the structure ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα), which plainly reveals the linear relation among the three hypostases. Karfiková, “Ad Ablabium,” 158–159.

In other words, the mediation of the Son is necessary to distinguish the second hypostasis from the third and to define their respective hypostatic particularities when they are both categorized simultaneously as being αἰτίατα.¹⁶⁸

What, then, did Gregory concretely think about the mediation of the Son for the distinction between Him and the Holy Spirit?¹⁶⁹

168 In this regard, Karl Holl accurately denied that the *filioque* could be found in Gregory, but emphasized that he by the mediation of the Son distinguished the second hypostasis from the third against the criticism of the Pneumatomachi who had accused him of making the Holy Spirit into a brother of the Son. Karl Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium in seinem Verhältnis zu den grossen Kappadoziern* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1904), 213–215. Moutsoulas showed his agreement with Holl's analysis when he criticized Théodore Dams for insisting that the expression "through the Son" was evidence for Gregory's acceptance of the *filioque*. Moutsoulas, "La Pneumatologie," 566–568. For Dams, see Théodore Dams, "La Controverse Eunoméenne" (ThD diss., Institut Catholique de Paris, 1952). When Simonetti called the Father the "causa prima" and the Son the "causa strumentale" for Gregory's trinitarian thought, he recognized Gregory's emphasis on the mediation of the Son in terms of the monarchy of the Father and was right to criticize Aurelio Palmieri for his attempt to read the Greek patristic tradition in the line of the Latin *filioque* after Augustine. See Simonetti, *La crisi ariana*, 499–500; "La processione dello Spirito Santo secondo i padri greci," *Aev* 26, no. 1 (1952): 39; for Palmieri, see Aurelio Palmieri, "Esprit-Saint," in *DTC* 5, 784–788. Like Simonetti, Moreschini criticized the inaccuracy of theologians who attempted to westernize Gregory's view on the Son's mediation. See Claudio Moreschini, "Osservazioni sulla Pneumatologia dei Cappadoci: Preannunci del Filioque," in *Il Filioque: A mille anni dal suo inserimento nel credo a Roma (1014–2014)*, ed. Mauro Gagliardi (Città del Vaticano: LEV, 2015), 127.

169 In terms of the mediation of the Son or the phrase διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ, Holl offered a remarkable synthesis of the expressions for the hypostatic properties which the Cappadocians produced: πατρότης and υἱότης were introduced by Basil of Caesarea; ἀγεννησία, γέννησις and ἐκπόρευσις by Gregory of Nazianzus; ἀγεννησία, μονογενής, and διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ by Gregory of Nyssa. This synthesis explicitly reveals how Holl understood the mediation of the Son in Gregory's theology. For him it signifies the hypostatic property of the Spirit that is distinguishable from the other hypostases. See Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium*, 206. I agree with Holl's idea in general, but in what follows the present chapter will analyze the concept of mediation in greater detail to show more concretely how Gregory thought of the role as mediation in terms of the Spirit's property. Interestingly, Brugarolas' study of the procession of the Holy Spirit in Gregory took an approach very similar to the one I will be taking. Following but also attempting to go beyond Holl in his fascinating article, "La procesión del Espíritu Santo en Gregorio de Nisa," *ScrTh* 44, no. 1 (2012): 45–70, he emphasized that the phrase διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ and the concept of mediation signified not only the hypostatic distinction or consubstantiality, but also the indissoluble link or bond (vínculo indisoluble) between Son and Spirit. His idea of the indissoluble bond, inseparability (inseparabilidad), or mutual inhesion (inhesión mutua) between Them is probably best summarized in the following sentence: "The Spirit exists through the Son and he cannot be thought without his Spirit, which is his Anointing and his Glory" (66). Apart from the similarity in the general approach, however, the present chapter will also reveal a differ-

4.2 *The Son's Role as Mediation*

4.2.1 Transmissive and Negative

From the previous examination of passages in *Ad Ablabium* (see pp. 123–124, 126 above), it emerged that Gregory understood the theme of the mediation of the Son primarily in terms of the Son having a transmissive role in the procession of the Holy Spirit. In the final sentence of the quotation from *Ad Ablabium* cited above (see p. 126), the Son contributes to the property of the Holy Spirit by being transmissive in that He does not contradict or hinder the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father. The causal relationship between Father and Holy Spirit is mediated by the Son, who is not another cause than the Father but has a transmissive role. This transmission safeguards the causal relationship between Father and Spirit, dedicated as it is mediately and definitively to the property of the Holy Spirit.

This transmission is designated by the preposition $\delta\iota\alpha$ in Gregory's trinitarianism, since this preposition appears to be located between a cause or origin and an effect. In view of the hypostatic particularities and the relationship among the three hypostases, the transmissive connotation of the preposition best comes to expression in *Epistula* 38:¹⁷⁰

Now the best way to follow up the discussion seems to be this. Every blessing which is bestowed on us by power divine we say is the working of the Grace which worketh all things in all; as the Apostle says, "But all these things one and the same Spirit worketh, dividing to everyone according

ence of emphasis on $\alpha\lambda\lambda\epsilon\varsigma$ with respect to Brugarolas' other articles, in which he offered a deeper study on the indissoluble bond between Son and Spirit. See Miguel Brugarolas, "Anointing and Kingdom: Some Aspects of Gregory of Nyssa's Pneumatology," *StPatr* 67 (2013): 113–119; "The Holy Spirit as the 'Glory' of Christ: Gregory of Nyssa on John 17:22," in *The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians*, ed. Nicu Dumitraşcu, Pathways for Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 247–263; for my tentative evaluation of his ideas, see note 211 below.

¹⁷⁰ See Karfíková, "Ad Ablabium," 131n6. She provided a short and useful bibliography for the discussion on the authorship of the letter. For recent discussion, see Volker Henning Drecoll, *Die Entwicklung der Trinitätslehre des Basilius von Cäsarea: Sein Weg vom Homöusianer zum Neonizäner*, FKD 66 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1996); "DIFF ESS HYP: Epistula 38 or Ad Petrum Fratrum," in Mateo-Seco and Maspero, *The Brill Dictionary*, 233–236; Zachhuber, *Human Nature*, 61–93; "Nochmals: Der 38. Brief des Basilius von Caesarea als Werk des Gregor von Nyssa," *ZAC* 7, no. 1 (2006): 73–90; Maspero, Mirko Degli Espositi, and Dario benedetto, "Who Wrote Basil's Epistula 38? A Possible Answer through Quantitative Analysis," in Leemans and Cassin, *Contra Eunomium III*, 579–594. The final article above notably attributes the authorship to Gregory using a quantitative analysis. The present work studies this letter insofar as specific passages in it and their teachings do not contradict what Gregory wrote in other, undisputed treatises.

as he will" (1 Cor 12:11). But if we ask whether from (ἐκ) the Holy Ghost alone this supply of blessings taketh its origin and cometh to those who are worthy, we are again guided by the Scriptures to the belief that the only begotten God is the source and cause of the supply of blessings which are worked in us through (διὰ) the Spirit. For we have been taught by the Holy Scripture that all things were made by Him and in Him cohere (John 1:3). Then when we have been lifted up to that conception, we are again led on by the divinely-inspired guidance and taught that through (διὰ) this power all things are brought into being from not-being; not, however, even by (ἐκ) this power without a beginning (ἀνάρχως); nay, there is a power which exists without generation or beginning, and this is the cause of the cause of all things that exist. For the Son, by whom all things are, and with whom the Holy Spirit must always be conceived as inseparably associated, is of (ἐκ) the Father.¹⁷¹

Gregory's argument in this long passage is as follows. On the basis of 1 Cor 12:11, it first says that every divine grace comes from the Holy Spirit. Yet, if this statement were to be accepted without deeper consideration of John 1:3, it probably sounds wrong for the Holy Spirit to be called the cause of all grace while the preposition ἐκ is attributed to Him. If the Holy Spirit were to be considered as cause and modified by the preposition ἐκ, however, this would not correspond with the Scriptures. In light of John 1:3, the Son is clearly the source (τὸ ἀρχηγόν) and cause (τὸ αἵτιον) of all creatures and grace. In this regard, it would be more correct for the preposition ἐκ to be attributed to the Son. Nevertheless, the preposition could not be attributed even to the Son, given that He is not the cause "without a beginning (ἀνάρχως)" in the Trinity. In other words, the preposition ἐκ cannot be attributed to the Son insofar as creatures exist through the Son *from* (ἐκ) the Father who is the cause "without generation or beginning" in the Trinity. Consequently, when serious account is taken of the Father as the only cause "without generation or beginning" in the Trinity, the entire passage finally attributes the preposition ἐκ to the Father alone, and substitutes the preposition διὰ for ἐκ in the places where the Holy Spirit and the Son are considered.

This careful substitution is meaningful for understanding the significance of the preposition διὰ and the difference between it and ἐκ in the intra-trinitarian relations. The latter preposition signifies generally the cause and origin that

171 The English translation is taken from Roy J. Deferrari, trans., *Saint Basil: The Letters*, vol. 1, LCL 190 (London: William Heinemann, 1926), 204–207.

has no other cause above or beyond it. This is the Father. The former signifies generally the transmission from that cause to creatures. In other words, the preposition *διὰ* is not used to signify the cause without any other cause. In contrast with the cause tied to *ἐκ*, the caused cause must be tied to *διὰ* (and not to *ἐκ*). In this sense, *διὰ* means “transmission,” in contrast with *ἐκ*, which means cause.

The transmissive connotation of *διὰ* in the quoted passage of *Epistula* 38 was found also in one of Gregory’s important analogies for the Trinity in *Eun* 1, 532–533. Here Gregory used the sun-sunray-light analogy:

Then at the high point of divine knowledge, I mean the God over all, as if we were at the turn of a race-track, we reverse course, running in our mind through things intimately connected and related, and from the Father through the Son (*ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς διὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ*) we arrive again at the Spirit (*πρὸς τὸ πνεῦμα*). Taking our stand in contemplation of the Unbegotten Light, from there we again instantly perceive in intimate connection the Light coming from him (*τὸ ἐξ αὐτοῦ φῶς*), like a sunray coexisting with the sun, which gets its cause of being from the sun (*ἐκ τοῦ ἡλίου*), but has its existence simultaneous, not being added to it later in time, but shining from (*ἐξ αὐτοῦ*) it as soon as the sun appears. But there is no need to follow the illustration slavishly and give critics of our case a handle by the looseness of the example. It is not so much a ray from a sun (*ἐξ ἡλίου*) which we shall perceive, but from the unbegotten Sun (*ἐξ ἀγεννήτου ἡλίου*) a second Sun shining out together with him (*αὐτῷ συνεκλάμποντα*) as if begotten simultaneously with the very thought of the first, in every respect like him in beauty, power, brilliance, greatness, brightness, and all the attributes of the sun together. Again there is in the same way a third such Light, sundered by no interval of time from the begotten Light (*οὐ χρονικῶ τινι διαστήματι τοῦ γεννητοῦ φωτὸς ἀποτεμνόμενον*), but shining through him (*δι’ αὐτοῦ*), which has the cause of its existence (hypostasis) in the primary Light (*ἐκ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου φωτός*), yet a Light which itself in the same way as the one previously envisaged shines and illuminates and performs all the other functions of light.¹⁷²

Gregory carefully distinguishes the use of the two prepositions here. The preposition *ἐκ* was attributed to the Father alone, who is the only cause of the divinity and has no other cause, and the unbegotten and primary Light. The preposition

¹⁷² *Eun* 1.532–533 (GNO 1, 180,10–181,5).

διὰ, by way of contrast, is attributed to the Son who is a sunray or the begotten Light. The last Light, which is the Holy Spirit, has the cause of its hypostasis *from* (ἐκ) the primary Light *through* (διὰ) the begotten Light. The reason why the preposition ἐκ could not be attributed to the begotten Light is that the begotten Light is not a cause without any other cause, but has its cause from (ἐκ) the unbegotten Light. In short, the preposition διὰ signifies the transmissive role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit insofar as it was used by Gregory in explaining the causal relationship among the three hypostases.

With the transmissive role, Gregory thought that the Son is involved in the procession of the Spirit to distinguish Him from the Spirit by defining the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit negatively. In the passage from *Ad Ablabium* quoted above (GNO 3/1, 56,4–10; see p. 126 above), Gregory defined or circumscribed the hypostatical property of the Son primarily in relation to the Father by the transmissive mediation of the Son: the Son is immediately from the Father and the only begotten of Him. From this definition of the hypostatic property of the Son, the Holy Spirit was distinguished from Him, even though He came from the Father as the Son did. In other words, the transmissive role of the Son, which positively constitutes the property of the Son as being the only begotten of the Father, contributes negatively to the property of the Holy Spirit in that the Holy Spirit is distinguished and defined as being no other only begotten of the Father. The transmissive role of the Son constitutes the hypostatic property of the Spirit negatively.

4.2.2 Active

Gregory did not just color the Son's role in the procession of the Holy Spirit as negative and transmissive. His mediation is rather also active. In the first place, the preposition διὰ as explained above signifies an "active" transmission. In the passage from *Epistula* 38 quoted above (see pp. 128–129 above), διὰ was attributed to the Son and the Spirit, in contrast with the preposition ἐκ, which is attributed to the Father as the only active cause in the Trinity. This usage of διὰ need not be understood as a "passive" transmission if we take serious account of the fact that in a passage from *Ad Ablabium* Gregory used the preposition interchangeably with ἐκ and παρὰ. In the following passage from *Ad Ablabium*, which describes the relationship between the Trinity and His creatures in a way similar to the passage from *Epistula* 38 as above, Gregory interestingly attributes the prepositions ἐκ and παρὰ, which is here probably synonymous to ἐκ, even to the Son and the Spirit when the letter uses διὰ:

When we inquire, then, whence this good gift came to us, we find by the guidance of the Scriptures that it was from (ἐκ) the Father, Son, and Holy

Spirit. Yet although we set forth Three Persons and three names, we do not consider that we have had bestowed upon us three lives, one from (παρά) each Person separately; but the same life is wrought in us by the Father, and prepared by (παρά) the Son, and depends on (παρά) the will of the Holy Spirit.¹⁷³

A comparison between this passage and the passage of *Ad Ablabium* in terms of the relationship between the Trinity and His creatures and the use of the three prepositions reveals that the preposition *διά* was used interchangeably with *ἐκ* or *παρά* and connoted the same activeness the other prepositions did. Hence, Gregory did not understand the preposition *διά* exclusively in terms of passiveness, even where it signified transmission in the causal relationship among the three hypostases in the Trinity.

The passage *Contra Eunomium* 1.532–533 cited above (see p. 130) on the analogy sun-sunray-light is very remarkable also for the activeness of the Son's mediation. There the Son's work in the causal relationship was described as the transmissive mediation between Father and Spirit. At the same time, the passage denotes the activeness of the Son's generation. Gregory wrote: "From the unbegotten Sun (ἐξ ἀγεννήτου ἡλίου) a second Sun [the Son] shining out together with him (αὐτῷ συνεκλάμποντα) as if begotten simultaneously with the very thought of the first" Actively, the Son *shines out together* with the Father. To this activeness of the generation Gregory tied the procession of the Holy Spirit through the Son as follows: "Again there is in the same way a third such Light, sundered by no interval of time from the begotten Light (οὐ χρονικῶ τινι διαστήματι τοῦ γεννητοῦ φωτὸς ἀποτεμνόμενον), but shining through him (δι' αὐτοῦ), which has the cause of its existence (hypostasis) in the primary Light (ἐκ τοῦ πρωτοτύπου φωτός)" In other words, these excerpts probably indicate that the Son as the second and begotten Sun brings forth the third Light simultaneously with the unbegotten Sun when the Son actively shines out together with the Father. Hence, if the preposition *διά* tied to the Son is not connected to the causal relationship between Father and Spirit, it signifies an active transmission even in the Trinity. Shining out together with the Father, the Son brings forth the last Light actively.¹⁷⁴

For this activeness, *Epistula* 38 contains an interesting expression. Following the quoted passage (see pp. 128–129), Gregory explicitly explains the hypostatic

¹⁷³ *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 48, 11–19).

¹⁷⁴ Maspero interestingly related the significance of the participle *συνεκλάμποντα* to "the classic *unus Spirator sed duo Spirantes*" from Aquinas' *Summa theologiae* 1a, q. 36, a. 4. Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 167–168.

particularities of the three hypostases. On the hypostatic particularities of the Holy Spirit, he remarks the following:

Since, then, the Holy Spirit, from whom (ἁφ' οὗ) the entire supply of blessings gushes forth to creation, is associated with the Son and produced [shines out inseparably together] with Him and He has His being attached to the Father as a cause, from whom indeed He proceeds, He has this distinguishing note characteristic of His person, that He is produced [acknowledged] after the Son and with Him and that He has His subsistence from the Father. As for the Son, who through Himself and with Himself makes known [acknowledges] the Spirit which proceeds from the Father, and who shines forth as the only begotten from the unbegotten light, He in the matter of the individual tokens which distinguish Him has nothing in common with the Father or with the Holy Spirit, but alone is recognized by the note just named.¹⁷⁵

In this passage, the verb “acknowledge” is first used in a passive sense in connection with the relationship between Son and Spirit. However, its use was changed to an active sense when it said, “As for the Son, who through Himself and with Himself *makes known* the Spirit which proceeds from the Father ...” (emphasis added). The Son *actively* makes the Holy Spirit known through and with Himself. As such, the first passive sense probably signifies an active transmission.

These investigations into the active nature of the mediation shed light on the famous expression “being manifested through the Son.” In *Contra Eunomium* 1.280 Gregory wrote: “His connexion with the Son in being uncreated, [and in having the cause of his existence from the God of the universe,]¹⁷⁶ is not continued when it comes to the personal characteristic, since he did not come to be only begotten from the Father and has been manifested through the Son himself.”¹⁷⁷ Here, “being manifested through the Son” probably points

¹⁷⁵ Deferrari, *The Letters*, 206–207.

¹⁷⁶ For the brackets, see pp. 115–117 above.

¹⁷⁷ *Eun* 1.280 (GNO 1, 108,16–109,1). Maspero correctly emphasized that Gregory used the expression “manifested through the Son” in this passage for the immanent relationship between Son and Spirit, in contrast with Gregory the Thaumaturge’s expression *manifested by the Son*, which has a clear economic value. See Maspero, *Essere e relazione*, 1–6; Maspero, “The Spirit Manifested by the Son in Cappadocian Thought,” *StPatr* 67 (2013): 3–11. For Gregory the Thaumaturge, see *De vita Gregorii Thaumaturgi* (GNO 10/1, 18,13–22). In addition, Maspero’s criticism of de Halleux on this point is reasonable. According to de Halleux, the expression “manifested through the Son” is related to the eternal commu-

to the active transmission if serious account is taken of the active connotation of the preposition *διὰ* and if it is not denied that the Son shines out together with the Father in the sun-sunray-light analogy (*Contra Eunomium* 1:532–533) and actively makes the Holy Spirit known through and with Himself.

4.2.3 Positive

Gregory generally attributed two hypostatic properties to the Holy Spirit: existing from (*ἐκ*) the Father as the cause, and through (*διὰ*) the Son. In the second property, the mediation of the Son is the active transmission explained above. Moreover, the role of the Son is not only negative but also positive. This positiveness came to plain expression when Gregory explained the second property of the Holy Spirit using the phrase “Spirit of Christ,” which he derived from Rom 8:9.¹⁷⁸

Gregory used this expression from Rom 8:9 in *De oratione dominica* and *Adversus Macedonianos, De spiritu santo* (GNO 3/1, 89–115).¹⁷⁹ In homily 3 of *De oratione dominica* (GNO 7/2, 42, 26–43, 4), Gregory said, “For he is called the only begotten of the Father by the Holy Scripture (John 1:14, 18); and this term established His property for Him. But the Holy Spirit is also said to be from the Father, and is testified to be the Son’s (*τὸ δὲ ἅγιον πνεῦμα καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς λέγεται, καὶ τοῦ υἱοῦ εἶναι προσμαρτυρεῖται*). For it says: If any man has not the Spirit of Christ, he is none of His (Rom 8:9).” Here the expression “Spirit of Christ” was related

nication of *ἐνέργεια* between Son and Spirit. This is insufficient for capturing Gregory’s whole idea. With the expression, Gregory defined the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit. Moreover, as outlined above (see pp. 93–96) Gregory in his criticism of Eunomius rejected the use of the term *ἐνέργεια* for the intra-trinitarian relationship. For de Halleux, see de Halleux, “‘Manifesté par le Fils,’” 31.

178 Moutsoulas accurately noted that the expression “Spirit of Christ” indicated the hypostatic distinction of the Holy Spirit from the Son. See Moutsoulas, “La Pneumatologie,” 567. Jaeger expressed a similar idea. See Werner Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssa’s Lehre vom Heiligen Geist* (Leiden: Brill, 1966), 142.

179 The dogmatic significance of this work was evaluated by Maspero in the context of the controversy against the Pneumatomachi of the fourth century. Maspero, “The Fire,” 229–276. In this paper (especially, 243–249), Maspero showed that Gregory underwent a dogmatical development in that he, in contrast with Origen, Athanasius, and Basil, recognized that the Spirit is Creator in the fullest sense. Recently, Piet Hein Hupsch has written a dissertation in which he translated the Greek text into Dutch, commented it, and provided a systematic-theological synthesis. See Piet Hein Hupsch, “De Heilige Geest is de glorie van de Drie-eenheid: Gregorius van Nyssa *Adversus Macedonianos*: Inleiding, vertaling, commentaar en systematisch-theologische synthese” (PhD diss., Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 2018).

to the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit. Similarly, the following passage from *Adversus Macedonianos* explicitly denoted the hypostatic property by the phrase “Spirit of Christ.”

We, indeed, confess that the Holy Spirit is of the same rank as the Father and the Son, so that there is no difference among them in any things which are thought or named piously about the divine nature, except that the Holy Spirit is considered individual with regard to hypostasis (ἐκτὸς τοῦ καθ’ ὑπόστασιν ἰδιαζόντως θεωρεῖσθαι τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον), because He is indeed from God and of the Christ (ὅτι ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐστὶ καὶ τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστὶ), according to Scripture; and we confess that He, who is not confounded with the Father in being never originated nor with the Son in being the only begotten but is considered in and of Himself according to some special properties (οὔτε κατὰ τὸ ἀγέννητον τῷ πατρὶ οὔτε κατὰ τὸ μονογενὲς τῷ υἱῷ συνχόμενον ἀλλὰ τισιν ἐξαίρετοῖς ἰδιώμασιν ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ θεωροῦμενον) in all else, as I have just said, joined with and undifferentiated from them (ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσι καθάπερ ἔφην τὸ συνημμένον καὶ ἀπαράλλακτον ἔχειν).¹⁸⁰

Briefly stated, the Holy Spirit is distinct from the Father and the Son in that the Spirit is neither “ungenerated” nor “only begotten,” but is from God the Father and of the Christ.

The precise meaning of the expression “Spirit of Christ” has been a subject of discussion. In particular, the above passage from *De oratione dominica* has been debated at length from a philological perspective. The essential point of controversy concerns the question whether the phrase τοῦ υἱοῦ εἶναι was authentically combined with the preposition ἐκ.¹⁸¹ According to the philologi-

180 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 89,21–90,5). The English translation has been taken, with revision, from *On the Holy Spirit against the Followers of Macedonius*, in *NPNF* 2, 5:315–325. For a better translation of the quoted passage, see Drecoll’s German translation in Drecoll and Berghaus, *The Minor Treatises*, 45, and Moreschini’s Italian translation in Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 1943–1944. Hupsch’s Dutch translation is similarly recommended. See Hupsch, “De Heilige Geest,” 83–84.

181 For the history of the controversy, see M. Gomes de Castro, *Die Trinitätslehre des Hl. Gregor von Nyssa*, Freiburger Theologische Studien 50 (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1938), 114–117; Graef, *St. Gregory of Nyssa*, 8–10; Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssa’s Lehre*, 122–153; Callahan’s preface, x–xiv, in his edition of GNO 7 (1992). Callahan acknowledged the existence of two families of Greek mss. in the fifth and sixth centuries which were found in the Syriac tradition Φ. However, he attributed the interpolation of the preposition ἐκ to a copyist from that period, following Georg Krabinger who argued that the preposition seems not to fit the literary context where the preposition exists in *Or dom*. For a good summary of

cal study of Johannes F. Callahan, who on this point followed Jaeger, the two Greek families of the text tradition, which are found in the Syriac tradition Φ , probably had the preposition as early as the fifth or sixth century.¹⁸² If the preposition is absent in manuscripts dating later than the ninth century, this absence is probably to be explained by the dogmatic controversy over the *filioque*.¹⁸³ Callahan insisted, however, that the preposition was most likely not in Gregory's original text. As Jaeger had noted,¹⁸⁴ Callahan thought that the absence of the preposition is authentic "from the stand point of Gregory's own line of argumentation."¹⁸⁵

Callahan's conclusion seems reasonable. First, the immediate context does not allow for the interpolation of the preposition $\epsilon\chi$; after all, the biblical passage quoted from Rom 8:9 does not have it. Moreover, as Georg Krabinger has argued,¹⁸⁶ Gregory used a similar expression, albeit without the preposition, in the same context of *De oratione dominica* when he claimed that the relational

the contents of *Or dom*, see Ekaterina Kiria, "OR DOM De Oratio Dominica," in Mateo-Seco and Maspero, *The Brill Dictionary*, 550–553; Coco, *Gregorio di Nissa*, 13–21. In an interesting article on the tradition of the Syriac translation in connection with the *filioque*, Maspero noted that the interpolation of the preposition $\epsilon\chi$ in the early Syriac manuscripts (from the sixth century) does not reflect the use of the preposition "in a polemical sense." In his conclusion, he remarked: "The Syriac tradition is conscious of the necessity to protect the procession of the Spirit from the Father according to the Greek *εκπορεύεται*, while at the same time being at greater liberty to express the role of the Son in the procession, manifesting theological content already present in the Greek trinitarian doctrine, and particularly in Gregory of Nyssa." Maspero, "Tradition and Translation: The Filioque and the Procession of the Holy Spirit in Syriac," *ParOr* 36 (2011): 113, 121.

182 Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssa's Lehre*, 122–153; Callahan, GNO 7/2, x–xiv; cf. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium*, 215n. Even if Jaeger followed Holl against Gerhard May, he corrected Holl's simple view on the interpolation of the preposition as a "western falsification." Holl, 215, note 1. Jaeger recognized that old manuscripts which obtained the preposition existed in the Greek tradition. Jaeger, *Gregor von Nyssa's Lehre*, 148.

183 As Jaeger pointed out, the Vatican Codex 2066 from the ninth or early tenth century has the preposition, which is absent from later manuscripts. Jaeger, 139–142.

184 Jaeger, 142.

185 Callahan, GNO 7/2, xii: "First, regarding the text tradition itself, we must conclude that the $\epsilon\chi$ belongs in the text as far as we can be guided by strictly paleographical evidence. But, in the second place, it is very difficult to justify its presence in the text from the stand point of Gregory's own line of argumentation, as Jaeger has indicated. This is true, it seems to me, even if we carefully exclude the doctrinal significance given to the $\epsilon\chi$ at a later time and $\epsilon\chi$, as we should, for a meaning that Gregory himself could give it. I have concluded, therefore, that $\epsilon\chi$ does not belong to the original text of Gregory, despite the paleographical evidence, and I have bracketed it in this edition."

186 Georg Krabinger, *S. Gregorii episcopi Nysseni De precatione orationes* 5 (Landeshut, 1840) 147, 652–664, quoted in Coco, *Gregorio di Nissa*, 63.

order Son—Spirit cannot be inverted: “And one cannot invert this relational succession so as to be able to indifferently invert with analysis the affirmation, and, as we say that the Spirit is of Christ, thus call Christ of the Spirit.”¹⁸⁷ Second, in line with what has already been noted about the general use of the preposition ἐκ and διὰ in Gregory’s thinking, he in the context of the intra-trinitarian relations attributed the preposition ἐκ to the Father in particular as the cause without any other cause, in distinction from the preposition διὰ. The context of the passage from *De oratione dominica* emphasizes the distinction between the Father and the other hypostases in terms of being αἰτία and attributes precisely the preposition ἐκ to the Father. Hence, it seems altogether reasonable for the use of the two prepositions to be maintained also for the expression. Last, the quoted passage from *Adversus Macedonianos*, where a similar expression occurs, has not been discussed philologically in terms of the possible interpolation of the preposition. Without the preposition ἐκ, that passage clearly expresses the property of the Holy Spirit as being of Christ from Rom 8:9. If Gregory in *Adversus Macedonianos* uses the same biblical text and the same expression without ἐκ for this property, there is no reason to abandon the conclusion of Jaeger’s and Callahan’s philological study.¹⁸⁸ For these reasons, the expression “Spirit of Christ” seems neither to have been combined with the preposition ἐκ, nor understood as an expression to signify a causal relation between Son and Spirit.¹⁸⁹ While it did not signify the causal relation generally connoted using the preposition ἐκ, the expression “Spirit of Christ” does bring the positive role of the Son for the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit into greater relief.

187 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 43,6–9).

188 Interestingly, Holl, with whom Jaeger agreed, drew the same comparison to the passage from *Maced* as I offer. Holl, *Amphilochius von Ikonium*, 215n1.

189 Moreschini, “Osservazioni sulla Pneumatologia,” 140–146. He acknowledged that the probability of the later interpolation of the preposition is based on the pneumatology of the Cappadocians (p. 146). In this context, he mentioned the study of Georgios D. Panagopoulos who attributed the significance of the mediation of the Son to the distinguishable characteristics of Son and Spirit. See Georgios D. Panagopoulos, “Die Vermittlung des Sohnes beim ewigen Ausgang des Heiligen Geistes aus dem Vater nach Gregor von Nyssa Ad Ablabium (GNO III/1,55,21–56,10),” in Drecoll and Berghaus, *The Minor Treatises*, 383–397. Maspero accepted Callahan’s philological conclusion. At the same time, however, Maspero attempted to interpret the mediation of the Son more positively for the real distinction between Son and Spirit rather than purely instrumentally within the monarchy of the Father. To this end, he wrote: “The ἐκ τοῦ υἱοῦ is not totally extraneous to the Nyssian doctrine.” Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 160. Like the present work, Maspero connected the passage in *Or dom* to another passage from *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 108,18). Maspero, “The Fire,” 261n99.

Gregory's interpretation of 1Cor 12:3 too needs to be examined in relation to this positiveness. When he quoted biblical passages to describe the relation between Son and Spirit, he frequently cited this verse from Paul together with Rom 8:9. For Gregory, this verse concisely expresses the point that making the Son known is a property of the Holy Spirit.

For example, *Epistula* 38 quotes this verse from Paul's epistle to the Corinthians to define the property of the Holy Spirit. After circumscribing the Son as being caused or generated from the Father as cause, Gregory's letter continues with a definition of the Spirit's property as follows: "For it is impossible for a man, if he has not been previously enlightened by the Spirit, to arrive at a conception of the Son."¹⁹⁰ Interestingly, this passage is followed immediately by the passage quoted above (see pp. 128–129) where the use of the prepositions ἐκ and διὰ for the hypostatic distinction in the Trinity is summarized. In the entire context, Gregory intended to say that the property of the Holy Spirit is defined not only as Spirit of God the Father in that He comes from Him, but also as Spirit of Christ in that the Holy Spirit has the hypostatic property of making the Son known, as Paul writes in 1Cor 12:3.

Other passages from Gregory's oeuvre where 1Cor 12:3 is quoted show the same pattern. The two following quotations from *Adversus Macedonianos* and *In canticum canticorum* 4 are particularly noteworthy. In *Adversus Macedonianos*, he wrote: "But if it is somehow proclaimed that the doctrines of the Christians take first place, there is no doubt that anyone who thinks of the Father thinks also of the one whose Father he is and that anyone who conceives of the notion of the Son has already been illuminated by the Spirit: 'No one can call Jesus Lord except in the Holy Spirit (1Cor 12:3).'"¹⁹¹ In this quotation, Gregory derived the unity and distinction between the Father and the Son from the fact that each of the terms, "father" and "son," includes the other. This argument can be paraphrased from the context in which it appears¹⁹² as follows: "Being father" itself includes "being son," and vice versa.¹⁹³ In other words, each of the hypostatic existences of the Father and the Son include the

190 Deferrari, *The Letters*, 207.

191 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 114,1–5): "εἰ δὲ ὅπως οὖν πρεσβεύειν τὰ τῶν Χριστιανῶν ἐπαγγέλλεται, πάντως ὅτι πατέρα ἑνωῶν καὶ τὸν οὐ ἔστι πατὴρ ἐνένοήσε καὶ υἱὸν τὴν ἑνωῖαν ἀναλαβὼν προκατηγάσθη διὰ τοῦ πνεύματος. Οὐδεὶς γὰρ δύναται εἰπεῖν κύριον Ἰησοῦν, εἰ μὴ ἐν πνεύματι ἁγίῳ." The English translation is mine. The same message is repeated in a sentence preceding the quotation: "καὶ μὴν φύσιν οὐκ ἔχει πατέρα ἐννοήσαντα μὴ συνεπινοεῖν τὸν υἱὸν καὶ υἱὸν τῇ διανοίᾳ δεξάμενον μὴ συμπεριλαμβάνειν μετὰ τοῦ υἱοῦ τὸ πνεῦμα." *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 113,27–29).

192 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 98,21–28, 113,24–114,5).

193 See also *Eun* 1.378.

existence of the other. This logic of the first part of the quotation is reiterated when the second part claims that the notion or name itself of the Son includes the notion of the Spirit. As such, the second part argues also that each of the hypostatic existences of the Son and the Spirit includes the existence of the other, and vice versa. Following the whole of Gregory's logic in this quotation, what 1 Cor 12:3 says is that the Spirit's property is immediately determined by the hypostatic existence of the Son in the way the Spirit exists to make the Son known.¹⁹⁴ In other words, the Holy Spirit has the hypostatic property to make the Son known, since the existence of the Son positively defines the existence of the Spirit.

Furthermore, a passage in *In canticum canticorum* 4 quotes the same biblical verse and claims that the Holy Spirit manifests the Son. Gregory said, "Since, then, her [the soul's or bride's] purified eye has received the imprint of the dove [the Holy Spirit], she is also capable of beholding the beauty of the Bridegroom. For now for the first time the virgin gazes upon the form of the Bridegroom, now, that is, that she has the dove in her eyes (for 'No one can say, 'Jesus is Lord!' except by the Holy Spirit' [1 Cor 12:3])."¹⁹⁵ The message here is thus similar: the hypostatic property of the Spirit who is the dove and form of the *Bridegroom* is "being of Christ" and consequently is defined as making the Son known. This is derived from the positive mediation of the Son in the Spirit's procession.

Another crucial element for the positiveness of the Son's mediation is Gregory's analogy of kingship and anointment.¹⁹⁶ The analogy shows concretely what the Holy Spirit makes known about the Son. In *Ad Eustathium, De sancta trinitate* (GNO 3/1, 3–16) and *Adversus Macedonianos*, Gregory insisted on the one divinity among the three hypostases from the perspective of the same activities (ἐνέργειαι). As explained above, the divine activities are the movements of the divine nature, and the same activity signifies the same divinity among the three hypostases. Kingship was one such activity in which the hypostases simultaneously share. Kingship, however, did not just signify the same divinity. Rather, Gregory described also the intra-trinitarian relation among the hypostases in terms of kingship. More precisely, he spoke of the

194 Citing the same biblical verse, *Eun* 1.531 (GNO 1, 180,4–6) says that the Son is contemplated as being Beginning of all things by the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

195 *Cant* 4 (GNO 6, 106,5–10).

196 See Brugarolas, "Anointing and Kingdom," 113: "The Nyssen's texts where the Holy Spirit is identified with the divine *anointing* of the Son and with his *kingdom*, or *kingship*, have special relevance to understanding Gregory's idea of intimate communion between the Son and his Spirit (see Rom 8:9)" (emphasis original).

transmission of kingship from the Father through the Son to the Holy Spirit. In terms of this transmission, Gregory described a reciprocal relationship between Son and Spirit as follows:

For the attribute of kingship denotes all dignity; and “our God,” it says, “is King from everlasting” (Ps 73:12). But the Son, having all things which are the Father’s, is Himself proclaimed a King by the Holy Scripture. Now the Divine Scripture says that the Holy Spirit is the unction of the only begotten, interpreting the dignity of the Spirit by a transference of the terms commonly used in this world For this reason, that the dignity of the Holy Spirit might be more clearly shown to men, He was called by the Scripture “the sign of the Kingdom (σύμβολον βασιλείας),” and “Unction (χρίσμα),” whereby we are taught that the Holy Spirit shares in the glory and kingdom of the only begotten Son of God (ὅτι τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξης καὶ βασιλείας κοινωνεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον) And for this reason He is properly called Christ, since this name gives the proof of His inseparable and indivisible conjunction with the Holy Spirit. If, then, the only begotten God is the Anointed, and the Holy Spirit is His Unction, and the appellation of Anointed points to the Kingly authority, and the anointing is the token of His Kingship, then the Holy Spirit shares also in His dignity (ἄρα κοινωνεῖ καὶ τῆς ἀξίας τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον). If, therefore, they say that the attribute of Godhead is significative of dignity, and the Holy Spirit is shown to share in this last quality, it follows that He Who partakes in the dignity will also partake in the name which represents it.¹⁹⁷

Remarkable about this long quotation is that Gregory said that the Holy Spirit has the same divinity of God and the divine kingship since He who was called “the sign of the Kingdom” and “Unction” “shares in the glory and kingdom of the only begotten Son of God.” It cannot be denied that this long passage witnesses an inseparable, reciprocal relation between the Son as Christ and the Spirit as Unction. In this inseparable relationship, however, it must be acknowledged that the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit as the sign of the kingdom and unction primarily depends on the Son as the King. Gregory wrote: “The dignity of the Holy Spirit might be more clearly shown to men, He was called by the Scripture ‘the sign of the Kingdom’ (σύμβολον βασιλείας), and ‘Unction’ (χρίσμα), whereby we are taught that the Holy Spirit shares in the glory and kingdom of the only begotten Son of God (ὅτι τῆς τοῦ μονογενοῦς υἱοῦ τοῦ θεοῦ δόξης καὶ βασιλείας κοι-

¹⁹⁷ Eust (GNO 3/1, 15,15–16,21).

νωνεῖ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἅγιον).” In brief, the Holy Spirit as the sign makes the kingship of the Son known, since His property is defined by the Son.¹⁹⁸

A similar point is made in the passage from *Adversus Macedonianos*. In a long excerpt (GNO 3/1, 102,17–103,13), it explains the divinity which the Holy Spirit shares with the other two hypostases in terms of the theme of kingship, as in *Ad Eustathium*. Moreover, when it argues for this same, shared divinity, this passage similarly describes an inseparable and reciprocal relationship between the Son as king and the Spirit as the symbol of the kingdom. In these similarities, *Adversus Macedonianos* does show a slightly different emphasis compared to *Ad Eustathium*. Against the Pneumatomachi, *Adversus Macedonianos* placed greater emphasis than *Ad Eustathium* on the same dignity of the kingship which the Holy Spirit Himself has and with which the Son as King was anointed. Gregory remarked the following: “If, then, the Father is King, and the only begotten is King, and the Holy Ghost is the Kingship, one and the same definition of Kingship must prevail throughout this Trinity;”¹⁹⁹ again, “the Son is essentially a King, and the Holy Spirit is that dignity of Kingship which anoints the Son.”²⁰⁰ Despite this emphasis on the equality, however, as in *Ad Eustathium* Gregory once again insists that the dignity of the Holy Spirit is defined by the Son as follows: “The thought of ‘unction’ conveys the hidden meaning that there is no interval of separation between the Son and the Holy Spirit. For as between the body’s surface and the liquid of the oil nothing intervening can be detected, either in reason or in perception, so inseparable is the union of the Spirit *with* the Son” (emphasis added).²⁰¹ The inseparable relation between Son and Spirit emphasizes the union of the Spirit *with* and His dependence on the Son also here.

In this regard, it is possible to understand the last part of the homily *De oratione dominica*. This final section is dedicated to arguing once again for the equal divinity of the Holy Spirit against the “warriors against the Spirit,” that is, literally, the πνευματομάχοι.²⁰² Gregory interpreted the petition “Thy Kingdom

198 According to Maspero, Gregory’s identification of the third hypostasis with kingship or kingdom represents a development beyond his brother Basil, who just said that the Holy Spirit “is participant” in the Kingdom (Basil of Caesarea, *De spiritu sancto* 20.51 [sc 17bis, 428,49–430,50]). See Maspero, “The Fire,” 260. Adding to Maspero’s argument, I argue that Gregory meant to say in this quotation that the Holy Spirit is determined as kingship or kingdom by the positive mediation of the Son who is King.

199 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 102,29–31) Maspero accurately emphasized this passage in relation to the procession of the Holy Spirit. Maspero, “The Fire,” 239–240.

200 *Maced* (GNO 3/1.103,10–12).

201 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 102,31–103,5).

202 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 43,16).

come” with reference to Luke 11:2, “May thy Holy Spirit come upon us and purify us.”²⁰³ From this comparison between Matthew and Luke, Gregory concluded that the Bible identifies the Holy Spirit with the kingdom or kingship (βασιλεία) which the Father and the Son have in the one divine nature: the Holy Spirit is not placed with the ruled, but with the ruling Nature.²⁰⁴ In this argumentation, Gregory interestingly connected the kingship of the Holy Spirit not just to the Father but also to the Son, in that the Holy Spirit is the Kingship by virtue of being the “Spirit of Christ” and “not alien from the nature of the Son.”²⁰⁵ Consequently, like *Ad Eustathium* and *Adversus Macedonianos* as treated above, also this last part of the third homily of *De oratione dominica* says that the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit as kingship or kingdom is defined also through the Son, and that the Spirit then makes the kingdom of the Son to come.²⁰⁶

203 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 39, 18–19). The authenticity of the quotation from Luke 11:2 has been subject to debate. According to Pelizzari and Coco, Krabinger in his edition rendered the two verses from Matthew and Luke similarly as “Thy kingdom come.” Krabinger also described the reading of Gregory as a “remarkable variety of readings” (*itaque memorabilis est haec lectionis varietas* in Krabinger, *S. Gregorii*, 141) quoted in Caldarelli, *S. Gregorio di Nissa* (2014), 83; cf. Coco, *Gregorio di Nissa*, 60. Robert Leaney, however, accepted the authenticity of Gregory’s reading and said that it probably came from the Lord’s prayer itself. According to Leaney, the word “kingdom” in Matthew was used for Israelites and the word “Spirit” in Luke also for the Gentiles in order to signify the Spirit’s penetration into their hearts. See Robert Leaney, “The Lucan Text of the Lord’s Prayer (Lk XI 2–4),” *NovT* 1, no. 2 (1956): 108. More recently, Monique Alexandre has studied this theme and concluded that Gregory is a witness to a variant reading connected to the Syrian tradition. Monique Alexandre, “La variante de Luke 11,2 dans la troisième homélie sur l’oraison dominicale de Grégoire de Nysse et la controverse avec les pneumatomaques,” in *Grégoire de Nysse: La Bible dans la construction de son discours*, eds. Matthieu Cassin and Hélène Grelier (Paris: IEA, 2008), 168 ff.

204 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 39, 22–40, 8).

205 See Maspero, “The Fire,” 261–262. With reference to the quoted passages from *Or dom* and *Maced*, Maspero accentuated the intra-trinitarian relation in which the Son as King received the Holy Spirit as Kingship or Kingdom from the Father. In this way, he claimed that the Spirit unites the Father and the Son, and that “the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, because his mode of being God is that of uniting the Father and the Son.” Maspero, 261–262. While Maspero did not overlook the non-inverted Father-Son-Spirit τᾶξις with this emphasis, the present work insists the non-inverted τᾶξις more strongly.

206 See Brugarolas, “Anointing and Kingdom,” 119: “Gregory finds in the pneumatology of the anointing an appropriate way to argue not only the divinity of the Holy Spirit but also his hypostatic property (*idiôtes*). Besides saying that the Spirit participates in the unique nature of God for his communion with the Son, the pneumatology of the anointing is an assertion of the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit. When Gregory affirms that the Holy Spirit is the ‘anointing of Christ’ and the ‘kingship of the king’ he is doubtlessly making reference to his personal property (*idiôtes*) of being ‘Spirit of the Son’ (Rom 8:9).”

Being kingship of the Son, the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit is also defined as the glory of the Son by the positive mediation of the Son.²⁰⁷ This hypostatic property comes to particularly clear expression in *Contra Eunomium* 1.385: "... if the Father who exists before time is always glorious, and the pretemporal Son is the glory of the Father, and if likewise the Spirit of Christ, which is forever contemplated together with the Son and the Father, is the glory of Christ, what source, what kind of education, makes this clever fellow name a 'senior' among the timeless and a 'more honorable' among those by nature."²⁰⁸ This quotation follows on Gregory's insistence on the difference between being uncreated and created in terms of temporal interval. From this ontological difference, Gregory stressed that there is no interval of any kind among the three hypostases due to the one divinity they all share (*Contra Eunomium* 1.375–379). Against the background of this context, the quoted passage should not be interpreted to designate any interval in the Trinity in terms of the theme of 'glory.' When it calls the Son "the glory of the Father" and the Spirit "the glory of Christ," this passage points rather to the hypostatic existences, or "how they exist as glory," that distinguish the three persons. In other words, the Son is the glory of the Father in that He is generated from the Father with whom He is equal in glory without any interval. The same is also the case for the Holy Spirit. The Spirit is the glory of the Son in that He is "Spirit of Christ." It is no coincidence that Gregory here quotes Rom 8:9, which has been explained above as being indicative for him of the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit in relation to the Son. By the mediation of the Son, the Holy Spirit who is of Christ is hypostatically defined as the glory of the Son.

The same message is also found in *Antirreticus adversus Apolinarium* (GNO 3/1, 131–233). When Gregory defended himself against the accusation of believing in two Christs, he claimed that the eternal Son became man for the absorption and deification of the human nature into the divine nature. In his argument, Gregory identifies the glory into which the human nature is absorbed with the Holy Spirit. In particular, a passage from *Antirreticus adversus Apolinarium*²⁰⁹ reveals clearly that the Holy Spirit as glory was contemplated around the only begotten God before all ages (δόξα πρὸ τῶν αἰώνων περὶ τὸν μονογενῆ θεὸν θεωρουμένη). Moreover, the Holy Spirit as "glory around Christ" is defined as *what belongs to Christ*, and belongs also to those who are of Christ

207 *Eun* 1.384 (GNO 1, 139); *Tunc et ipse* (GNO 3/2, 21, 19–22); *Cant* 15 (GNO 6, 467, 2–17); *Antirrh* (GNO 3/1, 222, 1–223, 10).

208 *Eun* 1.385 (GNO 1, 139, 22–140, 2).

209 *Antirrh* (GNO 3/1, 222, 11–19).

in the way they are united to Christ. The glory, in which the only begotten God is glorified, is the glory that was defined by the Son as His glory before all ages.

Another relevant passage about “the revolving circle of the glory” is from *Adversus Macedonianos*. Even though the citation is quite long, it needs to be given in full for an accurate understanding of what Gregory was saying:

... the Holy Spirit is, to begin with, because of qualities that are essentially holy, that which the Father, essentially Holy, is; and such as the only begotten is, such is the Holy Spirit; then, again, He is so by virtue of life-giving, of imperishability, of invariableness, of everlastingness, of justice, of wisdom, of rectitude, of sovereignty, of goodness, of power, of capacity to give all good things, and above them all life itself, and by being everywhere, being present in each, filling the earth, residing in the heavens, shed abroad upon supernatural Powers, filling all things according to the deserts of each, Himself remaining full, being with all who are worthy, and yet not parted from the Holy Trinity. He ever “searches the deep things of God,” ever “receives” from the Son, ever is being “sent,” and yet not separated, and being “glorified,” and yet He has always had glory. It is plain, indeed, that one who gives glory to another must be found himself in the possession of superabundant glory; for how could one devoid of glory glorify another? Unless a thing be itself light, how can it display the gracious gift of light? So the power to glorify could never be displayed by one who was not himself glory, and honor, and majesty, and greatness. Now the Spirit does glorify the Father and the Son. Neither does He lie Who says, “Them that glorify Me I glorify” (1 Sam 2:30); and “I have glorified You,” (John 17:4) is said by our Lord to the Father; and again He says, “Glorify Me with the glory which I had with You before the world was” (John 17:5). The Divine Voice answers, “I have both glorified, and will glorify again” (John 12:28). You see the revolving circle of the glory moving from Like to Like. The Son is glorified by the Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son; again the Son has His glory from the Father; and the only begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit. For with what shall the Father be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son: and with what again shall the Son be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit? In like manner, again, Faith completes the circle, and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of the Son.²¹⁰

210 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 108,18–109,15); see also *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,9–13).

This long passage from *Adversus Macedonianos* thus states that the Holy Spirit has the same glory as the Father and the Son, since the Spirit has the same divinity. In this same divinity, the Holy Spirit “who is not parted from the Holy Trinity” is emphasized to be glory by himself. This is why the Spirit is glorified and glorifies: “It is plain, indeed, that one who gives glory to another must be found himself in the possession of superabundant glory; for how could one devoid of glory glorify another?” In this sense, *Adversus Macedonianos* stresses the one divinity which never becomes more or less among the three hypostases.

With this emphasis, the text speaks about the circulation of glory among the three hypostases. Briefly stated, if the emphasis on the one divinity is taken seriously, what Gregory intended with the notion of circulation can indicate the hypostatic particularities, or “how they exist as glory,” in regard to the same shared glory by revealing the relationship between the order in οἰκονομία and the τάξις in eternity by this circulation of glory. This correlates being only begotten from the Father to the Son glorifying the Father, and as such indicates the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit as His glorification of the Son.

If we examine the passage in greater detail, the first thing to be noted is that Gregory consistently retains the order Spirit-Son-Father in the οἰκονομία. He said, “The Son is glorified by the Spirit; the Father is glorified by the Son.” In other words, following the order in the οἰκονομία, the glory comes from the Spirit through the Son to the Father. This order is also retained later on: “For with what shall the Father be glorified, but with the true glory of the Son: and with what again shall the Son be glorified, but with the majesty of the Spirit?” Likewise, the concluding part to this excerpt emphasizes the οἰκονομία order: “In like manner, again, Faith completes the circle, and glorifies the Son by means of the Spirit, and the Father by means of the Son.” Describing this order, then, Gregory establishes the τάξις in eternity as the background for the order in the οἰκονομία. When he says “... the Son has His glory from the Father; and the only begotten thus becomes the glory of the Spirit,” this signifies the τάξις in eternity that is reflected conversely in οἰκονομία. The Son glorifies the Father in οἰκονομία in that the Son has the glory from the Father in being only begotten in eternity, and the Spirit glorifies the Son in that the Son becomes the glory of the Spirit who is of the Son and receives the glory from Him in eternity.

With this connection between the τάξις and the order in οἰκονομία, Gregory intended to show that the circulation of glory in οἰκονομία reflects the hypostatic properties of the hypostases in regard to ‘how they exist.’ The Spirit who glorifies the Son in οἰκονομία is hypostatically defined as the *Glory of the Son* by the positive mediation of the Son.²¹¹

211 Recently, Brugarolas wrote an article stressing the theme of the circulation of glory in

The above analysis finds echoes in two similar passages from *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius* (GNO 3/2, 3–28) and *In canticum canticorum* 15.²¹² Interpreting John 17:22, these two passages similarly claim that the Holy Spirit was sent by the Son to unite the disciples and humankind to the Triune God. In their argument, both passages identify the Holy Spirit as the glory of the Son which the Son had before the ages from the Father, on the basis of the message of John 17:22 (“The glory which you have given to me I have given to them”). If this identification in John 17:22 corresponds to the absolute simultaneity of the three hypostases without any interval and the non-inverted τᾶξίς, it is probable that Gregory understood that identification as the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit which is connected to His procession from the Father through the Son. In His procession, the Holy Spirit who exists by the Father is defined as the third hypostasis according to the immediately definitive role of the Son. The Spirit, who is hypostatically defined as being of the Son and making the Son known, is the glory of the Son.

This analysis of the implication of Gregory’s thought finds support in his own words in these passages. *In illud: Tunc et ipse filius* precisely relates the identification of the Holy Spirit as “the glory of the Son” to Rom 8:9. The Holy Spirit, who is the glory of the Father, is also the glory of the Son in that He is “Spirit of Christ.”²¹³ So too we read in *In canticum canticorum* 15: “He who invested himself with humanity received this glory which he had before the cosmos existed,

intra-trinitarian life in Gregory’s thought. Even though he offered a thorough analysis of the quoted passage from *Maced* and other similar passages from his corpus in terms of the notion of circulation, he did not pay significant attention to the non-inverted *taxis* and the resulting order in the οἰκονομία. After quoting the passage from *Maced*, he remarked: “The Holy Spirit is understood as the *glory* of the Word, which proceeds from the Father, is received by the Son, and returns to the Father” (emphasis original). Brugarolas, “The Holy Spirit as the ‘Glory’ of Christ: Gregory of Nyssa on John 17:22,” in *The Ecumenical Legacy of the Cappadocians*, ed. Nicu Dumitrescu, Pathways for Ecumenical and Interreligious Dialogue (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 254. Although Brugarolas acknowledged that for Gregory the hypostatic property of the Spirit is defined as “Spirit of Christ” in another article (“Anointing and Kingdom,” 119; see note 206 above), it would seem that in this article he was thinking of a τᾶξίς Father-Spirit-Son that is absent from Gregory’s trinitarian thinking and is probably not reflected in the quoted passage. Cf. Maspero, “The Fire,” 257–259. In regard to the quoted passage from *Maced*, Maspero accentuated the active role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit such that his argument can probably attribute the preposition ἐκ to the Son also in Gregory’s trinitarianism against Eunomius, “who affirmed the procession of the Spirit from the Father alone by means of the only begotten (*Ref Eun* 190.1 ff. [GNO 2, 392, 23 ff.]).”

212 *Tunc et ipse* (GNO 3/2, 21, 22–22, 16); *Cant* 15 (GNO 6, 467, 2–468, 4).

213 *Tunc et ipse* (GNO 3/2, 22, 4–8).

and when that humanity had been glorified by the Spirit, the further gift of the Spirit's glory was passed on to the entire heredity [of that humanity], beginning with the disciples."²¹⁴ The incarnated Son in *οἰκονομία* received His *own* Spirit in eternity, and the glory of the Spirit which was passed on was that glory. In this sense, both treatises describe the uniting work of the Holy Spirit in such a way that He unites the disciples and all humankind primarily *to the Son*.

4.3 *Immediately Definitive*

From the entire analysis of the mediation of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit, Gregory's conception of it can be summarized as follows: the Son mediates the causal relation between Father and Holy Spirit not only by the negative and transmissive role, but also by the active and positive role to define the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit as "Spirit of Christ" who makes known the Kingdom and Glory of the Son.

This role of the Son is comparable with the role of the Father. The Father is the cause and the Holy Spirit is caused from the Father. The Father has a definitive role for the particular existence of the Holy Spirit in that the Holy Spirit exists definitively only from the Father. If serious consideration is given to this element, Gregory's criticism of Eunomius who denied the divinity of the Spirit and subordinated Him to the Son can be fully understood (*Eun* 1.303 ff.). The Holy Spirit, who is definitively from the Father, has the same divine nature as the Father and the Son.²¹⁵

Nevertheless, to Gregory's mind this definitive role of the Father for the particular existence of the Spirit is mediated by the Son as analyzed above. Otherwise, the two *αἰτίαι* are not distinguished in that both would be caused from the Father. Hence, the Father's relationship with the Holy Spirit is mediated "through the Son," while the Father has an immediate relationship with the Son, who is "immediately from the first and then only begotten" of Him. In this way, the Father is related to the property of the Holy Spirit mediately through the Son, even though the Spirit exists in being caused definitively from the Father. In brief, the Father has a mediately definitive role for the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit.

Compared to the mediately definitive role attributed to the Father, the Son as mediation between the Father and the Holy Spirit has an immediately definitive role for the property of the Holy Spirit. The Son is immediately related to

²¹⁴ *Cant* 15 (GNO 6, 467,10–14).

²¹⁵ Cf. Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* 2.34 (SC 305, 142), quoted in Moutsoulas, "La Pneumatologie," 559.

the Holy Spirit in that He exists as “διά” between Father and Spirit. He has a definitive role for the Spirit’s property in that the Holy Spirit has to be distinguished not only from the Father but also from the Son.

In Gregory’s trinitarianism which maintains the monarchy of the Father, this immediately definitive role of the Son is transmissive and negative for the hypostatic distinction of the Holy Spirit, as well as active and positive for the definition of His hypostatic property. The Holy Spirit as the third hypostasis in the Triune God exists only by proceeding from the Father as the cause without any other cause. In this sense, the immediately definitive role of the Son does not have any causal significance in comparison to the causal relation between Father and Holy Spirit. Keeping the monarchy of the Father, Gregory attributed the mediation of the Son to the distinction and definition of the Spirit’s properties among the three hypostases in the Triune God, whose three hypostases exist absolutely simultaneously without any kind of interval.²¹⁶ In this sense, while the mediation of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit must be taken seriously, the following statement from Henry B. Swete does not end up in the pitfall of concluding that the Son’s mediation worked as a *cause* for the consubstantial existence of the Holy Spirit: “Thus from S. Gregory’s point of view the Son is the μεσίτης in the Divine Triad, through whom the essential life of the Father eternally flows to the Ghost. The Son and the Spirit have One cause the Father; but the Son derives His Being directly from the Father, the Spirit issues mediately through the Son.”²¹⁷

216 Given the study of Gregory’s entire trinitarian thinking on the procession of the Holy Spirit in the present chapter, the following assessment of Christopher A. Beeley on the procession probably requires revision: “... like his brother, and in contrast with Gregory Nazianzen, Gregory of Nyssa pays little attention to the definition of the Spirit’s procession.” See Beeley, “The Holy Spirit in the Cappadocians: Past and Present,” *ModTh* 26, no. 1 (2010): 106. Rather, the above has revealed the depth and rich thinking of Gregory in terms of the role of the Son in the procession. For a similar evaluation, see Brugarolas, “La procesión,” 48n17; 66.

217 Henry B. Swete, *On the History of the Doctrine of the Procession of the Holy Spirit from the Apostolic Age to the Death of Charlemagne* (Cambridge, 1876), 103; cf. Markos A. Orphanos, “The Procession of the Holy Spirit: According to Certain Greek Fathers,” *Θεολογία* 51, no. 1 (1980): 93.

5 The Hypostatic Property of the Holy Spirit

5.1 *In Gregory's Trinitarian Theology*

As the entire analysis has revealed up to now, the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit in Gregory's trinitarian theology is defined by the Father and by the Son. The Father has a mediately definitive role and the Son an immediately definitive role. This came to clear expression when Gregory said that the Holy Spirit is hypostatically distinguished from the Father and the Son since, as *Adversus Macedonianos*, has summarized Gregory's entire understanding, He proceeds from the Father and is of Christ.²¹⁸ When the Holy Spirit proceeds mediately from the Father as αἵτιον through the Son, his hypostasis is negatively defined as not being the unbegotten. When the Holy Spirit is manifested as "being of Christ" immediately through the Son, His property is on the one hand defined negatively as not being the only begotten and as being the third hypostasis in the revealed τᾶξις. On the other hand, the transmissive mediation of the Son also defines the property positively and actively as Spirit of Christ for making known the Son, His Kingship or Kingdom, and in particular His Glory. All of these particularities derived from the summarizing passage in *Adversus Macedonianos* are probably what Gregory intended to indicate when he offered the following the summary in *Adversus Macedonianos*: "[the Spirit] is confused neither with the Father as the unbegotten nor with the Son as the only begotten, but we envision Him in and of himself with certain special characteristics."²¹⁹

218 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 89,25–90,1).

219 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 90,1–4). Maspero interestingly attempted to connect this passage to the passage from *Eun* 1.279 ff. (GNO 1, 108,7–109,5), and to interpret the expression "with certain special characteristics" in *Maced* here with the "εἶναι δὲ ὅλως" of *Eun* 1.280 (GNO 1, 180,12), which he translated as "to be in the mode of constituting a whole." In this connection, Maspero furthermore tried to emphasize the property of the Holy Spirit as the bond between Father and Son in the intra-trinitarian life as well as in οἰκονομία. For his argument, Maspero offered analyses most notably of the analogies of fire, anointing and kingship, and glory, as has also been done above in the present work. Maspero, "The Fire," 249–269; also, *Trinity and Man*, 177–180. While Maspero's deep and thorough analysis of the quoted material is convincing, the present work concentrates much more on the non-inverted τᾶξις and on the simultaneity of the three hypostases in eternity without any interval, as Gregory himself clearly and doubtlessly analyzed them in his analogical approach. Albeit Maspero's translation of the Greek expression εἶναι δὲ ὅλως is interesting, this expression can be translated in another way such as "but certainly to be" by Hall. This translation is quite reasonable since the same Greek expression, which was attributed to the Son in *Eun* 1.489 (GNO 1, 168,1–4), can be translated similarly. There the wording was not Gregory's own, but his paraphrase of the words of his opponents who accused him of considering the Father and the Son as two principles and as two unbegottens. The expression was used by his opponents within their argument that the mode of the Son's being is

5.2 *Gregory's Ideas on the Works of the Holy Spirit*

The hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit deriving from Gregory's trinitarian thinking was also reflected in his ideas on what the Holy Spirit does in the spiritual life of believers. To reveal that similarity, this final section of the present chapter will analyze his spiritual thinking. Gregory explained his ideas on the spiritual life in particular in his ascetic works. At the same time, his spiritual ideas were not limited to them. Instead, considerable elements of his spiritual theology are found also in his trinitarian works. An analysis of the latter has the added benefit of allowing a comparison between the conclusions reached from the analysis of his trinitarian thinking and the results deriving from the reading of his spiritual works. Therefore, this section will begin with a study of Gregory's spiritual theology as it is found in his trinitarian works, followed by his ascetic works.²²⁰

5.2.1 φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit

As examined, Gregory used the term φιλόανθρωπία in his trinitarian debate against Eunomius to describe the works of the Trinity in the history for the salvation of human beings. In other words, φιλόανθρωπία correlates with the οἰκονομία of the Triune God, which in turn occurs through the former. Due to His love for human beings, God works in history.

Gregory offered an explanation of the φιλόανθρωπία of the Holy Spirit, stating what the Holy Spirit in His οἰκονομία does as a result of this φιλόανθρωπία. Among several passages in Gregory's trinitarian works, it is *Contra Eunomium* 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–19)²²¹ in particular that clearly reflects his ideas on the φιλόανθρωπία and οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit. As noted, this passage uses the two terms in combination, φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία, and says that the activity of the Holy Spirit is to raise human beings to a kind of superior understanding of God. In this

not "being begotten from the Father" even if He certainly exists. For another example of the translation of the expression, Moreschini translated the expression in *Eun* 1.280 into Italian as "e pure essere in senso totale" (Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 809).

220 In fact, the combination of the Triune God and the spiritual and virtual life is deeply intrinsic to the core of Gregory's entire theology. In *Vit Moys* 2.166 (GNO 7/1, 88,5–12) he writes: "Religious virtue is divided into two parts, into that which pertains to the Divine and that which pertains to right conduct (for purity of life is a part of religion). Moses learns at first the things which must be known about God (namely, that none of those things known by human comprehension is to ascribe to him). Then he is taught the other side of virtue, learning by what pursuits the virtuous life is perfected." See also "Introduction" of Sarah Coakley in Sarah Coakley, ed., *Re-Thinking Gregory of Nyssa* (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2004), 1–14.

221 For the quotation, see p. 108 above. See also *Ref Eun* 91 (GNO 2, 349).

activity, due to His love, the Spirit uses analogies that are “accessible to” human beings. Briefly stated, the φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit is His hermeneutical guidance of the human being to take an upward journey toward what the divinity is.²²²

The hermeneutical activity which the Holy Spirit effects by φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία receives a thoroughly christological color on the following three points: What the Holy Spirit must interpret is Christ’s teaching about the Trinity; His hermeneutical work pursues the explicit goal of comprehending the one divinity that the Son shares with the Father; and becoming adopted sons due to the only begotten Son is part of this hermeneutical progress.

First, the Holy Spirit accurately interprets what Christ taught His disciples about the Trinity by the baptismal formula in Matt 28:19.²²³ As explained, Gregory’s criticism against Eunomius began with the latter’s ignorance of what the Logos said in this verse. Eunomius denied the names that Christ taught, and invented new words for the three hypostases in order to abandon the notion of the Son having the same divinity as the Father. Against this new formula and these invented names, Gregory established his basic argument concerning the teaching derived directly from Christ as follows: “We read what the Lord says in his own words: ‘Go,’ he says, ‘and make disciples of all nations, baptizing them into the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit’ (Matt 28:19). Where is the Son called a creature? Where does the word teach that the Father is creator and designer of the only begotten? Where is it taught that the Son is the slave of God in that quotation? Where is the God of the Son announced in the tradition of the sacrament?”²²⁴ The source of the hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit is christological in that Christ had taught what His Spirit guided the human intellect to understand precisely concerning the mystery of the Trinity.

Second, based on the teaching of Christ, the Holy Spirit interprets biblical passages in order to reveal the one divinity of the Son and the Father. This emerges from the context of the passage from *Contra Eunomium* 3.6.32 which clearly expressed the φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit.²²⁵ Against the Eunomian interpretation, Gregory interpreted the terminology of ‘begetting’ in a manner strictly appropriate to what the divine nature is. He emphasized that the Holy Spirit helps the human διάνοια and ἐπίνοια to understand and conceptualize the mystery of the eternal begetting by using material or compre-

222 *Ref Eun* 91 (GNO 2, 349,18–26). See also *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 42,13–43,2).

223 See *Eun* 1.10 (GNO 1, 25); *Eun* 1.156 (GNO 1, 74); Lucas F. Mateo-Seco, “Christology and Soteriology in the *Contra Eunomium* 1,” in Brugarolas, *Contra Eunomium* 1, 570.

224 *Eun* 3.9.62 (GNO 2, 287,22–29); see also *Eun* 1.54 (GNO 1, 40–41).

225 For the quotation, see p. 108 above.

hensible analogies of various connotations of begetting. Through this accommodation, the Holy Spirit interprets the terminology as an analogy to indicate the same divinity shared by the Begetter and the Begotten, and not the natural subordination of the Latter to the Former. In this hermeneutics, the Holy Spirit manifests the glory of the Son. The Spirit, who is Spirit of Christ to be the Glory of the Son and to make known the Glory of the Son,²²⁶ manifests the same divine nature of the Son to the Father in that He interprets the biblical passages and analogies to insist clearly on the same divinity of the Son. The goal of the Spiritual hermeneutics is the glory of Christ.

Lastly, the Spirit's hermeneutics glorifying the Son is not limited to the revelation of the one divinity of the Son and the Father. It is expanded to include the adoption of human beings as children of God the Father through the firstborn Son. This extension manifests itself remarkably in Gregory's brilliant distinction between the two words *μονογενής* and *τὸν πρωτότοκον*, and in the way he connects this distinction to his interpretation of John 20:17.

Eunomius and his followers actually attempted to comprehend the term 'firstborn' in such a way that it shows that the Son is not equal in divinity to the Father, but created. Gregory quoted their argument as follows:

So they say, 'Whatever we perceive as the essential being of all creation, we say that its firstborn has the same. If all creation is of the same being (*ὁμοούσιος*) as the Father of the universe, the same we will allow is true of creation's Firstborn; if on the other hand the God of the universe differs in his being from the creation, we are obliged to say that the Firstborn of creation does not share his being with God either.'²²⁷

In other words, they conceived 'being born' as being created and 'firstborn' as the first being of the created. In this sense, they argued that the Son being called firstborn is not divine but created. Additionally, Eunomius identified the term 'only begotten' with 'firstborn' in *Refutatio Confessionis Eunomii* 73.²²⁸ By this identification, the Son, whenever he is called 'only begotten' or 'firstborn,' is conceived by Eunomius and his followers as a created being.

Against this heretical statement, Gregory distinguished the significance of the two terms by offering an interpretation of the four occasions on which Paul used that term 'firstborn' (Col 1:15, 18; Rom 8:29; Heb 1:6). He concluded:

²²⁶ *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 179,9–13, 109,8–15); see pp. 143–147 above.

²²⁷ *Eun* 3.2.44 (GNO 2, 66,18–25).

²²⁸ GNO 3/1, 342,1–13.

That it is not in terms of his pretemporal existence that 'Firstborn' applies to the Son, is evidenced by the title 'only begotten'. One that is truly only begotten has no brothers, for how could an only begotten be reckoned among brothers? But just as he is called God and Man, Son of God and Son of Man, form of God and form of a slave, being some of these in his transcendent nature, and becoming the others by the dispensation of his kindness to men, so also, being only begotten God, he becomes the Firstborn of all creation, Only-begotten as he who is at the paternal breast, but, in those who are being saved through the new creation, Firstborn of creation both in deed and in name.²²⁹

In other words, the Son is called firstborn because He brought the restoration and new creation of all other human beings from death. In this sense, the Son as firstborn has brothers and sisters who were to be spiritually regenerated following the firstborn Son. The Son is called firstborn in relation to His recreated and regenerated brothers due to His *φιλανθρωπία*. In short, as Son of man assuming the form of a slave, the Son is the 'firstborn' brother of the other brothers who follow Him. As the only begotten, the Son is equal to the Father, Gregory argued.²³⁰ 'Only begotten' literally signifies that the Son has no brothers, while the term 'firstborn' implies that he does have them.

By this distinction, the Son is glorified. Only by the Son, who became firstborn in the form of a slave, can human beings become brothers of the firstborn Brother and adopted as children of God the Father. Gregory argued that this is the message of what John 20:17 says. The Son is glorified as the only way by which human beings are restored and recreated.

The fact of the matter, so Gregory argued, is that Eunomius wrongly interpreted John 20:17 and its context.²³¹ Eunomius attempted to state that the Son is not equal but subordinated to the Father by nature due to the fact that the Son shares the name of 'Father' and 'God' with His disciples. In other words, the Son was not divine by nature in that He like them uses the names 'Father' and 'God' which were revealed to express the relation between God and His

229 *Eun* 3.2.55 (GNO 2, 70,18–71,2); see also *Ref Eun* 76 (GNO 3/1, 343,18–26).

230 This conclusion was not abandoned even though Eunomius called the Son "firstborn," saying: "He [the Son] was constituted before the rest of creation" (*Eun* 3.2.56 [GNO 2, 71,3–4]). If Eunomius used "firstborn" in this sense, Gregory responded, his argument would be inconsistent. According to Eunomius, God the Father is the true God as Creator, while the Son is a creature. However, if Eunomius called the Son "firstborn" because he was created before the rest of creation and because the rest of creation was therefore made by the Son, He ought actually to be called "Father" not "firstborn" (*Eun* 3.2.56–57 [GNO 2, 71,2–21]).

231 *Eun* 3.10.7–8 (GNO 2, 291–292).

creatures. The Son shares rather the same relationship with God as the human disciples do. Hence, for Eunomius, the Son is not equal in divinity to the Father.

Against Eunomius, Gregory did not attribute being firstborn to a natural subordination of the Son, but rather to His οἰκονομία based on the distinction studied above. Interpreting the verse (John 20:17), Gregory called what the firstborn Brother said in it a “recapitulation of the whole aim of *oikonomia*.”²³² Being firstborn, the Son recreated and regenerated the human being which He had assumed and created His brothers. They become children of God the Father who share with their firstborn Brother in the use of the names ‘God’ and ‘Father.’ Only the firstborn Brother could realize the whole aim of God’s οἰκονομία from His φιλιανθρωπία.

The distinction between ‘only begotten’ and ‘firstborn’ and its connection to the orthodox interpretation of John 20:17 is the hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit. He safeguards these two terms from being mixed in terms of their significance. By his guidance, John 20:17 is interpreted as an indication of the glorification of the Son who became the firstborn Brother to bring the whole aim of God’s οἰκονομία into existence.

The christologically hermeneutical activity of the Holy Spirit has conformity to God the Father as its ultimate goal. First, the christological hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit leads human understanding to see who God the Father is (ὑπόστασις) through the incarnated Son. As we have seen, the Holy Spirit interprets biblical passages and analogies in order to reveal the divinity of the incarnated Son to be the same as that of the Father. In this way, He glorifies the Incarnate as God, and the Holy Spirit is the glory of the Son. This christological hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit is expanded to reveal who the Father is through the Incarnate. In other words, the Father is revealed through the Son’s similarity to Him by the Holy Spirit.²³³ It is in this sense that Gregory interpreted John 14:9 and Heb 1:3 as follows:

... he [the Son] is both from the Father and is perceived in the Father’s eternity, and in this way is most clearly to be observed the exact replication in the image of him whose image he is (ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐκ τοῦ πατρὸς ἐστὶ καὶ ἐν τῇ αἰδιότητι τοῦ πατρὸς καθοράται, καὶ τούτῳ μάλιστα τῷ τρόπῳ τὸ διὰ πάντων τῆς εἰκόνης ἀπαράλλακτον πρὸς τὸν οὗ ἐστὶν εἰκὼν θεωρεῖται). In this respect we find the word is true, when it says, ‘He that has seen me, has seen the Father’ (John 14.9). The saying of the Apostle might also best be

²³² Ref Eun 82 (GNO 3/1, 346,5–12).

²³³ Ref Eun 32 (GNO 3/1, 324,25–325,2).

understood as right and relevant, that the Son is ‘the radiance of his glory and the stamp of his substantial reality (ὑπόστασις)’ (Heb 1.3) Just as the body of the sun is replicated in the whole disc that surrounds it (τὸ ἡλιακὸν σῶμα ὅλῳ τῷ περιέχοντι κύκλῳ χαρακτηρίζεται), and one who sees the disc goes on through what is apparent to think of the substantial reality of the whole that lies deep within (ὅλου τοῦ κατὰ τὸ βάθος ὑποκειμένου τὴν ὑπόστασιν), so, he says, in the greatness of the Son’s power the Father’s majesty is replicated (εἶπεν ἐν τῷ μεγέθει τῆς τοῦ υἱοῦ δυνάμεως τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς μεγαλεῖον χαρακτηρίζεσθαι), in order that whatever knowledge there is of the one may equally be believed of the other. ... and as the beam comes from the sun (for there would be no sunbeam if there were no sun), yet the sun is not thought of by itself without its radiated beam, so in communicating the bond and eternity of the existence of the only begotten from the Father the Apostle calls the Son ‘radiance of glory’.²³⁴

This beautiful passage plainly states that the Father is perceived through the Son, since the Son’s similarity to the Father “replicates” who the Father is (ὑπόστασις). The Son is His Image which reveals who He is. Gregory clearly expressed the same idea in *Contra Eunomium* 1.531 as follows:

The Beginning of all things, which is Jesus Christ, irradiates souls through the Holy Spirit, for it is impossible for the Lord Jesus to be contemplated except in the Holy Spirit, as the Apostle says (1 Cor 12:4); and through the Lord, who is the Beginning of all things, the Beginning which transcends all beginning is discovered to us, that is the God over all, for neither is it possible to come to know the ultimate good, except as it appears in the Image of the Invisible.²³⁵

As the last quotation shows, the vision of the Father through the Son by the Holy Spirit occurs in a similar way in the spiritual world of the angels. Against the Pneumatomachi who considered the Holy Spirit an angelic creature,²³⁶ Gregory states that the Holy Spirit is God over created angels since He illumines them to see God the Father through the Son:

For since it is said the angels do always behold the Face of My Father which is in heaven (Matt 18:10), and it is not possible to behold the per-

234 *Eun* 3.6.11–14 (GNO 2, 189,29–190,27); see also *Eun* 1.636–637 (GNO 1, 209).

235 GNO 1, 180,3–10.

236 *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 12,1–21).

son of the Father (τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπόστασιν) otherwise than by fixing the sight upon it through His image; and the image of the person of the Father is the only begotten (ὁ δὲ χαρακτήρ τῆς τοῦ πατρὸς ὑποστάσεως ὁ μονογενὴς ἐστὶ; Heb 1:3), and to Him [the only begotten] again no man can draw near whose mind has not been illumined by the Holy Spirit (τούτῳ δὲ πάλιν οὐκ ἂν τις προσεγγίσειε μὴ τῷ ἁγίῳ πνεύματι καταυγασθεὶς τὴν διάνοιαν), what else is shown from this but that the Holy Spirit is not separated from any operation which is wrought by the Father and the Son? Thus the identity of operation in Father, Son, and Holy Spirit shows plainly the undistinguishable character of their substance. So that even if the name of God-head does indicate nature, the community of substance shows that this appellation is properly applied also to the Holy Spirit.²³⁷

The Holy Spirit performs the same οἰκονομία as the Father and the Son in that He encourages the intelligible creatures to see the Father through the Son as the εἰκὼν²³⁸ or χαρακτήρ²³⁹ of the Father and His visible glory.²⁴⁰ The Spirit's activity is not restricted to human beings, but relates also to angels. Who the Father is, is seen only through the Son by the illumination of the Holy Spirit.²⁴¹

More concretely, the human mind secondly is being conformed to the Archetype of God the Father through the Son as His Image by the Holy Spirit. Gregory plainly stated: "As the devout worshipper of the Spirit sees in Him the glory of the only begotten, and in that sight beholds the image of the Infinite God, and

237 *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 13, 11–23). The English translation here is indebted to *On the Holy Trinity, and of the Godhead of the Holy Spirit. To Eustathius*, in *NPNF* 2, 5:326–330.

238 *Eun* 2.215 (GNO 1, 288, 6); *Eun* 3.6.11 (GNO 2, 190, 2–3); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107, 11–12); Mühlhberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes*, 134n1; Moersch, *Opere dogmatiche*, 1976n60. According to Daniélou, the Greek word εἰκὼν implied the inferiority of the sensible world to the intelligible world in platonic philosophy. However, Philo of Alexandria used this term without any implication of inferiority, and was followed in this by Gregory. See Jean Daniélou, *Platonisme et théologie mystique: Essai sur la doctrine spirituelle de saint Grégoire de Nyse* (Paris: Aubier, 1944), 52–53; Anthony Meredith, "Gregory of Nyssa, De Beatitudinibus, Oratio 1: 'Blessed Are the Poor in Spirit, for Theirs Is the Kingdom of Heaven' (Mt 5,3)," in *Gregory of Nyssa: Homilies on the Beatitudes; An English Version with Commentary and Supporting Studies*, eds. Hubertus R. Drobner and Alberto Viciano, VCSup 52 (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 99–102; Chiara Somenzi, trans., *Gregorio di Nissa: Omelie sulle beatitudini* (Milano: Edizioni Paoline, 2011), 131. For a related theme συγγένεια, see Édouard des Places, *Syngeneia: La parenté de l'homme avec Dieu d'homère à la patristique*, Etudes et commentaires 51 (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1964).

239 *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 13, 14).

240 *Eun* 3.10.28.

241 *Eun* 1.531–532 (GNO 1, 180, 7–14); Moutsoulas, "La Pneumatologie," 565.

by means of that image makes an outline, upon his own cognition, of the Original”²⁴² Here, Gregory described the hermeneutical effect of the Holy Spirit to the human intellect (γνώμη) concretely and materially. The archetype of the Father is imprinted (ἐνετυπώσατο) on the human intellect by Its Image. In other words, the human thought is conformed to the archetype through its Image. In other works, Gregory uses an analogy of a mirror in a similar way.²⁴³ The human soul as mirror is transformed to the images which it collects with its free will. It is conformed to the archetype by collecting the images and impressions of the Image of the archetype. In this way, the goal of human life is to become an image of God and conformed to the archetype. In the conclusion of *De vita Moysis*, Gregory wrote:

For he who has truly come to be in the image of God (ἀληθῶς κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ γεγονώς) and who has in no way turned aside from the divine character (μηδαμῶς παρατραπείς τοῦ θείου χαρακτήρος) bears in himself its distinguishing marks (ἐφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ γνωρίσματα φέρει) and shows in all things his conformity to the archetype (συμβαίνει διὰ πάντων τῇ ὁμοιώσει πρὸς τὸ ἀρχέτυπον); he beautifies his own soul with what is incorruptible, unchangeable, and shares in no evil at all (τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ τε καὶ ἀναλλοιώτῳ καὶ πάσης ἀμιγεί κακίας τὴν ἰδίαν ψυχὴν καλλωπίζων).²⁴⁴

Lastly, the Holy Spirit interprets biblical passages in order to reveal that human beings are adopted as children of God the Father. It has already been made clear that the hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit glorified the one divinity of the Son and the Father by distinguishing the two terms “only begotten” and “firstborn.” This activity of the Holy Spirit finds its end in the revelation that the brothers and sisters of the firstborn finally become the adopted children of God the Father.

5.2.2 Deification in Gregory’s Ascetic Works

The φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit was not restricted to Gregory’s trinitarian thinking alone, but passed over into his spiritual theology as well.

²⁴² *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,9–13): “ὥσπερ γὰρ ὁ εὐσεβῶς τὸ πνεῦμα δεξάμενος εἶδεν ἐν τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ μονογενοῦς τὴν δόξαν, τὸν δὲ υἱὸν ἰδὼν τὴν εἰκόνα εἶδε τοῦ ἀορίστου καὶ διὰ τῆς εἰκόνης ἐνετυπώσατο τῇ γνώμῃ ἑαυτοῦ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον ...”

²⁴³ *Vit Moys* 2.47 (GNO 7/1, 46,13–23); *Cant* 3 (GNO 6, 102–104, 439–440); *Beat* 6 (GNO 7/2, 143–144); *Virg* (GNO 8/1, 296); Manlio Simonetti, ed. and trans., *Gregorio di Nissa: La vita di Mosè* (Roma: FLV, 2011), 285–286.

²⁴⁴ *Vit Moys* 2.318 (GNO 7/1, 143,14–18).

In fact, as noted above, his trinitarian thinking overlaps with his spiritual theology. The hermeneutical activity of the Holy Spirit has been revealed to relate closely to the transformation of the human being. Through the activity of the Holy Spirit, human beings become brothers of the firstborn and adopted children of the Father of the only begotten Son and is conformed to the Archetype through its Image.

This transformation, which has been provisionally sketched above, came to full development in Gregory's spiritual theology. It is his view on deification in particular that is indicative of the whole idea. Like the christological hermeneutics, deification too is φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit, which is strongly christological and has as its goal the establishment of the conformity to the Father in human beings.

Deification was one of the most essential elements in the theology of the Greek Church Fathers,²⁴⁵ and is crucial for understanding Gregory's spiritual theology. However, as Norman Russell's tremendous work has revealed,²⁴⁶ a general definition of the theme of deification in the patristic era is hard to come by.²⁴⁷

In his fifth oration on *De beatitudinibus* (GNO 7/2, 75–170), Gregory offered a literal definition for the terms: “So to participate in the Beatitudes (Ἡ οὖν τῶν μακαρισμῶν μετουσία) is nothing less than sharing in deity (θεότητος κοινωνία), toward which the Lord leads us up by his words (πρὸς ἣν ἡμᾶς ἀνάγει διὰ τῶν λεγομένων ὁ Κύριος). He seems to me therefore to be in a way deifying the one who hears and attends to his word through the teaching of the Beatitude now

245 Basil Studer, “Divinizzazione,” in *Nuovo dizionario patristico e di antichità cristiane*, eds. Angelo di Berardino and Gianluca Pilara, vol. 1 (Genova: Marietti, 2006), 1458b.

246 Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition*, OECTS (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004); for the Latin Fathers, Jared Ortiz, ed., *Deification in the Latin Patristic Tradition*, Studies in Early Christianity 6 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2019).

247 Clement of Alexandria seems to have been the first Church Father to use the technical term of deification, although he did so without defining it. Dionysius the Areopagite offers the following definition: “Deification (theosis) is the attaining of likeness to God and union with him so far as is possible” (*De ecclesiastica hierarchia* 1.3 [PG 3, 376A]); quoted in Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification*, 1). This definition, however, has not solved the ambiguity in the term, which naturally extends to contemporary discussions on deification. Gösta Hallonsten's indication of the ambiguity is of significant consequence for that contemporary discussion. See Gösta Hallonsten, “Theosis in Recent Research: A Renewal of Interest and a Need for Clarity,” in *Partakers of the Divine Nature: The History and Development of Deification in the Christian Traditions*, eds. Michael J. Christensen and Jeffery A. Wittung (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2007), 281–293.

in its turn to be studied.”²⁴⁸ Deification (θεοποιεῖν) is sharing in deity (θεότητος κοινωνία), which occurs by participation in the beatitudes. Here we simultaneously find two key terms for Gregory’s notion of deification: κοινωνεῖν (to share) and μετέχειν (to participate). In his thought there appears to be no meaningful distinction between them. Gregory expressed deification in terms of ‘participation in the divine virtues’ as well as ‘sharing’ in them.²⁴⁹ For Gregory, deification signified participation in the divine virtues which Christ revealed and taught by the Beatitudes.

Deification as participation in the divine virtues is closely related to Gregory’s understanding of the distinction between God and His creatures in nature from the perspective of διάστημα. God without διάστημα is totally different in nature from human beings with διάστημα. Based on this fundamental distinction, Gregory held God to be incomprehensible and inaccessible to the human ἐπίνοια. However, God revealed Himself through His ἐνέργεια. In Gregory’s spiritual theology, the divine virtues are the divine ἐνέργεια.

This identification is not artificial, but corresponds to Gregory’s trinitarian argumentation. God, who is totally unlimited without διάστημα, does not participate ‘more or less’ in something good.²⁵⁰ A ‘more or less’ in goodness would signify an increase or decrease in goodness, which in turn implies temporal and participatory διάστημα. God, by way of contrast, is without διάστημα and thus both unlimited and simple in goodness. God is goodness itself. Thus, all of the virtues related to goodness itself are ‘around the divine nature,’ movements of the divine nature, that is, ἐνέργεια(ι) of God. In this sense, Gregory defined deification as participation in the divine virtues, which are ἐνέργεια(ι) of the incomprehensible and inaccessible God.

In light of this ontological distinction and the notion of ἐνέργεια, Gregory obviously denied in *De professione christiana* (GNO 8/1, 129–142) any possibility for human nature to be compounded with the divine.²⁵¹ Instead, he explicitly stated that “the Gospel does order the good ἐνέργειαί to be imitated in our life as much as possible.”²⁵² The good ἐνέργειαί are the divine virtues revealed in Scripture.²⁵³ The imitation of the virtues is “truly the imitation of the divine and the perfection connected with the God of heaven.”²⁵⁴ In short, Gregory’s

248 *Beat* 5 (GNO 7/2, 124,13–18). For the English translation I am indebted to Stuart G. Hall’s translation in Drobner and Viciano, *Homilies on the Beatitudes*, 23–90.

249 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 135,6–15).

250 *Eun* 1.234, 270, 282–293 (GNO 1, 95, 105, 109–113). See pp. 86–89 above.

251 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 138,15–16).

252 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 138,17–18).

253 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 135,6–15).

254 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 138,22–23).

ideas on deification as participation were formed from the perspective of ἐνέργεια(ι), not from that of the divine being. No notion of deification as becoming a god and ceasing to be human can be found in his thinking.

If Gregory's notion of deification is accurately defined as participation in the divine virtues, one strongly has to consider the possibility that the cause of the virtues in Gregory's theology is the Father. The Father is the cause of the divinity in his trinitarian theology. φιλανθρωπία and its οἰκονομία of the Triune God come from the Father. God's grace flows from the Father through the Son in the Holy Spirit.²⁵⁵ The monarchy of the Father pervades Gregory's entire theology. The Father is the cause of the divine virtues which were revealed as activities of the Triune God. Therefore, deification aims at being conformed to the Archetype who is God the Father. As quoted above (see p. 157), Gregory clearly stated in the conclusion of *De vita Moysis* that the aim of the life of virtue is conformity to the Archetype.

This idea of conformity to the Archetype is closely related to Gregory's view on the creation of human beings as the image of God. This creation of the human race as image of God means that God placed the human race in the process of assimilation to God and the reflection of Him through participation in God, the Model.²⁵⁶ In other words, human beings were created *for* the process of progressing assimilation to God and the reflection of Him through participation in God.²⁵⁷ The created perfection of the human being was not static, but placed itself in progress. The very perfection of the human being is participation in the virtues of God the Blessedness.²⁵⁸ In this regard, Gregory viewed even the mutability of the human nature as something positive. Mutability is the possibility through which human beings can be changed progressively into the divine.²⁵⁹ Consequently, deification as participation in the divine virtues of the Archetype is the restoration of the created image of the human being: Becoming again likeness to the divinity.²⁶⁰

Deification is participation in the divine virtues which are ἐνέργεια(ι) of God who exists without διάστημα. This deification was the perfection of the original creation of human beings as image of God. After the Fall, deification as participation became the restoration of becoming the image of God, which means

255 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 106,30–32).

256 *Daniélou, Platonisme*, 53.

257 *Or cat* 5 (GNO 3/4, 18,5–16); *Daniélou, Platonisme*, 53; Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 223.

258 *Op hom* 4, 5 (PG 44, 136C, 137B); Moreschini, *Opere dogmatiche*, 23–24.

259 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 213,1–214,4).

260 *Beat* 1 (GNO 7/2, 82,24–25); *Vit Moys* 2.318 (GNO 7/1, 143,14–18); *Cant* 8; Abraham J. Malherbe and Everett Ferguson, trans., *The Life of Moses*, CWS (New York: Paulist Press, 1978), 194.

conformity to the Archetype. Hence, deification is a powerfully christological notion in Gregory's theology.²⁶¹ The Christo-centric character of Gregory's deification corresponds to his idea of the hypostatic property of the Spirit. The Holy Spirit works as "Spirit of Christ" in deification as He performs the transformative hermeneutics showing the Glory of Christ.

In particular, this Christo-centric character of deification is representatively reflected in Gregory's interpretation of Prov 8:22 in line with his transformative hermeneutics. The hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit interprets biblical passages and analogies to bring glory to the one divinity of the Son and His οἰκονομία. In this sense, Gregory interpreted the verse as indicative of the οἰκονομία of incarnation, rather than the subordination of His nature to that of the Father. Interestingly, Gregory's interpretation of the verse went a little further. In fact, he added the theme of deification to his interpretation of Prov 8:22, and identified the οἰκονομία of incarnation as the restoration of human beings to their original state. In other words, the incarnation was the new way of deification:

Therefore the phrase, 'created me,' is not spoken by the one who is purely divine, but, as we have said, by the one combined in the Economy with our created nature '... I am not announcing to you a new Gospel, but working for your restoration to your original state; for this reason I was created, the one who forever is, and needs no creative act in order to be, and I have thus become a beginning of ways for the works of God, I mean for human beings. Once the first way was destroyed, a new way had to be made for the wanderers, fresh and living (Heb 10:20): I myself, who am the Way' (John 14:6).²⁶²

Paul, according to Gregory, had already connected the phrase 'created me' with the incarnation and deification. In the continuation of the passage cited above, Gregory remarked the following:

²⁶¹ *Or cat* 33–40 (GNO 3/4, 82–106); Raymond Winling, "Introduction," in Raymond Winling, *Grégoire de Nyssa: Discours catéchétique*, SC 453 (Paris 2000), 26–108; Lucas F. Mateo-Seco, "Christology," in Mateo-Seco and Maspero, *The Brill Dictionary*, 146. On this point, Gregory appears to have taken a different approach from that of Origen. Gregory brought the imitation of Christ into relief more plainly and convincingly. According to Anthony Meredith, the idea of the imitation of Christ is one of the two points on which Gregory departs from Origen in connection with the notion of the imitation of God. Origen "appears to know nothing there (*De principiis* 3.6.1, 4.4.10) of the *imitatio Christi*"; Meredith, "Gregory of Nyssa," 104–105. Secondly, Gregory usually also understands the image and likeness of God in a different way from Origen. Meredith, 108.

²⁶² *Eun* 3.1.50–51 (GNO 2, 21,5–24).

That the idea of ‘created me’ applies to the humanity is put very clearly to us in his own words by the divine Apostle, when he urges, ‘Put on the Lord Jesus Christ’ (Rom 13:14), and when he furthermore employs the same expression, ‘Put on the new man which is created according to God’ (Eph 4:24). If the garment of salvation is one, and that is Christ, one cannot say that the new man, who is created according to God, is any other than Christ, but plainly, he who has put on Christ, has put on the new man, who is created according to God.²⁶³

This typical notion of christological deification with reference to Prov 8:22 is generally expanded into Gregory’s entire spiritual theology. Again, his view of deification is Christo-centric in nature. After the Fall, the lost primordial image could only be recovered by Christ the Image. In other words, deification is the imitation of Christ. Christ is the cause, mediator, and model for our deification.

Christ is the cause. By Christ the human nature was deified and raised to divinity. As Gregory’s interpretation of Prov 8:22 representatively revealed, the incarnation is *the* deification.²⁶⁴ This idea finds clear expression in Gregory’s argument against Apollinaris of Laodicea. Gregory defended the true human nature of Jesus Christ against Apollinaris on the grounds that the salvation of the entire human nature is impossible without its deification in the incarnation of Christ.²⁶⁵ The analogy of ‘the drop of vinegar’ absorbed by the sea can be seen as Gregory’s effort to demonstrate that the incarnation is the cause of the deification of human nature.²⁶⁶ Furthermore, the whole history of the

263 *Eun* 3.1.52 (GNO 2, 21,25–22,8).

264 *Or cat* 25 (GNO 3/4, 64,8–10); *Or cat* 37. See Raymond Winling, “La résurrection du Christ comme principe explicatif et comme élément structurant dans le discours catéchétique de Grégoire de Nysse,” *StPatr* 22 (1989): 74–80; “La résurrection du Christ dans l’*Antirrheticus* adversus Apollinarem de Grégoire de Nysse,” *REAug* 35 (1989): 12–43.

265 *Antirrh* (GNO 3/1, 169–170).

266 This image can probably serve anticipate the criticism of the absorption of the human nature into the divine by the hypostatic union. However, it has to be emphasized that Gregory strongly accented the human nature of the Son in the incarnation and that he expressed it in ways similar to the adverbs (“without confusion” [ἀσυγχύτως], “without change” [ἀτρέπτως], “without division” [ἀδιαίρετως], and “without separation” [ἀχωρίστως]; see DH 302) which the Council of Chalcedon had adopted against a Nestorian or Monophysite interpretation. See, *Antirrh* (GNO 3/1, 152–153, 216–217); Jean René Bouchet, “Le vocabulaire de l’union et du rapport des natures chez S. Grégoire de Nysse,” *RevThom* 68 (1968): 533–582; Maspero and Pinzón, “Essere, storia e misericordia,” 12n43. For the English translation of *Antirrh*, see Robin Orton, trans., *Anti-Apollinarian Writings*, FC 131 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2015).

human nature must be deified. In this regard, Gregory's view on deification is dynamic.²⁶⁷ Gregory considered Christ's entire life, conception, birth, death, resurrection, and ascension as the οἰκονομία of incarnation.²⁶⁸ As he says in *Oratio catechetica* (GNO 3/4) 32,²⁶⁹ the Son embraced the two limited ends, the beginning of life and death, of the whole of human nature to recover that entire nature from death to life.²⁷⁰

In light of the deification in the incarnation, Christ is the only mediator. In Him, man was united with the divine.²⁷¹ In Himself, He assumed and resurrected human nature, made it holy, preserved it, and dedicated it to God the Father. The Father permitted the disinherited to be adopted as His children in the mediator. The Father allowed His enemies to share in the divinity.²⁷²

Being the cause and mediator, Christ is the model. Christ is the Image and Imprint of the invisible God. He is the only model and example that human beings can imitate. The divine virtues which Christ as the model has revealed are the divine activities which the human beings can imitate and participate in. Imitation of Christ is becoming the image of God again. By the imitation of Christ as model, human beings as image of God can participate in the deity.²⁷³ In this regard, the first homily of *De beatitudinibus* offers crucial insights. There Gregory described Christ as the model for voluntary humility in particular. Christ's 'voluntariness' in humility is the antidote to the corrupted free will (προαίρεσις), by which the human being fell.²⁷⁴

Being the cause, mediator, and model, Christ is called "a rock" by Paul upon which Christians must stand (1 Cor 10:4).²⁷⁵ For Gregory, the gradual participation in the deity is the on-going and endless progress of imitating Christ. It is caused by the ontological distinction between God and human beings. While human beings are limited by διάστημα, God is unlimited without it. In this sense, the created and restored perfection of human beings as participation in the divinity must be unlimited. Gregory called it ἐπέκτασις. The human

267 *Or cat* 25, 27, 32 (GNO 3/4, 64,8–10, 68,1–70, 77,23–78,3); Winling, *Discours catéchétique*, 60.

268 Mateo-Seco, "Christology," 142; Winling, *Discours catéchétique*, 87–93.

269 *Or cat* 32 (GNO 3/4, 77,16–21).

270 *Or cat* 26 (GNO 3/4, 67,13–18); Maspero, *Trinity and Man*, 21.

271 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 204,17–206,14).

272 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 206,1–9).

273 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 194,14–195,8).

274 For an in-depth study of the term προαίρεσις, see Giampietro Dal Toso, *La nozione di "proairesis" in Gregorio di Nissa: Analisi semiotico-linguistica e prospettive antropologiche*, *Patrologia* 5 (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1998); "La nozione di proairesis in Gregorio di Nissa," in Drobner and Viciano, *Homilies on the Beatitudes*, 569–580.

275 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 192,15); *Vit Moys* 2.244 (GNO 7/1, 118,20).

being was created to imitate and reflect his Creator without end.²⁷⁶ For this unlimited progress, Christ is the only rock.

Additionally, as most notably Manlio Simonetti has argued, Christ is not just the rock but also the drawing motive and goal of ἐπέκτασις (Phil 3:12–13).²⁷⁷ The motive of the progress toward God is not found in any human capacity.²⁷⁸ It is the infinity of God. Moreover, after the Fall the motive is Christ. The recovery of the original perfection as ἐπέκτασις was realized only by Him. Christ encourages believers to imitate His virtues and to safeguard them “against being mixed with evil.”²⁷⁹

The Christo-centric deification was extended to human beings with the words of the Lord, with baptism, and with the Eucharist.²⁸⁰ By His words, the Lord promised deification. Gregory used the word “promise” frequently in his orations on the Beatitudes.²⁸¹ Especially in his eighth oration, he said that the Lord did not ignore the weakness of human nature and thus provided the eighth beatitude in advance as a promise.²⁸² Stephen was one of the examples who overcame his persecution by the promise of the Lord.²⁸³ Gregory himself encouraged believers at the end of the eighth oration with the promise.²⁸⁴ Baptism introduces believers to the ongoing imitation of Christ. Believers imitate Christ’s death and resurrection through baptism.²⁸⁵ This imitation introduces believers to unity with Christ and thus to immortality.²⁸⁶ Baptism interrupts the continuation of the moral evil, even if it is not the total cancellation of

276 In this way, Gregory overcame Origen’s idea that the soul comes to distance itself from God due to the satiety of the good (*De principiis* 1.8.4); Simonetti, *La vita di Mosè*, xxxiii. Also, see Marguerite Harl, “Recherches sur l’origénisme d’Origène: La satiété (Κόρος) de la contemplation comme motif de la chute des âmes,” *StPatr* 8 (1966): 373–403.

277 Simonetti, *La vita di Mosè*, 327. Irenaeus and Origen interpreted the rock as Christ, behind which Moses hid and through which he saw the back of God. In this tradition, Gregory develops the image of the rock as Christ from two perspectives: 1) Christ is the solid foundation which permits the believers to ascend to God, and 2) Christ is the final goal which believers have to reach and in which they find reward and rest. See *Vit Moys* 2.244 (GNO 7/1, 118,13–24); *Beat* 4 (GNO 7/2, 122,25–123,3).

278 In this sense, the charge that Gregory’s notion of deification amounts to a form of Pelagianism is inaccurate.

279 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 212,17–213,1).

280 Gregory’s main thought on the sacraments is found in *Or cat* 33–37.

281 *Beat* 2, 4, 6, 7 (GNO 7/2, 91,3–5, 119, 10–13, 140,8–12, 145,20–146,2, 151,27–152,1, 161,2–5).

282 *Beat* 8 (GNO 7/2, 165,14–17).

283 *Beat* 8 (GNO 7/2, 165,17–29).

284 *Beat* 8 (GNO 7/2, 170,18–24).

285 *Or cat* 35 (GNO 3/4, 86,6–19); Srawley, *The Catechetical Oration*, 130.

286 *Or cat* 33 (GNO 3/4, 82,5–14).

such evil.²⁸⁷ That ongoing imitation is maintained by the Eucharist. The body of man, which is corrupted with moral poison, needs the medicine of immortality. The medicine of immortality is the deified and immortal body of Christ.²⁸⁸ Those who partake in the Eucharist are united to and nourished by the body of Christ. When they eat and drink the bread and wine, their bodies are transformed to the body of Christ which has divine immortality.²⁸⁹ Then Christ causes the deification in Himself to continue in the partakers through the Eucharist by the economy of grace.²⁹⁰ The body of believers takes its spiritual nutriment to overcome the evil and to follow the virtues of Christ. Paul called the Lord “spiritual food and drink (1 Cor 10:3–4).”²⁹¹

From the examination of these elements in Gregory’s christological spirituality, we can understand what Gregory understood with the terms ‘Christianity’ and ‘Christian.’ Answering the question “What is meant by the term Christian?” in his letter to Armonius, Gregory clearly stated that “Christianity is the imitation of the divine nature.”²⁹² And a person can be called ‘Christian’ insofar as he or she is united to Christ and synonymous with Him (or puts on the name of Christ) and shares consequently and correspondently (κατὰ τὸ ἀκόλουθον) in the divine virtues of Christ revealed in Scripture.²⁹³ Gregory called Christianity a great promise in connection with deification.²⁹⁴ “The promise of the name [Christianity] proclaims an imitation of God.”²⁹⁵

Christological deification is the work of the Holy Spirit. A human being cannot desire to imitate the Image without the work of the Holy Spirit. This idea was expressed by Gregory in particular in his *In canticum canticorum*. When Gregory interpreted Song 1:5–2:7 in homily 4,²⁹⁶ he used a trinitarian analogy of archer-arrow to describe how the bride, the soul, becomes love or desire for the Bridegroom, the Son. In this, the work of the Holy Spirit was significantly depicted by Gregory as the heating of desire, even though the passage cannot be considered a particularly significant text for his doctrine of the Trinity.²⁹⁷

287 *Or cat* 35 (GNO 3/4, 89,5–11).

288 *Or cat* 37 (GNO 3/4, 93,1–19); Salvatore Taranto, *Gregorio di Nissa: Un contributo alla storia dell'interpretazione* (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2009), 597–598; Srawley, *The Catechetical Oration*, 141.

289 *Or cat* 37 (GNO 3/4, 93,19–94,1).

290 *Or cat* 37 (GNO 3/4, 97,20–98,6).

291 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 190,16–23).

292 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 136,7–8).

293 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 135,6–15).

294 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 136,23).

295 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 137,22–23).

296 *Cant* 4 (GNO 6, 127,7–129,19).

297 Volker Drecoll, “Spuren von Trinitätstheologie in den Hoheliedhomilien Gregors von

The bride was wounded by the chosen arrow, the only begotten God, which was discharged by the Archer, who is God and Love (1John 4:8, 16). Interestingly, the triple point of this arrow's barb, so Gregory wrote, was smeared by the Spirit of life. In other words, the heart of the bride was hit by the arrow of the archer through the wound which the Holy Spirit as the point of the arrow touched, opened, and pierced. With this trinitarian analogy, Gregory emphasized that the Spirit, who as the point of the barb touched the heart first of all, enflames the soul's love or desire for the Bridegroom. In this sense, Gregory said in homily 1 that the mind is boiled with love (ἐρωτικῶς) by the Holy Spirit.²⁹⁸ Without the heating of the Holy Spirit, the soul does not desire to approach and unite with the Bridegroom, and remains distant from and cold toward Him. The Holy Spirit as a life-giving power works for the deification of believers by causing them to desire to participate in, imitate, and unite with their Bridegroom.²⁹⁹

Nyssa," in *Gregory of Nyssa: In Canticum Canticorum; Analytical and Supporting Studies*, eds. Giulio Maspero, Miguel Brugarolas, and Ilaria Vigorelli, VCSup 150 (Leiden; Boston: Brill, 2018), 180–199.

298 *Cant* 1 (GNO 6, 27,13).

299 See also *Eun* 1.289, 315 (GNO 1, 111,23–112,7, 120,15–17); *Eun* 3.6.31–41 (GNO 2, 197,2–200,24); *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 11,15–12,5); *Or cat* 2 (GNO 3/4, 12,26–13,12); *Beat* 4 (GNO 7/2, 122,19–123,3).

Augustine of Hippo

1 Introduction

In light of the need for a thorough study and re-evaluation of the patristic background for contemporary discussions on the *filioque*, the previous chapter examined the trinitarian thinking of Gregory of Nyssa. In the present chapter, we will examine Augustine's trinitarian, again with a view to the ongoing discussions. The main focus will be on Augustine's *De trinitate* (CCSL 50; 50A),¹ where undoubtedly his mature views on the mystery of the Trinity find expression.² Yet wherever necessary, also other works with substantial ideas for the Trinity will be put to examination.

The argument of the present chapter is divided into four parts. First, a theological introduction to Augustine's trinitarian thinking will be offered. This

1 English translations from this treatise are taken from Stephen McKenna, trans., *St. Augustine: The Trinity*, FC 45 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1988). Where necessary, the translation has been revised. For the chronology of Augustine's works and their redaction, see Serafino M. Zarb, *Chronologia operum S. Augustini secundum ordinem Retractationum digesta* (Roma: Pontificum Institutum Angelicum, 1934); Anne-Marie La Bonnardière, *Recherches de chronologie augustiniennne* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1965); "Le De trinitate de Saint Augustin, confronté au livre XI^e de la Cité de Dieu," *Annuaire de l'École pratique des hautes études* 85 (1976): 343–346; Pierre-Marie Hombert, *Nouvelles recherches de chronologie augustiniennne* (Paris: IEA, 2000); Roland Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken: Bilanz, Kritik und Weiterführung der modernen Forschung zu "De Trinitate"*, Studien und Texte zu Antike und Christentum 22 (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 31–46; Lewis Ayres, *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 118–120. Chronology is undoubtedly an essential prerequisite for understanding the development of Augustine's trinitarian thought in *De trinitate*. For this reason, the consensus on crucial questions of chronology will be noted in the present chapter as necessary. Nevertheless, it will not directly engage the debates since the primary aim of this investigation is not the chronological development of Augustine's ideas, but rather the analysis of his ideas as a whole. For a historical reconstruction of Augustine's thought, see Eugene TeSelle, *Augustine the Theologian* (London: Burns & Oates, 1970); Alberto Pincherle, *Vita di Sant'Agostino* (Bari: Laterza, 1980). A useful table presenting an overview of the chronology of Augustine's works can be found in Volker Henning Drecoll, "1. Werke in Auswahl: 1. Zur Chronologie der Werke," in *Augustin Handbuch*, ed. Volker Henning Drecoll (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 253–261.

2 Nello Cipriani, "La teologia trinitaria di S. Agostino con particolare riguardo allo Spirito Santo," in *Sant'Agostino nella tradizione cristiana occidentale e orientale*, ed. Luca Bianchi (Padova: Edizioni San Leopoldo, 2011), 80. According to him, *De trinitate* was the most mature theological work in the Latin tradition.

introduction is intended to study Augustine's theological epistemology in relation to basic ideas or issues that he attempted to define clearly in his polemics with the heresies of his days. The introduction will therefore serve to shape a theologically appropriate approach to Augustine's works. After the introduction, his views on the monarchy of the Father will be defined in part two. In connection with the Father's monarchy, a third section will carefully articulate his view on the role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. From these latter two parts, it will become manifest that Augustine's subtle approach to the involvement of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit did not abandon or damage the monarchy of the Father. Lastly, this chapter will describe and concretize the hypostatic property of the Spirit primarily in connection with the procession of the Holy Spirit as it has already been treated in parts two and three, and in connection with the theological introduction offered in part one.

2 Introduction to Augustine's Trinitarian Thought

This section, as noted, will offer a theological introduction to Augustine's trinitarian thinking by examining substantial themes at the basis of his doctrine of the Trinity. The introduction will proceed in two steps. First, Augustine's trinitarian anthropology will be discussed particularly in relation to what he identified as a fundamental cause for erroneous approaches to the mystery of the Trinity. Thereafter, the appropriate approach established by Augustine in order to criticize and cure that cause of error will be described in terms of his theological epistemology.

2.1 *Trinitarian Anthropology*

At the very beginning of *De trinitate*, Augustine drew a fundamental contrast between wrong approaches and the right one. In *De trinitate* 1.1, he linked errant approaches to the mystery of God to three groups of people as follows:³ "Those who reason about God according to the flesh"; "those who think about Him as

3 *trin.* 1.1 (CCSL 50, 28). He added the following comment to the last group: "They are so much further from the truth in that nothing found in the body or the spirit either made or formed, or in the Creator Himself, affords a basis for their theories." See also *trin.* 8.3. According to Cipriani, Augustine was indebted to Porphyry (*Sententiae* 39.40, 44) for his criticism of the first two approaches, which is also found in *Orationes theologicae* 28 of Gregory of Nazianzus. On the other hand, Augustine's criticism of the third approach was targeted at Porphyry himself, whose thought on the auto-generation of God echoes that of Plotinus and Marius Victorinus. See Nello Cipriani, *La teologia di Sant'Agostino: Introduzione generale e riflessione trinitaria* (Roma: IPA, 2015), 86n312, 157.

a spiritual creature such as the soul is”; “those who think about God neither as a body nor as a spiritual substance, and yet believe false things about Him.” Augustine called these approaches “diseases,” and in the very first sentence of the entire treatise pointed to their common cause as follows: “The reader of the treatise on the Trinity should know beforehand that our pen is on the watch for the sophistries of those who consider it beneath their dignity to begin with faith, and who thus are led into error by their immature and perverted love of reason (*immaturo et peruerso rationis amore*).”⁴ The cause of the diseases listed is thus the “immature and perverted love of reason.” An appropriate approach to the mystery conversely has “to begin with faith.” As such, for an integrated understanding of Augustine’s trinitarian thinking it is necessary to gain a grasp on this contrast, and in particular on the relationship between faith and the immature and perverted love of reason.⁵

4 *trin.* 1.1 (CCSL 50, 27).

5 Discussing the readership of *De trinitate*, even if Cipriani drew attention to the request from Christian “brothers” in *Epistula* 174 for Augustine to explain the Trinity, Cipriani argued that the second part of *trin.* (books 8–15) was not addressed directly against the trinitarian heretics but to intellectuals. He demonstrated that the psychological approach was not discussed frequently or deeply in other anti-Arian treatises like *Contra sermonem Arrianorum*. This theme is absent even from the *Conlatio cum Maximino Arrianorum episcopo*. For this reason, so Cipriani argued, Augustine in the second part of *trin.* can be assumed to have been writing for intellectual pagans who devalued the rationality of the Christian faith by pointing to the Trinity. Moreover, Cipriani ascribed Augustine’s criticism of “the immature and perverted love of reason” in the beginning of the entire treatise to these intellectuals, even though he had expressed his uncertainties about this point in an earlier article (“La teologia trinitaria di S. Agostino,” 81). Cipriani now thought that the “*garruli ratiocinatores*” of *trin.* 1.4 were the “*infideles*” of *trin.* 15.48. See Cipriani, *La theologia*, 148–152; Agostino Trapè, “Introduzione,” in *La Trinità*, trans. Giuseppe Beschin (Rome: Città Nuova, 1973), x. However, the identification of the *infideles* as the readers of the second part is not a simple question. In his monograph on *De trinitate*, Kany interpreted *infideles* as a reference to intellectual pagans (*Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 424), but in an earlier article had connected the term to the Arians (“*Fidei Contemnentis Initium: On Certain Positions Opposed by Augustine in De Trinitate*,” *StPatr* 27 [1993]: 322–328). In her translation of and comments on *De trinitate*, Beatrice Cillerai took a different idea from Cipriani’s one. See Beatrice Cillerai, *Agostino: La Trinità*, PenOcc (Milano: Bompiani, 2012), 1182. Over against those scholars who focus on the identity of the readers and the meaning of the term *infideles*, Cillerai argued that the contrast Augustine draws between love of reason and faith in the beginning of *De trinitate* was probably not limited to the readers of the second part of *trin.*, with whom Cipriani had identified intellectual pagans. As will be detailed further on in the present chapter, Augustine contrasted “the immature and perverted love of reason” with the Catholic faith in the incarnated Son who is equal in divine nature to the Father. The christological faith was the common obstacle for both intellectual pagans and Arians. Additionally, if Augustine described the basic symptom of the love of reason as a temporal and corporeal approach to the mystery of the Trinity, Arianism was thoroughly contaminated by this love.

For a clear understanding of what Augustine means with his criticism of “immature and perverted love,” his theological anthropology plays a substantial role. In addition, his ideas on the creation of angels need be examined given their similarity with his view on the creation of human beings.

2.1.1 *Imago Dei: Formatio and Deformatio*

The human being was created to enjoy true happiness. As Augustine defined it at the beginning of his *Confessiones*, there is happiness only when the soul sees God face to face and reposes in Him: “Thou dost bestir him so that he takes delight in praising Thee, for Thou hast made us for Thee and our heart is unquiet till it finds its rest in Thee.”⁶ God is the Goodness and Beatitude itself which human beings were created to enjoy and by which they become happy. Human beings therefore have to follow God in order to reach the beatific condition. They were created to journey toward Beatitude.

In regard to this fundamental destiny, Augustine conceived of the creation of the human being in terms of the *imago dei*. The human being, more precisely the human mind (*mens*), was created as *imago dei*: The human being “is not called the image of God according to everything that pertains to his nature, but according to the mind (*mens*) alone.”⁷ Yet the phrase “image of God” was not used statically in *De trinitate* when Augustine attributed it to the human mind. It connotes two aspects of the mind. First, the human mind has a trinitarian structure similar to that of the Trinity (*De trinitate* 15.11). The mind thinks of and loves itself: the mind, self-intellect, and self-love are the trinity of the mind. This trinitarian structure of the *mens humana* are called a trinitarian *imago* of the prototype of the Trinity. This creation as *imago dei*, however, was not limited to this trinitarian structure of the human mind. The mind is called *imago* also from the fact that it “is capable of God and can be a partaker of Him” (*eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest*).⁸ This is the second aspect. According to Goulven Madec, this aspect signifies that the soul is *recipient* of God.⁹ Accord-

6 *conf.* 1.1 (CCSL 27, 1). The English translation of *conf.* has been taken from Vernon J. Bourke, trans., *St. Augustine: Confessions*, FC 21 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1966).

7 *trin.* 15.11 (CCSL 50A, 475).

8 *trin.* 14.6, 11 (CCSL 50A, 429, 436).

9 Goulven Madec, “Capax Dei,” in *AugLex*, 1:728: “Le redoublement de c. [*capax dei*] par <*particeps esse potest*> marque un sens fort, concret: l’âme est le recipient du Dieu.” Like B. Altaner and G.J.M. Bartelink, Madec argued that Augustine had taken this idea over from Rufinus’ translation of Origen’s *De principiis* (1.3.8: “θεὸν χωρεῖν, θεοῦ χωρητικὸς”). For Altaner and Bartelink, see Berthold Altaner, “Augustinus und Origenes,” in *Kleine patristische Schriften*, ed. Günter Glockmann, TUGAL 83 (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1967), 224–252; G.J.M. Bartelink,

ingly, the capacity of the mind is not fixed but enlarged by participation in God. As noted by Madec, in *confessiones* 1.6 Augustine writes: "Narrow is the household of my soul, for Thou to come into it: let it be enlarged by Thee" (*angusta est domus animae meae, quo uenias ad eam: dilatetur abs te*).¹⁰ Augustine accentuated this second aspect saying that it is the very fact by which the human mind is called image of God. Regarding this aspect, he writes, "It [the mind] cannot be so great a good except that it is His image."¹¹

Noteworthy in regard to these two perspectives and the relationship between them is an article from Johannes Brachtendorf. In this article,¹² Brachtendorf's primary purpose was to contribute to the discussions regarding the validity of the trinitarian structure of the *mens humana* in Augustine's trinitarian anthropology. Scholars have adopted various positions in regard to this validity. Some theologians powerfully accentuated its validity in Augustine's anthropology. The studies they conducted followed from their serious interest in the similarity Augustine posited between the trinitarian structure of the *mens humana* and the Trinity. Their reason for this interest is logical given the fact that Augustine himself discussed the first aspect in greater depth throughout his entire treatise *De trinitate*, and especially in books 8–14, where a so-called psychological analysis of the Trinity is offered. Other theologians, however, have shown different emphases. In spite of their awareness of Augustine's powerful interest in the trinitarian structure, Michael Schmaus, J. Moingt, and Edward Booth in particular have argued that Augustine's fundamental intention was to accentuate the difference between the trinitarian structure of the *mens humana* and the Trinity, and that he in the end rejected the similarity between them in the final book of *De trinitate*.¹³ Brachtendorf did not agree

"Die Beeinflussung Augustins durch die Griechischen Patres," in *Augustiniana Traiectina*, eds. Jan den Boeft and Johannes van Oort, Collection des Études augustinienes. Série Antiquité 119 (Paris: IEA, 1987), 15–17.

10 *conf.* 1.6 (CCSL 27, 3).

11 *trin.* 14.11 (CCSL 50A, 436).

12 Johannes Brachtendorf, "Der menschliche Geist als Bild des trinitarischen Gottes: Ähnlichkeiten und Unähnlichkeiten," in *Gott und sein Bild: Augustins De trinitate im Spiegel gegenwärtiger Forschung*, ed. Johannes Brachtendorf (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2000), 155–170. For a more detailed version of the argument, see his book entitled *Die Struktur des menschlichen Geistes nach Augustinus: Selbstreflexion und Erkenntnis Gottes in "De trinitate"*, Paradeigmata 19 (Hamburg: Felix Meiner, 2000).

13 Michael Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des heiligen Augustinus* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1967), 399–406; For J. Moingt, Paul Agaësse, trans., *La Trinité (Livres VIII–XV)*, Œuvres compl. 16 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1955), 643–645; Edward Booth, "St. Augustine's 'Notitia Sui' Related to Aristotle and the Early Neo-Platonists," *Aug(L)* 27 (1977): 70–130, 364–401; 28 (1978): 183–221; 29 (1979): 97–124.

with the latter group of theologians who accentuated the fundamental difference between the trinitarian structure of the mind and the Trinity in Augustine's thinking. He argued instead that Augustine accentuated four similar features between the divine nature and the trinitarian structure of the mind, even as late as book 15 of *De trinitate*. According to Augustine in *De trinitate*, so he argued, the following four features are to be ascribed to the Trinity: "1. The Father, the Son, and the Spirit can each be approached *ad se* and thus has independence. 2. Since whatever is defined *ad se* is the same for all Three, there is 'equality' among Them. 3. It is by the impossibility of accumulation that equality becomes unity. 4. The distinction between the Three exists only through the particular relationships."¹⁴ Brachtendorf then compared these features to the fundamental features of the *mens humana* as he derived them from his analysis of Augustine's account. He concluded that the fundamental features which Augustine ascribed to the trinitarian structure of the mind correspond with the four features of the Trinity.¹⁵ Moreover, so Brachtendorf argued, Augustine did not abandon this similarity between *mens humana* and the Trinity even in book 15, where he also drew attention to the difference between them.

To support his argumentation, Brachtendorf examined the relationship between the two aspects of *mens humana* as *imago dei* noted above (i.e., 1. the trinitarian structure of the mind; 2. its being capable of God and a partaker of Him). In this he did not overlook the fundamental character of the second perspective of the *imago dei*. Yet, so he argued, the trinitarian structure of the *mens humana* does not disappear even if the second perspective is damaged or weakened and the *mens* no longer participates in the Trinity.¹⁶ Even if Augustine in book 15 now accentuates the difference between *mens* and the Trinity, this does not mean, so Brachtendorf insisted, that he abandoned or radically changed his understanding of the first perspective of the *imago dei*.

Brachtendorf himself appears, however, to distinguish sharply between the two aspects and to place greater emphasis on the first than the second. Thus, when he argues that Augustine still thought of the human mind as the image

14 Brachtendorf, "Der menschliche Geist," 158: "1. Vater, Sohn und Geist sind je *ad se* ansprechbar und besitzen somit Eigenständigkeit. 2. Da die *ad se*-Bestimmungen für alle die selben sind, herrscht 'Gleichheit' unter den Dreien. 3. Durch die Nicht-Addierbarkeit wird die Gleichheit zur 'Einheit.' 4. Unterscheidbarkeit der Drei besteht nur durch die spezifischen Relationen."

15 Brachtendorf, 161: "Der menschliche Geist—so das Ergebnis des IX Buches—weist die gleichen Strukturmerkmale auf wie die göttliche Dreifaltigkeit, nämlich Eigenständigkeit, Gleichheit, Einheit und relationale Verschiedenheit der Glieder."

16 *trin.* 14.19.

of God since it has the trinitarian structure instead of the weakness of the second perspective, in Brachtendorf's account the two aspects are sharply distinguished.¹⁷ And when he claims that the first aspect is the condition of possibility for the second, it would seem he considers the first aspect to have been more important and fundamental for Augustine than the second.¹⁸

Even if there is some validity to these arguments from Brachtendorf, he overlooked another profound relationship between the two aspects that Augustine did emphasize. As I have already noted, the very fact by which the human mind is called image of God is that second aspect (i.e., being capable of God and a partake of Him). In this respect, a passage from *De trinitate* 14 that Brachtendorf strangely failed to treat is highly interesting. There Augustine writes: "Hence, this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made."¹⁹ This citation implies an argument according to which the self-intellect and self-love of the mind, if it does not participate in its prototype, become significantly less than its original "self."²⁰ As a result, if this second perspective is weakened or distorted, the trinitarian structure of the human mind cracks and is no longer fully complete given that the mind, self-intellect, and self-love are no longer each other's equal. The trinitarian structure of the mind is valid as image of "God" insofar as the second aspect is maintained. Moreover, Augustine emphasized that the human mind can never cease to be called *imago dei* from the point-of-view of the aspect of "being capable of God and a partaker of Him," even though it can indeed be weakened.²¹ Consequently, it is more accurate to

17 Brachtendorf, "Der menschliche Geist," 166: "Grundsätzlich ist aber festzuhalten, daß auch die törichte Seele Bild Gottes ist, nämlich aufgrund ihres konstanten Selbstverhältnisses. Jede Erneuerung und moralische Besserung stellt aber eine Veränderung in der Seele dar und muß somit auf einer anderen Ebene liegen als die ursprüngliche Selbstbeziehung des Geistes."

18 Brachtendorf, 166: "Das fundamentale Selbstverhältnis konkurriert nicht mit dem Verhältnis zu Gott, sondern ist dessen Möglichkeitsbedingung. Nur weil der Geist sich immer seiner selbst erinnert, sich immer denkt und liebt, ist er ein Selbst, das sich auf anderes als sich selbst richten und sich dieses zueignen kann. Nur ein in sich selbstbezügliches Wesen wie der menschliche Geist vermag sich überhaupt auf der Ebene diskursiven Bewußtseins Gott zuzuwenden, sich Gottes zu erinnern und ihn zu lieben."

19 *trin.* 14.15 (CCSL 50A, 442).

20 See also s. 96.2, 330.3; *en. Ps.* 118.8.2: When he interpreted the parable of the prodigal son (Luke 15.11–32) in relation to 2 Tim 3.2, Augustine argued that the soul's distorted self-love leads to the loss of itself (Dany Dideberg, "Caritas," in *AugLex*, 1:733).

21 *trin.* 14.6 (CCSL 50A, 429).

say that the *mens humana* is *imago dei* in that it has its trinitarian structure justified and maintained only by its participation in the Archetype.²²

Human beings were created as the *imago dei* which is capable of God and able to partake of Him in order that they can finally rest in Beatitude. In other words, they have the *species* of the *imago dei* in their creation, making them capable of participation in God. Yet this *species* does not remain static, but was created to exist in *formatio*, signifying an on-going progression. Human beings, created to have the *species* of the *imago dei*, continue in their journey toward Beatitude by their capacity of participation in Him.

For Augustine, the creation of humans in terms of *formatio* shares this similarity with the angels. All spiritual beings were created to participate in the divinity. In *confessiones* 12 and 13, Augustine offers an exegesis of God's creation in Gen 1:1–2. Here he interprets the heaven and earth of Gen 1:1 respectively as spiritual creatures, that is the angels, and as un-formed material creatures. Calling the heaven of Gen 1:1 the “heaven of heaven,” Augustine interestingly attributed the divine quality of immutability to the spiritual creatures. This does not mean that these creatures are immutable in their nature, since they are not absolutely divine but created. Nevertheless, Augustine boldly states that they are immutable in that they remain in participation of the divine and transcend “every variable vicissitude of time by adhering closely to” the divine.²³ In other words, the fact that the spiritual creatures were created to be immutable means that they continue to share or participate in the immutable divinity.

As such, spiritual creatures are *formed* to fully enjoy (*perfruatur*) the eternity and immutability of God.²⁴ Here, the notion of formation is synonymous with creation for spiritual creatures. They were created or formed to contemplate God. In this way, they are “derived from you, our God, but in such a way as to be wholly other than you and not Being itself (*non id ipsum*).”²⁵ For Augustine, such formation differs radically from the creation of the earth described in Gen 1:1. The earth is material, without any form (*informitas sine ulla specie*).²⁶ In

22 Maarten Wisse criticized Brachtendorf and Kany, who generally seemed to follow Brachtendorf, for the influence of Fichte's philosophy on their understanding of the second part of *trin.* and the validity of the *imago dei* for Augustine's trinitarianism. Even though Wisse's approach differs from that of the present work, there are similarities in the conclusions reached. See Maarten Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology beyond Participation: Augustine's De Trinitate and Contemporary Theology*, T&T Clark Studies in Systematic Theology 11 (London: T&T Clark, 2011), 150–163; for Kany, see *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 507–534.

23 *conf.* 12.9 (CCSL 27, 221).

24 *conf.* 12.15 (CCSL 27, 223).

25 *conf.* 12.21 (CCSL 27, 226).

26 *conf.* 12.3–4 (CCSL 27, 217–218).

contrast with this un-formed material earth, spiritual creatures were formed to participate in the divine immutability. Like these angels, the human being was created or formed (*formatio*) to participate continuously in the divine Beatitude.

When the creation of the human being is conceived as *formatio*, for Augustine this signifies that the *species* as *imago dei* can be changed, that is, weakened or damaged in the process of *formatio*. This comes to expression in *confessiones* 13.8.²⁷ Here Augustine speaks of the changeability of spiritual entities, including the human mind, in terms of a *cupiditas* for the abyss and a *caritas* toward God. The angelic creatures become increasingly warmer relative to their participation in God.²⁸ Similarly, the human mind becomes better relative to its attachment to the divinity.

As a matter of fact, for Augustine this characteristic of becoming better by participation is one of the essential differences separating God the Creator from the spiritual creatures. As will be explained below, God is simple in goodness and Beatitude itself, without becoming better or worse by any kind of participation in other entities. Spiritual creatures, by way of contrast, are neither simple in goodness nor beatitude itself, but become increasingly better by participating in the Goodness and Beatitude that is God.²⁹ Hence, in comparing the simplicity of creatures with that of God, Augustine remarked: "... the spirit of any creature becomes better when it adheres to the Creator than if it

27 CCSL 27, 245. For the text, see p. 258 below.

28 *conf.* 12.21.

29 In his criticism on contemporary Augustine scholars, Wisse denied all interpretations of Augustine's use of participation as "ontological sharing in the divine nature" and limited it "as a metaphor for the vision of God and of one's immortal state of bliss, perfection, and, thus, similarity to God" in the eschaton. Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology*, 276–278. However, Augustine scholars who accept the notion of participation in Augustine have not affirmed some kind of confusion between the human and divine natures. So too participation was for Augustine not just a metaphor for an eschatological state like immortality, as Wisse argued, but signifies the ontological state of *imago dei* which was created to be ontologically participatory in God. The ontological state of participation is ironically confirmed by the very distinction between Creator and creatures which Wisse had so insistently sought to emphasize. According to Augustine's distinction, God alone exists without any kind of participation, while human beings exist by participation in their Creator. Moreover, the participation of human beings was important for Augustine's polemics with Pelagius. After 412, Augustine in his criticism of Pelagius, who underscored the free will of human nature, emphasized the perspective of God's presence in human beings through their participation in God for the possibility of salvation. See Cillerai, *La Trinità*, 1149; H. Somers, "Image de Dieu et illumination divine: Sources historiques et élaboration augustinienne," in *Augustinus Magister*, ed. Congrès international augustinien (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 1:457.

does not adhere, and, hence, it is also greater because it is better.”³⁰ This is the reason why the creature should seek the incomprehensible God of the Trinity as he wrote in *De trinitate*: “Why, then, does he so seek if he comprehends that what he seeks is incomprehensible, unless because he knows that he must not cease as long as he is making progress in the search itself of incomprehensible things, and is becoming better and better by seeking so great a good, which is sought in order to be found, and is found in order to be sought?”³¹

This notion of the changeable or mutable formation of the human mind gains even greater depth against the background of Augustine’s analysis of the trinitarian structure of the human mind (that is, his psychological trinitarianism). In this approach, he explains how the human mind is being formed. While his ideas on the trinitarian structure of the human mind are complex, they can be summarized in relation to the changeability of the formation as follows.

Augustine traced the Trinity in both the inner man (*interiorem hominem*) and the outer man (*exteriorem hominem*).³² He defined the inner man as the soul (*anima*)³³ and the outer as the body (*corpus*).³⁴ Yet the outer man is not just limited to the body, but relates also to perception through the bodily senses. And the inner man is more precisely defined as *mens*, which is the capacity of *intelligere*.³⁵

Against the background of this distinction between the inner and outer man, Augustine described the processes of perception through the senses of the body and the processes of cognition of the human mind. In these processes, four species, which are not separated but interrelated, “are born, as it were, step

30 *trin.* 6.9 (CCSL 50, 238).

31 *trin.* 15.2 (CCSL 50A, 461).

32 *trin.* 11.1.

33 Following Agaësse, the present work defines *anima* as a vital principle of a body (*trin.* 4.3) that is capable of perception through the corporeal senses. *Animus* is a rational and intellectual principle of the human *anima* and is related to psychological operations (*trin.* 11). *Mens* is understood as a synonym for *animus* in that it is the rational and intellectual principle of *anima* (*trin.* 15.1, 15.11; *imm. an.* 6–7, 17; *an. quant.* 22; *div. qu.* 7; *civ.* 11.2). Augustine appears to have differed on this with Plotinus, who seems to distinguish *animus* and *mens*. Plotinus attributed a capacity of sensible memory and reason to the former as an inferior soul, and a capacity of contemplation of eternal realities to the latter (Agaësse, *La Trinité* [*Œuvres VIII–XV*], 581–583; Cillerai, *La Trinità*, 1014–1015). See Gerard J.P. O’Daly, “Anima, Animus,” in *AugLex*, 1:315–340.

34 *trin.* 4.6, 11.1, 13.2. The same definition is found also in *diu. qu.* 51.1, 64.2; *c. Faust.* 24.1–2; *ciu.* 11.2, 13.24; *en. Ps.* 6.2.

35 *trin.* 11.1 (CCSL 50, 333–334); also see *trin.* 12.1–2, 12.13; *ciu.* 11.2; *diu. qu.* 51.1–3; *c. Faust.* 24.2. See Robert Dodaro, *Christ and the Just Society in the Thought of Augustine* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 148; also Gareth B. Matthews, “The Inner Man,” *American Philosophical Quarterly* 4 (1967): 166–172.

by step, one from the other":³⁶ "The species of the body, which is perceived, produces the species which arises in the sense of the percipient; this latter gives rise to the species in the memory; finally, the species in the memory produces the species which arises in the gaze of thought."³⁷ In this process and by the four species, Augustine identified two trinities corresponding respectively to the outer and the inner man.³⁸ The first trinity exists in the outer man when "the species of the body" and "the species in the sense of the percipient" are combined by the will; the second trinity exists in the inner man when "the species in the memory" and "the species in the gaze of thought" are combined by the will.

From there, Augustine defined the two trinities related to the four species as the *formatio* of the outer and the inner man. Paraphrasing the relationship between the species in each of the two trinities as a process of *uisio*,³⁹ Augustine wrote the following:

For there are two visions, one of perception, the other of thought. But in order that this vision of thought may be brought about, something similar to it is wrought for this purpose in the memory from the vision of perception, to which the eye of the mind may turn itself in thinking in the same way, as the glance of the eyes turns itself in perceiving to the body. I have, therefore, chosen to mention two trinities of this kind; one, when the vision of perception is formed by the body, the other, when the vision of thought is formed by the memory.⁴⁰

Consequently, the human being, which is not only the inner man but also the outer, exists as being formed by the species which are perceived by the corporeal senses into memory or are gazed upon by thought from memory. In this way, human being is formation.

36 *trin.* 11.16 (CCSL 50, 353).

37 *trin.* 11.16 (CCSL 50, 353).

38 *trin.* 11.16.

39 In *Gn. litt.* 12, Augustine spoke of three types of vision: corporeal, spiritual, and intellectual visions. The first is a vision by means of the corporeal eyes, the second *per spiritum hominis*, and the third *per contuitum mentis*. The second is "seeing" images produced from the first vision, and the third is activity of *mens* whose objects are virtues, forms of material things, and God. The second vision is judged by the third vision (*Gn. litt.* 12.6.15–7.16, 10.21, 24.50–51). Moreover, the third vision is accessible only by purification from the material images of the world and occurs only in a direct sight of or participation in the Word Himself (*Gn. litt.* 12.26.54, 31.59); Ayres, *Augustine*, 148–149.

40 *trin.* 11.16 (CCSL 50, 353).

In his notion of formation, Augustine's view of *imago dei* in terms of the inner and outer man cannot be ignored. There is no doubt that it was not the outer man, but rather the inner man that he identified as *imago dei*.⁴¹ In this sense, Augustine focused more deeply on the formation of the inner man.

But the rational soul lives disgracefully, when it lives according to the trinity of the outer man, that is, when it applies to those things which form the sense of the body from without, not the laudable will by which it refers them to some useful end, but the shameful desire by which it has clung to them. For even when the species of the body which was perceived corporeally has been taken away, yet a likeness of it remains in the memory, to which the will may again turn its gaze in order to be formed by it from within, as the sense was formed by the sensible body that was presented to it from without. And so that trinity arises from the memory, the inner vision, and the will which unites both. And when these three are drawn together into unity, then from that combination itself, they are called thought.⁴²

This passage thus reveals briefly how Augustine thought of the human mind as being *formed*. The human mind is *formed* by turning its gaze to the likeness of the corporeal things that exist outside the human body and are perceived by the body's senses into the memory. In other words, when the human mind turns its gaze to the likeness in the memory, the human mind is *formed* after the likeness of corporeal things and *becomes* like them, even though it is spiritual rather than corporeal in nature. Conversely, the human mind created as *imago dei* is capable of being *formed* into the divinity. In this formation process, the human mind becomes better and more beatific. The creation of the human mind as *imago dei* signifies being capable of and participating in God in the advancing and changeable process of formation.

At this point, we can turn to Augustine's ideas on the *deformatio* of the human mind. In the changeable process of the formation of the human mind, also deformation unfortunately occurs. In fact, the passage from *De trinitate* 11.6 quoted above reveals not only the process of formation but also the possibility of deformation. The human mind is created to be *imago dei* so as to be capable of and to participate in God. This means that the human mind was created to turn its gaze to God. If, however, the human mind turns its gaze to the likeness

41 *trin.* 11.1.

42 *trin.* 11.6 (CCSL 50, 339).

of the corporeal things received by the corporeal senses into the memory, it is no longer *formed* toward God. As such, the human mind abandons (*deficit*) its formation: this, in short, is *deformatio*. Deformation means nothing less than the *damaging* of the human mind from its original formation as *imago dei*. This occurs when the mind does not turn its gaze to God, but to itself. More precisely, deformation is the turning of the human mind from God and toward itself through its love for creatures that are less than itself.

Augustine's ideas on this *deformatio* can be clearly understood from the interpretation he offers in *De trinitate* 10.7 of the command "Know yourself." After demonstrating that the human mind always fully knows itself, Augustine writes that according to this command the human mind must cognize and maintain its nature. In other words, this command prohibits the human mind from knowing and loving itself by turning its gaze from God and toward itself or lower creatures, and requires the human mind always to turn its gaze toward God and to exist in the formation as *imago dei*. When it rejects its formation as *imago dei* toward God, the human mind undergoes *deformation*.

2.1.2 *Scientia—Sapientia and Cognitio Historica*

Up to this point, we have examined the *formatio-deformatio* of the creation of human beings as *imago dei* in general in relation to "the immature and perverted love of reason," which Augustine calls a disease. At this point, we must turn to his epistemology to understand more precisely how the disease of the immature and perverted love of reason occurs, which Augustine connected to three wrong approaches to the Trinity.⁴³

Augustine distinguished two functions of the human mind: rational perception of temporal and corporeal things, and contemplation of eternal things.⁴⁴ When the human mind proceeds from rational perception to contemplation, the rational act of the mind precedes the cognition of the highest and intelli-

43 In regard to the development in Augustine's theological epistemology, Gaetano Lettieri argued that what began as a metaphysical project for understanding the Christian mystery by Platonic philosophy ended up as a radical denial of the autonomy of reason. Cipriani has correctly pointed out against Lettieri that Augustine did not establish projects to comprehend the Christian mystery either by Platonic philosophy alone or by the "autonomy of reason." Cipriani, *La teologia*, 24; "L'altro Agostino di G. Lettieri," *REAug* 48 (2002): 249–265. For Lettieri, see Gaetano Lettieri, "Agostino," in *Storia della teologia*, ed. Enrico dal Covolo (Roma: EDB, 1995), 1:353; *L'altro Agostino: Ermeneutica e retorica della grazia dalla crisi alla metamorfosi del De doctrina christiana*, Collana Letteratura Cristiana Antica (Brescia: Morcelliana, 2001). For more discussion between Lettieri and Cipriani on Augustine's theological development, see note 188 below.

44 *trin.* 12.4 (CCSL 50, 358).

ble things.⁴⁵ The former is called *scientia* and the latter *sapientia*. Augustine's epistemology was thus constructed from these two interrelated functions of the mind, namely *scientia* and *sapientia*.⁴⁶

In books 12 and 14 of *De trinitate*, Augustine offers a more precise definition for his terms. *Scientia* is knowledge of human things, and *sapientia* is knowledge of divine things.⁴⁷ In other words, the former is "the cognition of temporal and changeable things" (*cognitio rerum temporalium atque mutabilium*)⁴⁸ or "the reasonable cognition of temporal things" (*temporalium rerum cognitio rationalis*),⁴⁹ and "the action by which we use temporal things well" (*actio qua bene utimur temporalibus rebus*).⁵⁰ The latter is "the contemplation of eternal things" (*aeternorum contemplatio*)⁵¹ or "the intellectual cognition of eternal things" (*aeternarum rerum cognitio intellectualis*).⁵² "The eternal and unchangeable spiritual things are understood by the reason of wisdom" (*aeterna uero et incommutabilia spiritalia ratione intelleguntur*).⁵³ *Scientia* is the knowledge connected to the created, and *sapientia* the knowledge connected to the uncreated.⁵⁴

45 *trin.* 12.25 (CCSL 50, 379).

46 The use of the concept of *scientia* underwent a development throughout Augustine's works. Before his ordination, *scientia* signified rational argumentation about intellectual realities. In his work *ord.*, Augustine seems to use *scientia* in this way. After his ordination, the concept was extended to include things that occur in time and are experienced directly or indirectly through the testimonies of reliable people (*retr.* 1.14.3). The reason for this extension was Augustine's deep study of the Bible which nourished faith through the teaching of the history of salvation taking place temporally and corporeally. In this sense, *scientia* became knowledge obtained from the Bible about the history of salvation culminating in the salvific works of Jesus Christ. In addition, also the moral teachings of the Bible were included in the concept of *scientia* in that they taught and enforced virtues preparing *sapientia*, which is perfect contemplation of God and love for God. See Cipriani, *La teologia*, 22–28.

47 *trin.* 14.3 (CCSL 50A, 423); 1 Cor 12:8; also see, *trin.* 13.24–25; *Acad.* 1.16, 18, 23. This definition is Stoic. Augustine seems to be more directly influenced by Cicero here (*De officiis* 1.43–153; 2.2.5; *De finibus bonorum et malorum* 2.12.37; *Tusculanae disputationes* 4.26.57; 5.3.7; *De oratore* 1.49.212). See Cillerai, *La Trinità*, 1147–1148. Nevertheless, Augustine did not accept the Stoic concept without adaptation. See note 59 below.

48 *trin.* 12.17 (CCSL 50, 371).

49 *trin.* 12.25 (CCSL 50, 379).

50 *trin.* 12.22 (CCSL 50, 375).

51 *trin.* 12.22 (CCSL 50, 375).

52 *trin.* 12.25 (CCSL 50, 379).

53 *trin.* 12.17 (CCSL 50, 371).

54 For Augustine, the ontological distinction is not just made between spirit and matter, but fundamentally between temporal and eternal, that is, between the created and uncre-

In regard to this distinction, a typical biblical example used by Augustine is the prologue to the Gospel of John.⁵⁵ In the beginning of book 13 of *De trinitate*, he quotes John 1:1–14 in its entirety. Following this quotation, he distinguishes *scientia* and *sapientia* as he finds them reflected in the prologue.⁵⁶ The first five verses of the prologue require “a contemplative life,” and is “to be perceived by the intellectual mind.”⁵⁷ In this sense, the verses correspond to what is related to *sapientia*. On the other hand, the prologue says that the eternal Logos was incarnated in time and that John was sent to preach who the incarnated Logos is. The incarnation of the Logos and the mission of John correspond to what is related to *scientia*.

Based on this definition and distinction, Augustine defines the ideal relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia* in the human mind, which is an image of God. *Scientia* must be led to *sapientia*. *Scientia* reasons corporeal things, so that through it the human mind can approach the end of the highest good, which is intellectual by *sapientia*.⁵⁸ By *scientia* the mind uses temporal things in order to fix our gaze on eternal things, which are objects of *sapientia*.⁵⁹ It is clear that the creation of the human being is a continuous formation toward God. Moreover, this entire passage connects this formation as creation is closely connected to epistemological progress.

For the ideal relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia*, the concept of *cognitio historica* was a crucial one for Augustine in that *scientia*, which is required to proceed to *sapientia*, works by *cognitio historica*.

The first thing to be noted is that *historia* has two connotations in Augustine's theology. According to the clear definition offered by Basil Studer, *historia* can signify both “research or investigation” and “narration.” In more detail, *historia* is the investigation of and research into things in time and space by bodily perception and the narration of other people who have already performed such

ated. In this regard, Augustine cannot be said to adhere strictly to a (neo)Platonic metaphysics alone.

55 Goulven Madec, *La patrie et la voie: Le Christ dans la vie et la pensée de Saint Augustin*, Collection Jésus et Jésus-Christ 36 (Paris: Desclée, 1989), 217–222.

56 *trin.* 13.2 (CCSL 50A, 381).

57 *trin.* 13.2 (CCSL 50A, 382).

58 *trin.* 12.17 (CCSL 50, 371).

59 *trin.* 12.21 (CCSL 50, 374). Augustine did not ascribe *scientia* just to “whatever can be known by man in human things, where needless vanity and harmful curiosity are excessively abundant.” For him, it was rather “only that whereby the most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, protected, and strengthened” (*trin.* 14.3). According to Cipirani, the concept of *scientia*, which Augustine denies here, was a typical concept of the Stoics (Cipirani, *La teologia*, 26). In this regard, for Augustine true *scientia* was the *scientia* revealed in Scripture.

investigation and research or else heard of them from others.⁶⁰ In this regard, *historia* is a point of contact with the past or the present, not the future. In *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine defined *historia* as *rerum proprie gestarum narratio*.⁶¹

From the definition of *historia*, the concept of *cognitio historica* can be understood. This relates to knowledge from *historia*. Through the investigation of or research into things in time and space by bodily perceptions or narratives, the human mind acquires knowledge of the past and the present. Through this *cognitio historica*, the human mind obtains *scientia* and is encouraged through *scientia* toward *sapientia*.

2.1.3 Immature and Perverted Love of Reason

According to Augustine, this ideal relationship can be distorted. The mind does not always have its love set on obtaining *sapientia* through *scientia*, but seeks also to enjoy corporeal things and to rest in a false happiness.⁶² The mind is “conformed to this world by placing our final end in such goods and in directing our desire for happiness toward them.”⁶³ Here *sapientia* is no long what leads *scientia*, as *scientia* stops its pursuit of *sapientia*.

Augustine’s criticism of the “immature and perverted love” of reason is immediately connected to this distorted relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia* corresponding to the *deformatio* of the *imago dei*. The mind created as *imago* must depend on its prototype (God), participate in God, and then love

60 Basil Studer, “History and Faith in Augustine’s *De Trinitate*,” *AugStud* 28, no. 1 (1997): 15. For more detailed studies of the concept of *historia* in Augustine, see Giuseppe Amari, *Il concetto di storia in Sant’Agostino* (Roma: Ed. Paoline, 1951); Rudolf Lorenz, “Die Wissenschaftslehre Augustins,” *ZKG* 67 (1956): 29–60; 213–251; Magnus Löhrer, “Glaube und Heilsgeschichte in *De trinitate* Augustins,” *Freiburger Zeitschrift für Theologie und Philosophie* 4 (1957): 385–419; Henri Irénée Marrou, *Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique*, 2 vols. (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938–1949); Michael Schmaus, “Die Spannung von Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte in der Trinitätslehre Augustins,” *StPatr* 6 (1962): 503–518; Christof Müller, *Geschichtsbewusstsein bei Augustinus: Ontologische, anthropologische und universalgeschichtlich-heilsgeschichtliche Elemente einer augustinischen «Geschichtstheorie»*, Cassiciacum 39 (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1993); John M. Rist, *Augustine: Ancient Thought Baptized* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994); Basil Studer, “La cognitio historialis di Porfirio nel *De ciuitate Dei*(1),” in *La narrativa cristiana antica: Codici narrativi, strutture formali, schemi retorici*, ed. IPA (Roma: IPA, 1995), 528–553; “La cognitio historialis di Porfirio nel *De ciuitate Dei*(2),” in *Il De ciuitate Dei: L’opera, le interpretazioni, l’influsso*, ed. Elena Cavalcanti (Roma: Herder, 1996), 51–65.

61 *Gn. lit.* 8.1; *Io. eu. tr.* 61.4; *ciu.* 13.21.

62 *trin.* 12.17 (CCSL 50, 371); Luigi Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology of Augustine’s De Trinitate*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 225 ff.

63 *trin.* 12.21 (CCSL 50, 374).

God. God Himself is the goodness and happiness in which the mind desires to participate. However, the immature and perverted 'love' of *ratio* turns the intention of the will or love from God to other spiritual or material creatures. This love tries to find happiness in creatures or to think of God from the perspective of temporal and corporeal things. Hence, the *mens humana* no longer uses (*uti*) temporal things and their *scientia*, nor does its love go out to search for the *sapientia* of the eternal divinity of God through *scientia*; rather, it now loves and enjoys (*frui*) temporal and corporeal things.⁶⁴

2.2 Uera Theologia

To criticize and cure the disease, Augustine established an appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity. Before this approach to the mystery can be studied in detail, we must first examine Augustine's criticism of three theologies in his time, as well as his notion of *uera theologia*. This will help us to understand the religious and philosophical context against which he attempted to establish his appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity.

The term *theologia* does not actually occur in *De trinitate* itself. Even though *De trinitate* 14.3 seems to express ideas similar to what Augustine had said about *theologia* in *De ciuitate dei*, the term itself does not occur there.⁶⁵ Instead, the definition of *theologia* is widely discussed in *De ciuitate dei*.

Augustine in the first place defines the term as "an account or discussion of the divine nature" (*diuinitate rationem siue sermonem*).⁶⁶ What he actually intends to say with this literal definition of the Greek word θεολογία can be plainly understood from the criticism he launches on three theologies categorized by Marcus Terentius Varro. In *De ciuitate dei* 6.5.1, Augustine lists Varro's distinction: "mythical, physical, and political" in the Greek, or "fabulous, natu-

64 For *frui-uti*, see note 80 below.

65 *trin.* 14.3 (CCSL 50A, 424): "When I discussed this question in the thirteenth book, I certainly did not attribute to science whatever can be known by man in human things, where needless vanity and harmful curiosity are excessively abundant, but only that whereby the most wholesome faith, which leads to true blessedness, is begotten, nourished, protected, and strengthened.... For it is one thing merely to know what a man must believe in order to gain the blessed life, which is none other than eternal life, but another thing to know how this may help the godly, and be defended against the godless, which the Apostle seems to call by the proper name of science."

66 *ciu.* 8.1 (CCSL 47, 216–217). English translations from *De ciuitate dei* have been taken from Demetrius B. Zema and Gerald Groveland Walsh, trans., *The City of God. Books I–VII*, FC 8 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2008); Gerald G. Walsh and Grace Monahan, trans., *The City of God. Books VIII–XVI*, FC 14 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 2008).

ral, and political” in Latin.⁶⁷ The first category concerns what the Greek *mythos* describes about gods, with Varro himself observing: “In the first of these theologies are found many fictions unworthy of the dignity and nature of immortal beings.” The second Varro described as the theology of philosophers who “left many books discussing such questions as: Who are the gods? Where are they to be found? Of what kind and character are they? When did they begin? Are they eternal? Do they originate in fire (as Heraclitus thought), or from numbers (according to Pythagoras), or from atoms (as Epicurus said)?”⁶⁸ Finally, Augustine writes: “‘There is,’ he [Varro] says, ‘a third kind, which the people, and particularly the priests, in the cities ought to know and practice. It belongs to this theology to explain what gods should be worshiped in public and by what rites and sacrifices each one should do this.’”⁶⁹

While Varro distinguished between the first and third theologies, Augustine the similarity between them.⁷⁰ The two theologies are similarly mythical, fanciful, and political,⁷¹ so that no one obtained eternal life through them, which is the life in which there is no end to happiness.⁷² These theologies are not *uera theologia* in that they do not know the true God who grants endless happiness.⁷³

Yet a more fundamental reason by which Augustine criticized the two theologies finds expression in his criticism of Varro’s own theology. While Varro rejected the first and third theologies and approved of the second, natural theology, Augustine charged that Varro’s own theology stayed stuck in the third category. In book 7 of *De ciuitate dei*, where Augustine treats Varro’s “selected gods” (*dii selecti*), he writes that “the context is still, therefore chiefly civic religion,” notwithstanding Varro’s attempt “to provide a naturalistic explanation of beliefs and practices” of the Roman pantheon.⁷⁴ Augustine refused to accept

67 *ciu.* 6.5 (CCSL 47, 170–171). Augustine quoted Varro’s distinctions here: “What they call ‘mythical’ is what is especially in use among the poets; ‘physical’ theology is used by the philosophers; and ‘political’ by ordinary citizens.”

68 *ciu.* 6.5 (CCSL 47, 171).

69 *ciu.* 6.5 (CCSL 47, 172).

70 *ciu.* 6.6 (CCSL 47, 173).

71 *ciu.* 6.8 (CCSL 47, 177).

72 *ciu.* 6.12 (CCSL 47, 184).

73 *ciu.* 6.8 (CCSL 47, 177).

74 *ciu.* 7.1–2; Gerard J.P. O’Daly, *Augustine’s City of God: A Reader’s Guide* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), 107. In *ciu.* 7.6, Augustine offered a summary of Varro’s theology, which he in *ciu.* 8–10 discussed in greater detail by comparing it with Neoplatonic philosophy. Varro argued that “God is the soul of the universe (*anima mundi*) or cosmos and that the cosmos itself is God (*hunc ipsum mundum esse deum*)” (*ciu.* 7.5). In detail, he distinguished between four parts of the cosmos and identified them as the four souls: cosmos consists

Varro's naturalistic and civic theology as *uera theologia*. In spite of "the elaborate attempt of so acute a scholar as Varro to catalogue all these gods and to find a place for each of them in heaven or on earth," "the highest reality reached" is just "the operation of material natures in time and place," as is true for "the naturalist interpretations of mythology, whereby able scholars seek to transform human happenings into a theology of nature."⁷⁵ In other words, Varro failed to distinguish the Creator, the true God, from His creatures.⁷⁶ *Uera theologia*, which leads human beings to eternal life and true happiness, must distinguish the true God and His creatures.

Apart from the first and third theologies, also the second, which is natural theology or the theology of philosophers,⁷⁷ was not accepted by Augustine as *uera theologia* in the strict sense of the term. Nevertheless, in comparison to Varro's theology and mythical theology, which in nature is not altogether different from civic theology, Augustine judged the theology of the philosophers still to be close to *uera theologia*. The theology of the Platonists thus acknowledges the clear distinction between God and other things as follows:

They, on the contrary [to Varro], acknowledged a God who transcends the nature of every kind of soul, a God who created the visible cosmos of heaven and earth, and the spirit of every living creature, and who, by the communication of His own immutable and immaterial light, makes blessed the kind of rational and intellectual soul which man possesses.⁷⁸

In this regard, Augustine approved of the theology of the Platonists, in contrast with the mystical and political or civic theologies, and even that of materialists like Tales, Anaximenes, the Stoics, and Epicurus.⁷⁹

The greatest teaching of the Platonists is their ethics. Non-Platonist philosophers looked for a human good only in man himself when they sought it in the body which is "man's lower nature," or in the mind which is "man's higher nature," or in both of them. On the contrary, the Platonists "taught that man

of ether, air, water, and land, and "all these four parts are permeated with souls, which are immortal souls in the ether and the air, and are mortal souls in water and land" (*ciu.* 7.6 [CCSL 47, 191]). Additionally, the planets and stars are "ethereal souls" or "celestial gods," and the souls called "*heroes, lares, geni*" exist "between the circle of the moon and that of the highest cloud and the winds" (*ciu.* 7.6 [CCSL 47, 191]).

75 *ciu.* 7.28 (CCSL 47, 210); *ciu.* 7.29 (CCSL 47, 211).

76 O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*, 107–108.

77 *ciu.* 6.2 (CCSL 47, 167–168).

78 *ciu.* 8.1 (CCSL 47, 217).

79 *ciu.* 8.5 (CCSL 47, 221–222).

is never fully blessed, in the enjoyment of either corporal or spiritual good (*hominem fruentem corpore uel fruentem animo*), but only by a fruition in God (*sed fruentem deo*).⁸⁰

In spite of this positive note, also the theology of the Platonists in the end did not manage to avoid Augustine's fundamental criticism. He criticized them first of all for their weak idea of necessary intermediaries—that is, demons—between God and human beings. In brief, the demons of the Platonists are not appropriate for becoming mediators between God and human beings. Augustine described the general condition by which some beings can be mediators between two other extreme beings as follows in relation to the demons of the Platonists: "Only then would they [demons] be in the middle on the condition that both qualities were not shared either with gods or men but that one was shared with men and one with gods."⁸¹ If this general condition is taken seriously, so Augustine argued, one can only conclude that the demons of the Platonists represent "an unhappy eternity or an eternal unhappiness" and are thus inappropriate for true mediatorship.⁸²

80 *ciu.* 8.8 (CCSL 47, 225); O'Daly, *Augustine's City of God*, 113–114. For *frui-uti*, see Vernon J. Bourke, *Joy in Augustine's Ethics*, Saint Augustine Lecture Series (Villanova: Villanova University, 1979), 29–65; Oliver O'Donovan, *The Problem of Self-Love in St Augustine* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1980), 24–29; William Riordan O'Connor, "The Uti/Frui Distinction in Augustine's Ethics," *AugStud* 14 (1983): 45–62; Gerard O'Daly, *Augustine's Philosophy of Mind* (London: Duckworth, 1987), 38–39; Manlio Simonetti, ed. and trans., *Sant'Agostino: L'istruzione cristiana*, SGL (Roma: FLV, 2011), xvii–xx. Simonetti agreed that the background is formed by Seneca's distinction between the two words. For the relationship between Seneca and Augustine on the point of these terms, see also Rudolf Lorenz, "Fruitio Dei bei Augustin," *ZKG* 63 (1950–1951): 75–132; "Die Herkunft des augustinischen *frui Deo*," *ZKG* 64 (1952–1953): 34–60; Georg Pfligersdorffer, "Zu den Grundlagen des augustinischen Begriffspaares 'uti-frui,'" in *Augustino Praeceptor*, eds. Georg Pfligersdorffer, Maximilian Fussl, and Karl Forstner, Salzburger Patristische Studien 4 (Salzburg: Abakus Verlag, 1987), 101–131; Peter Prestel, *Die Rezeption der ciceronischen Rhetorik durch Augustinus in "de doctrina christiana"* (Frankfurt am Main: P. Lang, 1992). Moreover, the characteristics of the objects of *frui* and *uti* in Augustine's distinction were deeply colored by the Platonic distinction between immutability and mutability. See Ragnar Holte, *Beatitude et sagesse: Saint Augustin et le problème de la fin de l'homme dans la philosophie ancienne* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 200 ff.

81 *ciu.* 9.13 (CCSL 47, 261). A good example is the intermediate position Augustine gives human beings between angels and beasts: "This is the way in which man is half-way between beasts and angels, the former being irrational and mortal while the latter are rational and immortal, with man, a rational mortal animal, in between, lower than the angels and higher than the beasts, sharing mortality with the latter and rationality with the former" (*ciu.* 9.13 [CCSL 47, 261]).

82 *ciu.* 9.13 (CCSL 47, 260).

To unpack this roughly summarized criticism, we first need to study the Platonists' description of the distinction between gods and human beings and of the demons' attributes. Platonists, and Apuleius in particular, accentuated the radical distinction between gods and human beings. After quoting a passage from Apuleius (*De deo Socratis* 12),⁸³ Augustine commented:

Here, I find three pairs of contrary qualities applied to the two extremes in the order of nature, the highest and the lowest. For, when he had indicated three characteristics in praise of the gods, he repeated them in such a way as to bring out the qualities in men. The three attributes of the gods are: sublimity of abode, perpetuity of life, and perfection of nature. These he repeated, with a change in words, to bring out three opposite attributes in human nature Thus, he has enumerated three attributes of the gods: loftiness, eternity, and blessedness; and three antithetical attributes in men: lowliness, mortality, misery.⁸⁴

Thus, if demons were intermediate between gods and human nature, they ought to share in one or another of the three pairs of antitheses between gods and human nature in accordance with the general condition for mediatorship. Among the attributes listed by Apuleius, Augustine did not call into question the first element of abode when Apuleius attributed to demons as intermediaries a position between the highest and the lowest.⁸⁵ Given the other two pairs, demons must share in blessedness with the gods and in mortality with human nature, or else in eternity with the gods and in misery with human nature. Apuleius' theology leads one to the second of these possible combinations. Elsewhere in *De deo Socratis*, Apuleius attributed eternity to both the gods and to demons. Hence, Apuleius' demons were characterized by "an unhappy eternity or an eternal unhappiness."

From this conclusion, Augustine rejected the theology of the Platonists and approved of Christian theology. Given that demons are characterized by "an unhappy eternity or an eternal unhappiness," they are not appropriate

83 *ciu.* 9.12 (CCSL 47, 259): "You have here two kinds of animals, gods and men, the former differing greatly from the latter by the sublimity of their abode, the perpetuity of their life, the perfection of their nature. Thus, there can be no immediate communication of one with the other: first, because of the great difference in height between the loftiest and the lowest of abodes; then, because heavenly life is eternal and indefectible, while on earth it is transitory and precarious; and, third, because it is the nature of gods to be raised to blessedness and of men to be reduced to misery."

84 *ciu.* 9.12 (CCSL 47, 259–260).

85 *ciu.* 9.13 (CCSL 47, 260).

for becoming mediators between gods and human nature. They did not lead human nature, which is mortal and misery, to the eternal happiness.⁸⁶ What is needed is a mediator “who is not only human, but also divine, in order that, by the intervention of His blessed mortality, men may be led from their mortal misery to a blessed immortality.”⁸⁷ As the following beautiful passage from Augustine clearly expresses, this was Christ, the incarnate God: “... [since] the blessed God who makes us blessed, by deigning to share our humanity, showed us the shortest way to sharing in His divinity” (*quia beatus et beatificus deus factus particeps humanitatis nostrae compendium praeibit participandae diuinitatis suae*).⁸⁸

Moreover, in relation to the intermediate demons, Augustine criticized the Platonists for their claim that “the gods do not mingle with men.”⁸⁹ By this claim, they thought that “the special privilege of the sublimity” of the gods is “freedom from contamination by human contact.”⁹⁰ As such, in the theology of the Platonists it is the demons that are required to work between the gods and human natures. Yet in Augustine’s eyes their claim regarding the necessity of demons for human nature has serious inconsistencies. First, if demons are not superior to gods and, unlike the gods, are contaminated by their contact with human nature, they cannot help human nature to purification given that they themselves are contaminated.⁹¹ To overcome this problem, the Platonists could say that the demons are free from contamination. This, however, leads to a second inconsistency. If demons as mediators are free from contamination in their contact with human nature, they could be thought to be superior to gods of whom it had been said that they would not be free from such contamination as a result of their contact with human nature.⁹² Lastly, an even more fundamental inconsistency obtains in the theology of the Platonists. Even though the gods alone are to be worshiped by human beings and demons, one ought actually to conclude that also the demons should be worshiped given that they are the ones to be in contact with human beings in order to help and purify them and to lead them to the gods.

The most crucial cause of these inconsistencies was the claim of the Platonists that “the gods do not mingle with men.” On the contrary, Augustine

86 *ciu.* 9.15 (CCSL 47, 262).

87 *ciu.* 9.15 (CCSL 47, 262).

88 *ciu.* 9.15 (CCSL 47, 263).

89 *ciu.* 9.16 (CCSL 47, 263); Apuleius, *De deo Socratis* 4.

90 *ciu.* 9.16 (CCSL 47, 263).

91 *ciu.* 9.16 (CCSL 47, 265).

92 *ciu.* 9.16 (CCSL 47, 265).

argued that true theology does not accept “the special privilege of the sublimity.” Hence, when he turns to consider the true theology, Augustine remarks:

It is no argument to say that an invisible God does not work visible miracles. Those who talk that way admit that the invisible God made the world, and, surely, that is visible enough It is a fact, then, that God, who created the visible heaven and earth, deigns to perform visible miracles in heaven and on earth so that the soul so fixed on what it can see may be stirred to adore Him who cannot be seen.⁹³

For this reason, the patriarchs saw the invisible God in a bodily form even though that bodily form is not God Himself.⁹⁴ So too when the Law was proclaimed, the invisible God was visible “in manifest miracles of created nature obeying to its Creator.”⁹⁵ The most significant moment when the invisible God became most visible and mingled with men in the most fundamental way was the incarnated God. As the passage from *De ciuitate dei* 9.15 quoted above (see p. 188) indicates, “the blessed God who makes us blessed” was revealed in the visible human being.

Augustine’s criticism on all three theologies distinguished by Varro exposes the three elements that *uera theologia* should witness: the distinction between Creator and His creatures, Christ as the one true Mediator between God and human beings, and the work and manifestation of the invisible God in His dispensation in time and space. Hence, the true theology is the Christian theology, which does not ignore the distinction between God and His creature but believes in God’s presence and works in time and space, and finds its climax in the incarnated God as the true Mediator.

2.3 *Love and Purification*

In light of the three criticisms Augustine applied to the theologies of his day, the following will now examine his own attempt to establish an appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity. In the first place, Augustine reflected on the ontological distinction between God and His creatures. Second, this distinction yielded the necessity of God’s *oeconomia* or *dispensatio* and *operatio* in time for the weakness and limitation of the human mind. Third, God’s *dispensatio* was needed to produce *theologia* which seeks to understand God’s

93 *ciu.*10.12 (CCSL 47, 286, 287).

94 *ciu.*10.13 (CCSL 47, 287).

95 *ciu.*10.15 (CCSL 47, 288).

essentia through His *dispensatio* and *operatio* in time. Fourth, for doing *theologia* in God's *dispensatio*, the human mind must be purified by christological faith from its powerfully distorted adherence to material things and recover a love for God. Finally, Augustine provided a *canonica regula* and two ways to speak of God for the human mind which is being purified and recovers its love toward God. These five elements will be discussed in order below.

2.3.1 Distinction between God and Man: Apophatic Theology⁹⁶

As noted in the above summary, for Augustine the distinction in nature between the uncreated being and created beings must be crystallized with a view to an appropriate approach to the Trinity. In his thought, the uncreated being is unlike created beings in four respects.

First, created beings exist in times, while the uncreated being is eternal. Time "did not begin to be in time,"⁹⁷ and there is "no time before times began."⁹⁸ In other words, there are "no intervals of time in that highest Trinity, which God

96 For a deep and extensive study of apophaticism in Augustine's thought, see Paul van Geest, *The Incomprehensibility of God: Augustine as a Negative Theologian*, *The Mystagogy of the Church Fathers 1* (Leuven: Peeters, 2011). Against attempts to categorize Augustine's theology as Scholasticism, Van Geest on the theological level followed Henry de Lubac's call for a more historical-critical approach to the patristic texts as well as other precedent studies of Augustine's apophaticism whose bibliographies were concisely summarized in footnotes 21, 24–26, 32–33, and 39 (pp. 9–13, 15) of his book. Philosophically, Van Geest appropriated Jean-Luc Marion's idea that conceptualization and ontologizing of God by the concept "being" is the most important example of idolatry. Chapter 1 of Van Geest's study outlines the philosophical and theological background of Augustine's apophaticism, and chapter 8 investigates his apophatic theology in *De trinitate*. For *De trinitate*, see R.J. Teske, "Properties of God and the Predicaments in *De Trinitate* v," *ModSch* 59 (1981–1982): 1–19; Matthias Smalbrugge, "Le langage et l'être: La question du Dieu personnel et la notion de similitude du langage dans la doctrine trinitaire de S. Augustin," *RSPT* 72, no. 4 (1988): 541–556; Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, trans., *Augustinus van Hippo. Over de Drie-Eenheid* (Leuven: Peeters, 2005), 7–39. For de Lubac, see Henry de Lubac, *Augustinisme et théologie moderne* (Paris: Aubier, 1965); for Marion, see Jean-Luc Marion, *God without Being: Hors-Texte*, trans. Thomas A. Carlson (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); *In the Self's Place: The Approach of Saint Augustine*, trans. Jeffrey Kosky (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2012).

97 *trin.* 5.17 (CCSL 50, 225).

98 *trin.* 5.17 (CCSL 50, 225). In regard to the procession in the Trinity, Augustine rhetorically asked: "Where time does not exist, can we, therefore, ask whether the Holy Spirit had already proceeded from the Father when the Son was born, or whether He had not yet proceeded, and whether He proceeded from both after the Son was born, just as we could ask, where time is found, whether the will first proceeds from the human mind, in order to seek that which when found is called an offspring" (*trin.* 15.47 [CCSL 50A, 527]).

is."⁹⁹ Time exists *in* intervals and is an interval, but eternity has *no* intervals. In this sense, eternality is timelessness. In *confessiones* 11, Augustine defined this eternity as a 'present totality' when he said: "In the Eternal nothing passes away, but that the whole is present."¹⁰⁰ This thought is echoed in *De trinitate* 5.17: "... for whom the passed ages have not passed and for whom the future ages already exist ..."¹⁰¹ Arius' mistake was caused by his misunderstanding of the eternity of God.¹⁰²

Second, if God has *no* intervals, the uncreated being is *idipsum*, meaning that God remains always Himself without any change. While changeability exists in temporal or spatial intervals, God is free from all intervals and changeability, thereby remaining *idipsum*. The concept of *idipsum* was used by Augustine for the divinity frequently in his various works including earlier works like *De beata uita* (2.8.11), *De moribus* (1.24), and *De uera religione* (41). One of the most significant passages defining the term occurs in *Enarrationes in Psalmos*. He wrote: "What is *idipsum* (Ps 121:3)? That which always is in the same way, which is not now one thing, now another. What, therefore is *idipsum*, unless that which is? What is that which is? That which is eternal. For that which is always one thing and then another is not, because it does not abide."¹⁰³ This term, which was used to name the divinity in this way, was expanded to refer to the three hypostases in the Trinity in terms of their one divine substance. An example of this expanded use is found in *Confessiones* 12. Here Augustine writes about the Trinity: "So you, Lord, are not one entity in one place and another somewhere else, but you are the same and the same and the same (*id ipsum et id ipsum et id ipsum*)—holy holy holy (Rev 4:8), Lord God almighty."¹⁰⁴ This trinitarian use of the term occurs also in *De trinitate*. In *De trinitate* 4.30, for example, Augustine attributes *idipsum* equally to Father, Son, and Holy Spirit: the Trinity is

99 *trin.* 15.45 (CCSL 50A, 524). Also see *conf.* 11.30–31 (CCSL 27, 209): "I see that time, then, is a certain extension" (*Video igniter tempos quondam esse distentionem*). It is interesting that Augustine's notion of time is similar to the one Gregory used as defined in the previous chapter. At the same time, Augustine accentuates that temporal distance is measured by the impression (*affectio*) which remains in the mind, or in the memory in particular (*conf.* 11.35–36).

100 *conf.* 11.13 (CCSL 27, 201). This is a significant passage within Augustine's entire corpus for showing his idea on time and eternity. The notion of eternity as a present totality corresponds with Plotinus, *Enneades* 3.7.3. Manlio Simonetti, ed., *Sant'Agostino Confessioni*, SGL (Roma: FLV, 2006), 4:293–294.

101 *trin.* 5.17 (CCSL 50, 227).

102 *trin.* 6.1 (CCSL 50, 228); also see *s.* 7.7.

103 *en. Ps.* 121.5 (CCSL 40, 1805). The English translation is from Ayres, *Augustine*, 202–203.

104 *conf.* 12.7 (CCSL 27, 219).

idipsum without intervals of time and place (*idipsum sine ullis interuallis temporum uel locorum*).¹⁰⁵ Likewise in *De trinitate* 3.21, the term is ascribed equally to the hypostases in the context of Augustine's account of the Old Testament theophanies.¹⁰⁶ As will be noted below in the context of the monarchy of the Father in Augustine's theology, the Son and the Holy Spirit are called *idipsum* in that they are *deus de deo*, God from God the Father who is *idipsum*.¹⁰⁷

Third, the uncreated being is simple. This receives emphasis when Augustine came upon a most appropriate terminology for naming God. In connection with Exod 3:14,¹⁰⁸ Augustine uses the terms *substantia* and *essentia* for God without significant difference in meaning between them.¹⁰⁹ At the same time, however, he did prefer *essentia* to *substantia*, the reason being that the former reveals the simplicity of the divine being more clearly than the latter. "To subsist" or "substance" means that something is said according to itself (*ad se dicitur*) and subsists according to itself (*ad se ipsam subsistit*).¹¹⁰ It connotes a thing in which qualities or accidents exist.¹¹¹ As such, if the term is attributed to the divine being, God Himself is not the qualities of the divine being, but subsists just as a subject of the qualities which can be mutable in God. In this regard, the term *substantia* is not perfectly commensurate with the simplicity of the divine being.¹¹² Hence, the term *essentia* is most appropriate for signifying the simplicity of God. God is simple. For Him, being is the same as attributes. From this simplicity, Augustine argued that Eunomius' error was related to the divine property of simplicity. Eunomius thought that the will of God does not coincide

105 *trin.* 4.30 (CCSL 50, 202).

106 *trin.* 3.21 (CCSL 50, 150).

107 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 253).

108 For Augustine's interpretation of the biblical passage in terms of simplicity, see Werner Beierwaltes, "La dottrina agostiniana dell'Essere nell'interpretazione di 'Ego sum qui sum' (Exodo 3,14) e alcuni precedenti concezioni," in Werner Beierwaltes, *Agostino e il neoplatonismo cristiano*, trans. Giuseppe Girgenti and Alessandro Trotta, *Platonismo e Filosofia Patristica. Studi e Testi* 8 (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1995), 91–120.

109 *trin.* 5.3 (CCSL 50, 207–208). For more on the terms *substantia* and *essentia* in Augustine, see Roland J. Teske, "Augustine's Use of 'substantia' in Speaking about God," *ModSch* 62 (1985): 147–163; Matthias Smalbrugge, "Sur l'emploi et l'origine du terme «essentia» Chez Augustin," *Aug(L)* 39, no. 4 (1989): 436–446.

110 *trin.* 5.7, 7.9 (CCSL 50, 212, 260); see also *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 245–249).

111 *trin.* 7.10 (CCSL 50, 260).

112 *trin.* 7.10 (CCSL 50, 260–261). The same notion of simplicity is found in *f. et symb.* 20 (CSEL 41, 26). Augustine probably followed Ambrose of Milan (*De fide* 1.16.106 [CSEL 78/8, 46]) and Victorinus (*Adversus Arium* 1.19 [CSEL 83/1, 84–85]) also on this point. Ayres, *Augustine*, 208–211.

with the divine essence, implying that the Son from the will of God is not equal to the essence of the Father.¹¹³

Augustine's notion of simplicity, however, did not overlook the multiplicity of God's divine properties as follows:

How much more so, then, is this true of that unchangeable and eternal substance, incomparably more simple than the human soul. For in the human soul to be is not the same as to be strong, or prudent, or just, or temperate, for there can be a soul without any of these virtues. But for God to be is the same as to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, and to be whatever else you may say of that simple multiplicity, or that multiple simplicity, whereby His substance is signified.¹¹⁴

In this passage, simplicity is not contrasted with multiplicity. Rather, Augustine spoke of "simple multiplicity" or "multiple simplicity." God has all of the good virtues or properties, and all these properties are the same as the eternal and unchangeable being of God. God is eternal, does not have any kind of intervals, and, in this sense, God's being is never contaminated by any kind of changeability. Hence, the properties or virtues are not related to any interval or changeability, but they are all God's eternal being itself. In this regard, all of the diverse properties relating to multiplicity are eternally simple in that they are the same as God's being, without any intervals or changes.

Fourth, the uncreated being exists without any kind of participation, in contrast with the created beings which are dependent on the Creator. This is a logical consequence from the third aspect of the divine nature. If the divine being is simple, being itself is being all the attributes in eternity. As such, God is great, for instance, not because He participates in a greatness other than Himself, but because He Himself is greatness in eternity. Participation is not appropriate to the divine being.¹¹⁵ The created human mind, on the contrary, exists in participation in God. No spiritual creature can exist without participation.¹¹⁶

113 *trin.* 15.38 (CCSL 50A, 515); see also *trin.* 15.37.

114 *trin.* 6.6 (CCSL 50, 234).

115 *trin.* 5.9, 5.11 (CCSL 50, 215–216, 217–218). According to Brachtendorf, the unity of the Trinity can be derived from being simple without any kind of participation. All three persons are equally simple in the eternal divinity without participation. For Augustine, this is what signifies unity. Brachtendorf, "Der menschliche Geist," 158.

116 Like Gregory of Nyssa, for Augustine the theme of 'participation' is closely connected with the theme of simplicity distinguishing the divine being from spiritual creatures. For the

Last, the uncreated being is truly called ‘spirit’ (*spiritus*), a term from John 4:24.¹¹⁷ With the term *spiritus*,¹¹⁸ Augustine understands a double distinction between the uncreated being and created beings. First, he distinguishes the uncreated being from all material creatures, which embrace space or place. God is spiritual, not material.¹¹⁹ Second, Augustine more interestingly compares the divine being as spirit with other spiritual creatures. In this way, he draws a distinction in nature between them and God. God is the most perfect spirit compared to other changeable spiritual creatures.¹²⁰ This finds clearer expression in the theme of participation examined above. God is the spiritual being that exists without participation by which the other spiritual beings exist in relation to the perfect spirit, God. In *De trinitate* 14.22, Augustine explains this notion specifically using a comparison between God and the human mind. The human mind is spirit, but changeable through participation. By that participation, it can be deformed or reformed.¹²¹ God, however, is the spirit that does not change by any kind of participation. With the term *spiritus*, Augustine maintained not only the Platonic distinction between spirit and material, but also a “biblical” distinction between the uncreated and the created.¹²²

In light of these five characteristics of the divine being, Augustine claimed that God is beyond most of Aristotle’s nine categories, with the exception of *relatio* and *actio*.¹²³

criticism of Wisse’s abandonment of the notion of ontological participation in Augustine, see note 29 above.

117 *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219).

118 For a general explanation of the term *spiritus* in relation to *anima*, *animus*, and *mens* in Augustine, see Étienne Gilson, *Introduction à l’étude de Saint Augustin*, 2nd ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1943), 56; Agaësse, *La Trinité (Livres VIII–XV)*, 581–583. According to Agaësse, who followed Gilson, Augustine’s use of the term *spiritus* has a double origin. On the one hand, he borrowed the Pauline distinction πνεῦμα, ψυχή, and σῶμα (1 Thess 5:23) and identified *spiritus*, like *animus* and *mens*, as a spiritual and an intellectual part of the Soul (particularly in *f. et symb.* 23 [CSEL 41, 28–30]). On the other hand, Augustine also shows influences from the Porphyrian distinction, thereby placing *spiritus* between the intellectual soul and the corporeal soul (particularly in *Gn. litt.* 12.24.51 [CSEL 28/1, 416–417]). Also see note 33 above for the meaning of *anima*, *animus*, and *mens*.

119 *trin.* 8.3 (CCSL 50, 270).

120 *trin.* 8.3 (CCSL 50, 270).

121 *trin.* 14.22 (CCSL 50A, 452).

122 Ayres highlighted the ultimate distinction between Creator and creatures in Augustine’s thought by quoting his argument that the Son is the same divine substance as the Father “because all that is not created is God” (*trin.* 1.9). Ayres, *Augustine*, 189.

123 In Aristotle’s *Categoriae*, 4.1b.25, the categories are the following: *qualitas*, *quantitas*, *relatio*, *situs*, *habitus*, *locus*, *tempus*, *actio*, and *passio*. Augustine’s knowledge of Aristotle is also evident from *conf.* 4.28–29, for instance. Cillerai, *La Trinità*, 1062. The categories of *relatio*

Accordingly, let us think of God, if we are able, and insofar as we are able, in the following way: as good without quality (*sine qualitate*), as great without quantity (*sine quantitate*), as the Creator who lacks nothing, who rules but from no position (*sine situ*), and who contains all things without an external form (*sine habitu*), as being whole everywhere without limitation of space (*sine loco*), as eternal without time (*sine tempore*), as making mutable things without any change in Himself (*sine ulla sui mutatione*), and as a Being without passion (*nihilque patientem*).¹²⁴

His intention in this passage is clear: If God is the perfect spirit who is eternal without any intervals and simple without any participation, He is beyond the capacity of the human mind whose intellect is limited to the categories of Aristotle.¹²⁵

In this sense, Augustine's approach to the mystery of the Trinity is apophatic in nature. This came to suitable expression when he was seeking an appropriate terminology for defining what the three are in the Trinity.¹²⁶ According to Augustine, if a term must be found to name "what the three," one ought to search for "a generic or a specific name which may include the three together."¹²⁷ Moreover, it is better to choose a specific name than a generic

and *actio* were cautiously applied to the divinity by Augustine. The definition of *relatio* in the Trinity 'in se' was a substantial argument used by Augustine to establish his notion of the hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity. Quite interestingly, he did not explicitly use the category of *actio* for *in se*. See note 157 below.

124 *trin.* 5.2 (CCSL 50, 207).

125 Goulven Madec, "Notes sur l'intelligence augustinienne de la foi," *REAug* 17 (1971): 123. According to Van Geest, Augustine was evidently influenced by Paul in Scripture and by Plotinus. According to Plotinus, "the highest reality cannot be adjusted to the categories of human thought" and "that thought in turn cannot be adapted to fit the lower demands of human languages." And "from Paul, Augustine borrowed the idea that human beings see as if in a mirror." Van Geest, *The Incomprehensibility*, 156. From Augustine's apophaticism in *De trinitate*, Van Geest concluded the following: "Even in *De trinitate*, Augustine remained a mystagogue, who regarded uncertainty on account of God's incomprehensibility as the foundation for that humility that provides access to the Most High." Van Geest, 156.

126 In *trin.* 7.7 (CCSL 50, 255–257), Augustine reflected on the traditional phrases used for the Trinity by the Greek Fathers (*mia ousia, tres hypostaseis*) and by Tertullian (*una essentia uel substantia, tres personae*). Comparing these Greek and Latin formulas, Augustine identified the Greek word *hypostasis* as the Latin word *substantia*. He seems, however, not to have been familiar yet with the anti-Sabellian significance of the Greek word *hypostasis* in the Cappadocians. Cipriani, *La teologia*, 196. For the origins of the trinitarian formulas, see Manlio Simonetti, "All'origine della formula teologica una essenza—tre ipostasi," *Aug* 14 (1974): 173–175; *La crisi ariana nel IV secolo*, SEAUG 11 (Roma: IPA, 1975), 513.

127 *trin.* 7.7 (CCSL 50, 255).

name when objects called by a name have the same nature. However, what is not permitted is a specific term that “may include the three together.” Augustine raised two reasons for this point. First, it is necessary to confess three essences or gods for “what the three” if the divine essence is understood as genus and the three as species.¹²⁸ In other words, if the three are to be understood as species and a specific name is to be found for naming them together, it would lead to the conclusion of tritheism. Augustine’s second reason can be summarized as follows: a single genus has no species. If the divine essence were a genus, it would mean that the divine essence was a single genus. Therefore, the essence as a single genus has no species, no “what the three.”¹²⁹ According to these two reasons, Augustine would not allow a specific term to name “what the three.”

This means that a generic term is required, for which end Augustine referred to the term *persona* from the Latin linguistic tradition.¹³⁰ Yet even this term did not prove good enough given that *persona* as a generic term was not used just for the divine being, but could also be used for human beings “in spite of the great distance between man and God.”¹³¹ Moreover, the term *persona* in the Latin tradition is strictly speaking not accurate for naming “what the three.” While we require here a term denoting the three existing in their mutual relationship, the term *persona* does not suffice in that it has an absolute meaning,

128 *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 263). Here Augustine criticized “some” (*nonnulli*) who think that essence is the genus and substance or person the species. Regarding the identification of the “some” (*nonnulli*) in the quoted passage, Richard Cross and R. Kany argued that Augustine was criticizing the approach of the Cappadocians in book 7. See Richard Cross, “Quid Tres? On What Precisely Augustine Professes Not to Understand in De Trinitate 5 and 7,” *HTR* 100, no. 2 (2007): 225n40; Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 502–506. Cillerai accepted this idea. Cillerai, *La trinità*, 1080. Cipriani, however, has argued that the Cappadocians were not in view when Augustine wrote book 7. See Cipriani, *La teologia*, 197. Instead of focusing on Augustine’s target in his criticism, we do well rather to accentuate that Augustine was probably indebted to Porphyry’s argument in *Isagoge* 2, translated by Victorinus, for his argument as to whether a generic or specific term ought to be attributed to the “three what.” See Cross, “Quid Tres?” 220–221; Ayres, *Augustine*, 218–219.

129 *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 263).

130 *trin.* 7.7 (CCSL 50, 275). Augustine knew of another attempt for naming the three as individuals, of which he similarly disapproved. On the account of that attempt, the three were not accurately understood to be the same as *una essentia* itself in the Trinity, but to be individually participatory in *essentia*. As such, no possibility remained for thinking that more than three individuals could exist in the species or that the sum of the three individuals was a greater essence than a single individual. In this context, the word *indivuduum* probably signifies an individual containing properties that other individuals in the same species do not possess, which was the way Porphyry defined τὸ ἄτομον in *Isagoge* 2.17–20, 7.20–27. Cillerai, *La trinità*, 1080.

131 *trin.* 7.7 (CCSL 50, 275).

not a relational one.¹³² From this impasse, Augustine concluded that the term *persona* was just an inevitable choice to avoid Arianism and Sabellianism in the limitation and weakness of the human mind, and not entirely appropriate to the divine being.¹³³ Hence, all terms for naming the mystery of the Trinity are deeply apophatic. The mystery is beyond capacity of the human mind and is not grasped by it.

2.3.2 *Oeconomia, Operatio, Essentia, and Theologia*

Since the ontological distinction between Creator and creatures showed the mystery of the Trinity to be beyond the ability of the human mind, the mystery had to be revealed for the human mind to be able to approach it. As Luigi Gioia has put it concisely, "Augustine was a realist."¹³⁴ This corresponds to the way Augustine defined the two functions of the human mind and the relation between these two functions. When the human mind proceeds from rational

¹³² *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 262); see Cross, "Quid Tres?" 218; Ayres, *Augustine*, 218; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 196.

¹³³ *trin.* 7.9. However, the problem with "terminology" for "the three" is not related directly to the critical issue that the hypostases are not as fundamental in Augustine's alleged monism as the one divine essence, as evident from his psychological approach to the Trinity. Rather, Augustine emphasized that the "three" are really "three." He said that each of Them is said for himself in an absolute sense, and that being person is the same as being divine substance for each of the "three" (*trin.* 7.11). The "three" are really "three" in that each of them exists as a divine substance. As such, while the term *persona* does not suffice for denoting the relationship between the three persons, Augustine did affirm its absolute meaning. Hence, personhood is not undervalued just as a mutual relationship among the three in the Trinity, as eastern and western critics of Augustine have similarly suggested. Augustine emphasized rather the priority of personhood to that of relationship. He clearly wrote: "Wherefore, if the Father also is not something in respect to Himself, then He can by no means be spoken of in relation to something else. For what applies to color is not true here. The color of a thing is referred to the thing colored; nor do we ever speak of color as existing in itself, but always as belonging to something that is colored; but the object of which it is the color, even if it is called colored in relation to its own color, still when it is spoken of as a body, is spoken of in respect to its substance. But one must not consider the Father in any such way, as though nothing could be said of Him in respect to His own substance, but that, whatever He is called, He is called in relation to the Son; nor should we in any way think that the Son is spoken of both in relation to His own substance and in relation to the Father, when He is called the great greatness and the powerful power, certainly in reference to Himself, and the greatness and the power of the great and powerful Father, by which the Father is great and powerful. It is not so, but both are a substance, and both are one substance" (*trin.* 7.2 [CCSL 50, 247–248]). Therefore, the possibility cannot be excluded for each of the three persons to be called *solus deus* for Himself, provided that the unity of the three is firmly maintained. See Cross, "Quid Tres?"; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 197–198.

¹³⁴ Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology*, 222.

perception to contemplation, the rational cognition of temporal things precedes the cognition of the intelligible and the highest things.¹³⁵ The human mind progresses from temporal things to the eternity of God. For this reason, it is necessary to examine what Augustine thought of God's *oeconomia* in time.

The problem is that Augustine's notion of God's *oeconomia* cannot be studied directly by his use of the term, given the fact that it does not occur frequently in his writings. Rather, as Studer has accurately concluded, Augustine used the term *dispensatio* for what was signified by the Greek term οἰκονομία, while the concept of eternity or *res aeternae* (in contrast to time) corresponds to *theologia*.¹³⁶ In what follows, Augustine's notion of *oeconomia* will therefore be examined according to his alternative terminology.

For Augustine, the Latin *dispensatio* signified similar things to what the Greek word οἰκονομία did, that is, God's work in time for our salvation. A first observation that can be made here is that the term in Augustine's writings was linked with "times." A typical use of the term *dispensatio* in *De trinitate* occurs in a passage from book 3. In his interpretation of the epiphanies of the Trinity in the Old Testament patriarchal era, Augustine remarked: "It is, therefore, clear that all those things which were shown to the Fathers, wherein God made Himself known to them according to His own dispensation, suitable to those times (*secundum suam dispensationem temporibus congruam*), came about through a creature."¹³⁷ Here, he modified the term "dispensation" with "times." God's dispensation is related to times, to the history of salvation. The relationship between *dispensatio* and time becomes clearer when Augustine in the same paragraph links the term to the Old and New Testament: "the dispensation of the New Testament (*dispensatio noui testamenti*) and the dispensation of the Old Testament (*dispensatio ueteris testamenti*), in regard to the fitness of the ages and times (*secundum congruentiam saeculorum ac temporum*)."¹³⁸ *Dispen-*

135 *trin.* 12.4, 25 (CCSL 50, 358, 379).

136 Basil Studer, "Oikonomia und Theologia in Augustins De Trinitate," in Brachtendorf, *Gott und sein Bild*, 42: "Während er [Augustine] *oikonomia* in der bei den Lateinern üblichen Weise mit *dispensatio* wiedergab, vermied er nämlich das für ihn heidnisch klingende Wort *theologia*. Er gab vielmehr die dahinter stehende Idee mit *res aeternae* wieder." See also Basil Studer, "Theologie—Oikonomia: Zu einem traditionellen Thema in Augustins De Trinitate," in *Patrimonium Fidei: Traditionsgeschichtliches Verstehen am Ende?*, eds. Magnus Löhrer et al., SA 124 (Roma: Pontificio Ateneo S. Anselmo, 1997), 575–600; Bruno Uvini, "Dispensatio nel De trinitate di Agostino di Ippona," *Aug* 39, no. 2 (1999): 407–465.

137 *trin.* 3.22 (CCSL 50, 150–151).

138 *trin.* 3.22 (CCSL 50, 151). Against the Manicheans, Augustine had defended the Old Testament as *dispensatio* of God. Hildegund Müller and Karl-Heinz Schwarte, "Dispensatio," in *AugLex*, 2:490–491; Studer, "History and Faith," 35n155.

satio is God's administration of His works according to times in the history of salvation. In this regard, *De uera religione* 13 similarly draws a clear connection between *dispensatio temporalis* and God's providence for the salvation of the human race.¹³⁹

Second, in the history of salvation, Augustine more specifically connected *dispensatio* with the sending of the Son and the Spirit. These two sendings he called *dispensatio*. In *De trinitate* 3.22, he compares a new *dispensatio* with an old. In the latter, God's revelation was made by angels, and in the former by the coming of the Son. Therefore, the new *dispensatio* signifies the sending of the Son. In earlier works, Augustine had already brought the christological perspective of dispensation into relief. In *De uera religione* 14, he describes the christological content of dispensation.¹⁴⁰ A passage from *De fide et symbolo* concisely shows the same christological dimension.

But since, by what I have called a temporal dispensation, our mutable nature was assumed by the unchangeable Wisdom of God, for our salvation and restoration, by the act of God's loving-kindness, we also put faith in temporal things done on our behalf for our salvation The heretics have many insidious ways of attacking this temporal dispensation The incarnation took place for our salvation, so we must take care not to suppose that any part of our nature was unassumed. Otherwise it will have no part in salvation.¹⁴¹

Likewise, the sending of the Spirit is *dispensatio*. The fact that the Spirit was given twice is "a most significant dispensation."¹⁴²

Third, *dispensatio* is necessary for human beings. In *De trinitate* 2.5, Augustine interpreted the miraculous phenomena around Mount Sinai in particular as appropriate dispensation to the human senses. God administered His works

139 *uera rel.* 13 (CCSL 32, 196). For the possibility of distinguishing between *dispensatio* and *dispensatio temporalis* in relation to Augustine's criticism against Manichaean dualism, see Müller and Schwarte, "Dispensatio," 491–492; Cornelius Mayer, *Die Zeichen in der geistigen Entwicklung und in der Theologie des jungen Augustinus* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1969–1974), 1:259–270; 2:178–189; Wilhelm Geerlings, *Christus Exemplum: Studien zur Christologie und Christusverkündigung Augustins* (Mainz: Matthias-Grünwald-Verlag, 1978), 187–199; Müller, *Geschichtsbewusstsein*, 225–229.

140 *uera rel.* 14 (CCSL 32, 197).

141 *f. et symb.* 8 (CSEL 41, 11–12). The English translation of *f. et symb.* is taken also from Burleigh.

142 *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 200).

according to times since human beings are limited to their senses in times.¹⁴³ The *dispensatio* of the sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit was required by this necessity for human beings. Their sending occurred so that human beings could turn their attention from corporeal and temporal appearances of the Son and Holy Spirit to the eternal or timeless presence of the Trinity in time.

If, therefore, He is said to be sent insofar as He appeared outwardly in a bodily creature, who has always been concealed inwardly in His spiritual nature from the eyes of mortals, then it also becomes easy to understand about the Holy Spirit, why He, too, is spoken of as being sent. For some form of a creature was made for the occasion, in order that the Holy Spirit might be visibly manifested by means of it, whether when He descended upon the Lord Himself in the bodily form of a dove (Matt 3:16) or when ten days having passed since His Ascension, on the day of Pentecost, there suddenly came a sound from heaven as if a violent wind were blowing, and parted tongues as of fire appeared to them, which also settled upon each of them (Acts 2:2–4). This operation (*operatio*), visibly manifested and offered to mortal eyes, has been called the sending of the Holy Spirit, not as if His essence (*substantia*) itself had appeared in which He Himself is invisible and unchangeable as the Father and the Son, but in the sense that the hearts of men, being moved by these external signs, might be turned away from the temporal manifestation of His coming to the hidden eternity of Him who is forever present.¹⁴⁴

In this quotation, the final sentence is key for the present topic. Augustine said that the sending of the Holy Spirit was needed to move human hearts (*corda*) from the temporal manifestation to the hidden eternity of the divine substance which is always present in time. This was the case also for the sending of the Son. As will be explained in greater detail below, the sending of the Son is

143 *uera rel.* 19 (CCSL 32, 199–200): “... because the soul, implicated in and overwhelmed by its sins, cannot by itself see and grasp this truth, if in human experience there were no intermediate stages whereby man might strive to rise above his earthly life and reach likeness to God, God in his ineffable mercy by a temporal dispensation has used the mutable creation, obedient however to his eternal laws, to remind the soul of its original and perfect nature, and so has come to the aid of individual men and indeed of the whole human race. That is the Christian religion in our times. To know and follow it is the most secure and most certain way of salvation.” The Christianity The English translation of *uera rel.* is from John H.S. Burleigh, trans., *Augustine: Earlier Writings*, LCC 6 (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953).

144 *trin.* 2.10 (CCSL 50, 93).

understood to direct the human mind toward eternity in terms of the relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia*.¹⁴⁵ For Augustine, sending was revealing.¹⁴⁶

Lastly, God's *dispensatio* aims at *contemplatio*. When Augustine interpreted 1 Cor 15:24 according to the *canonica regula*, he said that the Son will deliver the kingdom to "God and the Father" (*deo et patri*) and lead believers to *contemplatio* of Him.¹⁴⁷ When *contemplatio* occurs, Augustine writes, another *dispensatio* "of likenesses through the angelical sovereignties, authorities, and powers will no longer be necessary."¹⁴⁸ In this regard, God's *dispensatio* in time aims at *contemplatio* in eternity. Likewise, in *De uera religione*, Augustine clearly expressed that God's *dispensatio* aims at renewing and restoring the human race unto eternal life.¹⁴⁹

From the above, it is clear that Augustine understood *dispensatio* in a way similar to what was typically signified using the Greek word *οἰκονομία*. Through *dispensatio* according to times, God administers His works for the human being limited in his senses and He leads believers to *contemplatio*.

The above examination of Augustine's understanding of the concept of *dispensatio* nevertheless does not suffice for a full understanding of his idea of God's dispensation for the establishment of an appropriate approach to the trinitarian mystery. Along with *dispensatio*, another crucial notion here is that of God's acts in His *dispensatio*. Their importance was already implied in Augustine's trinitarian anthropology and epistemology of *scientia* and *sapientia*. The human mind as *imago dei* exists in the process of formation toward

145 Augustine did not overlook the difference between the sending of the Son and the sending of the Spirit in terms of the *unitas personae*: "Hence, the Holy Spirit is also said to be sent on account of these corporeal forms which possessed existence for a time, in order to signify Him and to proclaim His presence in a manner adapted to the human senses. Yet it is not said of Him that He is less than the Father, as it was said of the Son on account of the form of a slave, because that form of a slave inhered in Him in the unity of the person (*unitas personae*), but those corporeal forms were made visible in order to show what had to be shown at that moment and afterwards ceased to be" (*trin.* 2.12 [CCSL 50, 96]).

146 Johannes Arnold, "Begriff und heilsökonomische Bedeutung der göttlichen Sendungen in Augustinus' De trinitate," *RAP* 25 (1991): 3–69; Basil Studer, *Augustinus De Trinitate: Eine Einführung* (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2005), 171–179; Ayres, *Augustine*, 181–188.

147 *trin.* 1.16 (CCSL 50, 49). The expression "*deo et patri*" is interesting. Augustine probably quoted the expression itself from the Latin Bible which he used. By this expression in the Latin version, Augustine interpreted 1 Cor 15:24 such that the Son will offer His own kingdom to "God," in whom the Son Himself is inclusive, "and" to "the Father."

148 *trin.* 1.16 (CCSL 50, 49); see also *ep.* 55.12–14.

149 *uera rel.* 13 (CCSL 32, 196): "*huius religionis sectandae caput est historia et prophetia dispensationis temporalis diuinae prouidentiae pro salute generis humani in aeternam uitam reformandi atque reparandi.*"

God and must use *scientia* of temporal and corporeal things to obtain *sapientia* of the eternal God. Moreover, one of the criticisms had Augustine launched against contemporary theologies was closely related to this issue.¹⁵⁰ When they denied that gods have direct contact with human beings and when they posited false mediatory beings such as demons, Augustine could not agree. For him, God's *dispensatio* is not separated from His *essentia*. This key notion of the existence of God in His *dispensatio* can be explained by examination of the relationship between God's *operatio* and His *essentia*.

In general, the term *operatio* signifies the activity of God in time.¹⁵¹ In *De Genesi ad litteram*, Augustine distinguished the complete act of creation from the *providentia* for creation, and ascribed the former to the concept of *opus* and the second to the concept of *operatio*.¹⁵² God works or acts to sustain the creation He had made Himself. And, when Scripture speaks of the "hand" of God in time, Augustine interpreted it as *operatio*.¹⁵³

Along with this general significance, the term *operatio* was also used more specifically to indicate God's activity in salvific history. A passage from *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 117 is representative of such usage. In closing his interpretation of John 19:17–22, Augustine highlighted Pilate's response ("What I have written, I have written") to the Jews who sought to change the title above the crucified Christ. In this context, he referred to the power of "*divina operatio*" which, he wrote, shouted silently in Pilate's mind. Through Pilate, so he argued, *divina operatio* worked to prevent a change in title as a sign that also the Gentiles would become children of God as prophesied. In this interpretation, *operatio divina* is immediately related to the climax of salvific history and works to bring it to completion. Undoubtedly, when the climax of salvific history was called *operatio*, it was connected to the temporal sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

From Augustine's use of *operatio* as detailed above, his thought on the relationship between *essentia* or *substantia* and *operatio* can be understood. This

150 See pp. 187–189 above.

151 As Drecoll accurately indicated, the Latin word *operatio* was not used frequently in classical Latin, although *opus* did see wide use. Augustine similarly uses *operatio* less than *opus*. However, *operatio* was the term used by the Old Latin translation of the Bible for ἐνέργεια (1 Cor 12:6, 10; Eph 1:19, 4:16; *ciu.* 22:18). In this regard, *operatio* signified a continuing activity, while *opus* typically focused on the complete action or its effect. These connotations were not totally fixed, however. Volker Henning Drecoll, "Operatio, Opus," in *AugLex*, 4:299–300.

152 *Gn. litt.* 5.20.40, 8.19.38, 8.24.45.

153 *ep.* 148.13; *perseu.* 14; *en. Ps.* 18.2.3, 101.2.12.

comes most clearly to expression when he explains the *operatio* of the temporal sending of the Son and the Holy Spirit in *De trinitate* 2.10 which has been quoted above (see p. 200). Regarding the temporal sending, Augustine says thus that *operatio* is the manifestation of God *Himself* in time for human beings. God, who in essence is hidden from the eyes of mortals, exists in the temporal sending. God, who “extends from end to end mightily and orders all things sweetly (Wis 8:1)”¹⁵⁴ and remains invisible and unchangeable in essence, *acts* in time.

Apart from the epiphanies or missions, Augustine understood the relationship between *operatio* and *essentia* to be similar in God’s general or providential activity in time. He wrote:

If God also produces (*facit*) sensible and visible effects in the creature of heaven and earth, and of the sea and air in order to signify His presence, and to reveal Himself in them (*ad se ipsum ... significandum et demonstrandum*), as He Himself knows it to be fitting, but without appearing in that substance itself by which He is, and which is wholly unchangeable and more inwardly and more mysteriously sublime than all the spirits which He created?¹⁵⁵

In His activities, the essence is hidden but God Himself produces or acts (*facit*, which is a synonym of *operatur* in Augustine) in sensible and visible things so that *He* reveals *Himself* in them, even though this is not according to *essentia*. As such, God’s activity is the activity of God Himself whose essence is hidden in time from mortal eyes.¹⁵⁶

Consequently, Augustine probably thought that God, who is hidden in *essentia*, reveals *Himself* according to His *operatio* in time and that God in His *operatio* is God Himself who is simultaneously hidden in His *essentia*. God’s existence in His *operatio* was so real for Augustine that he defended the equality (*aequalitas*) of the divine nature among the three hypostases in eternity from His *operatio* in time. From book 1 to 4 of *De trinitate*, Augustine analyzes the

¹⁵⁴ *trin.* 2.25 (CCSL 50, 114).

¹⁵⁵ *trin.* 3.10 (CCSL 50, 137).

¹⁵⁶ *trin.* 2.35 (CCSL 50, 126): “For the nature itself, or the substance, or the essence, or by whatever other name the thing itself that God is, whatever it is, should be called, cannot be seen corporeally. But we must also believe that not only the Son, or the Holy Spirit, but the Father also could have made Himself known (*significationem sui dare potuisse*) to our mortal senses in a corporeal form or likeness by means of a creature that had been made subject to Him.” Also, see *trin.* 2.25.

biblical passages describing the theophanies. By this analysis, he affirmed that the three persons are *unus deus*, since their *operationes ad extra* are inseparable.¹⁵⁷

From here we can now move on to Augustine's views on the relationship between *dispensatio* and *theologia*.¹⁵⁸ In brief, for him this relation exists in the understanding of eternal things (*res aeternae*) from temporal ones and in moving up from the visible to the invisible.¹⁵⁹ The relationship thus takes shape in that one does *theologia* through *dispensatio*.

As has been explained in terms of the relationship between *operatio* and *essentia*, eternity exists *in* time. Nevertheless, in Augustine's thought the distinction between God and the creature is never blurred. This also means that the characteristics of the divine being in eternity must be retained when eternity is revealed in time. These ideas come to expression in Augustine's thinking on the sending and eternal processions of the Son and Spirit.

In the first place, eternity exists *in* time. In *De trinitate* 2.7–11, Augustine interprets the biblical passages concerning the sending of the Son and the Spirit

¹⁵⁷ *trin.* 1.12, 1.15, 2.3. However, just like Gregory, Augustine did not attribute *operatio* to the internal relationship within the Trinity itself. No argument on this point can be found in *trin.* God's activity is just for our salvation. In this sense, Augustine was probably more cautious than Thomas Aquinas in calling the generation and procession from the Father immanent actions (*Summa theologiae* 1a, q. 27, a. 1; *Summa contra gentiles* II, ch. 1 and ch. 7; *De potentia*, q. 9, a. 9; q. 10, a. 1.), even though Thomas probably developed the idea of immanent actions from Augustine's psychological explanation of the Trinity as well as from Aristotle's ideas on relation and action (*Metaphysica* 9.8 [1050a23–b2]). In this sense, even though Ayres' ideas and interpretation of Augustine are highly relevant for the present work and frequently cited, we hesitate to agree with his view on Augustine's trinitarian ontology, which emphasizes the loving "acts" of the three persons for the unity of the divine substance in the Trinity. Even Thomas limited the phrase "immanent action" to the relation as *processio ab alio*, which is the communication of the divine nature (paternity, filiation, spiration, and procession). In this use of the terms, Thomas did not explicitly identify the divine nature with the act of mutual love, even though he acknowledged John of Damascus' argument concerning the Spirit's resting in the Son and interpreted it in terms of the Spirit's being the love of the lover who is God the Father. For a more detailed discussion of Ayres' trinitarian ontology, see the excursus below on him (pp. 244–247). For Thomas, see Gilles Emery, "Le traité de saint Thomas sur la Trinité dans *La Somme Contre les Gentils*," *RevThom* 96 (1996): 5–40; "La procession du Saint-Esprit à Filio chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," *RevThom* 96 (1996): 521–574; *La théologie trinitaire de saint Thomas d'Aquin* (Cerf: Paris, 2004). The last book was translated into English as Gilles Emery, *The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas*, trans. Francesca Aran Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007).

¹⁵⁸ For the close relationship between the two pairs of terms (*scientia-sapientia* and *oikonomia-theologia*) in Augustine, see Studer, "Oikonomia und Theologia," 43–44.

¹⁵⁹ *ciu.* 10.14 (CCSL 47, 288).

according to the *canonica regula*. He avoids the conclusion that the sender is greater than the one who is sent.¹⁶⁰ Rather, he argues that the passages in question must be interpreted such that the two sent persons are equal with the sender in the divine substance.¹⁶¹ Supporting this claim, Augustine says that all three hypostases as God were involved in the sending, and that those who are sent were given to Their own creation where They as eternal God already existed omnipresently. In other words, the divine being in eternity exists *in* time hidden from the material thinking of mortals, and appears in a temporal event by the sending of Himself. In this regard, eternity has already been *in* time.

Accordingly, in terms of the *filioque* controversy, it might thus be said that the eternal processions are signified by the temporal sending. This idea is very clear in Augustine. In *De trinitate* 4.29, he says that the temporal sending corresponds to the eternal processions. The temporal sending does not point to any kind of subordination in substance between sender and sent. Rather, the sending *in time* signifies the consubstantiality and original relationship among the three hypostases *in eternity*. Hence, Augustine writes: "For as to be born is for the Son to be from the Father, so to be sent is to know that the Son is from Him. And as for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to know that He proceeds from Him."¹⁶²

Finally, eternity must be kept from sensible or material thinking even though the former is revealed in the latter. Being concealed from the eyes of mortals, eternity must not be consumed by any kind of material thinking, but conceived in a way appropriate to the distinction between the divine being and creatures. Eternity exists in hiddenness, thus requiring the human mind to turn to it, away from its temporal manifestation and from a purely material way of thinking about it.¹⁶³

160 *trin.* 4.26–27.

161 Basil Studer, "La teologia trinitaria in Agostino d'Ippona: Continuità della tradizione occidentale," in *Cristianesimo e specificità regionali nel mediterraneo latino (Sec. IV–VI)*, ed. IPA, SEAUG 48 (Roma: IPA, 1994), 161–177.

162 *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 199). In contrast with what M. Schmaus claims ("Die Spannung von Metaphysik und Heilsgeschichte"; *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*), this passage and the relation between *dispensatio* and *theologia* as explained are revelatory of Augustine's emphasis on the aspect of *oeconomia* or dispensation for his thought on the Trinity *in se*.

163 *trin.* 2.10 (CCSL 50, 93).

2.3.3 Purification and the *Fides Catholica*

Up to now, we have studied Augustine's ideas on the necessary distinction between God and His creatures, and on the relationship between *dispensatio-operatio* and *theologia-essentia*. Using these ideas, Augustine attempted to cure the disease of the immature and perverted love of reason and to establish an appropriate way to approach the mystery of the Trinity.

Neglecting the distinction between the divine being and His creatures, however, the distorted mind is conformed to created beings.¹⁶⁴ It does not try to attain through the *scientia* of the created beings the *sapientia* of the uncreated being, the perfect simple spirit who does not have any kind of participation and exists in timelessness.

For this reason, so Augustine argued, the human mind needs to be purified. More precisely, the images of material things to which the human mind is *conformed* must be removed from it. He wrote:

For they [the images of the sensible things] have marvelously cohered to it with the glue of love, and this is its uncleanness that, while it endeavors to think of itself alone, it regards itself as being that without which it cannot think of itself. When it is, therefore, commanded to know itself, it should not seek itself as though it were to be withdrawn from itself, but it should rather withdraw what it has added to itself.¹⁶⁵

The purification of the mind therefore means to take away or remove (*detrhere*) images of and adhesion to material things. The human mind must remove the images of material things *into* which it came¹⁶⁶ and which have been imprinted on the memory.

Purification occurs by a *fides catholica* in the mystery of the Trinity.¹⁶⁷ More precisely, it is christological faith in the mystery of the Trinity that purifies the human mind. This was initially hinted at by Augustine's interpretation of Exod 33:11–18 in *De trinitate* 2.27–30.¹⁶⁸ There Augustine described what Moses saw and what he desired further when the Lord spoke to him “face to face.” According Augustine, Moses saw the Lord in a corporeal appearance. Yet what he

¹⁶⁴ *uera rel.* 40–43.

¹⁶⁵ *trin.* 10.11 (CCSL 50, 324).

¹⁶⁶ Augustine offered an interesting interpretation of the Latin verb *inuenire*. Noting its composition of the words *in* and *uenire*, Augustine pointed out that discovering is coming into something. In the case of material things, the human mind comes into images of them that have been imprinted on the memory by the body. See *trin.* 10.10 (CCSL 50, 323–324).

¹⁶⁷ *trin.* 1.7 (CCSL 50, 35–36).

¹⁶⁸ CCSL 50, 115–121.

wanted was to see the divine substance itself beyond corporeal appearance. To satisfy the desire for complete *contemplatio* in heaven, faith in “the back parts” (*posteriora*) of the Lord was required on earth. Commenting Exod 33:20–23, Augustine interpreted the back parts of the Lord as the flesh of Christ and argued that through the faith of the Catholic Church in the back parts of Christ, human beings are promised purification and vision of the Lord “face to face.”¹⁶⁹

Augustine explains the requirement of christological faith for purification much more clearly in connection with the theme of *scientia-sapientia*. If Christ, who is truly human and truly divine, is both true *scientia* and true *sapientia*, He is the place to proceed from *scientia* to *sapientia*. The human mind can desire to reach *contemplatio* of the divinity through *scientia* by faith in Christ as both *scientia* and *sapientia*.¹⁷⁰

This fascinating thought of Augustine is clearly explained in his interpretation of the prologue to the Gospel of John, which has already come up above. When he interpreted the prologue at the beginning of book 13 of *De trinitate*, it was not just the christological perspective of *scientia* and *sapientia* that Augustine detailed there. For, he at the same time gave a clear account of the need for faith. After drawing a connection from the first five verses of the prologue to the notion of contemplation related to *sapientia*, Augustine again quoted from verse 5 and interpreted it as demonstrating the need for faith: “... because of what was said: ‘The light shines in the darkness, and the darkness grasped it not,’ faith was surely necessary in order that we might believe what we did not see. For by the ‘darkness’ he meant the hearts of mortals that have been turned away from light of this kind and are less capable of beholding it.”¹⁷¹ Faith in the united person of Christ therefore causes the human mind not to seek to focus on Christ’s works in the flesh, but rather to desire to obtain *contemplatio* of His divinity. By faith the human mind no longer desires to be conformed to material things, but to ascend through *scientia* of Christ’s works in the flesh to *sapientia* of the divinity of Christ’s mysteriously united person. As Robert Dodaro aptly put it, the role of faith is that of a “grammar” teaching human beings to read the mystery of the incarnated God.¹⁷² The distorted mind is puri-

169 *trin.* 2.28 (CCSL 50, 119).

170 *trin.* 13.24 (CCSL 50A, 415–417).

171 *trin.* 13.2 (CCSL 50A, 382).

172 Dodaro, *Christ*, 141. Dodaro attempted to offer a clearer description than that offered by David J. Hassel and Lorenz in designating the connection of the relationship between the two natures in Christ’s unique person with the relationship between *sapientia* and *scientia*. See Dodaro, 167–168; for Hassel, see David J. Hassel, “Conversion-Theory and Scientia in the De Trinitate,” *RAP* 2 (1962): 383–401; for Lorenz, see Rudolf Lorenz, “Gnade und Erkenntnis bei Augustinus,” *ZKG* 75 (1964): 21–78. Cf. Arnold, “Begriff,” 3–69; Michel R. Barnes,

fied by the medicine of christological faith from the material things to which it had been powerfully conformed.

It is in this regard that Augustine accentuates the necessity of incarnation. A medicine must be “adapted to the disease.” The disease of the human mind is caused by temporal things and the desire for them. Accordingly, he writes, “we practice faith in the things that were done in time for our sake, and by it we are cleansed, in order that when we have come to sight, as the truth follows the faith, so may eternity follow mortality.”¹⁷³ Hence, Christ as our medicine became temporal in order that the human mind might be purified from temporal things by faith in Him.¹⁷⁴ The faith in the temporal *dispensatio* of the incarnation makes possible the ideal relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia*.¹⁷⁵

Through the purification rendered by the christological medicine, also the *scientia* of the mind as a trinitarian image becomes valuable. Without medicine

“The Visible Christ and the Invisible Trinity: Mt. 5:8 in Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology of 400,” *ModTh* 19, no. 3 (2003): 329–355. For the same idea in *diu. qu.* 69, see Studer, *Augustinus*, 173–174.

173 *trin.* 4.24 (CCSL 50, 191); *uera rel.* 45.

174 Augustine expressed this idea clearly also in *f. et symb.* 8 (CSEL 41, 11–12) which has been quoted above (p. 199 above). As Alois Grillmeier has notably argued, the necessity of the incarnation of the Logos in time for the limitation of the human mind was something Augustine shared with Marius Victorinus. According to Victorinus, “Il fallut, pour notre libération, que l’universel divin, c’est-à-dire la semence de tous les esprits qui subsistent selon un mode universel, c’est-à-dire l’être premier, c’est-à-dire le *Logos* universel, soit fait chair par le contact avec la matière inférieure et toute la corruption, pour détruire toute la corruption et tout le péché. Car les ténèbres de l’ignorance de l’âme, déchirée par les puissances matérielles, avaient besoin de secours de la lumière éternelle: *Logos* de l’âme et *Logos* de la chaire, après la destruction de la corruption, par le mystère de la mort qui mène à la résurrection, pourraient ainsi élever les âmes et les corps, sous la tutelle de l’Esprit-Saint, jusqu’aux pensées divines et vivifiantes, grâce à la connaissance, à la foi et à l’amour?” Paul Henry, eds., *Traité théologiques sur la Trinité*, trans. Pierre Hadot, sc 68 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1960), 371; for Grillmeier, see Alois Grillmeier, *Jesus der Christus im Glauben der Kirche* (Freiburg im Breisgau [etc.]: Herder, 1979), 1:594–596.

175 In this regard, it is correct to say that Madec placed greater emphasis on the Christocentric perspective of Augustine’s doctrinal principle than Olivier du Roy did. Following Madec, also Cipriani indirectly criticized Du Roy by way of a comparison between Plato’s *Timaeus* and Augustine’s *De trinitate*. While Plato made “an unbridgeable hiatus” between eternity and time and between truth and faith in *Timaeus* 29c, Augustine overcame this hiatus by faith in Christ (*trin.* 4.24). Cipriani, *La teologia*, 28–29. For his thorough refutation of Du Roy, see Nello Cipriani, “Le fonti cristiane della dottrina trinitaria nei primi dialoghi di S. Agostino,” *Aug* 34, no. 2 (1994): 253–312. For Du Roy, see Olivier du Roy, *L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité selon saint Augustin: Genèse de sa théologie trinitaire jusqu’en 391* (Paris: Etudes Augustiniennes, 1966); for Madec, see Goulven Madec, “Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra: Le principe de cohérence de la doctrine augustinienne,” *RAP* 10 (1975): 77–85.

or purification, the mind is not conformed again to its prototype, but remains conformed to sensible and material things. As such, the mind cannot obtain *sapientia* of the prototype through *scientia* of itself since it remains a distorted image of God. By the purification, the human mind is (re)formed as *imago dei*.¹⁷⁶ Accordingly, the mind can obtain *sapientia* through *scientia* of itself.¹⁷⁷

In the process through *scientia* of temporal things to *sapientia* of eternal things by christological faith, Augustine compared believers to philosophers.¹⁷⁸ Actually, philosophers, and Neoplatonists in particular, investigated eternal things as well as the changeability of corporeal things and the process of times. They conducted their investigation by philosophical method to understand eternal ideas, or else studied narratives about temporal and spatial things as well as the narratives of other witnesses.¹⁷⁹ Yet their knowledge was not perfect in that they did not love and contemplate the eternal Truth in God himself, that is in Wisdom itself, and their *historia* was limited to the past and the present. Their philosophy relied only “on the reason without the faith of the Mediator.”¹⁸⁰ They therefore did not obtain *sapientia* of eternal things from *scientia* of temporal things. Christians, by way of contrast, believed in Jesus Christ who is *scientia* and *sapientia*, and recognized eternal things through temporal knowledge.

This superiority of Christians results from love. The passage from *Confessiones* 13.8,¹⁸¹ which has already been examined above, shows how fundamental love is for the *deformatio* of the *imago dei*. Love for temporal creatures rather than their Creator causes the *formatio* of the *imago dei* to be distorted or damaged so that the human mind does not love the eternal divinity but temporal things, and to be conformed to the latter. By this immature and perverted love of *ratio*, the desire of philosophers and trinitarian heretics was not to reach *sapientia* through *scientia*, and they denied the catholic faith in that they loved their reason much more than they did faith in Jesus Christ who is the true *scientia*

176 *trin.* 12.21 (CCSL 50, 374).

177 *trin.* 15.44 (CCSL 50A, 522–523).

178 *trin.* 4.21–24.

179 *trin.* 4.21 (CCSL 50, 188).

180 *trin.* 14.26 (CCSL 50A, 459); Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology*, 219–231. He underscored Augustine's contrast between covetousness and pride of the reason, and faith in and love for Christ as Mediator. About the notion of purification, he correctly noted: “This purification had to be performed through the same reality which had become not the *cause* but the *occasion* of our fall, namely temporal realities (*temporalia*)—the *causes* are covetousness and pride.” Gioia, 221 (emphasis original).

181 CCSL 27, 245. For the quoted text, see p. 258 below.

and *sapientia*. Only through *caritas* toward God and the Mediator¹⁸² can their *ratio* be purified and desire to reach *sapientia* through *scientia* by christological faith.¹⁸³ By its love for Christ and its christological faith, the human mind is guided “through Christ as human being to Christ as God,” that is, through Christ as *scientia* of temporal perspectives to Christ as *sapientia* of the eternal perspective.¹⁸⁴

By this love, the pride (*superbia*) and covetousness (*avaritia*) of the human mind are defeated. In *De trinitate* 12.14–16, Augustine defines this covetousness and pride of reason. Briefly stated, *superbia* signifies that the soul does not love to be governed by God and God’s laws, but loves rather to govern itself by its own power and laws.¹⁸⁵ This was called “the beginning of sin” (Eccl 10:15). *Avaritia* means that the soul finds “its delights in the corporeal and temporal realities,” becomes “entangled with their images” in its memory, “is foully defiled by the fornication of the phantasy,” and “is immersed in the muddy whirlpool of carnal pleasure.”¹⁸⁶ It is “the root of all evils” (1 Tim 6:10), and, as Luigi Gioia correctly summarized Augustine on this point, *avaritia* is “the perversion of the right order between using and enjoying” of temporal and corporeal realities.¹⁸⁷ Love and faith purifies the human mind from *superbia* and *avaritia* so as to turn to Christ who guarantees the true progress to *sapientia* through *scientia*, to *theologia* through *dispensatio*.¹⁸⁸ Hence, modifying 1 Cor 8:1, Augustine

182 *sol.* 1.2; *mor.* 1.24; *doctr. chr.* 1.27; *ciu.* 8.8, 10.1, 19.14; *trin.* 8.4. For Augustine, who became a Christian under the influence of Neo-Platonism, the first object of love is the *summum bonum, deus*. This leads to *dilectio ordinata* (*doctr. chr.* 1.28). See Dany Dideberg, “Caritas,” in *AugLex*, 1:732, 735–736; John Burnaby, *Amor Dei: A Study of the Religion of St. Augustine*, 3rd ed. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1960), 113–137. According to Simonetti, the expression *dilectio ordinata* was derived from Song 2:4, as Origen interpreted this verse to show the priority and distinction in the act of love (*Homiliae in Canticum canticorum* 3.186 ff., Baehrens). Moreover, in Augustine this expression corresponds with his idea of the *ordo naturalis* between Creator and His creatures (*ciu.* 15.22, 19.13; *c. Faust.* 22.30; *ep.* 140.4). See Simonetti, *L’istruzione cristiana*, 404; see also Holte, *Beatitude*, 257 ff.

183 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50.252–254). See Madec, *La patrie*, 35–50, 217–222; Basil Studer, *Gratia Christi—Gratia Dei bei Augustinus von Hippo: Christozentrismus oder Theozentrismus?*, SEAug 40 (Roma: IPA, 1993), 82–87.

184 Basil Studer, *The Grace of Christ and the Grace of God in Augustine of Hippo: Christocentrism or Theocentrism?*, trans. Matthew J. O’Connell (Collegeville, MN: The Liturgical Press, 1997), 154; Amari, *Il concetto*, 124 f.; Madec, “Christus, scientia et sapientia nostra,” 81; TeSelle, *Augustine*, 334.

185 *trin.* 12.14 (CCSL 50, 368).

186 *trin.* 12.14 (CCSL 50, 368).

187 Gioia, *The Theological Epistemology*, 225.

188 As Augustine wrote in his *Retractationes*, his theology itself was progressive: “Let those, therefore, who are going to read this book not imitate me when I err, but rather when I

remarks: "Knowledge does not puff up because charity edifies" (*scientia non inflat quia caritas aedificat*).¹⁸⁹

progress toward the better. For, perhaps, one who reads my works in the order in which they were written will find out how I progressed while writing" (*retr.* 1. prol. 3 [CCSL 57, 6]). The English translation of *retr.* is taken from Mary Inez Bogan, trans., *The Retractations*, FC 60 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1999). One question debated among scholars concerns the way to define the progress in Augustine's theology. Scholars following O. du Roy (*L'intelligence*, 16) have posited a radical evolution in a progression from his early Neoplatonism to the Christian theology of his later life. Recently, Gaetano Lettieri (*L'altro Agostino*, 35) followed Du Roy and argued in his study of *doctr. chr.* that Augustine evolved in his understanding of God's grace at the beginning of his episcopate. In total contrast from his earlier theology, so Lettieri argued, Augustine evolved in accentuating the grace of God according to the doctrine of predestination. Lettieri called this later Augustine "another Augustine." The younger J. Ratzinger shared ideas similar to those of Du Roy and Lettieri on this point (Ratzinger, *Popolo e casa di Dio in Sant'Agostino*, trans. Antonio Dusini [Milano: Jaca Book, 2005], 237, note 2). Lettieri's argument is not entirely inaccurate. Augustine himself admitted the change in his thinking about the *initium fidei* at that time in his *retr.* 1.23.2 and in *praed. sanct.* 3, 7. While he had once thought that the initiation of faith depended exclusively on humanity, he modified his understanding after his study of Scripture so as to say that also the initiation of faith depends not only on human beings but also on God's grace. This was a remarkable development. Nevertheless, according to Cipriani, who rather followed E. Gilson (*Introduzione allo studio di S. Agostino*, trans. Vincenzo Venanzi Ventisette [Casale Monferrato: Marietti, 1983], 263), Lettieri's idea of the "evolution" of "another Augustine" probably was an exaggerated one in that Augustine had always seriously reflected on God's aid, and in particular the *caritas* granted by the Holy Spirit, for doing good. See Cipriani, "L'altro Agostino di G. Lettieri," *REAug* 48 (2002): 249–265; *La teologia*, 39–40.

- 189 *trin.* 4.1 (CCSL 50, 159). Dodaro (*Christ*, 139–145, 146–181) and Ayres (*Augustine*, 159–170) have related the role of faith to the Christian virtue of humility especially in connection with the Pelagian controversy. Interestingly, Van Geest linked the virtue of humility to Augustine's apophaticism (*The Incomprehensibility*, 145–174). Adopting their emphasis on humility, the present work attempts also to add *caritas* to this emphasis, which detracts the human mind from "the immature and perverted love of reason" to faith. This topic will be discussed below (see pp. 237–242, 252–275) in relation to the property of the Holy Spirit and His relationship with the Son. For humility, see also O. Schaffner, *Christliche Demut. Des hl. Augustinus Lehre von der Humilitas* (Würzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1960), 185–206. The similarity between Augustine's argumentation in *trin.* 4 and his anti-Pelagian ideas has not been accepted by all scholars. Dodaro and Ayres, for example, appear to follow Jean Plagnieux who claimed that *trin.* 4 echoes Augustine's criticism of Pelagius' ideas on human nature (Jean Plagnieux, "Influence de la lutte antipélagienne sur le De Trinitate, ou christocentrisme de Saint Augustin," in *Augustinus Magister*, 2:817–826). Studer, however, did not agree with Plagnieux's position. See Basil Studer, "«Sacramentum et Exemplum» chez Saint Augustin," *RAP* 10 (1975): 127–133. For a detailed bibliography to the debate as well as a criticism of Studer, see Dodaro, *Christ*, 155–156. From the debate, it at least appears to emerge that the theme of *sacramentum* and *exemplum* consistently was an important one for Augustine in his theology, even before his polemics with Pelagius, and

Based on all the themes examined above, Augustine then proposes an appropriate way to approach the mystery. This was formed by a combination of the *canonica regula* and two discourses on the Trinity. The *canonica regula* was a method for interpreting the text of the Bible. It was not an original idea of Augustine, but a teaching of the catholic church.¹⁹⁰ Augustine introduced this concept in *De trinitate* 1.14 in relation to Phil 2:6–7.¹⁹¹ A clearer account of it is given in *De trinitate* 2.2–3. In *De trinitate* 2.3 in particular, Augustine explained the *regula* in terms of three categories with biblical examples for each. In short, biblical passages that speak about the Trinity should be interpreted to “indicate the unity and equality of the substance” (*unitatem aequalitatemque substantiae*), or “to show that the Son is less on account of the form of a slave” (*minorem propter formam serui*), or “to intimate that He is of the Father” (*quod de patre sit*).¹⁹² According to the regulation, the biblical passages that Arius used to support his arguments are to be read to signify the *forma serui*, not the *forma dei*. Even if the passages are related to *forma dei*, they must be interpreted so as to intimate the original relationship of consubstantiality between the Father and the Son. In this way, the human mind can keep itself from the contamination of material thinking about the divine being, and interpret the passages in a manner appropriate to what the divine being is.

In light of the *canonica regula*, Augustine offered two ways to speak of the Trinity.¹⁹³ He first distinguished between the Trinity and His creatures in the ontological categories attributed to them. Two categories are ascribed to creatures: substance and accidents. With ‘substance,’ Augustine, as already stated above (see pp. 192–193), signified that something is said according to itself (*ad se dicitur*) and subsists according to itself (*ad se ipsam subsistit*). With ‘accidents,’ he signified changeable qualities which “need another being in order to

remained significant throughout his anti-Pelagian writings. For the theme of *sacramentum* and *exemplum*, see pp. 261–266 below.

190 The rule cannot be said to have been shared by all churches and fathers in a defined and written format. Even Augustine spoke of “a certain canonical rule” (*tamquam canonica regulam*).

191 For Augustine’s use of Phil 2:6–7, see Albert Verwilghen, *Christologie et spiritualité selon Saint Augustin: L’hymne aux Philippiens* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1985); “Le Christ Médiateur selon Ph. 2, 6–7 dans l’œuvre de Saint Augustin,” *Aug(L)* 41, no. 1 (1991): 469–482. As Ayres accurately pointed out, Augustine claimed that Christ Himself taught the accurate interpretation of Phil 2:5–7 which he gave in *trin.* 1.17–18 and 1.21. Ayres also provided a brief analysis of the relationship between Augustine and the earlier Latin usage of Phil 2:6–7 and 1 Cor 15. See Ayres, *Augustine*, 151–154, 155–159.

192 *trin.* 2.3 (CCSL 50, 82).

193 *trin.* 5.6–9.

be able to be.”¹⁹⁴ In other words, ‘substance’ connotes something in which qualities or accidents exist.¹⁹⁵ While both categories apply for creatures, Augustine ascribed just the first category of ‘substance,’ or more precisely ‘essence,’ to the Trinity on the grounds that there is nothing changeable in the Trinity. The category of accident he replaced for the Trinity with that of ‘relation.’ ‘Relation’ is identified neither with substance nor with accident. On this point, Augustine distinguished himself from Aristotle, Plotinus, and Porphyry who considered ‘relation’ an accident.¹⁹⁶

Based on this distinction, Augustine offers two appropriate ways for speaking of the Trinity in *De trinitate* 5.6.¹⁹⁷ In the first way, the Trinity is spoken of according to His *substantia* or *essentia* (*ad se*). For instance, all hypostases are equally called God and ‘wisdom and power.’ In this discourse, the unity and equality of the substance are accentuated, in line with the first regulation of the *canonica regula*. Hence, whatever can be said of the one God or of each of the hypostases in the Trinity by *essentia* is expressed in the singular. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are not three Gods or three wisdoms or powers, but one God who is wisdom and power. In the second way, the Trinity is spoken of said according to the relationship among the persons (*ad aliquid*). The names ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are used relatively, between the first and the second persons, and not substantially.¹⁹⁸ So too the words ‘*genitor*’ or ‘*ingenitus*’ and ‘*genitus*’ are used relatively, not substantially.¹⁹⁹ In this discourse, the original relationship among the persons is expressed in line with the third regulation of the *canonica regula*. The error of Arianism was its confusion of the second way of speaking of the Trinity with the first, in that used the words ‘*ingenitus*’ and ‘*genitus*’ point to a difference in substance.

These two ways, according to Augustine, are commensurate with what the formula ‘*deus de deo*’ in the *Symb. Nicaen.* signifies.²⁰⁰ This formula was used to signify the same substance between what was first called ‘*deus*’ and what was later called ‘*deus*.’ The formula did not permit any understanding according to which the first ‘*deus*’ is subordinated to or different from the second in

194 *trin.* 7.10 (CCSL 50, 260).

195 *trin.* 7.10 (CCSL 50, 260).

196 See Cipriani, *La teologia*, 179–181. For the significance of Augustine’s attribution of “relation” to the Trinity in the Latin tradition, see M. Mellet and P.Th. Camelot, trans., *La Trinité (Livres I–VII)*, 2nd ed., Œuvres compl. 15 (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1996), 584n34.

197 *trin.* 5.6 (CCSL 50, 210–211).

198 *trin.* 5.6 (CCSL 50, 210).

199 *trin.* 5.7–8 (CCSL 50, 214–215).

200 *trin.* 2.2–3, 6.2.

nature, in contrast with what Arius²⁰¹ and Eunomius²⁰² erroneously argued about the Trinity. At the same time, the formula denoted the original relationship between the first ‘*deus*’ and the second ‘*deus*’ in terms of consubstantiality: the first is God ‘from’ the second.

3 The Monarchy of the Father

At this point, we can turn to examine Augustine’s thought on the monarchy of the Father. As noted in chapter 2 on the contemporary discussion, one of the main issues has been whether or how the western tradition has managed to maintain the monarchy of the Father while confessing the *filioque*. In regard to this inquiry, Augustine’s theology has been considered of key significance. The following examination will clearly reveal how Augustine managed to maintain the monarchy of the Father in which the Father is the only *principium* for the Son and the Spirit.

3.1 Principium for the Son

As mentioned at the outset of the present chapter, Augustine began his entire treatise *De trinitate* with a description of the three misunderstandings of the Trinity, which he attributed to the immature and perverted love of *ratio* and described as “diseases.” Over against this perverted love and the false approaches to the Trinity, he in *De trinitate* 1.7 provided a summary of the catholic faith on the Trinity, which he called “tabernacle”²⁰³ and “rock.”²⁰⁴

All the Catholic interpreters of the divine books, both the Old and the New Testament, whom I have been able to read, who wrote before me about the Trinity, which is God (*de trinitate quae deus est*), had this pur-

201 *trin.* 6.1 (CCSL 50, 228).

202 *trin.* 15.38 (CCSL 50A, 515).

203 *trin.* 1.31 (CCSL 50, 79).

204 *trin.* 2.28 (CCSL 50, 119). Augustine’s entire argument for explaining the mystery of the Trinity in *trin.* was based on the Catholic faith summarized in *trin.* 1.7. As the faith distinguished the three hypostases so clearly that it was forced to defend the confession of “the one God” against suspicions of “the three gods,” Augustine’s theology did not begin with the unity of the divine essence or substance, but with the clear distinction among the three hypostases. Cipriani was right to emphasize the importance of the Catholic faith of *trin.* 1.7 in Augustine’s argument and to criticize the so-called de Regnon’s paradigm critically identifying Augustine as the Latin church father who began with the unity of the divine essence while ignoring the distinction. Cipriani, *La teologia*, 158.

pose in view: To teach in accordance with the Scriptures that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit constitute a divine unity of one and the same substance in an indivisible equality. Therefore, they are not three gods but one God; although the Father has begotten the Son, and, therefore, He who is the Father is not the Son; and the Son was begotten by the Father and, therefore, He who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son,²⁰⁵ but only the Spirit of the Father and the Son, and He Himself is also coequal with the Father and the Son and belongs to the unity of the Trinity.²⁰⁶

After this beautiful summary, Augustine in *De trinitate* 1.9 claimed the divinity of the Son which the catholic faith confessed. Against heretical views, he argued there that the Son is divine, or more precisely the uncreated God, on the basis of his interpretation of John 1:1–3.²⁰⁷ In particular, Augustine boldly attributes the title *uerus deus* also to the Son: “He is of the one and the same substance with the Father (*unius igiturque eiusdem cum patre substantiae est*), and consequently He is not only God but also the true God (*non tantum deus sed et uerus deus*).”²⁰⁸ Yet this statement is not limited to the Son’s divinity alone. Rather, it at the time explains also *how* the Son is uncreated and truly divine. The Son is the true God in that “He is of the one and the *same* substance *with*

205 According to Ayres, the statement “He who is the Son is not the Father; and the Holy Spirit is neither the Father nor the Son” was one of the most common ones in anti-Monarchian language. It occurs here for the first time in Augustine’s corpus and was frequently used thereafter (s. 212.1; *Io. eu. tr.* 105.3; *conl. Max.* 11). Before Augustine, also Tertullian (*Aduersus Praxean* 8–9), Novatian (*De trinitate* 27 [PL 3, 938]) and Phoebadius (*Liber contra Arrianos* 27.4 [CCSL 64, 51]) appear to have used this formula. Among Augustine’s contemporaries, a similar formula can be found in Faustinus (*Confessio fidei* [CCSL 69, 357]) and Isaac the Jew (*De trinitate et incarnatione seu Fides Isacis* 3 [CCSL 9, 342]). The closest parallel to the phrasing used by Augustine is found in *Confessio fidei Catholicae* in Isaac’s *Expositio fidei catholicae* (CCSL 9, 347). It is not clear how exactly the relationship of influence between Augustine and his contemporaries works. See Ayres, *Augustine*, 97–100.

206 *trin.* 1.7 (CCSL 50, 34–35). The passage as quoted was not the sum of what Augustine confessed as the catholic faith in *trin.* 1.7. On the division of the whole confession, see Ayres, *Augustine*, 95–96. Ayres drew a connection from the creed of Milan “which Augustine had received at his baptism and used for most of his career” to the following expressions in the full quotation: “Born of the Virgin Mary”; “crucified and buried under Pontius Pilate”; and “rose again on the third day, nor ascended into heaven.” Ayres, 97.

207 *trin.* 1.9 (CCSL 50, 38).

208 *trin.* 1.9 (CCSL 50, 38). As Ayres has noted, Ambrose of Milan is a notable figure among Augustine’s predecessors in the attribution of the terms “only” and “true” also to the Son and the Spirit. See Ayres, *Augustine*, 100–103. Ambrose attributed these words also to the Son (*De fide* 5.2.29–32) and to the divine nature (*De fide* 3.2.11–13).

the Father" (emphasis added). That is, the Son is the true God from the Father who is the true God. As Ayres has accurately noted in relation to the innovative phrase "*trinitas quae deus est*,"²⁰⁹ Augustine emphasized "that the Father is the source of the Trinity such that titles like "only" and "true" can only be applied to Son and Spirit with care" while he was "the heir both to a trajectory of increasingly direct descriptions of the Trinity as the one God and of the divine nature as the object of worship."²¹⁰ In short, the quoted passage clearly says that the titles can only be applied to them with the Father as *principium*.

In this regard, it is notable that Augustine used the phrase "*pater solus*," which is highly indicative of monopatrism, even in *De trinitate* 15.12. The context of *De trinitate* 15.12 is the so-called psychological approach to the Trinity from which Augustine traced also the trinitarian structures in the human mind. In that context, the passage reveals Augustine's argument to be indicative of the difference between the trinitarian structures of the human mind (the mind, its knowledge, and love, or the memory, understanding, and will) and the Trinity itself. Even though there is a similarity with the Trinity in terms of structure, there is also an explicit difference. Of crucial importance for this difference is the notion of divine simplicity. Each element of the trinities is not equal to the whole of the trinities because they are not simple. Knowledge is not love but just knowledge, and love is not knowledge but just love. Memory itself is not understanding or will, and the last two exist just as each of them. As for the Trinity, however, each of the three persons is the whole Trinity. The whole Trinity is not greater than each of the persons. Hence, it is not accurate to say that the Father is memory, the Son understanding, and the Spirit will, but rather that each of the persons is memory, understanding, and will.

In this psychological approach and comparison, Augustine notably used the term "*pater solus*" for expressing how each of the three persons has and is simultaneously memory, understanding, and will, in distinction with what obtains in the images of the Trinity.

... we conclude that the Father is His own love, in the same manner as He is His own understanding and His own memory. Behold these three, therefore: memory, understanding, love or the will in that highest and unchangeable essence, which is God, and these three are not the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, but the Father alone (*pater solus*) ... For He

²⁰⁹ *trin.* 1.7 (CCSL 50, 35).

²¹⁰ Ayres, *Augustine*, 103. In other words, the two ideas of which, as Ayres thought, Augustine was the heir, were not separated but interwoven in his thought. The Son is called "only" and "true" God in that He comes from the Father.

[the Son] Himself is also His own memory, His own understanding, and His own love; but that He is so, comes to Him from that Father of whom He was born ... But He [the Holy Spirit] has these three things, and so has them that He Himself is these three things. But that He is so, comes to Him from Him [the Father] from whom He proceeds.²¹¹

In this passage it is clear how for Augustine each person in the mystery of the Trinity has memory, understanding, and love, and is simultaneously the three. First, the Father alone (*pater solus*) has and is the three. Then, each of the other persons has and is the three just like the Father in the way they come from the Father. In other words, the Father alone is *principium* for the divinity of the other persons that is equal to that of the Father.²¹²

What is more, elsewhere in the same passage from which the above quote was taken, the Father is called *deus* explicitly and distinguishably.²¹³ Moreover, He is also called *deus* explicitly in a later passage in connection with the begetting and proceeding from the Father in time.²¹⁴ Given Augustine's idea of the relationship between time and eternity, the Father might for him be "God in the strict sense."²¹⁵ He wrote:

211 *trin.* 15.12 (CCSL 50A, 477).

212 The explanation of *trin.* 15.12 remarkably provided the following two elements to be considered seriously in relation to Augustine's so-called psychological analogy which he investigates deeply in the second part of *De trinitate*. First, Augustine himself judged the analogy to be weak and inaccurate for grasping the whole mystery of the Trinity. Some scholars, and in particular M. Schmaus ("Die Spannung von Metaphysik"; *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre*), have criticized Augustine for his heavy emphasis on the analogy and for diminishing the perspective of salvation history. However, the passage from *trin.* 15.12 (as well as *trin.* 15.39, 15.44) gives expression to Augustine's fundamental acknowledgement of the weakness of the analogy. Moreover, this passage also does not allow the second criticism on Augustine's psychological analogy. Scholars including Karl Rahner ("Il Dio trino come fondamento originario e trascendente della storia della salvezza," in *Mysterium Salutis: nuovo corso di dogmatica come teologia della storia della salvezza*, ed. Fernando Vittorino Joannes [Brescia: Queriniana, 1977], 3:410), who were influenced by de Regnon's paradigm, criticized Augustine for his allegedly essentialist preference for *de deo uno* over *de deo trino*. However, the passage from *trin.* 15.12 treating the analogy emphasizes the monarchy of the Father which emphasized the aspect of "*pater solus*" and distinguishes the three hypostases by this emphasis. Also, see Studer, "La teologia," 165: In relation to the criticism launched against Augustine's essentialism and his emphasis on *de deo uno*, Studer accurately indicated a progression within *trin.* from a discourse about the *distinction* and equality among the three hypostases as revealed in the Bible to the psychological analogy.

213 *trin.* 15.12 (CCSL 50A, 476).

214 *trin.* 15.29 (CCSL 50A, 503); *s.* 140.2; *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13.

215 Studer, "Oikonomia und Theologia," 43 and 49; Studer, "History and Faith," 38–39.

The Word of God, therefore, is sent by Him of whom it is the Word. It is sent by Him of whom it was born. He sends who begot; that is sent which was begotten when the Father is apprehended in time by anyone, it is not said that He was sent, for there is no one of whom He is, or from whom He proceeds. For Wisdom declares: 'I came out of the mouth of the Most High' (Eccl 24:5), and it is said of the Holy Spirit: 'He proceeds from the Father' (John 15:26), but the Father is from no one (*pater uero a nullo*).²¹⁶

While the other two hypostases were sent by the Father, the Father was never sent. For Augustine, the Father, who is *pater uero a nullo*, exists truly without origin, is *principium* of the other two persons, and might be called truly God.²¹⁷ As Augustine said in following Hilary of Poitiers,²¹⁸ the Son is from the Father who is the highest origin (*summa origo*)²¹⁹ of all the creatures which the Father created through the Son.

Augustine's idea view on the monarchy of the Father corresponds with the formula '*deus de deo*.' As examined above, he introduced this formula as the appropriate way to speak of the Trinity according to the divine essence and relationship.²²⁰ The formula signified the consubstantiality between the one first called *deus* and the later one, and also the original relationship between the two.²²¹ The first *deus* in the phrase '*deus de deo*' is God 'from' the second. The Son is God from the Father who is *pater uero a nullo* and *principium*.

From the double significance of the formula, Augustine solved a problem that still remained with a traditional argument against Arius for defending the consubstantiality of the Son with an appeal to 1 Cor 1:24. Augustine first recapitulated the argument of some of "our adherents":²²² "... during the disputes,

²¹⁶ *trin.* 4.28 (CCSL 50, 198–199).

²¹⁷ *trin.* 2.8, 2.12, 2.22; Alfred Schindler, *Wort und Analogie in Augustins Trinitätslehre* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965), 14, 146. Studer, *Augustinus*, 175.

²¹⁸ Hilary of Poitiers, *De trinitate* 2.1.

²¹⁹ Augustine, *trin.* 6.12 (CCSL 50, 242).

²²⁰ *trin.* 7.2.

²²¹ *trin.* 2.2–3, 6.2; Ayres, *Augustine*, 179.

²²² According to Cipriani, "our adherents" were Marius Victorinus (*Adversus Arium* 1.13.11–20, 1.20.23), Pseudo-Athanasius (*De trinitate* 5.17, 11.24–25.11), Gregory of Elvira (*De fide Nicaena* 27), Ambrose of Milan (*De fide* 2.16.143, 4.8.79–80, 9.111), and even the younger Augustine as a presbyter (*diu. qu.* 23; *retr.* 1.26). In particular, Victorinus thought of the Neoplatonic idea of the auto-manifestation or auto-definition of God the Father as the first *principium*: God the Father is beyond *esse*, *vivere*, and *intelligere* which exist potentially in Him, and He himself is manifested and represented by the generation of the Son which signifies the activity of the three (*Adversus Arium* 1.47.36–41; *Traité théologiques sur la Trinité*, trans. Pierre Hadot, SC 69 [Paris: Cerf, 1960], 795). For Augustine, such an

which our adherents held with those who said: 'There was a time when the Son was not,' some also introduced this line of reasoning: 'If the Son of God is the power and the wisdom of God, and God is never without His power and wisdom, then the Son is co-eternal with God the Father.'²²³ This argument did not satisfy Augustine because it does not correspond with the "*deus de deo*" formula. According to that formula, the Son is God from God, Light from Light, and true God from true God. However, the quoted argument is mistaken in supposing that the Father Himself is not wise without the Son as His wisdom, and then that the Son is not "wise from wise."²²⁴ Therefore, Augustine interpreted 1 Cor 1:24 according to the formula just as he defended at once both consubstantiality and original relationship over against the trinitarian heresy. The Son is God who himself is wise and has power in that He comes from God the Father who himself is wise and has power.

Augustine's anti-Arian interpretation of John 5:19 in *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 18.19 and 23 reflects the same relationship between Father and Son in the monarchy of the Father.²²⁵ Augustine identified seeing with hearing and both of them with the being of the Son in the Trinity by virtue of the divine simplicity (*Io. eu. tr.* 18.10, 23.9). Based on this identification, he interpreted the verse to signify the eternal generation of the Son from the Father according to the principle of *deus de deo* (*Io. eu. tr.* 23.11). The key passage here is *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 19.13, where John 5:19 is interpreted in relation to John 5:26.

Why then does he say, 'He has given to the Son to have life in himself'? Let me state it briefly. He begat the Son. For it is not that he was without life and received life; but he is life by a 'being born.' The Father is life, not by a 'being born'; the Son is life by a 'being born.' The Father [is] from no father (*de nullo patre*); the Son, from God the Father. The Father, in that he is, is from no one (*a nullo*); but in that he is the Father, he is in regard to the Son (*propter filium*). But the Son, both in that he is the Son, is in

understanding does not correspond to the *deus de deo*. See Nello Cipriani, "La presenza di Mario Vittorino nella riflessione trinitaria di S. Agostino," *Aug* 42, no. 2 (2002): 285–288; "La teologia," 86–87; *La teologia*, 186, 191–193.

223 *trin.* 6.1 (CCSL 50, 228).

224 *trin.* 6.2 (CCSL 50, 229).

225 See Basil Studer, "Johannes 5,19f. in der Trinitätslehre der Kirchenväter" in *Imaginer la théologie catholique: Permanence et transformations de la foi en attendant Jésus-Christ. Mélanges offerts à Ghislain Lafont*, ed. Jeremy Driscoll (Roma: PASA, 2000), 515–542; Cipriani, "La teologia," 87–88; Ayres, *Augustine*, 233–250.

regard to the Father (*propter patrem*), and in that he is, is from the Father (*a patre*).²²⁶

If seeing, hearing, and being are the same for the Son by virtue of divine simplicity, John 5:19 in relation to John 5:26 is revelatory of the relationship in which the Father is *principium* for the Son.

Augustine did not allow for a reversal of the *taxis* (order) Father—Son—Spirit expressed in the baptismal formula. Otherwise, the Son would be a father of the Father, which in his eyes was ridiculous. Augustine's strong insistence on this *taxis* comes to expression in his attempt in *De trinitate* 7.2 to find a good interpretation for the aforementioned text in 1 Cor 1:24. There he proposes and examines five inaccurate interpretations of this verse that follow from the limitation of the human mind. His criticism of the fifth interpretation witnesses of his attention for his right understanding of the *taxis*: "Or shall we affirm that the Father is not anything in respect to His own substance, and that not only that He is the Father, but that He is at all, is spoken of Him in relation to the Son?"²²⁷ This question followed from the simplicity of God. According to God's simplicity, there are no accidents in the divine being, but what can be attributed to God is substantial. In relation to wisdom this means that if the Father is only wise when He begets the Son who is His wisdom, the Father's being is dependent on the being of the Son. As such, the Son would become the cause not only of the wisdom of the Father, but also of the Father's being. Augustine called such an interpretation *insanus*.²²⁸ The Father alone stands before the Son in the *taxis* since He is His *principium*: "Every son is what he is of his father, and is son to his father, but no father is what he is of his son, but is father to his son."²²⁹ So too in the Trinity, the Son is from the Father, but the Father is not from the Son.²³⁰

Using the different significations of the Latin prepositions *ab* or *de* and *propter*, the passage from *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 19.13 as quoted above reflects the same notion of the *taxis*. Augustine used the three prepositions distinguishably for the relationship between Father and Son and for Their hypostatically distinct properties. In more detail, he used the preposition *propter* so as to indicate the mutual relationship between Father and Son. The Father is Father *propter* the Son, and the Son is Son *propter* the Father. Yet the use of *ab* or *de* differs from that of *propter*. While the Son is also *a Patre*

²²⁶ *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13 (CCSL 36, 196).

²²⁷ *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 246).

²²⁸ *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 249).

²²⁹ *trin.* 2.2 (CCSL 50, 82).

²³⁰ *trin.* 4.27 (CCSL 50, 195).

when He is *propter Patrem*, the Father is not *ab* or *de* the Son, even though the Father is Father *propter* the Son. Rather, the Father is *a nullo* and *de nullo patre*. In short, *ab* or *de* specified the revealed order between Father and Son in terms of *principium*, while *propter* signified the mutual relationship between Them. In relation to the taxis, as Ayres has accurately pointed out, it is not easy to find any passages of Augustine that “might allow us to conceive of a retroactive action of Son on Father” in order to define what or who the Father is.²³¹

3.2 *Principium for the Holy Spirit*

As the Father is *principium* for the Son, He is *principium* also for the Spirit, though Augustine used the same terminology for the Son in the procession of the Spirit (see pp. 228–236 below). In particular, the monarchy of the Father in the procession of the Spirit came to crystallization in Augustine’s argument to refute Victorinus as well as his own earlier understanding of the relationship between Father and Spirit and to extend the definition of the term *principium*.

In *De trinitate* 5.14, we find a non-extended definition: “Whatever remains in itself and either begets something or works, is a principle to that thing which it begets or works” (*quidquid in se manet et gignit aliquid uel operatur principium est*).²³² With this definition, Augustine identified the Father as *principium* of the Son who is begotten from Him. Marius Victorinus seemed to apply this non-extended definition also to the procession of the Holy Spirit. In his eyes, if the Father is *principium* of the Spirit, it implies that the Spirit is begotten and therefore a Son, making the Father the Father of the Spirit.²³³

In his earlier works, Augustine himself had followed Victorinus. This can be seen in a question that Augustine had probably posed about the catholic faith in one such early work. After summarizing the catholic faith, Augustine in *De trinitate* 1.8 listed three questions it raised.²³⁴ The first and second were described as follows: How the Trinity is one God and how the hypostatic distinction is to be understood in the works of the Trinity that are inseparable.²³⁵ The first question had been treated in depth by other church fathers,²³⁶ while the second is probably to be ascribed to Augustine’s friend Nebridius.²³⁷ The

²³¹ Ayres, *Augustine*, 247.

²³² *trin.* 5.14 (CCSL 50, 221).

²³³ Victorinus, *Adversus Arium* 4.33.24; *Ad Candidum Arrianum* 31; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 183.

²³⁴ Cipriani, 158–159.

²³⁵ *trin.* 1.8 (CCSL 50, 36).

²³⁶ Tertullian, *Adversus Praxean* 3.1; Gregory of Nazianzus, *Orationes theologicae* 31.13; Ambrose of Milan, *De fide* 1.1.10; *De spiritu sancto*, 3.13.92, 15.104; Gregory of Nyssa, *Ad Ablabium*.

²³⁷ *ep.* 11; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 150.

third and final question is: "The question about the manner in which the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity also disturbs them, since neither the Father nor the Son, nor both of them have begotten Him, although He is the Spirit of the Father and the Son" (*mouet etiam quomodo spiritus sanctus in trinitate sit, quem nec pater nec filius nec ambo genuerint, cum sit spiritus patris et filii*).²³⁸ This question had been raised by Augustine himself. Following Victorinus' erroneous conception, Augustine too had thought that the Spirit would be a Son or be begotten if He were co-substantial with the Father.²³⁹ In *De trinitate* 2.5, he raised the same question, delaying his response until the final book of the treatise: "But since the Son is of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father, we shall discuss in another places if God shall grant, and insofar as He shall grant, why both are not called sons, nor both begotten, but the former is called the one only begotten Son, and the latter, the Holy Spirit, neither son nor begotten, because if begotten, then certainly a son."²⁴⁰

Criticizing Victorinus' idea as he himself had once subscribed to it, Augustine corrected that erroneous conception of the procession of the Spirit and extended the definition of the terminology.²⁴¹ In doing so, he distinguished between the verbs that are attributed to the procession of the Son and of the Spirit from the Father. As noted,²⁴² Augustine applied the *canonica regula* in interpreting the biblical verses revealing the sending or receiving of the Holy Spirit from the Father or from both the Father and the Son. The verses did not signify subordination, but rather consubstantiality with and procession from the Father. Hence, Augustine concluded, "For as to be born is for the Son to be from the Father, so to be sent is to know that the Son is from Him. And as for the Holy Spirit to be the gift of God is to proceed from the Father, so to be sent is to know that He proceeds from Him."²⁴³ As this conclusion shows, Augus-

238 *trin.* 1.8 (CCSL 50,36).

239 Cipriani, *La teologia*, 159. Cipriani here quotes Augustine's identification of the Father as *pater pignoris* in *sol.* 1.2. In this passage, Augustine called the Father *deus pater ueritatis*, *pater sapientiae*, *pater uerae summaeque uitae*, *pater beatitudinis*, *pater boni et pulchri*, *pater intellegibilis lucis*, *pater euigilationis atque inluminacionis nostrae*, and *pater pignoris*, *quo admonemur redire ad te* (CSEL 89, 5). Also, see Nello Cipriani, "La Retractatio agostiniana sulla processione: Generazione dello Spirito Santo (*Trin.* 5,12,13)," *Aug* 37, no. 2 (1997): 431–439; "La presenza," 261–313.

240 *trin.* 2.5 (CCSL 50, 86).

241 Augustine had probably already attempted to revise the weakness of Victorinus' trinitarian thought in its misunderstanding of the Spirit as another Son in *f. et symb.* 19; Cipriani, "La teologia," 78–79.

242 See pp. 212–214 above.

243 *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 199).

tine learned to distinguish the verbs that are used to express the procession of the Son and that of the Spirit. The Son is said to be “generated,” but the Holy Spirit is said to proceed or to be given from the Father.²⁴⁴ By this distinction, he recognized that the Spirit, unlike the Son, is not “generated,” and that He is therefore not another Son of the Father. Based on the distinction, Augustine then went on to correct Victorinus and his earlier self as follows: “For we speak of the Holy Spirit of the Father, but on the other hand we do not speak of the Father of the Holy Spirit, lest the Holy Spirit be understood to be His Son. We likewise speak of the Holy Spirit of the Son, but we do not speak of the Son of the Holy Spirit lest the Holy Spirit be understood to be His Father.”²⁴⁵ According to this revision, Augustine extended the definition of the term *principium* in the Trinity so as to indicate that the Holy Spirit is not generated, but is rather given or proceeds from the Father.

However, in their relations to each other in the Trinity, if the begetter is the Principle of the begotten, then the Father is the Principle of the Son since He begot Him. But whether the Father is also the Principle of the Holy Ghost of whom it was said: ‘He proceeds from him’ (John 15:26), is not an easy question. For if it is so, then He is not only the Principle of the thing which He begets and makes, but also of that which He gives (*quia si ita est, non iam principium ei tantum rei erit quam gignit aut facit sed etiam ei quam dat*).²⁴⁶

244 According to Augustine, procession is synonymous with gift. In *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219), he writes: “For He is the gift of the Father and the Son, since He ‘proceeds from the Father,’ as the Lord says, and the saying of the Apostle: ‘He who does not have the Spirit of Christ, does not belong to him,’ certainly refers to the Holy Spirit.”

245 *trin.* 5.13 (CCSL 50, 220).

246 *trin.* 5.15 (CCSL 50, 222). For the variety in the English translation of the term *principium*, see John E. Rotelle, ed., *Arianism and Other Heresies*, trans. Roland J. Teske, WSA 18 (Hyde Park, NY: New City Press, 1995), 331. Teske suggested a number of English words like “beginning,” “principle,” and “source.” In this context, also David Coffey’s analysis of Augustine’s term is worthy of consideration. Comparing the Greek word αἰτία and the Latin *principium* in terms of the *filioque* problem, he distinguished a “strong” sense and a “weak” sense of the term *principium*. The first denotes “that which produces something out of itself,” and the second denotes “the mere point of departure of something on its way to somewhere else.” Regarding Augustine’s term *principaliter*, he applied the strong sense to the term *principium*, identified it with the term *aitia*, and translated them both as “cause.” See David Coffey, “The Roman ‘Clarification’ of the Doctrine of the Filioque,” *IJS* 5, no. 1 (2003): 5–6. His analysis can be accepted if Augustine’s own definition in the quoted passage from *trin.* 5.15 is taken into consideration. In this quotation, Augustine applied the term *principium* to the relationship between God and His creatures and at the same time to the relationship between the Father and the other persons within the Trinity. If God can

This extended definition of *principium* clearly expresses that the Father is *principium* for the Spirit's consubstantiality with the Father. Augustine understood this to correspond with the revelation of the Logos Himself in John 15:26: the Father alone is the principle of the entire Godhead (*totius diuinitatis uel si melius dicitur deitatis principium pater est*), and the procession of the Spirit is referred back to the Father of whom the Son was born.²⁴⁷

3.3 Two More Questions

For Augustine, therefore, the Father is *principium* for both the Son and the Holy Spirit. As such, he safeguarded the monarchy of the Father in the Trinity. Yet this conclusion needs further explanation in relation to two additional questions. The first question concerns the sense in which the Father is called *principium* for both of Them. In other words, it asks whether the Father is *principium* for just their consubstantiality or also for their hypostatic existences. The second question follows from Augustine's attribution of the term *principium* also to the Son. For, how exactly did he understand the monarchy of the Father if he at the same time attributed the term *principium* also to the Son?

As chapter 2 has demonstrated, the first question arises from the argument of contemporary western theologians who accept the monarchy of the Father and at the same time attempt also to maintain their tradition of the *filioque* in the procession of the Holy Spirit. To that end, they introduce a slight distinction between the divine being and the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit, and connect the former to the Father as *principium* and the second to the Son as *principium*. For this subtle strategy, Augustine has become the Latin Church Father of choice to cite. The question is thus whether Augustine used the same distinction in connection with his monopatrism.

For an answer to this question, Augustine's idea of God's simplicity shows itself of crucial importance. As detailed in the introduction to his trinitarian theology above, simplicity proved to be one of the most important characteristics of the divine being by which Augustine distinguished God from His creatures. The uncreated being is simple, but created beings are compounded. In *De trinitate* 6.6 (CCSL 50, 234), Augustine compared the divine being with the human soul and stressed the simplicity of God.²⁴⁸ In the simple divine being

be called cause (in the strong sense of *principium*) in relation to His creatures, it seems probable that the same meaning was intended for the relationship between the Father and the other persons of the divinity.

247 *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 200).

248 Also, see p. 193 above.

there are no accidents. Everything that can be attributed to God does not produce a change in substance, but is the same as being.²⁴⁹

According to the notion of simplicity, “to be a person” cannot in the divine being be different from “to be” as follows:

... In God to be is not one thing, and to be a person another thing, but it is wholly and entirely one and the same ... in this Trinity when we say the person of the Father, we mean nothing else than the substance of the Father. Therefore, as the substance of the Father is the Father Himself, not insofar as He is the Father, but insofar as He is, so too the person of the Father is nothing else than the Father Himself.²⁵⁰

In “being Father,” the person of the Father is the same as the substance of the Father. While the hypostatic existence of the Father is connected to the relationship with the other two hypostases, it is not different from the divine being of the Father. The Father subsists as “Father of the Son” and as God absolutely simultaneously.²⁵¹

Given Augustine’s notion of divine simplicity, the approach of some contemporary western theologians cannot find support in Augustine. He argued that the Holy Spirit comes to exist from the Father and receives everything from Him without the distinction.

The second question, as noted, relates to Augustine’s attribution of the term *principium* also to the Son. A full answer to this question will be offered later on in this chapter, after an investigation into Augustine’s view on the role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. Nevertheless, already here an initial answer

249 *trin.* 5.3 (CCSL 50, 208).

250 *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 261, 262).

251 The emphasis of simplicity in terms of “being” and “being a person” in the Trinity does not lead to the essentialism of which Augustine has been accused. The distinction of the three hypostases does not fade in Augustine’s thought, in contrast to what has been suggested in the critical readings of some contemporary eastern orthodox and western theologians. As noted in connection with Augustine’s thought on the monarchy of the Father, the person of the Father is the cause of the deity. From the person of the Father as cause, the other two hypostases exist as the same divine beings with the Father in eternity. As such, Augustine did not know of a source of the divine essence other than the person of the Father. Furthermore, as note 133 explained above, personhood was not undervalued just as a mutual relationship in the Trinity, but Augustine emphasized the priority of personhood to that of relationship (*trin.* 7.2 [CCSL 50, 247–248]). His problem with the term *persona* is not related to what the Three in the Trinity are, but only to the way the Three can be called using one common term. He did not doubt that God exists at once as three and one, but doubted about the proper terms for calling Them.

can be formulated on the basis of Augustine's ideas as they have been studied in relation to the introduction to his trinitarian theology and the monarchy of the Father.

First, the monarchy of the Father does not imply any kind of temporal sequence among the three hypostases, but Their absolute simultaneity or co-existence. Augustine's idea of the monarchy of the Father is deeply rooted in his notion of the distinction between God and His creatures. God must be thought of in accordance with His divine qualities, which are distinct from those of created beings. The first of them to be mentioned was eternity. Time, which consists in interval, is attributed to the created, but not to the uncreated. The uncreated is eternal, meaning timelessness and no interval. There is no temporal interval (*interualla temporum*) among the existences of the hypostases in the Trinity.²⁵² Hence, the causal relationship in which the Father is the cause²⁵³ and the other hypostases are the caused does not signify any kind of temporal interval between the existence of the Father and that of the Son and the Spirit.²⁵⁴ In this eternity without any interval of time(s), the persons are conceived co-eternally and co-existently. The monarchy of the Father is far removed from temporal interval and sequence.

Second, the monarchy of the Father does not signify that the Father can be said in any way to be the truest God in whom the other Gods exist by way of participation.²⁵⁵ The Father's monarchy does not allow any form of participatory interval or sequence in the divinity among the three hypostases. The same point follows from Augustine's insistence on one of the properties of the divine being distinguished from the properties of creatures. God is simple, creatures are compound. God's simplicity is synonymous with "no participation." God has no participation. The notion of monarchy does not signify that the other persons are not perfectly divine but become perfect by participation in the

252 Cipriani, "La teologia," 91.

253 For the translation of the term *principium* as cause, see note 246 above.

254 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528); also, see *trin.* 15.45.

255 See Hadot, *Traité théologique*, 719; "L'image de la trinité dans l'âme chez Victorinus et chez Saint Augustin," *StPatr* 6 (1962): 409–442. According to Hadot, Augustine's idea of the relationship did not line up with the predominance Victorinus gave to the distinction among the hypostases in the Trinity. The relationship as Augustine understood it was not contaminated by any notion of participation, in departure from that indicated by Victorinus' predominance. Even in his earlier dialogues (*ord.* 1.29, 2.16; *sol.* 1.4; *an. quant.* 77; *beata. u.* 34–35; *mor.* 1.62), Augustine attempted to distinguish more clearly than Victorinus between the three persons in the Trinity under the influence of Damasus of Rome and Ambrose of Milan, who attended the Council of Constantinople in 381. Cipriani, "La teologia," 76–77. Also, see note 222 above.

perfect divinity of the Father in eternity. Rather, what the formula *deus de deo* signifies is “no participation.” The Son is the *true* God from the *true* God the Father. For God, the word “true” means “perfectly true” which allow for no participatory interval. Otherwise, 1 Cor 1:24 could be interpreted in a way different from the explanation Augustine gave.

Finally, Augustine uses the monarchy of the Father specifically for the particular property of the hypostatic existence of the Father in eternity without temporal or participatory interval. The notion of monarchy says that the Father as cause is distinguished from the caused Others. The notion of monarchy, which maintains the same divinity among the three persons in the Trinity, at the same time signifies the hypostatic distinction. The term *principium* itself was used relatively when applied to the Father.

4 The Son as *Principium*

One of the key issues related to the *filioque* is how the role or involvement of the Son can be expressed without surrendering the monarchy of the Father. In regard to this issue, Augustine’s thinking has been a target of ardent debate between western and eastern theologians. A central point of contention has been Augustine’s attribution of the term *principium* to the Son. For eastern theologians, this attribution seems to imply the abandonment of the Father’s property as *principium* for the Spirit and to confuse the hypostatic properties of the Father and the Son. This criticism from the eastern side has turned Augustine into a representative of the Latin Church Fathers who established the theological groundwork for the rigid filioquism that abandoned the monarchy of the Father, damaged the properties of the three hypostases, and implied essentialism in the Trinity.

But is the criticism of eastern theologians really correct? Did Augustine abandon the monarchy of the Father and confuse the hypostatic properties between Father and Son in terms of being *principium* for the existence of the Spirit? The following will suggest that Augustine’s thought does succeed in escaping this criticism from eastern side. First, it will be argued that Augustine does not abandon monopatrism when he attributes the term *principium* to the Son. Second, it will be shown that Augustine did not confuse the hypostatic properties of the Father and the Son. Finally, an account will be given of what exactly Augustine meant when he attributes the term *principium* also to the Son.

4.1 *Necessity of the Role of the Son*

For Augustine's view on the role of the Son in the procession, we need to recall the third of three questions arising from the catholic faith as Augustine summarized it in *De trinitate* 1.8: "The question about the manner in which the Holy Spirit is in the Trinity also disturbs them, since neither the Father nor the Son, nor both of them have begotten Him, although He is the Spirit of the Father and the Son" (*mouet etiam quomodo spiritus sanctus in trinitate sit, quem nec pater nec filius nec ambo genuerint, cum sit spiritus patris et filii*).²⁵⁶ As has been noted (see pp. 221–224 above), this was a question Augustine had probably raised himself after initially following Victorinus.

Another way to put it is to say that Augustine attempted to solve the question of a definition for the hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit when His hypostatic property is understood as "being of the Father and the Son." As such, the question assumes that Augustine ascribed "being of the Father and the Son" to the Spirit as a hypostatic property. This was, in fact, not just a personal assumption of Augustine, but one of the entire catholic faith. At the outset of Augustine's treatment of this problem, he in *De trinitate* 1.7 described the property of the Holy Spirit as expressed in the catholic faith.²⁵⁷ According to this catholic faith, the Holy Spirit is the same divine being as the Father and the Son. At the same time, He is neither the Father nor the Son, but "the Spirit of the Father and the Son" (*patris et filii spiritus*). That is, the Spirit's personal property is "being *communis*" with the Father and the Son.²⁵⁸

Book 5 of *De trinitate* offers a clear explanation of the Holy Spirit's hypostatic property of being *communis* with the Father and the Son in terms of the relationship among the three hypostases in the Trinity. There Augustine criticized the Arians for misunderstanding the biblical passages that seem on the face of it to subordinate the Son to the Father in terms of the divine nature.²⁵⁹ And, as

256 *trin.* 1.8 (CCSL 50, 36).

257 *trin.* 1.7 (CCSL 50, 35); see pp. 214–215 above. Studer accurately ascribed the term *dispensatio* to the revelation of the salvific works of God in time, especially the incarnation of the Son, and to the distinction among the hypostases. As such, *dispensatio* revealed and narrated in Scripture describes the hypostasis of the Holy Spirit, "wie der Geist zu Gott und zu Christus steht." Studer, "Oikonomia und Theologia," 41.

258 Also, see *f. et symb.* 20. Among recent Augustine scholars, Ayres has emphasized particularly this property of being *communis* as "a key plank of his [Augustine's] increasingly subtle mature treatments of the Spirit." Lewis Ayres, "«Spiritus Amborum»: Augustine and pro-Nicene Pneumatology," *AugStud* 39, no. 2 (2008): 207–221; "Sempiternae Spiritus Donum: Augustine's Pneumatology and the Metaphysics of Spirit," in *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, eds. George E. Demacopoulos and Aristotle Papanikolaou (Crestwood: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 2008), 127–152; Ayres, *Augustine*, 251 and 255.

259 For the identification of the Arianism subjected to criticism in *trin.* 5, see Michel R. Barnes,

detailed above, he offered his readers an appropriate way for speaking of the Trinity: to speak of the Trinity according to the divine nature which is common to all of the hypostases, and to speak of the hypostases according to the relationship among them. Augustine argued that the problematic biblical passages should be read according to the relationship between the Father and the Son. That relationship does not signify any subordination in terms of nature, but rather a hypostatic distinction between Father and Son in the Trinity. The very names “Father” and “Son” are relational. Augustine similarly distinguished also the person of the Spirit from the others according to the relationship among them as follows:

But it [the Trinity] can be called indeed the Holy Spirit in a universal sense, according to that text of Scripture: ‘For God is spirit,’ because the Father is a spirit, and the Son is a spirit, and the Father is holy and the Son is holy. Therefore, the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, since they are one God, and certainly since God is holy and God is a spirit, the Trinity can be called the Holy Spirit (*potest appellari trinitas et spiritus et sanctus*). If by that Holy Spirit, however, not the Trinity but a person in the Trinity is understood, that is to say, if by the Holy Spirit is meant the person to whom it properly belongs, then it denotes a relation (*relative dicitur*). For, He is referred to both the Father and the Son, because the Holy Spirit is the Spirit of the Father and the Son (*cum et ad patrem et ad filium refertur quia spiritus sanctus et patris et filii spiritus est*).²⁶⁰

Augustine thus states again that the third person, who is called “Holy Spirit,” is distinguished relationally from the other hypostases: The Holy Spirit is the

“The Arians of Book v and the Genre of de Trinitate,” *JTS* 44, no. 1 (1993): 185–195; “De Trinitate VI and VII: Augustine and the Limits of Nicene Orthodoxy,” *AugStud* 38, no. 1 (2007): 189–202. Barnes identified it with Homoianism, arguing that there is no exclusive reference to Eunomian doctrine in *trin.* 5 and that the term *ingenitus* discussed by Augustine was interesting also for the Homoians. Ayres followed Barnes on this point (Ayres, *Augustine*, 212n38). Barnes’ argumentation, however, has not been accepted unanimously. Kany, for instance, did not agree and affirmed that Augustine might have known Eunomius and anti-Eunomian argumentation through Ambrose of Milan (*De incarnationis* 9.89 f. and *De fide* 5.9.116). Similarly, Cipriani did not approve of Barnes’ idea and identified the Eunomians as the opponents in *trin.* 5. According to Cipriani, the Arianism that was depicted to claim a difference between Father and Son in substance in book 5 was not Homoianism, given that the latter did not insist on such a radical difference. See Kany, *Augustins Trinitätsdenken*, 168; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 156 and 178.

260 *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219).

Spirit of the Father and the Son. He explicitly adds that the Spirit as Spirit of the Father and the Son is *communis* with them in regard to titles like “holy” and “spirit” that are common to the three persons. Interestingly, Augustine even mentioned the possibility of referring to all the hypostases in the Trinity as “Holy Spirit” given that all three are called “spirit” and “holy” in the Bible. At the same time, he argued, if the Father and the Son are called holy and spirit, the third person is also called Holy Spirit because he is *communis* with the Father and the Son. The Spirit as being *communis* is called “Holy Spirit.” In this sense, the very name “Holy Spirit” signifies being *communis*.

Augustine attempted to explain how the Spirit exists hypostatically in the Trinity in regard to his personal property of being *communis*. To his mind, this question remained unresolved at the time he was writing *De trinitate*, and would only be fully resolved at the time of the eternal contemplation of the Trinity.²⁶¹ Nevertheless, Augustine to the extent of his ability offered two solutions in *De trinitate* for resolving the question. The first, as has been explained, was to extend the definition of *principium*. While the younger Augustine in following Victorinus had thought that the term signified the relationship between begetter and begotten, the Augustine of *De trinitate* extended the term to encompass the relationship of procession.²⁶² In this way, Augustine affirmed that the Spirit exists as the true God from the true God by procession and is not confused with the second person who is generated from the Father.

Yet the extended definition of the term *principium* was not sufficient to resolve the problem of how the Spirit exists as *communis*. The procession from the Father as *principium* accounts for only half of the question concerning the Spirit’s “how to exist”: the Spirit is “of the Father” in that he proceeds from the Father. The other half remained unexplained.

How does the Spirit exist as being *communis* with the Father and the Son? For a full solution to this question, Augustine needed not only his extended definition of *principium* but also a description of the role of the Son in the procession of the Spirit. To this end, he articulated the Spirit’s property using more relative terms.

²⁶¹ *trin.* 15.45 (CCSL 50A, 523–524): “We shall see the truth there without any difficulty, and shall enjoy it to the full because it is most clear and most certain. Nor shall we seek anything by the reasoning of the mind, but by contemplating we shall perceive why the Holy Spirit is not the Son when He proceeds from the Father.” Also, see *c. Max.* 2.14.1 (CCSL 87A, 569): “*distinguere autem inter illam generationem et hanc processionem nescio, non ualeo, non sufficio.*”

²⁶² See pp. 223–224 above.

As noted, Augustine accepted the catholic faith and defined the property of the Spirit as being *communis* of the Father and the Son in *De trinitate* 1.7–8. In book 5 of the same work, Augustine connected this property to the term *donum*. After insisting that the name “Holy Spirit” itself shows the property of being *communis*, he went on to argue that the Spirit as being *communis* was revealed in Scripture as *donum*, clearly designating the relationship between the Spirit and the other two hypostases, just as the gift of a giver and the giver of the gift have a mutual relationship.²⁶³ The Spirit as *donum* is therefore given by the givers to whom He is *communis*.

With this more relational term *donum*, Augustine fully resolved the question of the “how” of the Spirit’s existence: the Spirit as *donum* exists to be *from* both of the other two hypostases to whom He is *communis*. The Spirit exists by being given from both the Father and the Son if the Spirit is their *communio* and *donum*. As such, the role of the Son was required for Augustine for a full resolution to the question.

Accordingly, for Augustine the term *principium* could be attributed also to the Son. To his mind, there was no term or concept except for *principium* for expressing the relationship among the three hypostases when he expanded it to encompass not only generation but also procession. Hence, the term *principium* was attributed also to the Son when the Spirit as Spirit and *donum* of the Son was said to be given also from the Son. In the last part of book 15 of *De trinitate*, Augustine summarized his idea of the property of the Spirit and the role of the Son as follows:

How, then, would He not be most absurdly called the Son of both, since as the generation from the Father without a beginning in time and without any changeableness in nature bestows essence upon the Son, so the procession of the Holy Spirit from both without any beginning in time, and without any changeableness in nature bestows essence upon the Holy Spirit? For the Father alone is not from another and, therefore, He alone is called unbegotten, not indeed in the Scriptures, but according to the practice of the disputants who employ such terms as they can about so great a subject. But the Son was born of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeds principally (*principaliter*) from the Father, and since the Father gives without any interval of time, He proceeds from both in common (*communiter*). But He would be called the son of the Father and the Son if, what is abhorrent to everyone of sound mind, both had begotten Him.

²⁶³ *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219–220).

Therefore, the Spirit of both was not begotten from both, but proceeds from both.²⁶⁴

For Augustine, the emphasis fell on the final sentence of this long quotation. The Spirit as *being communis of the Father and the Son* is not begotten but proceeds *from both* of Them. *The procession of the Spirit from both the Father and the Son signifies His hypostatic property as being communis.*²⁶⁵

Did Augustine confuse the hypostatic properties of the Father and the Son when he attributed *principium* to the Son? Augustine probably would have responded to this question with a resounding “no.” In spite of the attribution of the term *principium* also to the Son, Augustine managed to escape the charge of confusion. Actually, this accusation could already have been rejected with the above examination of Augustine’s thoughts on the monarchy of the Father. His monopatrism did not allow the Son to become another *principium* like the Father. Apart from this general remark based on his monopatrism, here we will address the matter specifically in regard to Augustine’s attribution of the term *principium* to the Son.

Even if the Son had to be called *principium* for the procession of the Spirit, this did not mean that the Son is another Father in the Trinity. In the eyes of Augustine, this was an absurdity, as indeed he notes at the beginning of the long passage from *De trinitate* 15.47 just quoted. In other words, if the Spirit becomes another Son and the Son another Father by the attribution of the term *principium* to the Son, this leads to an absurd understanding of the relationship

264 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 529).

265 In regard to the role of the Son in the determination of the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit in the procession, as well as Augustine’s fundamental idea of the relationship between *dispensatio* and *theologia*, Augustine’s view on the procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son *in dispensatio* contributed to his view on the procession and on the distinction among the three hypostases *in eternity*. In other words, the work of the incarnated Son including the sending of His Spirit after the resurrection and ascension was fundamental for Augustine in the formation of his doctrine of the Trinity. Without the *dispensatio* of the incarnated Son, the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit was not clearly defined, making it difficult to gain a thorough grasp on the distinction in the Trinity. In this regard, Du Roy’s criticism is probably not valid for Augustine’s *trin.* According Du Roy (*L’intelligence de la foi en la Trinité*, 103), Augustine followed Porphyry’s Neo-Platonism in constructing his thought on the Trinity and did not give serious consideration to the *dispensatio* of the incarnation. For a similar criticism of Du Roy, see Madec, “Notes sur l’intelligence,” 119–142; Nello Cipriani, “Rivelazione cristiana e verità in S. Agostino: A proposito di un recente saggio,” *Aug* 41, no. 2 (2001): 477–508; “La rivelazione dell’amore trinitario nell’incarnazione e morte di Cristo,” in *Croce e identità cristiana di Dio nei primi secoli*, ed. Fernando Taccone (Roma: OCD, 2009), 161–171; *La teologia*, 141–143.

among the three hypostases in that there would be two Sons or two Fathers. For Augustine it was undoubtedly true that the Son is the only begotten Son and is distinguished from the Spirit by the distinction between the generation and the procession *from the Father*. Augustine's warning assumes that the relationship of generation absolutely never dwindles between Father and Son, but that the Father is always Father and the Son always Son.²⁶⁶

Moreover, even if Augustine attributed the term *principium* to the Son, he emphasized that the Father *Himself* allowed the term to be attributed to the Son. The following passage plainly reveals what he means.

And yet it is not without reason that in this Trinity only the Son is called the Word of God, and that only the Holy Spirit is the Gift of God, and that only He, of whom the Son was begotten, and from whom the Holy Spirit principally proceeds, is God the Father (*nec de quo genitum est uerbum et de quo procedit principaliter spiritus sanctus nisi deus pater*). I have added 'principally (*principaliter*),' therefore, because the Holy Spirit is also found to proceed from the Son. But the Father also gave this to Him (*sed hoc quoque illi pater dedit*), not as though He already existed and did not yet have it, but whatever He gave to the only begotten Word, He gave by begetting Him. He so begot Him, therefore, that the common Gift should also proceed from Him, and that the Holy Spirit should be the Spirit of both.²⁶⁷

In this quotation, the word *principaliter* undoubtedly reflects Augustine's emphasis on the monarchy of the Father in the Trinity. The passage emphasizes that the Father *Himself* causes the term *principium* to be attributed to the Son in the procession of the Spirit. The Father is "God the Father," who is the only cause of the other persons. Even though Augustine attributes the term *principium* to the Son as well, he does clearly insist that the Father begets the Son such that the word can be attributed to the Son *by the Father*. Something similar is reflected in the following passage from *De trinitate* 15.47.

Let him understand that, just as the Father has in Himself that the Holy Spirit should proceed from Him, so He has given to the Son that the same

²⁶⁶ If Augustine had not overcome Victorinus, the criticism of the confusion between the hypostatic properties of the Father and the Son could accurately be raised also against him. The following passage from Victorinus probably suggests the possibility of attributing the term "father" also to the Son: "*Spiritus Sanctus a Patre per Christum et in Christo genitus*." (*Adversus Arium* 4.33.24; quoted in Cipriani, *La teologia*, 183).

²⁶⁷ *trin.* 15.29 (CCSL 50A, 503–504).

Holy Spirit should proceed from Him (*sic dedisse filio ut de illo procedat idem spiritus sanctus*), and both apart from time; and that when the Holy Spirit is said to proceed from the Father, it is to be so understood that His proceeding also from the Son comes to the Son from the Father. For if whatever He has, the Son has from the Father, then certainly He has from the Father that the Holy Spirit also proceeds from Him (*si enim quidquid habet de patre habet filius, de patre habet utique ut et de illo procedat spiritus sanctus*). But we should not think of this in terms of time, which consists of before and after, because time does not exist there at all.²⁶⁸

In short, the Son is not *principale principium* or *principium sine principio*, since that belongs to the Father alone, but He is rather a *principium generated* from the Father. The monarchy is only of the Father: "For the Father alone is not from another (*pater enim solus non est de alio*) and, therefore, He alone is called unbegotten (*ideo solus appellatur ingenitus*), But the Son was born of the Father (*filius autem de patre natus est*)."²⁶⁹ Hence, Augustine explicitly interpreted John 15:26 as monopatrism.²⁷⁰

Being *generated principium*, the Son is *commune principium* in that the role of the Son as *principium* contributes to the full definition of the hypostatic property of the Spirit as being *communis*. In the passage from *De trinitate* 15.47 which has been quoted preceding the just quoted passage from the same text, Augustine ascribes the word *communiter* to the procession of the Spirit from the Son, while the word *principaliter* is used for the procession from the Father. Whereas *principaliter* signifies that the Father is *principium sine principio* or *principale principium* for the procession, *communiter* is immediately tied to the necessity of the Son's role in the procession. The Spirit proceeds as being *communis* from the Father and the Son. In this sense, as explained, the Son must have a role as *principium*. As such, the Son's being *principium* is required to define the property of the Spirit as being *communis*. The word *communiter* signifies that being *principium* of the Son for the procession is necessary to define the property of the Spirit. The Spirit is the *communio* of the Father and the Son in that He proceeds *principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son.²⁷¹

²⁶⁸ *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528).

²⁶⁹ *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528).

²⁷⁰ *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 199–200).

²⁷¹ As the present chapter has explained, Ayres in following Gerald Bonner accurately distinguished the role of the Father from that of the Son in Augustine's idea of the procession of the Spirit. He underscored the monarchy of the Father in Augustine's trinitarianism in

4.2 *The Hypostatic Property of the Spirit*

It has been explained that Augustine had to introduce the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit in order to resolve the question of how the Holy Spirit exists in the Trinity as being *communis*. But how exactly did Augustine conceive of the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit? How was the role of the Son for the procession of the Spirit defined?

First of all, Augustine ascribed a negatively distinguishing role to the Son. As has already been noted in regard to the extension of the term *principium*, even for Augustine the way to distinguish the second and third hypostases from each other in the monarchy in which both exist from the Father as *principium* had proved a difficult problem. The distinction between the two hypostases was affirmed when the Spirit as *communis* was distinguished from the Son as the only begotten from the Father. For this distinction, the Son was identified as the *commune principium* for the procession of the Spirit. In that sense, the role of the Son in the procession is negative given that the Son's being *principium* serves to affirm that the Spirit is not the Son.

The role of the Son in the procession was not just limited for Augustine to this negative distinction. The Son was involved also in the procession to

which the Father as *principium* gives the Son that the Spirit proceeds also from Him. He expressed this as follows: "the Father gives it to the Son and to the Spirit that the Spirit proceeds also from the Son." Ayres, *Augustine*, 265; for G. Bonner, see Gerald Bonner, "St Augustine's Doctrine of the Holy Spirit," *Sobornost* 4, no. 1 (1960): 51–66. What Ayres actually intended to emphasize with the formula is quite different from what the present chapter is arguing. About the formula Ayres himself wrote: "Note that Augustine equates the Father's giving to the Son that the Spirit proceed from him with the Father's establishing the Spirit as the Spirit *of* Father and Son. Thus the Father's begetting of the Son is identical with the establishment of the communion of Father, Son and Spirit because *in* the begetting of the Son the Father gives his love (or substance), thus eternally establishing the Son as lover of the Father and the Spirit as the personal giving love of Father and Son" (Ayres, *Augustine*, 263–264; emphasis original). This emphasis, which is revealed in the quoted passage, is quite concrete. By the formula, Ayres attempted to underscore that the Father establishes the second person as Son through giving the Spirit as love, which is the divine essence: "Augustine is clear that the Spirit comes from the Father to the Son as the fullness of divinity, as the personal loving that constitutes the Son as fully God in the trinitarian life" (Ayres, 266). In other words, Ayres' formula of and emphasis on the monarchy of the Father for the procession of the Spirit actually aims at concluding that from the Father "the Son is generated *in* the Spirit" (Ayres, 265–266; emphasis original). This conclusion, however, serves to dissipate the perspective of the Spirit's procession also *from* the Son, and the focus of the argument now moves from the procession to the generation without concrete answers for the following questions: Why and how does the Son become *principium*, and what role does the Son as *principium* concretely play? For a more detailed discussion of Ayres, see the excursus below (pp. 244–247).

determine the hypostatic property of the Spirit positively and definitely. This hypostatic property of the Spirit, we recall, is being *communis* and *donum* of the Father and the Son. In this regard, this property of the Spirit is not complete when the Spirit proceeds just from the Father *principaliter* but not from the Son *communiter*. Only when the Spirit proceeds *communiter* from the Son does he exist as being *communis* and *donum* also *of the Son*. Without the role of the Son as *commune principium*, there is no Holy Spirit. The Son determines the existence of the Spirit positively and definitely.

The Son's role of being *commune principium*, which negatively distinguishes and positively determines the hypostatic property of the Spirit, is active. The Son *distinguishes* and *determines* the existence of the Spirit as actively as the Father does. This activity, however, is not un-generated. Even for this activity, the Son is generated from the Father who is *principium sine principio*. On this point there are similarities with Augustine's interpretation of 1 Cor 1:24. When Augustine offered an interpretation of this passage that is more appropriate to the formula *deus de deo* than the one his predecessors and his earlier self had held, he called the Son the "generated" Wisdom from the Father who is "un-generated" Wisdom. In other words, the Son is "generated" *deus* from "un-generated" *deus*. Similarly, the Son is "generated" *principium* from "un-generated" *principium*. So too His being *principium* works in "generated" activity from the "un-generated" activity of the Father as *principium*.

4.3 Summary

Augustine attempted, to the best of his ability, to solve the question that can only be fully answered and understood in the eternal contemplation of God, face to face: How does the Holy Spirit exist as being *communis* of the Father and the Son? He offered two solutions. The first one was the extension of the connotation of the word *principium*, which he no longer understood merely as the relation of generation, but now also as the relation of being given or procession. The Holy Spirit exists in the procession from the Father as *principium*. Yet this first resolution was not sufficient to explain the "how" of the Spirit's existence in regard to his property as *communis*, given that the extended connotation of the term *principium* only says that the Spirit is of the Father. Accordingly, the role of the Son was required. If the Spirit is also of the Son and *donum* of the Son, He proceeds also from the Son.

Remarkably, Augustine did not abandon the monarchy of the Father when he offered these two solutions. Even if he called the Son *principium*, he never considered the Son another Father. In his thinking, the causal relationship of generation "between Father and Son" was in no way damaged by this. The Son's being *principium* is not related to the relationship of generation but to that of

procession. Moreover, the Son is *principium* for the procession of the Spirit only insofar as the Son is *generated* from the Father. The Son is the generated *principium* from the Father who is *principium sine principio* or *principale principium*. The formula *deus de deo* is also valid here. Finally, being generated *principium*, the Son is also *commune principium*. The Holy Spirit as being *communis* of both the Father and the Son proceeds *principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son. The word *communiter* signifies the requirement of the Son's role for a full definition of how the Spirit exists as being *communis*.

In the monarchy of the Father in which Augustine attributed the role as generated and *commune principium* to the Son without abandoning his commitment to monopatrism, he described the Son as negatively distinguishing the person of the Spirit from Himself and as positively determining the property of the Spirit as being *communis*. Augustine's commitment to monopatrism did not mean that these roles were passive, for he understood them as active in that the Son is the generated active *principium* from God the Father.

5 The Hypostatic Property of the Holy Spirit²⁷²

5.1 *In the Trinity*

As has been explained in the previous section, Augustine followed the catholic faith in confessing and defining the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit as being *communis* and *donum* of the Father and the Son. Yet his understanding of the hypostatic property of the Spirit is not complete if only these two aspects are treated. For Augustine, the Holy Spirit exists as *caritas* as well. Yet this third aspect is not totally different from the other two. It rather derives from Augustine's argument for explaining the other two properties of the Spirit.

The first aspect of the Spirit's properties was being *communis* of the Father and the Son. The third aspect, *caritas*, was in turn ascribed to the Holy Spirit in that He is *communis* of the Father and the Son. This implication of the first aspect for the third finds clear expression in *De trinitate* 6.7.

The Holy Spirit is, therefore, something common, whatever it is, between [of] the Father and the Son (*commune aliquid est patris et filii*). But this

²⁷² As Studer has accurately pointed out, Augustine's pneumatology was less philosophically and more biblically shaped than his account of God the Father and the Son. Basil Studer, "Zur Pneumatologie des Augustinus von Hippo: (De Trinitate 15,17,27–27,50)," *Aug* 35, no. 2 (1995): 567–583; *Mysterium Caritatis: Studien zur Exegese und zur Trinitätslehre in der alten Kirche*, SA 127 (Roma: PASA, 1999), 311–327; *Augustinus De Trinitate*, 176.

communion itself is consubstantial and coeternal, and if this communion itself can be appropriately designated as friendship, let it be so called, but it is more aptly called love. And this again is a substance, because God is a substance, and 'God is love (*deus caritas*)' (1John 4:8; 4:16), as it is written. But just as love is a substance together with the Father and the Son, it is also at the same time great, good, holy, and whatever other qualities may be attributed to this substance. For, as we have shown above, it is not one thing for God to be, and another thing for Him to be great, or good, etc.²⁷³

Augustine's argumentation in this passage is summarized as follows: The Holy Spirit is *communis* of the Father and the Son; love (*caritas*) is the substance of God; therefore, the Holy Spirit as *communis* of the other two hypostases who are love is love. In short, the Holy Spirit is *caritas* since He as *communis* proceeds from the Father and the Son who are love. Commenting 1John 4:8 and 4:16, Augustine expresses the same idea in *De trinitate* 15.37:²⁷⁴ briefly stated, both the Father and the Son are love in that God is love, and the Holy Spirit is undoubtedly love since He is "common to both (*communis ambobus*)."²⁷⁵ The property of the Spirit, which is "being *communis*" of the Father and the Son, confirms that the Spirit is called *caritas*. "Otherwise, if in that Trinity the Holy Spirit alone is love, then indeed even the Son is found to be the Son, not of the Father alone, but of the Holy Spirit as well."²⁷⁶ Augustine illustrated the absurdity of this with a false interpretation of Col 1:3.

The only begotten Son of God the Father! Such is the name by which He is called, and which is read in innumerable places; and yet what the Apostle says of God the Father also remains true: 'Who has rescued us from the power of darkness, and transferred us into the kingdom of the Son of his love' (Col 1:13). He did not say 'of his Son,' though if he had said it, he would have most truly said it, just as because he often said it, he most truly said it, but he said 'of the Son of his love.' Therefore, He is also the Son of the Holy Spirit if no one in that Trinity is the love of God except the Holy Spirit. And if this is most absurd, it remains that there the Holy

273 *trin.* 6.7 (CCSL 50, 235–236).

274 *trin.* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 513–514).

275 In *cū.* 11.24, Augustine called the Holy Spirit also *sanctitas* and *bonitas*, in that both are identical to each other in the divine simplicity. By calling the Holy Spirit such, Augustine similarly emphasized the property of the Holy Spirit as being *communis* to the Father and the Son.

276 *trin.* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 514).

Spirit alone is not love, but that He is properly so called on account of those things that I have sufficiently explained; but when He is called ‘the Son of his love,’ nothing else is to be understood than ‘of his beloved Son,’ or finally ‘of the Son of his substance.’ For the love of the Father, which is in that ineffably simple nature, is nothing else than His own nature and substance itself, as we have already frequently said, and it does not annoy us to repeat it frequently. And, therefore, the Son of His love is none other than He who was born of His substance.²⁷⁷

The relationship of generation is absolutely limited to the relation between Father and Son: The Father is always Father of the Son, and the Spirit is never another Father. To avoid this most absurd interpretation, Augustine emphasized that being *caritas* of the Holy Spirit is derived from being *communis* to the Father and the Son.²⁷⁸

As being *caritas* was derived from being *communis*, it connects closely to the second aspect of the Spirit’s property. Being *donum* signifies being *caritas*. Since the Holy Spirit as *donum* of the Father and the Son was given from both, the Spirit as *caritas* of both was poured out from both. First, the Father gives *caritas* as His *donum*. In *De trinitate* 15.31,²⁷⁹ Augustine first emphasized the monarchy of the Father: “For the Father alone is God in such a way that He is not of God.” Based on this monarchy, he went on to interpret 1 John 4:7: “Beloved, let us love one another because love is of God.” This verse indicates that “love” is “of God” although the Father is not “of God.” As such, Augustine comments

²⁷⁷ *trin.* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 514).

²⁷⁸ David Coffey has accurately indicated that Augustine correlated the two perspectives, being *communis* and being love as I have analyzed. However, he criticized Augustine’s thinking on this point in order to develop the mutual-love theory in the immanent Trinity. When he did not distinguish the two perspectives in the immanent Trinity, he defined the Holy Spirit as *common* gift or love even in the immanent Trinity and obliterated the notion of love as being *mutual* between Father and Son. In this way, according to Coffey, Augustine became representative for all western theology which has ignored the mutual-love theory in the immanent Trinity, in spite of its probable origins in Augustine. See David Coffey, “The Holy Spirit as the Mutual Love of the Father and the Son,” *TS* 51, no. 2 (1990): 193–199. Coffey’s interpretation of Augustine’s idea of the relationship between being *communis* and being love is accurate, and his criticism of Augustine is interesting. However, he did not thoroughly consider how the passage from *trin.* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 514) in relation to Col 1:13 as quoted above relates to Augustine. For a more detailed discussion of Coffey, see the excursus below (pp. 247–252).

²⁷⁹ *trin.* 15.31 (CCSL 50A, 505–506). Augustine here carefully exegetes the biblical basis for calling the Holy Spirit *caritas*, knowing that the Bible does not call Him *caritas* explicitly (*trin.* 15.27 [CCSL 50A, 502]).

that the love in this verse is not the Father, but the Son or the Spirit who is from the Father. For defining who, between the Son and the Spirit, is love, Augustine referred to 1 John 4:10 and 13 which say that the Father loved us, sent the Son by this love, and gave us this love. In other words, if the Father sent the Son by this love and gives us this love which 1 John 1:7 reveals, the love is the Spirit who is of the Father. Consequently, Augustine concluded that the Holy Spirit is God in that He is of God the Father, and is given as *donum* and *caritas* by the Father in that He proceeds from the Father: “*Deus ergo ex deo est dilectio.*”

Since the Spirit as *caritas* is given from the Father in that He is “of the Father,” He is given from the Son as well since He is also “of the Son.” In *De trinitate* 15:33, Augustine clearly identified the water in John 7:37–40 with the Holy Spirit as *donum* and stated that He was given by the Lord in John 4:7–14. Moreover, *De trinitate* 15:34 plainly states that the Holy Spirit is the “grace” and “gifts” of Eph 4:7–8 which the Lord gave after rising from the dead and returning to heaven.²⁸⁰ The Holy Spirit as *donum* and *caritas* is undoubtedly given by the Son in that He is “of the Son” and proceeds from Him.

As the two explained passages of *De trinitate* 15:31 and 34 therefore show, the Holy Spirit who is given as *donum* by the Father and the Son is *caritas communis* to Both. In this sense, Augustine identified *donum* with *caritas* and insisted most significantly on the following: “Nothing is more excellent than this gift of God. It is this alone which divides the children of the eternal kingdom from the children of eternal perdition.”²⁸¹

Up to now, being *caritas* has been explained as deriving from being *communis* and *donum of* both the Father and the Son. Yet Augustine’s thinking about the Holy Spirit as *caritas* was expanded so as to describe the relationship among the three hypostases in terms of love. In other words, Augustine did not only consider the Holy Spirit as *caritas of* the Father and the Son, but also as *caritas between* Father and Son. One of the clearest passages on this notion of *caritas between* is *De trinitate* 6:7.

Wherefore, the Holy Spirit also subsists in this same unity and equality of substance. For whether He is the unity between both of them, or their holiness, or their love, or whether the unity, therefore, because He is the

280 *trin.* 15:33 (CCSL 50A, 509).

281 *trin.* 15:32 (CCSL 50A, 507). The present work considers this passage key to understanding Augustine’s theology since love toward God was the most profound theme of Augustine in his trinitarian polemics over the notion of the immature and perverted love, as well as in his spiritual theology in which he emphasized the work of the Holy Spirit as love to cause believers to love the Son and the Father.

love, and the love, therefore, because He is the holiness, it is obvious that He is not one of the two. Through Him both are joined together (*quo uterque coniungitur*); through Him the begotten is loved by the begetter, and in turn loves Him who begot Him (*quo genitus a gignente diligitur generatoremque suum diligit*); in Him they preserve the unity of spirit through the bond of peace (Eph 4:3), not by a participation but by their own essence, not by the gift of anyone superior to themselves but by their own gift (*sintque non participatione sed essentia sua neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio seruantes unitatem spiritus in uinculo pacis*).²⁸²

In this passage, Augustine claims that it is through the Holy Spirit that the Father loves the Son and that the Son loves the Father. The Holy Spirit exists as *caritas between* the other two hypostases who love each other through the Spirit. In relation to 1John 4:8 and 4:16, which both seem to be in the background to his passage, Augustine could probably identify the Holy Spirit as “*caritas between*” even God’s *essentia*.

If this idea of the *caritas between* is misunderstood, however, there are two kinds of subordination that can possibly follow. The first is the subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son. If it is said that the Holy Spirit as *caritas between* exists by the mutual relationship of love between Father and Son, one might conclude by affirming that the mutual relationship precedes the existence of the Holy Spirit and that the latter is dependent on the former. The second subordination works the other way around. If the property of *caritas between* is overestimated so as to be understood as the divine essence itself, one might be led to conclude that the Holy Spirit precedes the other hypostases.

Augustine’s *caritas between*, however, was not contaminated by either one of these two kinds of subordination. As noted, the hypostatic property of the Spirit as *caritas* was primarily defined as *caritas of* the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit as being *communis* to the Father and the Son was defined as *caritas* which is common to Them. As noted in the passage just quoted, the Father and the Son love “not by a participation but by their own essence, not by the gift of anyone superior to themselves but by their own gift.”²⁸³ The Spirit is love in that He is *communis* to the other persons who are love by themselves.

²⁸² *trin.* 6.7 (CCSL 50, 235).

²⁸³ In this quotation, it is not entirely clear what Augustine meant with the phrase *neque dono superioris alicuius sed suo proprio*. The meaning of the phrase *suo proprio* in particular is difficult. This ambiguity can be seen in the various translations used by scholars. Some scholars, such as Schmaus, Giuseppe Beschin, Ayres, Cipriani, and Cillerai have translated *suo proprio* as “their own gift,” as above. Other scholars, including Van Bavel and Michel

Hence, what Augustine actually said in that last passage is as follows: God the Father and God the Son love each other by the divine essence as love which is equally shared by Them; the Holy Spirit as *being communis* to Them exists as the *common* love of and between Them who love each other by Themselves; therefore, He can be conceived as cause or medium (*quo*) of Their mutual love and as unity between Them since He is the *common* love of and between the two who Love. This interpretation emphasizes the equality of the divine essence among the three persons and the eternal simultaneity of Their existence; it involves no subordination of any kind. In terms of love, all of the three hypostases are equally love.²⁸⁴

Excursus: Nello Cipriani, Lewis Ayres, and David Coffey

Nello Cipriani, one of the most prominent Augustinian scholars today, has emphasized Augustine's idea of the relation of love in his intriguing book on Augustine's trinitarian theology entitled *La teologia di Sant'Agostino: Introduzione generale e riflessione trinitaria* (Rome: IPA, 2015).²⁸⁵ With the emphasis on the relation of love, Cipriani attempted to develop a new approach to Augustine's trinitarian theology. Previous scholarship had underlined the influence of Neoplatonic philosophy, without giving serious attention to Augustine's emphasis on the hypostatic distinction and the interpersonal or intersubjective

Corbin have translated the phrase as "their own initiative." On the first option, one wonders what "their own gift" is. It is probable that the scholars who translated the term in this way consider the Holy Spirit the *donum* (*trin.* 5.12 [CCSL 50, 219–220], 15.31–33 [CCSL 50A, 505–509]). With the second option, on the other hand, scholars have understood *proprium* as a noun and presumably attempted to draw a parallel between *essentia sua* and *suo proprio* over against *participatione* and *dono superioris alicuius*. In a strict sense, however, both translations and interpretations lack direct confirmation in Augustine. Nevertheless, what he probably tried to emphasize here is that the Father and the Son as Lovers keep the unity of the Spirit by Themselves. Even if *suo proprio* signifies the Holy Spirit, it underscores that the Spirit is the Father's and the Son's *own*. That is to say, He is *communis* to Them.

284 Likewise, Augustine said, "According to the Sacred Scriptures, this Holy Spirit is neither the Spirit of the Father alone, nor of the Son alone, but *the Spirit of both* (*nec patris est solius nec filii solius sed amborum*), and, *therefore*, He insinuates to us the common love by which the Father and the Son *mutually love each other* (*et ideo communem qua inuicem se diligunt pater et filius nobis insinuat caritatem*)."*trin.* 15.27 (CCSL 50A, 501; emphasis added). Even though he criticized Augustine's thinking in this passage, Coffey accurately understood it such that for Augustine the mutual love between Father and Son is identical with the *common* love that the Father and the Son equally have and that is personalized in the immanent Trinity as the Holy Spirit who is *communis* to the Father and the Son. See Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 198–199.

285 Cipriani, *La teologia*, 146–148, 154, 156–157, 175–177, 181, 188–189.

relation among the hypostases in the Trinity. Cipriani, by contrast, highlighted the monarchy of the Father and the relation of origin on which Augustine based his whole argument for the Trinity. In addition to the causal relation in monopatrism, Cipriani remarkably accentuated the relation of love by which, as he claimed, Augustine tremendously developed an interpersonal or intersubjective relation among the hypostases.

While Cipriani's attempt will need to be taken seriously for future research on Augustine's trinitarianism, his argument on the intra-trinitarian relationship of love already shows two initial weaknesses. First, Cipriani offered no account of the connection between the relation of origin and that of love in Augustine's trinitarianism. Without any clear account of this connection, Cipriani seems just to have claimed that Augustine bore the two relations simultaneously in mind or even that the relation of love was in his thinking more fundamental than the relation of origin.²⁸⁶ Given the interpretation of the connection proposed in this work, however, it would be more accurate and consistent to insist that the relation of love was derived from the relation of origin. Second, it is not entirely clear what Cipriani's concept of "interpersonal" or "intersubjective" could mean in regard to the relation of love. He seems to have interpreted the relation of love as the *mutual* relation of love *between* Father and Son,²⁸⁷ and he used the concept "interpersonal" or "intersubjective" in connection with this mutuality of love. Yet Cipriani's interpretation of the relationship of love may lead to a distortion of one of the contributions Augustine himself makes for the discussions of his day about the Trinity. Augustine did not in the first place claim that the Holy Spirit is *caritas between* Father and Son, but that He is *communio* and *caritas of* the Father and the Son. By this insistence, Augustine avoided very form of subordinationism among the three hypostases and maintained the eternal simultaneity of Their existence in the monarchy of the Father. Cipriani's interpretation of the relationship of love *between* Father and Son, in contrast, could be framed so as to end up in the subordination of the Holy Spirit as love depending on the mutuality between Father and Son, which indeed precedes the existence of the Spirit.²⁸⁸

286 Cipriani, 188–189, 193–195.

287 Cipriani, 188, 193, 195.

288 In an earlier article predating the book (i.e. "La teologia trinitaria di S. Agostino"), Cipriani had similarly attempted to promote the *via caritatis* in the Trinity more explicitly than Augustine's psychological trinitarianism, even though he acknowledged that the former was more obscure than the latter in *trin*. In this way, he attempted to bring into relief the perspective of the intersubjective relation of love in Augustine's trinitarian thinking. This attempt was interesting enough to gain ecumenical attention in the symposium that was held by theologians of the Roman Catholic Church and Greek Orthodox Church. Never-

Prior to Cipriani, Lewis Ayres had developed an idea similar to the interpersonal or intersubjective relation in the Trinity in a more sophisticated way in his book *Augustine and the Trinity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010).²⁸⁹ Emphasizing Augustine's idea that the Holy Spirit as *caritas* is the divine essence, he attempted to develop "Augustine's trinitarian ontology" which he characterized as "analogical personalism."²⁹⁰ His complex argument can be briefly framed as the intention to depict the Trinity as the divine substance constituted by the three persons who all are active agents of love.²⁹¹ In greater detail this means that Father and Son, who are irreducible persons and equally have love as God's essence, exist as active agents of love to each other (*ad aliquid*), and that the Holy Spirit is the fount (*fons*) of love and the active agent of the love between Father and Son.²⁹² By the fact that the three persons equally have love as God's essence, the three exist as irreducible persons and simultaneously consist in the unity or one substance of the three. In this way, *essentia* does not precede *persona*, but "the divine three ... eternally constitute the 'one substance' of the Trinity."²⁹³ In this regard, Ayres called his account "personalism." The term "analogical" was required to qualify "personalism" because "Augustine is clear about the ways in which divine 'persons' transcend human persons and the categories that we use to speak of them."²⁹⁴ "Analogical" might be replaced with the term "apophatic," which in Ayres' thinking means *ineffabilis*.²⁹⁵

Moreover, Ayres attempted to integrate his understanding of Augustine's trinitarian ontology with the monarchy of the Father, which in his reading Augustine did not hesitate to underscore. In other words, "analogical personalism" was realized by the *monarchia* of the Father according to the following careful passage.

But Augustine is not suggesting that Father and Son are somehow brought into unity by the gift of the Spirit as an act subsequent to the generation of the Son. It makes sense only to read him as saying that the Father from eternity establishes the Son as one who is all that the Father is, and as

theless, the article version appears not to avoid the same weaknesses detailed above in connection with the book version.

289 Ayres, *Augustine*, 251–262.

290 Ayres, 261.

291 Ayres, 261.

292 Ayres, 256–257, 261.

293 Ayres, 261.

294 Ayres, 261.

295 Ayres, 262.

one who loves the Father in and with the love that is God from God and also all that the Father is. The Father establishes the Son as one who also has as his essence the love that is identical with the essence of God, of the Father, but that love is also the active agent of his love for the Father. It seems true to say then both that the Son loves the Father and that the Spirit is the love and communion which joins Father and Son in love—the Son both loves (being himself love itself) and the Spirit is the love with which he loves.²⁹⁶

In short, the Father is the *principium* who makes “the inter-personal acts of the divine three”²⁹⁷ in that He generates the Son as having love as God’s essence and as loving in and with the Spirit who is love itself.

As was true also for Cipriani, Ayres’ argument offers fascinating tools for developing Augustine’s trinitarian thought as a trinitarian ontology. However, it also runs the following two critical risks. First, Ayres’ “personalism” appears to conflict with the very monarchy of the Father that Ayres himself had attempted to underscore in Augustine’s trinitarianism. This conflict is particularly evident in the passage from his book just quoted above. In fact, he was very careful in that passage to avoid any possibility of the notion of monarchy being blurred by his emphasis on the personhood of the Spirit. This emerges clearly when Ayres says about the relationship between Son and Spirit in the generation of the Son that “the Father from eternity establishes the Son as one who is all that the Father is, and as one who loves the Father *in* and *with* the love that is God from God and also all that the Father is” (emphasis added). The Son does not love the Father *by* the Holy Spirit, but *in* and *with* the love from God the Father. In other words, Ayres carefully emphasizes that the Son exists as the loving Son to the Father, not by the Holy Spirit but only from the Father who gives the Son God’s essence. Otherwise, if the Son is said to love the Father *by* the Spirit as love itself, it cannot avoid Augustine’s criticism on the absurdity that the Son is Son not only of the Father but also of the Spirit, since the Son would then receive God’s essence also from the Spirit. Ayres’ use of the prepositions suggests he is aware of this criticism on the part of Augustine.

In spite of the caution Ayres exercised, he still seems not to have avoided Augustine’s criticism completely. Following the sentence quoted twice above, he called love, which is the Holy Spirit, “the active agent of his love for the Father.” Here, the Holy Spirit is defined *as the agent of the Son’s love* for the

296 Ayres, 258.

297 Ayres, 259.

Father. What exactly Ayres understands with this sentence is somewhat ambiguous, since he failed to offer a clear explanation. From his explanation of Augustine's interpretation of Acts 4:32 in *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 18 and 39,²⁹⁸ one might surmise that Ayres intended to emphasize the active role of the Holy Spirit as *fons dilectionis* for the Son's love to the Father. The Holy Spirit can be said to encourage the love of the Son to the Father. If Ayres' ambiguous account is interpreted in this sense, the Son in his reading of Augustine depends not only on the Father but also on the Spirit since the Son exists as the loving person to the Father. This, however, conflicts with the monarchy of the Father. Moreover, Ayres claimed—even if hesitantly—that Augustine “envisages the Father eternally constituting the Son through giving him his own personal and active Spirit who is love” and that “Augustine is clear that the Spirit comes from the Father to the Son as the fullness of divinity, as the personal loving that constitutes the Son as fully God in the trinitarian life.”²⁹⁹ If these claims could be understood such that the Spirit as love itself makes and constitutes the second person as Son who is fully God and loves His Father, the Spirit might become *principium* for the Son. For this reason, Ayres' claims make it difficult for him to avoid Augustine's criticism, even if he again cautiously concluded from these claims that “the Son is generated *in* the Spirit” (emphasis original).³⁰⁰

Second, the aspect of *ad aliquid* which Augustine explained for the distinction among the three seems not to find full reflection in Ayres' “personalism,” even if he was not ignorant of its importance. As a matter of fact, Ayres underscored that there was “nothing ‘in’ the Trinity other than the three persons from Augustine's exegetical focus on the Trinity.” And he added, “Augustine seems to have moved cautiously toward an account of the three as existing dynamically *ad aliquid*.”³⁰¹ Moreover, Ayres' consistent emphasis on *ad aliquid* in relation to the three persons in the Trinity can be found throughout his entire book. Nevertheless, his understanding of Augustine's *ad aliquid* seems to fall short of what Augustine himself emphasized when he attempted to interpret *ad aliquid* as mutual love among the three. If *ad aliquid* signifies mutual love in Augustine as Ayres attempted to explain, the relation between Father and Son is depicted by this *ad aliquid* and the two persons are established as hypostatically distinct from each other. The personhood of the Spirit, however, is depicted in Ayres' *ad aliquid* as mutual love since the Spirit, as Ayres emphasized, exists not as

298 Ayres, 256–258.

299 Ayres, 265–266.

300 Ayres, 265–266.

301 Ayres, 261.

loving the other persons but as love or the act of love itself. In other words, Ayres' identification of *ad aliquid* as mutual love ironically cannot succeed in defining the distinctiveness of the Holy Spirit in the way Augustine affirmed it using the phrase *ad aliquid*. For Augustine, *ad aliquid* was not first of all connected to mutual love, but was the causal relationship among the three persons. In Augustine's *ad aliquid*, the personal distinctiveness of the Holy Spirit, as explained above, was defined as being *communis* to Father and Son in the procession from Them both.

As was true for Cipriani, so too for Ayres these two critical remarks seem to relate to his neglect of the fact that the Holy Spirit is not only *caritas between* Father and Son, but first of all *caritas of* Father and Son. This is at once ironic and regrettable, given that Ayres was one of few scholars who has called for attention to the importance of the notion of being *communis* for the personhood of the Holy Spirit.³⁰²

While Cipriani and Ayres as patristic theologians concentrated on Augustine's works, David Coffey as a Roman Catholic systematic theologian attempted to assess Augustine's trinitarian thinking critically and to develop it for his own construct of a Spirit Christology and a mutual-love theory for the Trinity. According to his criticism, the western tradition of the procession model for the Trinity, of which the *filioque* has been representative, has not succeeded in reflecting an ascending Christology and the "biblical doctrine of the Trinity,"³⁰³ even though it is compatible with a descending Christology. From this criticism, he developed a mutual-love theory for the immanent Trinity that was designed to reflect the ascending Christology and to complement the procession model of the Trinity. Briefly stated, his theory argues that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love between Father and Son when the Father bestows the Holy Spirit as His paternal love on the Son and the Son bestows the same Spirit as His love on the Father by His response to the Father's love.³⁰⁴

For two reasons, the most important Church Father for Coffey's project was Augustine. The first was positive, in that the mutual-love theory has its origins in Augustine who simultaneously had the two models of the immanent Trinity.³⁰⁵ Yet the second one was negative in that Coffey argued that Augustine

302 See note 258 above.

303 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 195. With the term "biblical doctrine of the Trinity," he signified biblical data revealing the relationship between Jesus and God the Father and the Holy Spirit as God's power in a non-metaphysical way. From these data, the so-called immanent Trinity or economic Trinity were formed.

304 David Coffey, "A Proper Mission of the Holy Spirit," *TS* 47, no. 2 (1986): 232; *Grace: The Gift of the Holy Spirit* (Sydney: Catholic Institute of Sydney, 1979), 11–32.

305 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 193. Coffey explains the mutual love theory in Augustine particu-

did not succeed in fully developing the mutual-love model. Coffey's criticism was that Augustine had not studied the biblical data on which the mutual-love model could be developed³⁰⁶ and was "content to argue from the *filioque* rather than from Scripture."³⁰⁷ In other words, the Latin Father moved from the *filioque* to the idea of the Holy Spirit as the communion of the Father and the Son, and identified being communion with being mutual love for the property of the Holy Spirit (*trin.* 6.7, 15-27, 37).³⁰⁸ In this argument, Augustine defined the Holy Spirit as the eternally (*sempiternae*) common Gift of the Father and the Son, and passed up on the chance to describe the Holy Spirit as the *mutual* love between Them.³⁰⁹ Consequently, the procession model was dominant in Augustine's trinitarian theology notwithstanding the fact that the origins of the mutual-love theory are also with him, and the significance of the biblical data for the ascending Christology has been diminished in the history of western theology. As Coffey put it: "Clearly, Augustine sees no great difference between communion and mutual love."³¹⁰

In criticism of Augustine, Coffey thus attempted to define an ascending Christology, to construct the mutual-love relation between Father and Jesus from the biblical doctrine of the Trinity, and to correlate the two models of the Trinity in complementary fashion.

For Coffey, there is no pre-existent divine sonship. What the Gospels say rather signifies that the Father's bestowal of the Holy Spirit brought about the sonship in the man Jesus.³¹¹ Jesus became the Son of the Father because he was obedient to and loved the Father to the point of death on the cross, by the Holy Spirit who was bestowed on Jesus as the Father's love and returned as the Son's love for the Father.³¹² This love was totally radical in the case of Jesus, in that He called God "my Father"³¹³ and appropriated this love so as to return it as his

larly on pp. 194–201. For the history of the model of mutual love, Coffey depended on John Cowburn, *Love and the Person: A Philosophical Theory and a Theological Essay*, Studies in Theology and Church History (London: Chapman, 1967) 258–272.

306 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 195.

307 Coffey, 196.

308 Coffey, 196–199.

309 Coffey, 197.

310 Coffey, 198.

311 Coffey, 203.

312 Coffey, 201–218. "The exercise contains two parts. The first concerns the proposition that the Holy Spirit is the Father's love for Jesus; the second, that the same Spirit is Jesus' answering love for the Father." 201.

313 Coffey, 204. "Jesus' experience of God is objectively stated to be an experience of the Spirit of God, but for him subjectively it is essentially an experience of God's fatherly love." This sentence summarizes Coffey's argument, which distinguishes the experience of Jesus from

own to the Father.³¹⁴ In this process of sonship, the Holy Spirit was revealed as the mutual love between Jesus and the Father.³¹⁵

From this ascending Christology, Coffey constructed his mutual-love theory for the immanent Trinity.³¹⁶ He boldly said, "If Jesus is brought into being as the divine Son in humanity through the Father's radical bestowal of love on him, which love is the Holy Spirit, and if the response of Jesus is a love for the Father which ultimately is a return of the same Spirit, then in the immanent Trinity itself the Holy Spirit exists as the mutual love of the Father and the Son."³¹⁷ This model does not exclude the *filioque*: "The Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son inasmuch as the Son makes Him his own and returns Him to the Father as his own. The Father and the Son are therefore copinciples of the Holy Spirit, and since the Spirit is one, they must constitute a single principle."³¹⁸ While maintaining the *filioque*, this model shows that the Holy Spirit exists as mutual love also in immanence.

other prophets and particularly from the suffering Servant. The others experienced the Holy Spirit as the power of God, but Jesus as the Father's love.

314 Coffey, 205–206.

315 For a more detailed analysis of his christological argumentation, see David Coffey, "The 'Incarnation' of the Holy Spirit in Christ," *TS* 45, no. 3 (1984): 466–480. In this article, he accepted Karl Rahner's philosophical and theological anthropology in terms of transcendence and his scholastic concept of *potentia obedientialis* as well as Wolfhart Pannenberg's claim that the divine Sonship of Jesus was indirect. Coffey interpreted the Incarnation as the incarnation of the Holy Spirit in Jesus which produced the divinization of the humanity of Jesus as the work of the Holy Spirit. His argument might be summarized succinctly by noting that Coffey argues that the divine Sonship of Jesus took a progressive actualization by the progressive actualization of the incarnation of the Holy Spirit as the mutual love between Father and Jesus in Jesus' human and transcendental love for the Father and by the *potentia obedientialis* of Jesus' humanity. See Coffey, "A Proper Mission," 238. For his quotation from Rahner and Pannenberg, see Karl Rahner, "On the Theology of the Incarnation," in *Theological Investigations* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 4:110; "Dogmatic Reflections on the Knowledge and Self-Consciousness of Christ," in *Theological Investigations* (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1966), 5:193–215; for Pannenberg, see Wolfhart Pannenberg, *Jesus, God and Man* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968), 334. In reality, as Ralph Del Colle has accurately summarized Augustine's theology, all his theological arguments converge under the rubric of Spirit Christology, even though Coffey himself did not use this term. See Ralph Del Colle, *Christ and the Spirit: Spirit-Christology in trinitarian perspective* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 98; cf. Myk Habets, *The Anointed Son: A Trinitarian Spirit Christology* (Eugene, OR: Pickwick Publications, 2010), 202–208.

316 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 218–223.

317 Coffey, "The 'Incarnation,'" 479–480; Coffey, "A Proper Mission," 234.

318 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 220.

From Coffey's perspective, Augustine, who did not clearly distinguish the two models, described the Holy Spirit as the *common* Gift even in eternity and also as the *common* Love of the Father and the Son. In this way, he failed to emphasize that the Father and the Son are two Lovers who bestow love *on each other* and that the Holy Spirit is the mutual love between Them. Hence, the inter-personal relationship within the Trinity is absent in Augustine.³¹⁹ In criticizing him, Coffey explicitly said, "In the immanent Trinity, on the other hand, the Holy Spirit is not given, because He is not bestowed *gratuitously*. He is, however, bestowed, but bestowed by the Father and the Son *on each other*. This is something that we know not from the *filioque* but from the mutual-love theory."³²⁰

Coffey's christological and trinitarian thinking as summarized above represents a fascinating attempt to construct a Spirit Christology and a mutual-love model of the Trinity. However, his reading of Augustine seems to be inaccurate. One of his arguments is that the mutual-love theory has its origins in Augustine. This is true insofar as the Holy Spirit in Augustine's thought was not only a *communis caritas* of the Father and the Son but also a *caritas between* the Father and the Son. Yet Augustine did not claim that the Father gave the Holy Spirit as His love to the Son and that the Son returned Him to the Father. He rather just said that the Father "has given to the Son that the same Holy Spirit should proceed from Him."³²¹

In addition to misunderstanding Augustine, Coffey's attempt to go beyond him seems also unconvincing, notwithstanding his attempt to modify a development he found in Augustine's thought. Coffey criticized Augustine's parallel between "being communion" and "being the mutual love," and the co-existence of the procession model with the mutual-love model in Augustine's thought. To modify Augustine, he distinguished explicitly between the two models and emphasized that the Holy Spirit is the *mutual*, not *common*, love between the two Lovers in the immanent Trinity. Whereas the mutual-love theory in Augustine was absorbed into the procession model, Coffey included the *filioque* in the mutual-love theory.

Coffey's attempt probably fails to convince Augustine given that the two subordinations which I have already raised for Cipriani and Ayres can apply

319 Del Colle, *Christ*, 108. The criticism alleged against the procession model is that the relationship among the three persons is not based "on principality." "Rather, mutuality is at the basis of these relations. The Father loves and bestows that love on the Son, with the Son answering in love to the Father."

320 Coffey, "The Holy Spirit," 221.

321 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528); see pp. 233–234 above.

also for Coffey. For one, his attempt can be understood as seeking to place the Holy Spirit *after* the mutual loving act of the Father and the Son. This seems an unavoidable conclusion from the following statement Coffey makes, for example: "For while in the bestowal model the Son is seen as other than the Father, and hence at least initially as moving out from Him, the model is *completed only* with the Son's return to the Father in love. The Holy Spirit, as the Father's love for the Son, moves out from the Father to the Son, but as the Son's love for the Father returns to the Father, its ultimate source" (emphasis added).³²² Again, "the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father for the Son; the Holy Spirit is the answering love of the Son for the Father; and the Holy Spirit is the mutual love of the Father and the Son. The explanation just given enables us to see that despite first appearances these three statements are compatible with each other. It also allows us to say that in the context of the divine love the first of them is the most basic, and *the third is the most comprehensive*, statement that can be made about the Holy Spirit" (emphasis added).³²³ When the mutual or bestowal model is completed, as Coffey writes, only with the Spirit's return from the Son to the Father, the Spirit fully is mutual love after the return.

So too the inverted subordination raised for Cipriani and Ayres is a real danger for Coffey. In other words, the Father and the Son can be conceived as loving each other not by Themselves, but by the Holy Spirit as the mutual love. Coffey emphasized the Holy Spirit as the Father's love. However, while Augustine would modify his predecessors' interpretation of 1 Cor 1:24 (*trin.* 6.1–2 [CCSL 50, 228–229]), Coffey seems to be suggesting that the Father is not love by himself without the Spirit as His love. Similarly, for the mutuality of the love, Coffey insisted that the Son returns the same love to the Father. This emphasis could end in the Son's dependence on the Holy Spirit for His personhood by which He loves the Father. If the Son can love His Father only through the Holy Spirit, the Son is dependent on Him in terms of love and, due to the notion of divine simplicity, consequently also in terms of being. Augustine had in fact warned explicitly for this argument in relation to the false interpretation of Col 1:13 in *De trinitate* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 514; see pp. 238–239 above). Regretfully, this precise

322 Coffey, "A Proper Mission," 232.

323 Coffey, "A Proper Mission," 249. Interestingly, Coffey's idea of the procession of the Holy Spirit based on the mutual love theory relates to Gregory Palamas' notion that "the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and 'reposes' on the Son, so that the Son (and hence Christ) is the 'Treasurer' of the Holy Spirit" (250). Even if he followed Dumitru Stăniloae on this point, Coffey did not reflect on the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια which ought in fact to have been considered.

passage was ignored by Coffey when he analyzed a number of sentences from the same part of *De trinitate*.

Without falling into the contamination of these two forms of subordination potentially implied by Coffey's admittedly interesting theory, Augustine explicitly indicated that Scripture did not apply the word love particularly to the Holy Spirit and emphasized that all three persons as true God are by themselves love. When he applied the term love particularly to the Holy Spirit, it signified that He as being *communis* to the Father and the Son was conceived as the *common* love of the Father and the Son who are love. In this way, Augustine at the same time maintained the same divinity which the Spirit had with the Father and the Son and His hypostatic property.

While the Holy Spirit is first *caritas of* and then *between* Father and Son, the *caritas* of the Holy Spirit works *toward* the Father and the Son. The Holy Spirit as *caritas of* the Father and the Son proceeds from Both. When He as *caritas* of the Father proceeds from the Father, he creates in the human mind love *toward* the Father. He also causes in human beings love toward the Son in that He as *caritas* of the Son proceeds also from the Son.

More precisely, the *caritas* toward the Father and the Son is *caritas* working "through the Son toward the Father" in that the Holy Spirit as *caritas* exists *principaliter* from the Father. This emerges clearly when Augustine says about the Spirit, "*deus ergo ex deo est dilectio*." Love, who proceeds *principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son, finally creates in the human mind love toward the Father through the Son.

5.2 *In Augustine's Trinitarian Epistemology*

The crucial issue in the doctrine of the Trinity was the Son's equal divinity with the Father. Against Arianism, Augustine defended this teaching throughout his trinitarian treatises. In order to do so, he identified the key sticking point at the beginning of *De trinitate*. As quoted and analyzed above, Augustine attributed the key error to the perverted love of *ratio*. At the same time, he insisted on the catholic faith taking priority for an appropriate approach to the trinity.³²⁴

This faith is christological in its nature. First of all, the faith was transmitted from Christ through the apostles. This christological origin of the catholic faith was plainly expressed in *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 37.6. Augustine there clearly said that the teaching of John was learned "from the Lord."³²⁵ This catholic faith from the Lord was transmitted to believers through "the teachings

324 *trin.* 1.1 (CCSL 50, 27); see pp. 168–170 above.

325 *Io. eu. tr.* 37.6 (CCSL 36, 334).

of the Apostles” and a “continuous line of succession.”³²⁶ The faith, transmitted originally from Christ, furthermore has christological contents teaching who Christ is. In particular, this faith teaches one to distinguish *forma serui* and *form dei* in the one person of Christ.³²⁷

Based on this teaching, Augustine introduced the *canonica regula*.³²⁸ As explained,³²⁹ the *regula* distinguished biblical texts that reveal the humanity of the Son from those that reveal the divinity of the Son. The *regula* allowed him to interpret in terms of the salvific *dispensatio* those biblical passages that reveal the *forma serui* of the Son, and to confess the same divinity of the Son from other biblical passages that reveal the *forma dei* of the Son. Interestingly, as notably Ayres has pointed out,³³⁰ Augustine said from his interpretation of John 14:28, 16:28, and 20:11 that also the *canonica regula* originated from Christ.³³¹ Consequently, both the catholic faith and the *canonica regula* were entirely christological in that they are taught by and transmitted from Christ in order to teach us who the incarnated God is in the Trinity.

Through this *regula* taught by Christ, the catholic faith fully maintained the Trinity. Against Sabellianism, it taught the hypostatic distinction between the Son and the Father. Against Arianism, it affirmed the one divinity of the Son and the Father.

We, that is, the Catholic faith, coming from the teaching of the Apostles implanted in us, received through a continuous line of succession a healthy faith to be transmitted to our posterity, has held that truth between both, that is, between each error. In the error of the Sabellians, there is only one; the very same one who is the Son is the Father. In the error of the Arians, the Father is a different person from the Son, but the Son is not only another person but also another thing. You in the middle, what about you? You have excluded the Sabellians; exclude also the Arians. The Father is the Father; the Son is the Son, another person, not another thing. For he said, “I and the Father, we are one thing” (John 10:30), as I taught yesterday, as well as I could. When he hears, “we are,” let the Sabellian depart in confusion; when he hears, “one thing,” let the Arian

³²⁶ *Io. eu. tr.* 37.6 (CCSL 36, 335).

³²⁷ *Io. eu. tr.* 36.2 (CCSL 36, 324).

³²⁸ Augustine called the teaching just *regula* in *Io. eu. tr.* 36.2 (CCSL 36, 324).

³²⁹ See pp. 212–214 above.

³³⁰ Ayres, *Augustine*, 152–155.

³³¹ *trin.* 1.18, 21 (CCSL 50, 53–54, 58–59).

depart in confusion. Let the Catholic pilot the ship of his faith between each; for one must beware of shipwreck upon each. Therefore, do you say what the Gospel says: "I and the Father, we are one thing." Not different, because "one thing," not one [person], because "we are."³³²

The christological faith is not limited to who Christ is, but leads ultimately to the knowledge of the Father. The ultimate goal of purification by the christological faith is the knowledge of God the Father.

For this ultimate goal, the Son was made flesh. Augustine even stated this explicitly from the very first book of *De trinitate*. In *De trinitate* 1.27, he explained a number of biblical passages with apparently conflicting messages on the incarnated Christ. There he followed the *canonica regula* and interpreted those passages as revealing at one and the same time who Christ is in the *forma serui* and in the *forma dei*. In this exegesis, Augustine emphasized that faith in Christ is to believe that the Son, who takes the *forma serui*, has a Godhead equal to *that of God the Father* according to the *forma dei*. At the same time, he insisted that the Son "drew men's faith away from Himself and brought it back to the Father."³³³

Moreover, when interpreting 1 Cor 15:24, Augustine said, "Our Lord Jesus Christ, therefore, will deliver the kingdom to God and the Father (1 Cor 15:24), though neither He Himself nor the Holy Spirit are to be kept out of it when He shall bring the faithful to the contemplation of God. There is the end of all our good deeds, and the eternal rest and joy which will never be taken from us."³³⁴ In other words, believing in Christ signifies the movement of believers to the contemplation of the Father. Interestingly, Augustine interprets the eschatological event of 1 Cor 15:24 not just as the contemplation of the Father, but also as the contemplation of God the Trinity.³³⁵ Augustine did not neglect the equal divinity of the Son and the Holy Spirit with that of the Father. Rather, he emphasized that the christological faith leads into the true knowledge of the Father whose Image is the incarnated Son. The human mind is purified by the christological faith in order to see the Father.

In Augustine's trinitarian epistemology, the Holy Spirit's work is nothing other than to convert the human mind to the christological faith so as to contemplate God the Father. In other words, the Holy Spirit as *communis caritas* of

³³² *Io. eu. tr.* 37.6 (CCSL 36, 335).

³³³ *trin.* 1.27 (CCSL 50, 68).

³³⁴ *trin.* 1.20 (CCSL 50, 56).

³³⁵ For the expression "God and the Father" (*deo et patri*), see note 147 above.

the Father and the Son causes the human mind to love and believe in Christ in order to reach *contemplatio* of the Father.³³⁶

The catholic faith in Christ, with which the human mind must begin to seek the Trinity, is not in principle an ability of the “immature and perverted love of *ratio*.” This immature and perverted love demonstrates rather that the human mind, if it bears this love, is far removed from the christological faith. If the human mind’s love for itself is mature and correct, in line with Augustine’s ideas on *imago dei* as analyzed above, the human mind cannot but believe in and love Christ as the Image of God. The human mind can be defined to be fully *imago dei* when it remains capable of God and of participation in the divine through the Image of God. In this participation, it remains the image and it loves itself as itself. Then, *amor sui* is complete. Otherwise, its self-love cannot be a complete *amor sui* since it loves its deformation. In this sense, perverted love signifies the absence of faith in Christ.

Only the Holy Spirit can recover the human mind’s love of and faith in Christ. As explained, the Holy Spirit as *caritas* of the Son creates love for Christ. Augustine encouraged believers, saying, “Let us, therefore, love Him and hold fast to Him by that charity which is diffused in our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).”³³⁷ The Holy Spirit as Gift, which is love, “attaches” (*subiungit*) human beings to Christ.³³⁸ In this sense, Augustine boldly states that the gift of love of the Holy Spirit “divides the children of the eternal kingdom of the children of eternal perdition.”³³⁹

Faith in Christ works continuously also by the love given by the Holy Spirit which attaches believers to Christ. As has been argued, the christological faith in Christ as *scientia* and *sapientia* purifies the human being from thinking of temporal things and turns it to thinking of eternal things. This purification will be completed in the eschaton. At that time, the purified human mind can see God the Trinity face to face. Until that time, the human mind passes through a process of purification by faith in Christ who is true man and true God. This journey of purification by faith can be led only by the Holy Spirit’s gift of love to desire to love and believe in Christ as *scientia* and *sapientia* and to believe that it will see Christ and the holy Trinity face to face in the eschaton.³⁴⁰ Consequently, Augustine writes, “For in order that faith may work through charity,

336 Also, see *ench.* 5–8.

337 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 253).

338 *trin.* 7.6 (CCSL 50, 254).

339 *trin.* 15.32 (CCSL 50A, 507).

340 *trin.* 4.24–25.

the charity of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5).³⁴¹

Encouraging believers to love and believe in Christ for purification from temporal and corporeal thinking, the Holy Spirit leads them to *contemplatio* of the Father. The work of the Holy Spirit is not just determined by this christological perspective. Rather, existing not only *communiter* from the Son but also *principaliter* from the Father, He purifies the human mind through the christological faith in order to acknowledge God the Father. The ultimate goal of the purification effected by christological faith through the gift of love of the Spirit is the knowledge of the Father who is *pater uero a nullo*.

5.3 In Augustine's Spiritual Theology

5.3.1 Formation to Participate in the Divine Nature

One of the elements studied above in the introduction to Augustine's trinitarian theology was his view on the creation of angels. Some substantial passages, among them *Confessiones* 12.9, 12.12, and 12.15, were examined to reveal Augustine's views on the creation of the spiritual creatures. What emerged from them is that their creation was their formation to contemplate God, to participate in God, and to fully enjoy (*perfruatur*) the eternity and immutability of God.³⁴² Even though they are neither God and Being itself (*non id ipsum*)³⁴³ nor eternal and immutable, Augustine still attributed the divine quality of immutability to them in that they were created to be *formed* to contemplate and participate in the immutable God.

Augustine's notion of the creation of angels was again deeply colored christologically. This becomes clear when he explains in *Confessiones* 12.20 the creation of angels as "becoming the created wisdom" by "the creating Wisdom" and as "being illuminated" by the Light of God.³⁴⁴ Augustine identified both the Light and the Wisdom of God with the Son when he explained the existence of the Trinity in creation. In *Confessiones* 13.6, he interpreted the "in the beginning" of Gen 1:1 as in the Son who is the begotten Wisdom equal to the Father and coeternal.³⁴⁵ So too he identified the Light with the Son who is the Logos of God when he depicted the creation of the spiritual creatures as an illuminated conversion to the Light.³⁴⁶

341 *trin.* 13.14 (CCSL 50A, 400).

342 *conf.* 12.15 (CCSL 27, 223).

343 *conf.* 12.21 (CCSL 27, 226).

344 *conf.* 12.20 (CCSL 27, 225–226).

345 *conf.* 13.6 (CCSL 27, 244).

346 *conf.* 13.3 (CCSL 27, 243).

In this christological creation, Augustine significantly defines the creation of the spiritual beings as conformation to the Form who is the Logos: "Or, how did the inchoative spiritual creation merit from Thee, even to ebb and flow darkly like the abyss, but unlike Thee, unless it were turned by the same Word to the same Being by whom it was made, and, enlightened by Him, could become light—though not as an equal, but still conformed to a form equal to Thee?"³⁴⁷ Similarly, when Augustine studies Gen 1:3, he interprets the light there in the sense of this christological conformation.

Happy the creature who has known nothing else! Though it would have been something else, if, as soon as it was made, without any time interval, it had not been borne upward by Thy Gift which moves over every mutable thing by that call whereby Thou didst say: 'Be light made' (Gen 1:3) and so it became light. For, in us, there is a difference between the time when we belonged to darkness and when we were made light (Eph 5:8). But, in the case of that creature, it was said what it would have been if it had not been illumined; and thus it was said, as if it were at first unstable and darkened, so that the cause, by which it was made to exist differently, would be evident; that is, became light by being turned toward the never-failing Light.³⁴⁸

The same message is found also in *De ciuitate dei* 11.9³⁴⁹ and, in even clearer terms, in *De Genesi ad litteram* 1.4.9 and 2.8.16 (CSEL 28/1, 7, 43). The creation of spiritual beings is formation for contemplating and participating in God the Father through the illumination by and conformation to the Son who is the Wisdom, Logos, and Light.

This christological creation-conformation of the spiritual creatures is maintained by the Holy Spirit. For the work of the Holy Spirit, the just quoted passage from *Confessiones* 13.11 is of key significance. The passage designates not only the christological creation of the spiritual creatures, but also their pneumatological creation. Augustine attributed it to the Gift of God that the spiritual creatures could not fall from being illumined by and conformed to the Light who is the Son: "Though it would have been something else, if, as soon as it was made, without any time interval, it had not been borne upward by Thy Gift which moves over every mutable thing (*quod superfertur super omne mutabile*) by that call whereby Thou didst say: 'Be light made' (Gen 1:3) and so it

347 *conf.* 13.3 (CCSL 27, 243).

348 *conf.* 13.11 (CCSL 27, 247).

349 CCSL 48, 329–330.

became light.” This Gift of God is the Holy Spirit who stimulates the spiritual creatures to go upwards: “... every obedient mind in Thy heavenly City clung to Thee and rested in Thy Spirit, who moved immutably over every mutable thing (*qui superfertur incommutabiliter super omne mutabile*). Otherwise, the very heaven of heaven would have been in itself a dark abyss.”³⁵⁰ In order to describe the Holy Spirit, Augustine uses an expression here (*qui superfertur incommutabiliter super omne mutabile*) that is similar to the one he uses for the Gift of God in *Confessiones* 13.11. In *Confessiones* 13.10 he plainly identifies the Holy Spirit as the Gift according to Acts 2:38.³⁵¹

By his work of maintenance, the Holy Spirit causes the spiritual creatures to move continuously up toward God the Father. Interpreting Rom 5:5, Augustine compared *cupiditas* for the abyss and *caritas* toward God, and attributes *caritas* to the work of the Holy Spirit.

Now, from this point on, let him who can, follow in his understanding Thy Apostle who says that Thy ‘charity’ is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit who has been given to us (Rom 5:5); and who teaches about spiritual things (cf. 1Cor 12:1), showing us the super-eminent way of charity and bending His knee to Thee for us, so that we may learn the super-eminent knowledge of Christ’s charity (Eph 3:14 and 19). And so, being super-eminent from the commencement, He moved over the waters. To whom shall I speak, how shall I speak of the weight of concupiscence pulling down into the steep abyss, and of the uplifting power of charity through Thy Spirit, who moved over the waters? To whom shall I speak, how shall I say it? For, here are no places in which we are submerged and from which we emerge. (What analogy could be truer, what analogy more false?) Here, rather, are feelings, here are loves: the impurity of our spirit flowing down lower, because of the love of things which are cares; and Thy holiness lifting us up higher, because of the love of freedom from care, so that we lift up our heart to Thee, where Thy Spirit moves above the waters, and we may come to supereminent repose, when our soul will have passed through the waters which are without substance (Ps 123:5).³⁵²

Although this passage actually describes the love of the Holy Spirit in the inner man, this work is entirely similar to what he does in the spiritual creatures. In

³⁵⁰ *conf.* 13.9 (CCSL 27, 245–246).

³⁵¹ CCSL 27, 246.

³⁵² *conf.* 13.8 (CCSL 27, 245).

the love of the Holy Spirit, the spiritual creatures can remain in their illumination by and conformity to the Light and in their upward progress to upward God. "Otherwise, the very heaven of heaven would have been in itself a dark abyss."³⁵³ More clearly, Augustine writes: "Thus with our praise to our Creator, we should all proclaim that, not only of holy men, but also of holy angels, it may be said that 'the charity of God is poured forth' in them 'by the Holy Spirit who has been given' to them. Nor is it the good only of men, but first and foremost that of angels, which is referred to in the words: 'It is good for me to adhere to my God.'"³⁵⁴

5.3.2 Christ as *sacramentum* and *exemplum*

By *deformatio*, the condition of human beings worsened from that of their original creation due to the fact that the human mind adheres so powerfully to material things that it thinks itself as one of them and does not recognize what it truly is. This human mind, which is restricted to the corporeal senses in time, requires a temporal and visible solution to achieve *reformatio*. To this end, the merciful love of God took the initiative to reveal the way to Beatitude: the incarnated Son. Augustine writes: "For since man ought to follow none but God in order to reach his blessedness, and was unable to perceive God; by following the God-Man, he would follow Him whom he could perceive, and whom at the same time he ought to follow."³⁵⁵ The Son who was incarnated visibly in time, is the only way through which human beings can follow.

In Augustine's thinking, the human mind must be *reformed* or *renewed* by the *Imago dei* from its *deformatio* to its original *formatio* as *imago dei*. Augustine described this general conception in *De trinitate* 14.22 where he interprets Rom 12:2 and Eph 4:23–24.³⁵⁶ The human mind does not receive a new form by *reformatio*. Rather, with "the new man" or "the newness" the human mind means the recovery of the original *formatio* by way of *reformatio* or *renouatio*. By *reformatio*, the human mind recovers its *species* as *imago dei* and turns its intention toward God. This *reformatio* cannot but occur by turning toward the Son. He is the Creator and the *Imago* through which human images were created by God the Father: "... with the example of this Image before us, let us also not depart from God. For we are, likewise, the image of God, not indeed an equal image, since it was made by the Father through the Son, not born of the

353 *conf.* 13.9 (CCSL 27, 246).

354 *ciu.* 12.9 (CCSL 48, 364).

355 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 253).

356 *trin.* 14.22 (CCSL 50A, 451–452).

Father as that is.”³⁵⁷ The Son is *Imago sine exemplum* for the images that have to imitate and follow the *Imago* as Augustine argued in *De trinitate* 7.5: The Son “does not imitate anyone who comes before Him in respect to the Father, from whom He is wholly inseparable, since He has the same essence with Him from whom He is; we have to imitate Him ... because by His humility He has been made a road for us in time, in order that by His divinity He might be for us a mansion in eternity.”³⁵⁸

In this general and christological *reformatio* of the human mind, Augustine does not overlook the fact that the human body will become like Christ’s glorified body in the resurrection. Christ is not only *Imago* for images that are human mind, but also the model to which the human body will be transformed to become immortal. The immortal body will participate in the immortality of the glorified body of Christ.

357 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 252–253).

358 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 253). Here Augustine echoes his own argument from *diu. qu.* 51 and 83. There he distinguished “being image” and “being according to image.” The first was attributed to the Word, and the second to the creation of human beings. Human beings were created according to the Image of God who is the Word. In this interpretation, Augustine probably followed his Latin predecessors (Victorinus, *Adversus Arium* 4.22.4; Ambrose of Milan, *De fide* 1.7.53). Moreover, this was the interpretation of the Alexandrian tradition (Irenaeus, *Adversus haereses* 5.16.2; Clement of Alexandria, *Stromateis* 5.14.94, 6.9.72; Origen, *Commentaria in evangelium Joannis* 1.17, 2.3; *Homiliae in Genesim* 1.13; Athanasius, *Contra gentes* 2; *De incarnatione* 6.14). Interestingly, however, Augustine himself appears to contradict this interpretation as late as in the last part of *trin.* 7. There he critically noted the distinction, saying: “For there are some who distinguish in such a way that they will have the Son to be the image, but man to be not an image, but to the image. But the Apostle has refuted them when he says: ‘A man indeed ought not to cover his head, because he is the image and the glory of God’ (1 Cor 11:7). He did not say to the image, but ‘the image.’ But since this image is elsewhere spoken of as ‘to the image,’ it is not said as it were in reference to the Son, who is the Image equal to the Father; otherwise, He would not say ‘to our image’” (*trin.* 7.12 [CCSL 50, 266–267]). Did Augustine contradict his own position, and was he inconsistent even within the same book? Most commentators, such as M. Mellet-Th. Camelot, Cillerai, and Cipriani, have simply noted the change in *trin.* 7.12 compared to *diu. qu.* 51 and 83 with little or no attention for *trin.* 7.5. But when the interpretation of *diu. qu.* 51 and 83 finds similar expression in *trin.* 7.5, the interpretation in *trin.* 7.12 cannot just be explained as a change from his earlier position. When he maintained the two interpretations in the same book, Augustine probably did not intend to deny his earlier position or to substitute a new position for it. Rather, in *trin.* 7.12, Augustine probably seeks at once to emphasize the unity and distinction of the three persons in the Trinity using the biblical expression in plural form (“our image”) as he did when he quoted John 10:30 in the previous paragraph, *trin.* 7.11. See Mellet and Camelot, *La trinité (Livres I–VII)*, 589–591; Cillerai, *La trinità*, 1081; Cipriani, *La teologia*, 199–200.

For a deeper understanding of Augustine's general notion of the *reformatio* of the human mind and the transformation of the mortal body into an immortal body, it is necessary to examine his famous *sacramentum-exemplum* pairing.³⁵⁹

For Augustine, the whole human being, which consists of the inner and the outer man, must be redeemed by Christ. As such, the redemption of the inner man, which is the soul or mind, is penance, and that of the outer man, which is the corporeal body, is the renewal of life in the corruptible body.³⁶⁰ In connection with the redemption of the whole man, Augustine called Christ *sacramentum* and *exemplum*.³⁶¹

First, Christ is *sacramentum* for the inner man. Augustine relates Christ's death on the cross and his resurrection to the resurrection that occurs in the inner man. The resurrection in the inner man is penance, as Augustine indeed says in the passage just quoted. More precisely, if the death of the inner man is *impietas* and *peccatum*,³⁶² the resurrection of the inner man is their death.³⁶³ In other words, if the death of the inner man is becoming *peccatores* and *inimici dei*³⁶⁴ through spiritual death to God, the resurrection of the inner man is reconciliation toward and with Him. For this death and resurrection of the inner man, the death and resurrection of Christ is *sacramentum*.

This *sacramentum* is defined as a *sacramentum of sanguis iusti*.³⁶⁵ The blood of the Just is the *sacramentum* which brought the human mind from *impietas* and *peccatum* against God to reconciliation with Him. In *De trinitate* 13, Augustine offers an interpretation of what the two biblical phrases "justified by his blood" and "reconciled by the death of his Son" (Rom 5:10) signify.³⁶⁶ He

359 Also, see Charles Couturier, "Sacramentum et Mysterium dans l'oeuvre de S. Augustin," in *Études augustinienes*, eds. H. Rondet et al. (Paris: Aubier, 1953), 162–332; Studer, "«Sacramentum et Exemplum»"; Dodaro, *Christ*, 147–164.

360 *trin.* 4.5 (CCSL 50, 165).

361 Studer emphasized the unity of the divine and human natures in the one person of Christ for the unity of *sacramentum* and *exemplum* in his criticism of Geerlings' weak emphasis on the unity. See Basil Studer, "Zur Christologie Augustins," *Aug* 19 (1979): 539–546; Geerlings, *Christus Exemplum*, 209–222. Dodaro attempted to give clearer emphasize to the mutual relationship between the two natures in Christ as an analogy for the relationship between Christ's sacraments and examples See Dodaro, *Christ*, 91–92, 154n33.

362 *trin.* 4.15 (CCSL 50, 180).

363 *trin.* 4.6 (CCSL 50, 167).

364 *trin.* 13.14 (CCSL 50A, 400–401). Interpreting Rom 5:6 and 8–10, Augustine considered the following four terms synonyms: *peccatores* (Rom 5:8), *inimici dei* (Rom 5:10), *infirmi*, and *impii* (Rom 5:6).

365 *trin.* 4.4 (CCSL 50, 164); *ciu.* 18.49.

366 *trin.* 13.15 (CCSL 50A, 402).

began his interpretation with the following statement: "By the justice of God the whole human race was delivered into the power of the devil, the sin of the first man passing originally into all of both sexes, who were born through conjugal union, and the debt of our first parents binding all their posterity."³⁶⁷ In this statement, Augustine's key message is that the human race was captured "into the power of the devil" by the *justice (iustitia)* of God. He explains this statement more concretely in the following passage from *De trinitate* 13: "But as regards the manner, whereby man was delivered into the power of the devil: it ought not to be understood as though God had done this or ordered this to be done, but that He only permitted it, yet justly. For when He abandoned the sinner, the author of sin immediately entered into him."³⁶⁸ The sinner was allowed to be captured by the devil by "the *just* anger of God" (*iram dei iustam*) against sin.³⁶⁹ In this regard, justice means that God cannot but *justly* permit the appropriate *poena* of sinners due to their sins.

In this regard, Augustine states that "the devil was to be overcome, not by the power of God, but by His justice,"³⁷⁰ which is "the justice of Jesus Christ" (*iustitia Iesu Christi*).³⁷¹ What "the justice of Christ" means is explained in *De trinitate* 13.18–19, although even there his account is not easy to conceptualize or systematize. Nevertheless, two aspects of "the justice of Jesus Christ" can be reasonably derived from that passage. First, the justice of Christ is obedience to the will of God the Father to his death on the cross even though the devil "found in Him nothing worthy of death." The second is the justice by which sinners, whom the devil justly captured, should be set free from the devil, who unjustly slew Christ who was just. These two aspects of that justice are captured well in the following dense quotation.

What is the justice, therefore, by which the devil was conquered? What, unless the justice of Jesus Christ? And how was he conquered? Because, although he found in Him nothing worthy of death, yet he slew Him. And it is certainly just that the debtors, whom he held, should be set free, since they believed in Him whom he slew without any debt.³⁷²

³⁶⁷ *trin.* 13.16 (CCSL 50A, 402).

³⁶⁸ *trin.* 13.16 (CCSL 50A, 403).

³⁶⁹ *trin.* 13.16 (CCSL 50A, 404).

³⁷⁰ *trin.* 13.17 (CCSL 50A, 404).

³⁷¹ *trin.* 13.18 (CCSL 50A, 406).

³⁷² *trin.* 13.18 (CCSL 50A, 406).

By the *sacramentum* of the justice of the blood of Christ who was just, sinners were justified and reconciled with God the Father.

Second, Christ is *exemplum*. Most of all, He is *exemplum* for the outer man. Augustine relates this particularly to the death of the corruptible body, which is *poena peccati* for the inner man,³⁷³ and its resurrection: "Moreover the death of the Lord's body serves as a type (*exemplum*) of the death of our outer man, And the Resurrection of the Lord's body is found to serve as a type of the resurrection of our outer man"³⁷⁴ In other words, Christ is *exemplum* for the future that the outer man will die and then be resurrected like Christ. More precisely, the glorified and incorruptible body of Christ is *exemplum* for the transformation of the corruptible body in the resurrection after death. In this regard, the death of the corruptible body is imitation of and participation in the *exemplum* of Christ, so that it cannot be drawn to "the ruin of the second and eternal death."³⁷⁵ In short, *exemplum* is *exemplum* of the transformation of the body into the incorruptible and glorified body of Christ.

However, for Augustine being *exemplum* was not limited to the outer man. Christ is at the same time also *exemplum* for the inner man. Augustine referred to this specifically as the *exemplum humilitatis*. It is the *summum mediamentum* for *superbia*, which is the *maximum impedimentum* to the *forma* as *imago dei* which has to adhere to God.³⁷⁶ Furthermore, Christ is *exemplum oboedientiae* for the inner man.³⁷⁷ Sinners were not obedient to God following their *superbia* and their love for the *potentia* of the devil against God. Christ, on the contrary, revealed the way of *oboedientia* that the human mind is to imitate. In these two ways, Christ, who is *sacramentum* as explained above, is also *exemplum humilitatis* and *oboedientiae* for the inner man who is contaminated by the *superbia* of the devil against God. Christ as *sacramentum* and *exemplum* cures our *superbia*.³⁷⁸

To fully understand the unique character of Augustine's notion of Christ as *sacramentum* and *exemplum*, we need to consider the elements he emphasized in his criticism on Pelagius and his followers. Interestingly, Pelagius' Christology may not have differed significantly from that of Augustine. At least, Pelagius confessed that Christ had two natures and that human beings are redeemed

373 *trin.* 4.5, 15 (CCSL 50, 165, 181).

374 *trin.* 4.6 (CCSL 50, 168).

375 *trin.* 13.19 (CCSL 50A, 408).

376 *trin.* 13.22 (CCSL 50A, 412–413).

377 *trin.* 13.22 (CCSL 50A, 413).

378 *trin.* 8.7 (CCSL 50, 267); Studer, "«Sacramentum et Exemplum»,” 105; Dodaro, *Christ*, 156–157.

from their sins by Christ's death and resurrection.³⁷⁹ In this sense, one might expect Pelagius to have shared similar ideas with Augustine on the *sacramentum* and *exemplum* of Christ, since Augustine's view, as detailed above, was based on the two natures of the unique person of Christ.

In fact, however, Augustine throughout his polemics was not convinced by Pelagius' argument regarding the *exemplum* of Christ and its imitation. His vehement criticism of his opponents revolved around the following two main points, namely that the possibility of imitating the *exemplum* of Christ was given primarily only "in" Christ, and is attributed to human beings only "by" Christ.

Even though he acknowledged the two natures in the one person of Christ, Pelagius appears not to have taken the relationship between the two natures very seriously. Otherwise, he would not have identified Christ's virtual *exemplum* as something that human beings could imitate in their human nature. He did not distinguish Christ's virtual *exemplum* and human virtual ability, but argued that Christ's *exemplum* could be imitated by human nature. Augustine, by contrast, emphasized the relationship between the two natures in the one person of Christ who was the only true Mediator between God and man, and acknowledged that Christ's *exemplum* has its origin from His divine nature.³⁸⁰ In other words, Christ's virtual *exemplum* is not just human but also divine in His unique person. As Robert Dodaro has accurately noted: "Virtues, which have their origin in God, are mediated to human beings through Christ's divine and human natures."³⁸¹ Hence, His *exemplum* is not simply imitated by human beings in their human nature. His *exemplum* was "His" *exemplum*. Since Pelagius' Christology failed to account for the relationship between the two natures in the one person of Christ, Augustine charged that he in fact confessed two Christs.³⁸²

379 For Pelagius' Christology, see J. Rivière, "Hétérodoxie des Pélagiens en fait de rédemption?," *RHE* 41 (1946): 5–43; Joanne M. Dewart, "The Christology of the Pelagian Controversy," *StPatr* 17 (1982): 1221–1244.

380 For the development of the concept of the unity of the two natures in Augustine, see Tarsicius Jan van Bavel, *Recherches sur la christologie de Saint Augustin: L'humain et le divin dans le Christ d'après Saint Augustin* (Fribourg: Éd. Universitaires, 1954); Hubertus R. Drobner, *Person-Exegese und Christologie bei Augustinus: Zur Herkunft der Formel una persona*, *Philosophia Patrum* 8 (Leiden: Brill, 1986).

381 Dodaro, *Christ*, 92.

382 *pecc. mer.* 1.60; s. 294.9. Even though Wisse's criticism on contemporary understandings of Augustine's *unus christus* and *totus christus* and his own interpretation of Augustine's Christology are interesting, he regrettably did not pay sufficient attention to the influence of the anti-Pelagian controversy on Augustine's concept of *unus Christus* and *totus*

Moreover, Christ's human nature was not equal to that of other human beings who had fallen from their *formatio* to God. In the unconfused unity of his human and divine natures, Christ was totally free from all sin. His human nature remains always integrated with the divine nature.³⁸³ Christ was the only Just (*solus iustus*).³⁸⁴ In this regard, His virtues were beyond any ability of human beings, who had become enemies of God.

For this reason, human beings cannot imitate Christ's *exemplum* by their natural capacity or ability, as Pelagius indeed thought. Rather, imitation is possible only "by" Christ. Augustine brought this into relief by interpreting the figure of the cross in terms of the relationship between Christ's *sacramentum* and *exemplum*. In *Ad inquisitiones Ianuarii* (ep. 54–55) and *De gratia noui testamenti* (ep. 140), Augustine interprets Eph 3:18 and connects the verse figuratively to the cross of Christ.³⁸⁵ Where the verse speaks about the height, breadth, length and depth of Christ's love, Augustine relates these dimensions to the four parts of Christ's cross: the height of Christ's love was related to the vertical beam above the crossbeam; the breadth to the crossbeam; the length to the vertical beam; and, finally, the depth to the hidden part of the vertical beam. Once he had connected the four elements of Christ's love with the four parts of the cross, Augustine offered a symbolic and virtual interpretation of the four parts

Christus. See Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology*, chapter 3. For a more detailed discussion of Wisse, see note 395 below.

383 *ench.* 40; *praed. sanct.* 30; Van Bavel, *Recherches*, 85–101, quoted in Dodaro, *Christ*, 92n82. Based on the research of Van Bavel, Dodaro argued that Augustine's comparison between Christ and human beings changed after 411, particularly in his anti-Pelagian writings. Before that time, Augustine had distinguished Christ and human beings only in general terms (*exp. Gal.* 24; *uirg.* 37; perhaps *en. Ps.* 44.7). After that time, Augustine no longer considered any symmetry even between Christ and saints like Paul (*gest. Pel.* 32) and plainly confirmed that Christ alone was completely free from sin (*c. Iul. imp.* 5.57) as a result of the unity of the two natures in "one person." (*c. Iul. imp.* 4.48). In this regard, Dodaro, following Van Bavel and Drobner, argued that the concept "one person" emerged much more clearly in the context of the Pelagian controversy, even though Augustine had indeed already used it at an earlier time (*pecc. mer.* 1.60; s. 294.9; *ep.* 140.12, 187.10; *perseu.* 67; *corrept.* 30; *c. Iul. imp.* 4.84; *ench.* 36). See Dodaro, 93; Van Bavel, *Recherches*, 20; Drobner, *Person-Exegese*, 241–253.

384 *ciu.* 17.4; *Io. eu. tr.* 41.9; *en. Ps.* 36.2.14, 50.9, 98.7; s. 161.9.

385 The similarly symbolic interpretation of the cross occurs first in *doctr. chr.* 2.41. Here, Augustine relates the four parts of the cross to the virtual life of Christians. The elements of the virtual life echo what Augustine writes in *ep.* 54–55 and *ep.* 140. Apart from these passages, the symbolic interpretation of the cross appears also in *Io. eu. tr.* 118.5; *en. Ps.* 103.1.14, 147.34; s. 53.15, 165.3. See Simonetti, *L'istruzione cristiana*, 477. For the various interpretations of the cross in the patristic era, see Jean Daniélou, *Théologie du judéo-christianisme* (Paris: Desclée, 1958), 290 ff.

of the cross: The vertical beam above the crossbeam symbolized Christ's perseverance in hope; the crossbeam symbolized His just deeds; the vertical beam symbolized His endurance of suffering and evil; and, finally, the hidden part of the vertical beam beneath the earth symbolized the hidden source of Christ's virtues. From these four parts of the cross as they were tied to the four elements of Christ's love, Augustine emphasized against the Pelagians that the final, hidden part of the cross has a special relationship to the other parts of the cross. The other parts reveal Christ's virtual *exemplum* to be imitated by Christians.³⁸⁶ The final, hidden part signifies the hidden source of His *exemplum*, which sustains the three parts above the earth and makes them possible. In other words, christological *exemplum* and its imitation is realized only by the hidden source. In this regard, Augustine called it the "hiddenness of the sacrament" (*secretum sacramenti*)³⁸⁷ and identified it with God's grace.³⁸⁸ Against Pelagius who claimed a natural capacity for human beings to imitate Christ's virtual *exemplum*, Augustine plainly denied that possibility and underscored the necessity and priority of Christ's *sacramentum* and God's grace. When human beings are free from sins and reconciled with God by Christ's *sacramentum*, they are transformed to be able to imitate Christ's virtual *exemplum*.

This possibility recovered *by* Christ is also brought to actualization only *by* Christ. Or, to follow Augustine's own terms more accurately, the actualization of the recovered possibility is not just *by* but *in* Christ. For this *in* Christ perspective, we need to recall here Augustine's notion of *totus Christus*. When human beings are united with Christ the Head and become His members, the members imitate the virtue of the Head *in* the body of Christ which is *totus Christus*.³⁸⁹ Augustine developed this theme in his theology particularly in relation to his principle for the interpretation of the Psalms. For Augustine, the Psalms are the songs either of Christ or of His body. In other words, the Psalms are the songs or prayers of *totus Christus*.³⁹⁰ As Manlio Simonetti has argued, Augustine adopted this notion from Tyconius, whose principles he quoted in *De doctrina christiana* 3.44 as Origen had developed them (*Exegetica in Psalmos* [PG 12, 1133]).³⁹¹

386 *ep.* 140.62–68.

387 *ep.* 55.25.

388 *ep.* 140.62.

389 *ciu.* 10.6, 10.20, *en. Ps.* 30.2.3.5, 61.4, 90.2.1; *s.* 341.11; *s. Dolbeau* 22.2, 22.19. In particular, *s.* 341.11 says that *Christus totus* is the third mode of Christ's existence after the eternal Word and the incarnated Son.

390 *en. Ps.* 58.1.2, 59.1; *ep.* 138.2. See Goulven Madec, "Christus," in *AugLex*, 1:879–882.

391 Simonetti, *L'istruzione cristiana*, 516–517. Interestingly, Simonetti, following Pier Cesare Bori, has argued that Augustine omitted the term *ratio* from the two quotations taken from

This principle was not just a hermeneutical one for Augustine. It rather was mystically ontological. In *Sermo* 133.8 (PL 38, 742), Augustine quotes Matt 25:40 and Acts 9:4 to underscore that *totus Christus consists of* Christ the Head and His body (*totus Christus caput et corpus*). A passage from *In Iohannis euangelium tractatus* 108.5 expresses the same idea much more clearly in relation to the notion of *unus Christus*.

But since, through the fact that the Mediator of God and men, the man Christ Jesus (cf. 1 Tim. 2:5) was made the Head of the Church [and] they are his members, therefore he says what follows: "And for them do I sanctify myself" (John 17:19) For what is "And for them do I sanctify myself" (John 17:19) except "I sanctify them in myself" since they themselves, too, are myself? For those about whom he says this, as I said, are his members, and the Head and the body is the one Christ (*unus est Christus caput et corpus*), as the Apostle teaches and says about the seed of Abraham, "But if you are Christ's, then you are the seed of Abraham" (Gal 3:29) when he had said earlier, "He does not say, 'and to seeds,' as in many, but as in one, and to your seed, which is Christ" (Gal 3:16) If, therefore, the seed of Abraham, that is Christ, what else was said to those to whom it was said, "Then you are the seed of Abraham" (Gal 3:29) except "Then you are Christ"? In regard to this is that which in another place the very same Apostle says: "I now rejoice in sufferings for you, and I fill up those things which are wanting of the afflictions of Christ in my flesh" (Col 1:24), He did not say "of the afflictions of me" but "of Christ" (Col 1:24), because he was a member of Christ and in his persecutions, such as it was necessary for Christ to suffer in his whole body, even he [i.e., Paul] was filling up his [i.e., Christ's] afflictions in his own [i.e., Paul's] portion.³⁹²

In this tremendous paragraph, Augustine claimed *unus est Christus caput et corpus*. The *unus* here, as Tarsicius Jan van Bavel has argued, signified *una persona*.³⁹³ For Augustine, the union between Christ and His body is the hypostatic

Tyconius in *doctr. chr.* 3.44. Even though for Tyconius the term *ratio* represented the only means to discern between Christ and His body, Augustine probably intended to emphasize the divine aid for the interpretation of the sacred texts. Pier Cesare Bori, "La ricezione delle « Regole » di Ticonio, da Agostino a Erasmo," *Annali di storia dell'esegesi* 5 (1988): 125–142.

392 *Io. eu. tr.* 108.5 (CCSL 36, 617–618). The English translation has been taken from John W. Rettig, trans., *Tractates on the Gospel of John 55–m*, FC 90 (Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1994).

393 Van Bavel, *Recherches*, 81. In relation to this beautiful passage, Madec in following Egon

union. Augustine thought of the *una persona* of Christ consisting of the Head and the members of His body.³⁹⁴ Based on the *una persona*, Augustine in the quoted passage expressed the sanctification of the members of Christ's body. For him, the sanctification of His body occurs only *in totus* and *unus Christus*.³⁹⁵

Franz has said that for Augustine the members themselves are Christ, and Pasquale Borgomeo has found the *communicatio idiomatum*. See Madec, "Christus," 881; Pasquale Borgomeo, *L'église de ce temps dans la prédication de Saint Augustin* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1972), 224n78. For Franz, see Egon Franz, "Totus Christus: Studien über Christus und die Kirche bei Augustin" (PhD Diss., Evangelisch-Theologische Fakultät der Rheinischen Friedrich-Wilhelms-Universität, Bonn, 1956).

394 In this regard, Borgomeo claimed, Augustine thought that the incarnation and the hypostatic union between Christ and His body is the one economy and that the latter is an extension of the incarnation. See Borgomeo, *L'église*, 211, 217, and 227–234.

395 In his *Habilitationsschrift*, Wisse criticized contemporary Augustine scholars like Van Bavel, Studer, John C. Cavadini, Drobner, Dodaro, and Ayres for their "pan-christological reading of Augustine." One of his key criticisms centered on the concept of *totus Christus* in relation to the *communicatio idiomatum*. According to Wisse, those scholars misunderstood Augustine's original idea of *totus Christus* in that they inaccurately tried to integrate it with the *communicatio idiomatum*, with which Augustine probably was not familiar. Against their reckless integration, Wisse claimed that Augustine did not teach the *communicatio idiomatum* but the unity of human beings *only* with the human nature of Christ (Wisse, *Trinitarian Theology*, 130). To support his claim, Wisse quoted *pecc. mer.* 60 and *trin.* 1.14 where Augustine similarly spoke of the unity of human beings or the Church "with the man Christ (*cum homine Christo*)." Wisse interpreted the phrase "with the man Christ (*cum homine Christo*)" to signify *only* the human nature of Christ (Wisse, 128–134). His criticism and interpretation of *totus Christus* is interesting and notable in that he accurately raises an important question as to whether or not Augustine reflected seriously on the signification of the technical term *communicatio idiomatum*. At least he is accurate insofar as Augustine did not use the term itself. Nevertheless, Wisse's argument seems weak to me and unbalanced. The phrase "the man Christ" in the passages from *pecc. mer.* 60 and *trin.* 1.14 which he quoted in support do not signify the human nature *only*. In *pecc. mer.* 60, the phrase appears rather to be a synonym for *unus Christus*, who is described as having the two natures in the unity of the person, and to signify the necessity of the incarnation for uniting human beings into *unus Christus*. So too in *trin.* 1.14, the phrase does not designate Christ's human nature *only* in that Augustine identified "the man Christ" with the Mediator who in Augustine's theology must be true God and true man. Apart from these two passages, Wisse pointed to the phrase *secundum formam serui* in *trin.* 1.24 to support his claim. When Augustine says "according to the form of a slave He is 'the head of the body, the Church,'" Wisse interpreted this passage to refer to the unity of the Church *only* in terms of the human nature of Christ. The whole context of *trin.* 1.24 is not, however, a typically christological discussion on the relationship between the two natures in the one person. It rather relates to the *canonica regula* for teaching how *unus Christus* was spoken of by the anti-Arian interpretation of biblical verses that were misunderstood such that they seemed to deny that the incarnated Son has the same divinity as the Father. Hence, it is probably more balanced to say that Augustine devoted more attention to the *unus Christus* than he did to a sharp definition of the

By the *sacramentum* and *exemplum* of Christ, the human mind is reformed and the body transformed *in unus* and *totus* Christus.³⁹⁶ If human beings believe that Christ is *sacramentum* and *exemplum* for *reformatio* and *transformatio*, if they then are baptized into Christ, and if they imitate the *exemplum* of Christ, the whole human being, mind and body, will be prepared for seeing God face to face. Christ as *sacramentum* and *exemplum* is the “medicine and resurrection” for the death of the soul and the body.³⁹⁷

In particular, the human mind comes to be purified by the blood of *sacramentum* and *exemplum humilitatis*: “The one cleansing of sinful and proud men is the blood of the Just One and the humbling of God.”³⁹⁸ Interpreting 2 Cor 4:16, Augustine described the purification of the human mind as an on-going process in which the human mind is renewed “more and more” from day to day.³⁹⁹ After the resurrection of the body, the process of purification proceeds finally to the completion of the *reformatio* of the *imago dei*, which is the com-

relationship between the two natures. Augustine seemed to underscore that the unity of human beings or the Church exists in this *unus Christus* without a technical concern for the relationship between the two natures in the unity. For the way Wisse neglects Augustine’s anti-Pelagian strategy in the concept of *unus Christus* and *totus Christus*, see note 382 above.

396 In Dodaro’s estimation, Gérard Philips and Johannes Verhees focused more on the work of the Holy Spirit than they did on the work of Christ for the mediation of moral virtues to the members of His body. They emphasized Augustine’s understanding reflected in *Io. eu. tr.* 74 and *praed. sanct.* 31 that the divine nature was united with the human nature in Christ through the grace of the Holy Spirit, and that Christ mediated the grace of the Holy Spirit to His members through His human nature in His unity with His members. In this sense, they probably thought that Christ’s role is not active, but just that of “a passive conduit” for providing the grace of the Holy Spirit to His members. Even though their interpretation of Augustine is fascinating, the present study attempts to achieve a greater balance than they did between the perspective of *totus* and *unus Christus* and the work of the Holy Spirit for the *reformatio* process of the body of Christ. For Philips, see Gérard Philips, “L’influence du Christ-Chef sur son corps mystique,” in *Augustinus Magister*, 2:805–815; for Verhees, see Johannes Verhees, *God in beweging: Een onderzoek naar de pneumatologie van Augustinus* (Wageningen: Veenman, 1968); “Heiliger Geist und Inkarnation in der Theologie des Augustinus von Hippo: Unlöslicher Zusammenhang zwischen Theologie und Ökonomie,” *REAug* 22 (1976): 234–253; Dodaro, “Augustine on the Roles of Christ and the Holy Spirit in the Mediation of Virtues,” *AugStud* 41, no. 1 (2010): 145–155.

397 *trin.* 4.5 (CCSL 50, 165): “And for both of these things that are ours, that is, the soul and the body, there was need of a medicine and a resurrection, in order that what had been changed for the worse might be renewed for the better.”

398 *trin.* 4.4 (CCSL 50, 163–164).

399 *trin.* 4.5, 14.25 (CCSL 50, 165; 50A, 457).

plete *informatio* by the *Forma simplex*⁴⁰⁰ and *Imago*. Then, “nothing shall be wanting to that form at which it ought to arrive.”⁴⁰¹

This process consists of two aspects. The first one is negative in that the mind is purified from material thinking. As explained (see pp. 190–197 above), Augustine decried the disease by which the human mind inappropriately thinks of God the Trinity. In particular, he linked the disease to the material thinking caused by the human mind’s adhesion to corporeal material things. By its strong adhesion, the human mind thinks in corporeal terms even of God the Trinity. Consequently, the human mind thinks of and loves itself less than what it is in nature, in that it depicts its prototype and itself as corporeal. With its purification (*detractio*) from material thinking, the human mind begins to think of itself according to the *imago dei* and to be able to approach it appropriately to what the divinity is and who God the Trinity is.

The second aspect is a positive one. With the purification, the human mind as *imago dei* is being in-formed after God the Trinity as prototype. As the human mind is in-formed by *actio voluntatis* after *phantasiae* that have entered the memory from external material things through the corporeal senses and remain there in the memory, the human mind must be in-formed after the *Imago* and God. Comparing the trinitarian structure of the human mind that is caused by an external material thing with the structure that is caused by the faith, Augustine remarked.

We can assume a trinity similar to this when, as that body in place, so the faith which is in us has been so established in our memory that the thought of the one remembering is formed (*informatur*) from it, just as the eye of the beholder from that body, and to both of these, in order that the trinity may be completed, the will is reckoned as a third, which connects and combines the faith established in the memory and a kind of effigy of it impressed on the gaze of recollection; just as in that trinity of the corporeal vision, the attention of the will joined the form of the body that is seen, and the corresponding form that arises from it in the gaze of the beholder.⁴⁰²

The same message is expressed in *De trinitate* 9.16 using the terms *similis-similitudo*.

400 *trin.* 15.25 (CCSL 50A, 500).

401 *trin.* 15.26 (CCSL 50A, 501).

402 *trin.* 14.5 (CCSL 50A, 427).

The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness (*similitudinem*) of the species known to it, Wherefore, we are like (*similes*) God inasmuch as we know (*nouimus*) Him, but we are not like Him to the extent of being His equal, because we do not know Him as He Himself knows Himself. And as, when we learn of bodies through our bodily sense, some likeness of them arises in our mind, and is a phantasm of the memory (for the bodies themselves are by no means in our mind when we think of them, but only their likenesses); so, when we know God, although we become better than we were before we knew Him, and especially when this knowledge also pleases us, and worthily loved, is a word, and thereby produces some similarity to God, yet that knowledge is less than He, because it is in a lower nature; for the mind is creature, but God is Creator.⁴⁰³

The human mind should be in-formed after and becomes *similis* to God. It is *reformatio* and *renouatio* by the *Forma* and *Imago dei*.

In relation to this process of the inner man, Augustine interestingly uses the same analogy of illumination that he had used to depict the relationship between "heaven in heaven" and the Son in eternity. As explained above (see pp. 256–259), the spiritual creatures have to be illuminated by the Light and then become "lights." Their formation as "lights" depends on their illumination by the Light. For Augustine, the human mind is formed as *imagines* by the same relationship with the Light who came into His world but was rejected by it.⁴⁰⁴

In this on-going renewal of the inner man, the outer man also takes a journey in which the renewal of life is increased and strengthened from day to day toward the resurrection.⁴⁰⁵ Augustine wrote: "For the soul is brought back to life by penance (*per paenitentiam*), and in the body that is still mortal, the renewal of life begins by faith, whereby men believe in Him who justifies the impious (Rom 4:5), is increased by good habits (*bonisque moribus*), and is strengthened from day to day, while the inner man is being renewed more and more."⁴⁰⁶ This on-going journey of the outer man is not separated from the journey of the inner man. Rather, Augustine combines these two journeys into a single journey in which the mind takes priority so as to lead the outer man. This is clear from the last passage quoted. Augustine states there that the renewal of life in the outer man begins by faith, and increases and is strengthened by good habits.

403 *trin.* 9.16 (CCSL 50, 307).

404 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 252–253).

405 *trin.* 4.5 (CCSL 50, 165).

406 *trin.* 4.5 (CCSL 50, 165).

As such, faith in Christ and God the Trinity belongs to the inner man and, moreover, through the outer man good habits are conducted by the inner man which is being in-formed after the *exemplum humilitatis* and *oboedientiae*. The soul is mixed (*contemperatur*) with the body in some marvelous way⁴⁰⁷ such that the soul “is whole in the whole body, and whole in every one of its parts.”⁴⁰⁸ The soul is the principle of the body.

5.3.3 *fides catholica*

From the incarnated Son who is the only way to the Beatitude for which human beings were created, the *fides catholica* was transmitted through the Apostles into the *catholica ecclesia*. This faith guides the human mind, which exists in time and is restricted to the corporeal senses, to reach for the invisible and eternal God. In *De trinitate* 13.3, Augustine reveals what he thinks of faith: “Although we are, therefore, commanded to believe for this very reason, that we cannot see that which we are commanded to believe; yet when the faith itself is in us, we see it in us, because the faith of things that are absent is present, and the faith of things that are without is within, and the faith of things that are not seen is seen”⁴⁰⁹ In short, faith is called by Heb 11:1 “the evidence (*conuictionem*) of things that are not seen.”⁴¹⁰ God who is the happiness of human beings itself must be believed.

Faith, which is linked to the invisible and eternal God, is required also for the human being to be purified to see God face to face. God will be seen by His images, which will be completely in-formed and transformed after His *similitudo*. Before that moment, the human being must be purified and reformed by faith.⁴¹¹ In this regard, interpreting Acts 15:9 and Matt 5:8 eschatologically, Augustine describes the beatific vision as *merces* for purification and reformation by faith.⁴¹²

Therefore, human beings who are being purified and reformed by faith will be led to the face-to-face contemplation of God and to the completion of their *renouatio* and *transformatio*. The following passage from *De trinitate* 14.23–24 offers a clear summary of Augustine’s ideas on faith, the purification process, and its completion.

⁴⁰⁷ *trin.* 11.3 (CCSL 50, 336).

⁴⁰⁸ *trin.* 6.8 (CCSL 50, 237).

⁴⁰⁹ *trin.* 13.3 (CCSL 50A, 383).

⁴¹⁰ *trin.* 13.3 (CCSL 50A, 383).

⁴¹¹ *trin.* 1.3 (CCSL 50, 30).

⁴¹² *trin.* 1.17, 8.4 (CCSL 50, 51, 275–276).

This renewal (*renouatio*), of course, is not brought about in the one moment of the conversion itself, as in Baptism that renewal is brought about in one moment by the remission of all sins, for there does not remain even one sin, however small it may be, that is not forgiven the first step in a cure is to remove the cause of the disease, which is done through the remission of all sins; the second is to heal the disease itself, which is done gradually by making progress in the renewal of this image If the last day of this life shall find anyone in such progress and growth holding fast to the faith of the Mediator, he will be received by the holy angels, in order that he may be brought to the God whom he has worshiped, and by whom he is to be brought to perfection; and at the end of the world he shall receive an incorruptible body, not for punishment but for glory. For the likeness to God in this image will then be perfect when the vision of God will be perfect (*in hac quippe imagine tunc perfecta erit dei similitudo quando dei perfecta erit uisio*). The Apostle Paul says of this vision: 'We now see through a mirror in an obscure manner, but then face to face' (1 Cor 13:12). He likewise says: 'But we, beholding the glory of the Lord with face unveiled, are transformed (*transformamur*) into the same image from glory to glory, as through the spirit of the Lord' (2 Cor 3:18). This is what takes place in those who are making progress steadily day by day. But the Apostle John says: 'Dearly beloved, now we are the children of God, and it has not yet appeared what we shall be. But we know that, when he appears, we shall be like to him, for we shall see him just as he is' (1 John 3:2).⁴¹³

The *catholica fidei* is fundamentally christological. What is believed by faith has already been explained in the previous section. It is the Catholic faith that was transmitted by the Catholic Church from Christ through His apostles. This faith believes in Christ who has *forma serui* and *forma dei* and is *scientia*, *sapientia*, *sacramentum*, and *exemplum* for the salvation of human beings. By this christological faith, the inner man is purified and renewed after the *Forma* and *Imago*, and the renewal of life in the outer man is increased and strengthened toward the complete *transformatio* into the glorified body of Christ.

413 *trin.* 14.23–24 (CCSL 50A, 454–455).

5.3.4 The Holy Spirit: The Transformer by Love and Faith⁴¹⁴

In the christological journey toward Beatitude, the Holy Spirit takes an indispensable role. He converts human beings from the darkness to the Light and to the *catholica fides*, and causes them to hold on to the faith in Christ for the course of the whole journey.

First of all, the Holy Spirit converts the soul from darkness to the Light. If human beings willingly depart from God by their bad will (*mala voluntas*), it has to be converted to a good will (*bona voluntas*). The Holy Spirit as Love (*caritas*) renews a *bona voluntas*. The Holy Spirit as Love renews the human mind to convert itself to the Light and to love that Light. In this sense, Augustine remarkably calls the Holy Spirit a gift.⁴¹⁵ As Gift, the Holy Spirit makes the human mind to love the Light, *Imago*, and *Forma*.

The same is true for the spiritual creatures, “heaven in heaven.” Just like they must remain illuminated by the Light, so human beings must be illuminated by It in order to be *reformed* after the *Forma* and *Imago*. Moreover, human beings must be aided by the Holy Spirit for this illumination, just like the spiritual creatures too were aided for their illumination by the Holy Spirit, as noted above. Without the Holy Spirit, angels could not convert themselves to the Light (see pp. 258–259 above). Similarly, human beings cannot convert themselves to and love the *Imago* without a *bona voluntas*, which the Holy Spirit as Gift of Love renews for them.

When the Holy Spirit renews the good will toward Christ, He converts human beings to the *fides catholica* which was transmitted from Christ through the Apostles to the Catholic Church. It confesses God the Trinity, the two natures in the one person of Christ, being *scientia* and *sapientia* of Christ, and Christ’s *sacramentum* and *exemplum*. Over against the immature and perverted love of *ratio*, the Holy Spirit converts the human mind to hold on to faith and to love it. By the Gift of Love, human beings turn from the love of *ratio* to the love of *fides catholica*.

Converting human beings to the faith, the Holy Spirit as Love keeps them in the process of purification and reformation toward Beatitude. Conversion to Christ and the christological faith is the beginning, not the goal. The goal

⁴¹⁴ Gérard Remy complemented his own earlier Christocentrism in the mediation of virtues to believers with a new emphasis on the role of the Holy Spirit in unity with Christ and His body in order to take a more trinitarian approach to the mediation of virtues. Gérard Remy, *Le Christ médiateur dans l’oeuvre de saint Augustin*, vol. 1 (Lille: Atelier reproduction de thèses Université de Lille III, 1979); “La théologie de la médiation selon saint Augustin: Son Actualité,” *RevThom* 91, no. 4 (1991): 580–623 (esp. 609–623); for a critical evaluation of Remy’s development, see Dodaro, “Augustine on the Roles,” 150–153.

⁴¹⁵ *trin.* 15.32 (CCSL 50A, 507); also, see pp. 240, 255–256 above.

is *contemplatio* face to face in the beatific vision, which will be a reward for the process of purification, reformation, and transformation by faith. The Holy Spirit, who makes the beginning possible in human beings, leads them in the process toward the goal. In other words, the Holy Spirit, who causes human beings to love and believe in the incarnated Son, causes them also to love or desire to see the divinity of the Son and God the Father in the beatific vision.

Conclusion: Comparison and Contribution

1 Introduction

Up to now, this study has offered an analytic summary of the remaining discrepancies in the contemporary controversy over the *filioque* in chapter 2, and against that background studied and explained the trinitarian theologies of the two Church Fathers Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine of Hippo in chapters 3 and 4. These patristic investigations have been conducted in terms of the authors' own trinitarian controversies with the heresies of their day, particularly in regard to the anthropological and epistemological themes on which they established their own trinitarian theologies, the monarchy of the Father, the role of the Son in the procession, and the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit in their accounts of the Trinity and in their spiritual thought.

Throughout this entire analysis, a resolution to the main question of the present work as formulated in chapter 1 was delayed, namely: what ground for rapprochement does the patristic era offer in the contemporary controversy between East and West on the *filioque*? To work toward an answer to that question, this final chapter will compare the trinitarian theologies of the two fathers examined. Comparing the ideas of Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, the first part of the present chapter will reveal both similarities and differences between their trinitarian theologies. This comparison will offer the opportunity in the second part of the present chapter to formulate an answer to the main question.

2 Comparison between Gregory and Augustine

For a good comparison between theologians or Church Fathers in general, it is necessary first of all to define a category by which they might be compared in as fair and meaningful a way as possible. Ultimately, this category depends on the overall aim of the study. For the present work, the stated aim is to contribute to the contemporary *filioque* debate. In this sense, the category in which the thought of Gregory and Augustine will be compared has already been offered in the conclusion to chapter 2, namely the following four disagreements that were identified to be remaining after the investigation of the two ecumenical occasions (i.e., the Memorandum of 1981, and the Clarification of 1995) and the

consultations, study meetings, and/or papers directly related to them: 1) How to define monopatrism; 2) How to define the role of the Son in the procession; 3) How to define the relation between οἰκονομία and θεολογία; and 4) How to define the property of the Holy Spirit? Gregory and Augustine will thus be compared on these four categories, albeit in a slightly different order with a view to the argument of the present chapter.

2.1 οἰκονομία—θεολογία and οὐσία—ἐνέργεια

The controversy against Eunomius was not restricted to the doctrine of the Trinity as defined according to the divisions prevailing in systematic theology today. Rather, it encompassed also other substantial dogma or dogmatic themes such as the distinction between God and His creatures, anthropology, deification as soteriology, the relation between οἰκονομία and θεολογία, the relation between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια, and even theological hermeneutics. Moreover, these related dogmas or dogmatic themes showed themselves to be particularly intertwined in the context of the debate surrounding the epistemological approach to the Trinity. Hence, Gregory's criticism of Eunomius on the doctrine of the Trinity can be understood as one battle within the whole war for Christian doctrine ignited by the clash over theological epistemology. This was why the present work devoted considerable space to the study of Gregory's epistemological approach as an introduction to his theology; in this epistemology, key dogmatic issues were ardently debated against Eunomius.

Gregory's fundamental criticism of Eunomius concerned his epistemology (see pp. 72–74 above). Briefly stated, Eunomius considered human conceptual thought (ἐπίνοια) on intellectual or material realities as the divine providence given by God's creation of the realities,¹ and then identified the human concept of 'unbegotten,' which he considered as God's providence for naming the divine nature, with the divine nature itself. In identifying the concept of 'unbegotten' with the divine nature,² Eunomius specified that the Father, who is called 'unbegotten,' is the true God, and then subordinated the Son, who is not called 'unbegotten' but 'only-begotten,' to God the Father in His nature.

Against Eunomius, Gregory affirmed that any term attributed to the Trinity by the human intellect is not God's revelation itself but human conceptual

1 *Eun* 2.125, 196–198 (GNO 1, 262, 281–283).

2 Eunomius, *Apologia* 7–11 (SC 305, 244–256); Gregory, *Eun* 2.12–23, 141, 158, 177, 377–386, 504–523, 623 (GNO 1, 230–233, 266, 271, 276, 336–339, 373–379, 408).

thought implanted by God in the human being.³ In this sense, the term ‘unbegotten’ as well as any other term is not identified with the divine nature itself, but rather signifies how the divine being is conceptualized by human thought.⁴

At a deeper level, this criticism was based on the ontological distinction between God and His creatures, which was substantial for Gregory’s φιλοσοφία (see pp. 84–89 above). For Gregory, the Song of Songs teaches φιλοσοφία of “how lovers of the transcendent Beauty are to relate themselves to the Divine.”⁵ This philosophy relies on the distinction between the uncreated being and created beings. As explained, this distinction does not just echo Platonic dualism, for Gregory rather Christianized a Platonic division between the Creator and His creatures which are intellectual, intelligible, and nonmaterial as well as perceptible and material.⁶ In Gregory’s distinction, the divine nature is first of all being without any ‘interval in between’ or ‘lying between’ (διάστημα), including temporal or spatial intervals.⁷ From this divine property, God’s other properties were derived: God is infinite since He exists without any intervals;⁸ God is simple in that He has no intervals of ‘more or less’ and thus no limitation by opposition or contradiction;⁹ God exists without participation in that He has no interval of ‘more or less’ and is absolutely simple;¹⁰ and God is eternal as timeless in that He has no temporal interval related to beginning or end.¹¹ The divine nature with these properties remains always beyond all human conceptual thought. Hence, the human concept ‘unbegotten’ was not identified with the divine nature itself. Gregory’s theology is apophatic: “To believe him to be above every name is the only fitting way to name God.”¹²

In spite of this, it is not accurate to reduce Gregory’s apophatic theology to a theological agnosticism. Gregory affirmed rather powerfully that God exists in time as the object of human thought.¹³ In Gregory’s terms, the divine οὐσία

3 *Eun* 2.185–186, 395 (GNO 1, 278, 341–342).

4 *Eun* 2.395–396 (GNO 1, 341,29–342,11); *Vit Moys* 2.165 (GNO 7/1, 87,23–88,5).

5 *Cant* 6 (GNO 6, 172,22–173,1).

6 *Cant* 6 (GNO 7, 174,1–6); cf. Basil of Caesarea, *Contra Eunomium* 2.31 (SC 305, 128–132).

7 *Eun* 1.345, 353, 355 (GNO 1, 129,6, 131,13–20, 132,5).

8 *Eun* 1.345 (GNO 1, 129,11–13).

9 *Eun* 1.168–169, 233–234 (GNO 1, 77,7–22, 95,5–20, especially 95,12–15); 3.7.60 (GNO 2, 236,3–13).

10 *Eun* 1.234, 270, 282–293 (GNO 1.95, 105, 109–113). Being in participation was for Gregory a definition of being created (*Eun* 1.275).

11 *Eun* 1.670–672 (GNO 1, 218–219).

12 *Eun* 2.587 (GNO 1, 397,26–28): “μόνον ἐστὶ θεοῦ προσφυὲς ὄνομα τὸ ὑπὲρ πάντων αὐτὸν εἶναι πιστεῦ-
εῖν ὄνομα.”

13 *Eun* 2.12–13, 149 (GNO 1, 230,24–30, 268,25–269,2); *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 48,22–49,1, 50,20–51,16); see pp. 92–106 above.

acts in its ἐνέργεια in time. God's ἐνέργεια is intrinsic "movement of the divine nature" (φύσεως κίνησις)¹⁴ and exists as substantial (and not non-hypostatic [ἀνυπόστατον]) not by itself but by οὐσία¹⁵ and "around God" (περὶ τὸν θεόν).¹⁶ This ἐνέργεια is "for our life."¹⁷ In other words, God's activity is God's οἰκονομία, which comes from His φιλάνθρωπία (God's love toward mankind)¹⁸ in order to restore the original state of the human being as image of God.¹⁹ Moreover, God's ἐνέργεια was revealed in the Bible using diverse names or titles. Names or titles in the Bible were revealed not to speak of what the divine nature is, but to speak "around God" (περὶ τὸν θεόν), that is, of God's ἐνέργεια.²⁰ The names or titles "around God" were accommodated by the φιλάνθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit in a manner appropriate to the limitation of the human intellect and its ἐπίνοια.²¹

From God's ἐνέργεια and the names or titles revealed for it by the Spirit's οἰκονομία, the anagogic journey toward the mystery of the Trinity takes place. The human intellect and ἐπίνοια must understand the names or titles in a manner appropriate to the divine nature against the background of the ontological distinction between God and His creatures. This for Gregory is θεολογία. Given that the distinction between God and human intellect never disappears, and that the divine nature remains always beyond human conceptual thought, Gregory's θεολογία must be an anagogic journey traveling up through the revealed names "around God" toward what the divine nature is.²²

This journey was not left to the autonomy of the human intellect alone. The anagogic journey itself is also φιλάνθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Spirit. He guides the human intellect in doing θεολογία. In this guidance, He does not lead the human intellect by *gnosis*, which is a sort of experimental knowledge or scientific investigation about visible, material, and corporeal things by the corporeal

14 *Eun* 1.211 (GNO 1, 211,15); *Eun* 1.246–247 (GNO 1, 99,5–12).

15 *Eun* 1.251 (GNO 1, 100,6–15).

16 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 42,19–43,2); *Eun* 3.5,60, 6.3 (GNO 2, 182,4–13, 186,9–15).

17 *Eun* 2.149 (GNO 1, 268,28–29); *Eun* 3.10.1–17.

18 *Eun* 3.2,55, 6.19–21, 10.11 (GNO 2, 70,22–71,2, 192–193, 293, 19).

19 *Eun* 3.4,63–64, 10.11–15 (GNO 2, 158–159, 293–295).

20 *Eun* 2.102, 581–587 (GNO 1, 256, 395–397); *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 43,9–15). The particular example is the word "God" (θεός). For Gregory, "God" (θεός) and "divinity" (θεῖον) signifies God's ἐνέργεια of watching (θεᾶσθαι) all things (*Eun* 2.585 [GNO 1, 397,8–16], 3.10.10 [GNO 2, 292,23–293,1]).

21 *Eun* 2.242, 353 (GNO 1, 297,2–15, 329,7–12); 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–10); also, see *Eun* 2.424–425 (GNO 1, 350,20–21).

22 *Eun* 2.304 (GNO 1, 315,23–29), 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–19).

senses.²³ Rather, the Spirit guides the human intellect by faith, which is related to the unseen, invisible, and nonmaterial. That faith is what the Logos taught and transmitted particularly in the baptismal formula (Matt 28:19) in terms of the Trinity and the divine οἰκονομία of the transformation of human beings into divine immortality.²⁴ This faith also assures one of seeing the unseen which is not yet possessed but still hoped for.²⁵ As with Abraham (2 Cor 5:8), it is by faith and not by sight²⁶ that the φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit encourages the human intellect and its conceptual thought and cooperates with it to walk in the anagogic journey toward the mystery of the divine nature.

As with Gregory, Augustine's polemics against the trinitarian heresies were not limited to the doctrine of the Trinity in the modern systematic theological sense of the term. The same substantial dogmatic themes identified in connection with Gregory were interwoven also for Augustine in the controversy in complex fashion. In particular, the discussion about a theologically appropriate epistemology was the center around which all the issues debated revolved. In this sense, the study of Augustine's thought on the mystery of the Trinity had to begin with his establishment of a theological epistemology, representing his theological introduction.

Augustine began the formulation of his epistemology with an attack on the "immature and perverted love of reason" as described in the first lines of *De trinitate*.²⁷ This love of *ratio* led to three erroneous approaches to the mystery of the Trinity, which Augustine called "diseases."²⁸ In reality, this criticism is deeply rooted in his trinitarian anthropology (see pp. 170–179 above). For Augustine, the human being, more precisely the *mens humana*, was created as *imago dei*²⁹ from two perspectives: The *mens humana* has a trinitarian structure,³⁰ and it "is capable of God and can be a partaker of Him" (*eius capax est eiusque esse particeps potest*).³¹ The second perspective was more profound, leading Augustine to accentuate it as "the very fact" by which the human mind is called the image of God.³² In fact, even the first perspective will crack if

23 *Eun* 2.93 (GNO 1, 254,3–4).

24 *Ref Eun* 4, 17 (GNO 2, 313,5–314,12, 319,9–15).

25 *Eun* 2.93, 94–96 (GNO 1, 254,4–13, 17–30).

26 *Eun* 2.85–86, 92–93.

27 *trin.* 1.1 (CCSL 50, 27).

28 *trin.* 1.1, 8.3 (CCSL 50, 28, 270).

29 *trin.* 15.11 (CCSL 50A, 475).

30 *trin.* 15.11 (CCSL 50A, 475).

31 *trin.* 14.6, 11 (CCSL 50A, 429, 436); *conf.* 1.6 (CCSL 27, 3).

32 *trin.* 14.11 (CCSL 50A, 436).

there is no participation in God.³³ The human mind can never stop being called *imago dei* from the point-of-view of the second perspective, even if that *imago* can indeed be weakened.³⁴

From this possibility of weakening, creation as *formatio* as *imago dei* appears not to be static but rather mutable or changeable. The perspective of a process was interestingly described by Augustine from the trinitarian structure of the human mind. Briefly stated, the human being, which is not only the inner man as the soul (*anima*) but also the outer as the body (*corpus*) and the senses,³⁵ exists in being formed by the *species* perceived by the corporeal senses into the memory or are gazed upon by thought from memory.³⁶ In this process, *formatio* as *imago dei* is mutable and changeable either by a *cupiditas* for temporal and corporeal creatures or a *caritas* toward God.³⁷ If the human soul or mind adheres by *cupiditas* to the temporal and corporeal creatures or their *phantasiae* in the memory, it abandons (*deficit*) its *formatio* as *imago dei*. This is *deformatio*.³⁸ Hence, the *mens humana* must be continuously formed after God by turning the gaze of its thought from material creatures or their *phantasiae* to God. To this end, it may not enjoy (*frui*) *scientia* of temporal and corporeal creatures,³⁹ but must rather use (*uti*) that *scientia* in order to obtain *sapientia* of God.⁴⁰ *Scientia* must be led into *sapientia*. *Scientia* reasons corporeal things by *cognitio historica*, which means ‘research or investigation’ and ‘narration,’⁴¹ so that through it the human mind can approach the end of the highest good which is intelligible to *sapientia*.⁴² Unfortunately, however, as Augustine observed in the beginning of *De trinitate*, the “immature and perverted love of reason” for temporal and corporeal things distorts the ideal relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia* and it causes “diseases.”

Thereafter, Augustine provided two solutions against *deformatio* and for the recovery of the ideal relationship between *scientia* and *sapientia*. The first is christological, and the second pneumatological. But in order to gain a full grasp on Augustine’s solutions, we first needed an understanding of his ideas on the

33 *trin.* 14.15 (CCSL 50A, 442); s. 96.2, 330.3; *en. Ps.* 118.8.2.

34 *trin.* 14.6 (CCSL 50A, 429).

35 *trin.* 4.6, 11.1, 13.2; *diu. qu.* 51.1, 64.2; c. *Faust.* 24.1–2; *ciu.* 11.2, 13.24; *en. Ps.* 6.2.

36 *trin.* 11.16 (CCSL 50, 353); *Gn. litt.* 12.6.15–7.16, 10.21, 24.50–51, 26.54, 31.59.

37 *conf.* 13.8 (CCSL 27, 245); *conf.* 12.21.

38 *trin.* 11.6, 10.7 on the command “Know yourself.”

39 *trin.* 12.17, 22, 25 (CCSL 50, 371, 375, 379).

40 *trin.* 12.17, 22, 25 (CCSL 50, 371, 375, 379); see pp. 179–182 above.

41 *trin.* 4.21; *Gn. lit.* 8.1; *Io. eu. tr.* 61.4; *ciu.* 13.21.

42 *trin.* 12.17, 21 (CCSL 50, 371, 374).

distinction between God and His creatures and on the relationship between God's *dispensatio* and *theologia* and His *operatio* and *essentia*.

For Augustine, the ontological distinction between God and His creatures is so strong that it never blurs (see pp. 190–197 above). So too in his eyes the primary property of the divine nature is 'no intervals.' From this property, the other properties derive: God is eternal or timeless in that He has no temporal intervals⁴³ and everything is totally present for Him (present totality);⁴⁴ God is "*idipsum*" without any change;⁴⁵ God is simple⁴⁶ without any participatory intervals;⁴⁷ and God is perfect *spiritus* who is neither material nor spiritual like other spiritual beings are.⁴⁸ God, who has these properties, exists beyond human intellectual capacity in that most of Aristotle's categories (with the exception of *relatio* and *actio*) are unavailable to it for speaking of the divinity.⁴⁹

Nevertheless, Augustine was a realist who emphasized God's real existence in time (see pp. 197–205 above). God, who is beyond human mind according to His *essentia*, acts in time. This is His *operatio*⁵⁰ in His *dispensatio*.⁵¹ God's *dispensatio* is His salvific history, and God's *operatio* is His activity in *dispensatio* in order to renew or restore the original state of the human mind as *imago dei* and ultimately to bring the human mind to face-to-face *contemplatio* of God.⁵² Thus, for Augustine, God's *operatio* in His *dispensatio*, which takes place in a manner appropriate to the temporal and corporeal limitation of the human being,⁵³ reveals God Himself.⁵⁴ The divine essence is hidden in His activities, but God *Himself* produces and acts in sensible and visible things. He signifies

43 *trin.* 5.17, 15.45, 47 (CCSL 50, 225, 227; CCSL 50A, 524, 528); *conf.* 11.30–31 (CCSL 27, 209).

44 *conf.* 11.13 (CCSL 27, 201); *trin.* 5.17 (CCSL 50, 227).

45 *trin.* 4.30 (CCSL 50, 202); *beata u.* 2, 8, 11; *mor.* 1.24; *uera rel.* 41; *en. Ps.* 121.5 (CCSL 40, 1805); for the use for all the persons in the trinity, *conf.* 12.7 (CCSL 27, 219); *trin.* 3.21, 4.30, 7.5 (CCSL 50, 150, 202, 253).

46 *trin.* 5.3, 7.10, 15.38 (CCSL 50, 208, 260–261; CCSL 50A, 515); *f. et symb.* 20 (CCSL 41, 26); for "simple multiplicity" or "multiple simplicity," see *trin.* 6.6 (CCSL 50, 234); also, see p. 193 above.

47 *trin.* 5.9, 11 (CCSL 50, 215–216, 217–218).

48 *trin.* 5.12, 8.3, 14.22 (CCSL 50, 219, 270; CCSL 50A, 452).

49 *trin.* 5.2. As explained in pp. 194–197 above, the categories of *relatio* and *actio* were cautiously applied to the divinity by Augustine. The definition of *relatio* in the Trinity "*in se*" was the main argument for Augustine to establish his idea of the hypostatic distinctions in the Trinity. Quite interestingly, the category of *actio* was not explicitly used by Augustine for the Trinity *in se*.

50 *Gn. litt.* 5.20.40, 8.19.38, 8.24.45; *ep.* 148.13; *perseu.* 14; *en. Ps.* 18.2.3, 101.2.12; *Io. eu. tr.* 117.

51 *trin.* 3.22 (CCSL 50, 150, 151); *uera rel.* 13 (CCSL 32, 196).

52 *trin.* 1.16 (CCSL 50, 49); *uera rel.* 13 (CCSL 32, 196); *ep.* 55.12–14.

53 *trin.* 2.10 (CCSL 50, 93); *uera rel.* 14 (CCSL 32, 197).

54 *trin.* 2.10, 25, 35, 3.10 (CCSL 50, 93, 114, 126, 137).

and reveals *Himself* in them according to His *operatio*, not according to *essentia* which is hidden in time from mortal eyes.

From his idea of *dispensatio* and the relationship between *operatio* and *essentia*, Augustine derived two solutions for *deformatio*. The climax of God's *dispensatio* and *operatio* was the sending of the Son and the Spirit for the human mind. The sending of the two persons was God's *dispensatio* and *operatio* to cure the immature and perverted love and to establish the ideal relation between *scientia* and *sapientia*.

The Son who was sent was true man (*forma serui*) and true God (*forma dei*), and so also true *scientia* and true *sapientia*. By faith in the incarnated God, the human mind finds the way from *scientia* to *sapientia* in the one person of Christ (*unus Christus*).⁵⁵ Accordingly, faith causes the human mind to desire not only to focus on Christ's works in the flesh, but also to attain *contemplatio* of His divinity. By faith, the human mind no longer desires to be conformed to material things, but desires rather to ascend through *scientia* of Christ's works in the flesh to *sapientia* of the divinity of Christ's mysteriously united person.⁵⁶ By the medicine of christological faith, the distorted mind is purified from the material things to which it had been strongly conformed.⁵⁷

The Holy Spirit was sent to convert the human mind to the incarnated Son and faith in Him.⁵⁸ The Holy Spirit as *caritas* causes the human mind to love the incarnated Son and to turn it toward faith in Him, and then guides it "through Christ as human being to Christ as God," through Christ as *scientia* of temporal perspectives to Christ as *sapientia* of eternal perspectives. The immature and perverted *love* of reason had caused the human mind to adhere to temporal and corporeal realities and to take a wrong approach to the mystery of the divinity. The Spirit, on the other contrary, as *caritas* guides the human mind in the anagogic journey to the mystery through love for the incarnated Son and christological faith. By the gift of love for Christ and by faith, the human mind can interpret the biblical passages about God's *dispensatio* according to the *canonica regula*,⁵⁹ and speak of the Trinity in a manner appropriate to the one divine essence and the causal relation among the three persons⁶⁰ as signified in the expression "*deus de deo*" in the *Symb. Nicaen.*⁶¹

55 *trin.* 2.27–28 (CCSL 50, 115–119), 13.24 (CCSL 50A, 415–417); *f. et symb.* 8 (CSEL 41, 11–12); see pp. 206–214 above.

56 *trin.* 15.44 (CCSL 50A, 522–523).

57 *trin.* 4.24 (CCSL 50, 191); *uera rel.* 45.

58 *trin.* 2.10 (CCSL 50, 93).

59 *trin.* 1.14, 2.2–3.

60 *trin.* 5.6–8.

61 *trin.* 2.2–3, 6.2.

The above summary of the introduction of Gregory and Augustine to the trinitarian controversy reveals the following similarities, albeit with differences in degree or accent. First, for both the fundamental struggle concerned an appropriate approach to the mystery of the Trinity. Yet there also was a slight difference in the cause behind these similar motives. Gregory had to reject and revise Eunomius' misguided epistemology more directly in the context of the trinitarian controversy. For Augustine, however, the cause was more anthropological in nature, in that he criticized the "immature and perverted love of reason" and connected his criticism more immediately to the *deformatio* of the *imago dei*. Augustine thus discussed epistemology in the context of *formatio* and *deformatio* in a trinitarian anthropology. Nevertheless, they did both share the necessity of establishing an appropriate approach to the mystery as an introduction to the trinitarian controversy.

Second, they founded their respective epistemologies on similar ideas concerning the relationship between οἰκονομία or *dispensatio* and θεολογία, and between οὐσία or *essentia* and ἐνέργεια or *operatio*. While insisting firmly on the ontological distinction between God and His creatures, they did not abandon themselves to theological agnosticism but became realists. God *Himself* acts in His οἰκονομία or *dispensatio* caused by His love and mercy for humankind. God is beyond the human mind according to οὐσία or *essentia*, but at the same time does manifest *Himself* according to ἐνέργεια or *operatio*. In time, God really exists by His ἐνέργεια or *operatio*, retaining His transcendence according to οὐσία or *essentia*. In this regard, θεολογία means nothing other than to think of the divine mystery in οἰκονομία or *dispensatio* in a manner appropriate to what the divinity is.⁶²

Yet also in this similarity, the two Church Fathers revealed different degrees of clarity and expression. Gregory reflected on the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια and explained it more clearly than Augustine did, since he was forced in the trinitarian controversy to contend more directly with Eunomius' epistemology. Whereas in Augustine's writing it is difficult to find a clear and explicit definition of this relation, Gregory subtly defined ἐνέργεια as an "intrinsic movement of the divine nature" (φύσεως κίνησις), "around the divine nature" or "around God" (περὶ τὸν θεόν), particularly in view of his assessment and rejection of Eunomius' use of the term ἐνέργεια for the divine "*in se*." In this regard, Gregory was clearer than Augustine in his rejection of ἐνέργεια for the "*in se*" of the Trinity. Moreover, Gregory offered a brilliant description of the relationship

62 In this regard, Jean-Claude Larchet's and Chrestos Yannaras' criticism of Augustine for the absence of a subtle distinction and connection between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια in comparison with Gregory is inaccurate. See pp. 63–64 (note 136) above.

between biblical names or titles and God's ἐνέργεια in terms of the οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit, over against Eunomius who connected the divine names and οὐσία in erroneous fashion. Yet in spite of these differing degrees of explicitness, it cannot be overlooked that Gregory and Augustine shared similar ideas about οἰκονομία—θεολογία and οὐσία—ἐνέργεια.

Third, their understanding of how the approach to the mystery of the Trinity should be shaped was similar in that they both posited an *anagogic* journey. This similarity followed from their shared idea on the ontological distinction between God and His creatures. For both, the most important property of the divinity for ontologically distinguishing God from His creatures was that God exists without any intervals. The ontological distinction derived from this criterion of the absence of intervals in God is so sharp that knowledge of God can never be complete, but exists in an upward journey toward the mystery.

Fourth, Gregory and Augustine gave similar shape to this journey as a christological and pneumatological one. For both, the Spirit leads and guides the journey by christological faith. Yet within this similarity Augustine offered a more explicit explanation of the christological foundation than Gregory. Gregory did allude to the christological aspects of the journey when he accentuated the faith that Christ taught and transmitted about Himself. The transmitted faith in Christ as true God and true man was the orthodox criterion for speaking appropriately of the same divinity of the Son and His οἰκονομία for us. By this christological faith, the human mind turns itself from the seen to the unseen, and from temporal and corporeal beings to God, and it desires and hopes for the unseen God. Compared to Gregory, Augustine used more explicit expressions in regard to the incarnation of the Son when he emphasized the importance of the christological faith. Christ's being itself as *forma serui* and *forma dei* and as *scientia* and *sapientia* was accentuated as the medicine to cure the immature and perverted love and as the possibility for and grammar of the journey. Moreover, in Augustine's thought the Holy Spirit as *caritas* has a definite and concrete role of leading the human intellect to love and turn to Christ. Even if Gregory attributed the journey to the οἰκονομία of the Spirit who arouses ἔρως in the human mind, Augustine offered a more explicit and crystallized account of the work of the Spirit as *caritas*. In spite of these differences, the similarity in their thought must still be acknowledged in that they both argued for a christological and pneumatological journey toward the mystery, where Augustine's explanation serves to complement the ideas of Gregory.

Finally, the journey itself is to restore the original state of the human being as *imago dei*. The human being was created as *imago dei* to participate in, to

become likeness to, and to mirror God. The *oikonomia* in which the Trinity acts aims at the recovery of the *imago dei*, and the recovery process is represented by the anagogic journey.

2.2 *The Monarchy of the Father*

In the controversy against Eunomius and the Pneumatomachi, Gregory's main aim was to defend the one divinity of the Son and the Spirit which they shared with the Father. To this end, Gregory demonstrated that the Son and the Spirit had the same divinity when they were caused in eternity by the Father, who is αἰτία (or αἴτιον) of the divinity.⁶³

When he invented new names for the three hypostases according to the baptismal formula with which he himself had probably been baptized,⁶⁴ Eunomius sought to interpret the eternal generation of the Son from the Father as a creation of the created Son who is un-equal to Him in nature. The Father, called the "Highest and most authentic being" and "unbegotten," is the true God, while the Son is not the true God in the strict sense of the term since He is the "one which exists because of that being [the Father] and after that being has supremacy over the rest."⁶⁵ Gregory, on the contrary, began with the τάξις revealed by the Logos Himself in Matt 28:19⁶⁶ and with the catholic faith of the Council of Nicaea (325).⁶⁷ The revealed names "Father" and "Son" connote the natural affinity and the causal relationship between them.⁶⁸ In this light, Nicaea confessed that the Son is "from the Father" as "eternal from eternal."⁶⁹ The Son is "light from light, life from life, good from good, wise, just and mighty and in every other attribute similarly derived as like from like."⁷⁰ The "from" does not on any occasion here signify a natural subordination to the Father, but rather the Son's natural affinity with the Father. The Son is God from God the Father⁷¹ in that natural affinity and causal relationship. For establishing the same divinity of the Holy Spirit, Gregory took the same approach. The Holy Spirit is not subordinated to the divinity that is common to the Father and the Son. Rather, the Holy Spirit as God proceeded from God the Father. The

63 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 55,21–56,4).

64 *Eun* 1.54, 3.9,61 (GNO 1, 40,16–23; GNO 2, 287,12–17); Epiphanius, *Panarion* 76.54,32–33.

65 *Eun* 1.155, 552 (GNO 1, 73,20–26, 186,3–10).

66 *Eun* 1.156 (GNO 1, 74,1–6); *Ref Eun* 5–6 (GNO 2, 314,24–315,3).

67 *Eun* 1.158 (GNO 1, 74,16–23). Gregory called it κοινὸν συνέδριον.

68 *Eun* 1.159, 298, 498, 628, 650, 3.1.92–92, 138 (GNO 1, 75,1–7, 114,11–17, 170,13–17, 207,17–20, 213,13–19; GNO 2, 35,16–22, 49,27–50.2).

69 *Eun* 1.688 (GNO 1, 224,4–5).

70 *Eun* 1.688 (GNO 1, 224,2–5).

71 *Eun* 1.689 (GNO 1, 224,9–10).

Former is caused, not created as an angelic entity, and the Latter is cause.⁷² Consequently, God the Father is the only cause from which the equal divinity of the other caused hypostases in eternity came. Gregory used the monarchy of the Father as his major strategy for defending the equal divinity of the Son and the Spirit.

When in Gregory's evident monopatrism the Father is the only cause for the Son and the Spirit, it signifies that the Father is the only cause for their consubstantiality and hypostatic existence (see pp. 120–122 above). From the perspective of the divine simplicity, there is no distinction for each of the hypostasis between being consubstantial and existing as hypostasis. It is indeed necessary to speak distinguishably of being consubstantial and of existing as hypostasis in terms of the mutual relationship within the Trinity in order to articulate the hypostatic distinctions against every form of Sabellianism. Nevertheless, Gregory insisted that it is not correct for being hypostatic to be conceived of as something apart from being consubstantial. For each hypostasis, being God is the same thing as being hypostasis. This was confirmed by the use of the Greek term ὑπαρξίς. For Gregory, this term signified both being consubstantial and existing as hypostasis. The Father is the cause for the ὑπαρξίς of the Son and the Holy Spirit.

To safeguard the monarchy of the Father, Gregory was on the lookout for any possibility of subordination within the mystery of the Trinity resulting from the fact that the Father alone is the only cause. In this regard, he brought the ontological difference between Creator and the created to bear on the question. As summarized above, for Gregory the fact that all creatures are defined by diastema while the Creator is not represents a momentous fact. He recognized two kinds of intervals in particular: temporal and participatory intervals. While all creatures are defined by temporal and participatory interval, the Trinity exists beyond all intervals. From there, Gregory highlighted the simultaneity of the existence of all three hypostases and their absolute equality in the divine nature, even though it is the Father who causes the others. Even the τάξις, according to Gregory, does not imply any interval that can be recognized by the limited human ἐπίνοια in relation to the τάξις. The preposition “from” in the Trinity signifies the preposition “with.”

From these two elements, chapter 3 concluded that the monarchy of the Father in Gregory's trinitarian theology signifies the hypostatic property of the Father as being cause in relation to the other hypostases in the mystery of the Trinity without any interval.

72 *Eun* 1.280, 378, 532–534 (GNO 1, 108,11–109,1, 138,5–15, 180,10–181,11).

Interestingly, the results of chapter 4 show that there is significant similarity between Gregory's ideas and Augustine's thought on the monarchy of the Father. In his polemics against the trinitarian heresies, Augustine defended the equal divinity of the Son and the Father from the perspective of the monarchy of the Father (see pp. 214–221 above). Explicitly calling the Father *deus* (*pater deus*),⁷³ *pater uero a nullo*,⁷⁴ and *pater solus*,⁷⁵ Augustine argued that the Father is *principium* of the divinity, and that the Son is generated God—not created—from God who is the Father. The Son is true God in that He is from the true God who is the Father.⁷⁶ This was signified by the formula *deus de deo* of the *Symb. Nicaen.*⁷⁷ This formula expresses the consubstantiality between the first “*deus*” and the second, and simultaneously also the original relationship between the two. The first “*deus*” is God “from” the second. The Son is God from the Father who is *pater uero a nullo* and *principium*.⁷⁸ In this sense, Augustine revised the interpretation of 1 Cor 1:24 that had been offered by “our adherents,”⁷⁹ proposing that the Son is Wise from the Father who is Wise.⁸⁰

The monarchy of the Father remained clear also in the procession of the Holy Spirit. Augustine showed this understanding particularly in his criticism and revision of the view of Victorinus to which he had once subscribed himself concerning the Spirit and the definition of the term *principium* (see pp. 221–224 above). With the un-extended definition of the term *principium* as it was attributed to the relation of generation,⁸¹ Victorinus and the young Augustine seem to have considered the Spirit another Son of the Father in that even the Spirit is generated from the Father.⁸² Abandoning his earlier position, Augustine now extended the definition of *principium* to the relation of *processio* (or *datum*) between Father and Spirit,⁸³ and affirmed the distinction between Son and Spirit saying that the Son is “generated” but the Spirit “is given” or “pro-

73 *trin.* 15.12, 29 (CCSL 50A, 476, 503); *s.* 140.2; *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13.

74 *trin.* 4.28, 6.12 (CCSL 50, 198–199, 242); also, see Hilary of Poitiers, *De trinitate* 2.1.

75 Augustine, *trin.* 15.12 (CCSL 50A, 477).

76 *trin.* 1.9 (CCSL 50, 38).

77 *trin.* 2.2–3, 6.2, 7.2.

78 *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13 (CCSL 36, 196).

79 They were probably Marius Victorinus (*Adversus Arium* 1.13.11–20, 20.23), Pseudo-Athanasius (*De trinitate* 5.17, 11.24–25.11), Gregory of Elvira (*De fide* 27), Ambrose of Milan (*De fide* 2.16.143, 4.8.79–80, 9.111), and even the younger Augustine in his time as a presbyter (*diu. qu.* 23; *retr.* 1.26). See p. 218, note 222 above.

80 *trin.* 6.1–2. (CCSL 50, 228–229).

81 *trin.* 5.14 (CCSL 50, 221).

82 For Victorinus, see Victorinus, *Adversus Arium* 4.33.24; *Ad Candidum Arrianum* 31; for Augustine, see Augustine, *sol.* 1.2 (CSEL 89, 5); *trin.* 1.8, 2.5 (CCSL 50, 36, 86).

83 *trin.* 5.15 (CCSL 50, 222).

ceeds" from the Father.⁸⁴ By this revision and extension of the significance of the word *principium*, Augustine affirmed that the Spirit proceeds also from the Father. For Augustine as well, the teaching of the Logos in John 15:26 is monopatrism for the procession of the Spirit.⁸⁵

As with Gregory, Augustine's monopatrism offers a similar answer to the question whether the Father is the cause only for being consubstantial or also for existing hypostatically (see pp. 224–227 above). For Augustine, divine simplicity was the key property of the Trinity, and in the divine being "being a person" cannot differ from "being."⁸⁶ The Father is the only cause for the divinity and hypostatic existence of the Son and the Spirit.

Insisting on monopatrism, Augustine did not ignore the possibility of an apparent subordination following from the monarchy of the Father in the Trinity. Here too the ontological differences between God the Creator and His creatures were of crucial importance for Augustine. In particular, Augustine like Gregory would allow no temporal or participatory intervals of any kind in the mystery of the Trinity. The formulation "*deus de deo*" does not signify any temporal or participatory intervals between the Father and the other hypostases. Even if the Father is the only cause, it does not signify either that the Father is the truest God and that the other persons become God by participating in the Father, or that there is a temporal interval between the existence of the Father and that of the other hypostases.⁸⁷ All three are true God in nature absolutely simultaneously in timeless eternity without any participation or temporal interval. For Augustine as well, in the mystery of the Trinity the preposition "from" is a synonym of "with."

In the absolute simultaneity of existence and the equality in the divine nature, the monarchy of the Father does not signify a priority of the Father in time or nature, but the hypostatic property of the Father as being *principium* in relation to the other hypostases in eternity. The revealed τᾱξις (Matt 28:19) expresses this hypostatic property of the Father. As the τᾱξις teaches, the Father as the only *principium* is named before the Son and the Spirit. Just as any attempt to reverse the τᾱξις in terms of the hypostatic property seemed "*insanus*" to Augustine,⁸⁸ so too any confusion between the Father and the Son in relation to the property of being *principium* is "*insanus*" for him.

84 *trin.* 4.29, 5.13 (CCSL 50, 199, 220). For Augustine, in describing the relationship of the Spirit with the other persons, "being given" was synonymous with "proceeding."

85 *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 200).

86 *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 261, 262).

87 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528); also, see *trin.* 15.45.

88 *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 249); also, see *trin.* 2.2, 4.27 (CCSL 50, 82, 195); *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13 (CCSL 36, 196).

In regard to their monopatrism, Gregory and Augustine were fundamentally agreed that the Father is the only *aitia* or *principium* for the Son and the Spirit. Five similarities can be pointed out in this respect.⁸⁹ First, by their monopatrism both Gregory and Augustine confessed and affirmed the one divinity of the Son and the Spirit which they share with the Father. Against the Arians, Eunomians, and Pneumatomachi, their monopatrism confirmed that the Son and the Spirit are true God from the Father who is true God.

Second, affirming the same divinity of the two persons, monopatrism guarantees the hypostatic distinction among them. The Son is distinguished from the Spirit in that He is generated from the Father whereas the Spirit proceeds from Him. Even though Augustine had been forced to criticize and revise his own misunderstanding as found in earlier treatises, there were no discrepancies between Gregory and him on this point. In this way, they managed to avoid Sabellianism.

Third, emphasizing that monopatrism signifies both the one divinity and the hypostatic distinctions of the Son and the Spirit, Gregory and Augustine in similar ways denied the possibility of any subordinationism in the Trinity. Even if the Father is the only cause for the same divinity and hypostatic distinctions of the Son and the Spirit, this does not mean that there are temporal or participatory intervals in eternity. The three exist absolutely simultaneously in the perfect equality of the divinity.

Fourth, while accentuating the simultaneity and equality of the hypostases and denying all subordinationism, their monopatrism affirmed the hypostatic distinction of the Father from that of the other two in terms of his being *principium*. This was what the τᾶξις of Matt 28:19 teaches. Naming the Father before the Son and the Spirit, the τᾶξις shows the hypostatic property and distinction of the Father as *principium* from the other two in the absolute simultaneity and perfect equality of the Trinity. The τᾶξις cannot be reversed, making every confusion of the Father and the Son in terms of being *principium* “*insanus*” even for Augustine.

Finally, the four similarities just listed followed from an interpretation of the *deus de deo* in the *Symb. Nicaen.* For both Gregory and Augustine, the formula articulates the same divinity as well as the hypostatic distinctions in line with the original relation in monopatrism, for which the Father in absolute simultaneity is the only cause for the Son and the Spirit.

89 The differences between Gregory and Augustine in their thought on the Father's monarchy are related to their views on the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit, which will be analyzed in the following.

2.3 *The Role of the Son*

As also summarized above, the Father is the only αἰτία or αἵτιον while the other hypostases are αἰτιατά.⁹⁰ The Father is the only cause for the hypostatic and consubstantial existence of the Holy Spirit. In this sense, the Holy Spirit has the same divine nature and definite existence from the Father as the Son. Nevertheless, Gregory's monopatrism did not ignore the role of the Son in the procession of the Holy Spirit. More precisely, it required the role of the Son in the procession for clearly defining the hypostatic distinction among the three in the Trinity.⁹¹ The τάξις in Matt 28:19, which expresses the hypostatic distinction with the un-reversed relational succession,⁹² needed clearer interpretation in regard to the hypostatic distinction between Son and Spirit. When the Father is called αἰτία for the other two, the Son and the Spirit are not clearly distinguished in terms of monopatrism, since both of them are equally called αἰτιατά without any explicit distinction between them. While the two hypostases are indeed distinguished by the terms "only-begotten" and "procession" even in monopatrism, Gregory attempted to offer a clearer distinction between Them.

For this distinction, Gregory required the role of the Son: the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son. The role of the Son is mediation (μεσιτεία) and affirms the hypostatic distinction between Son and Spirit in monopatrism.⁹³ Consequently, the Father as the only cause has the definitive and mediate role for the procession, while the Son as mediation between Father and Spirit has the definitive and immediate role for the procession. The Holy Spirit proceeds definitively from the Father mediately through the Son, who is the immediate mediation for determining the hypostatic distinction of the Spirit definitively.

The immediately definitive role of the Son is negatively transmissive for the distinction, and active and positive for the definition of the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit (see pp. 128–147 above). First, the mediation of the Son is transmissive. The Son as mediation safeguards the causal relationship between Father and Holy Spirit in that all that is given to the Spirit from (ἐκ) the Father is transmitted through (διὰ) the Son.⁹⁴ The preposition διὰ cannot be confused with ἐκ.⁹⁵ Second, the transmissive mediation defines the hypostatic

90 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 55,21–56,4).

91 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 42,21–25); see pp. 123–127 above.

92 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 43,2–9).

93 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,4–10).

94 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,4–10).

95 *Epistula* 38 (Roy J. Deferrari, trans., *Saint Basil: The Letters*, vol. 1, LCL 190 [London: William Heinemann, 1926], 204–207); *Eun* 1.532–533 (GNO 1, 180.10–181.5).

distinction of the Spirit negatively. The Spirit is not the Son, in that the procession from the Father is mediated through the Son who is generated immediately from the Father.⁹⁶ Yet the Son's mediation was not considered to be negative alone. Gregory also gave this mediation an active and positive color. The third characteristic of the mediation is therefore active. The mediation is active in shining forth together,⁹⁷ acknowledging,⁹⁸ and causing the Spirit to be "manifested through" the Son.⁹⁹ Even the preposition *διὰ* was not used by Gregory to connote passivity, but to signify an active transmission in relation to the divine nature.¹⁰⁰ In the fourth place, the role of the Son is positive for defining the hypostatic property of the Spirit as "Spirit of Christ" (Rom 8:9; 1 Cor 12:3),¹⁰¹ as Kingship and anointment of the Son,¹⁰² and as Glory of the Son.¹⁰³

Like Gregory, Augustine was required by his firm commitment to monopatristism to distinguish the Son and the Spirit more clearly in that monopatristism. As detailed in chapter 4 (see pp. 228–236 above), the distinction between Son and Spirit in terms of "how to exist" was one of the three questions elicited by the catholic faith.¹⁰⁴ For this distinction, Augustine began with the catholic faith confessing the hypostatic property of the Spirit as being Spirit of and *communis* to the Father and the Son.¹⁰⁵ The name "Holy Spirit" itself signifies the property of being *communis*.¹⁰⁶ Augustine attempted then to explain how the Spirit exists as being *communis* to the Father and the Son. To this end, he articulated the property of the Spirit in a more relational sense, and attributed the term *principium* also to the Son.

First, the property of the Spirit was articulated more relationally. When the Spirit is defined as being *communis*, Augustine paraphrased this concept as being *donum* of them both.¹⁰⁷ The name *donum* expresses the property of

96 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 56,4–10).

97 *Eun* 1.532–533 (GNO 1, 180,10–181,5).

98 *Epistula* 38 (Deferrari, *The Letters*, 206–207).

99 *Eun* 1.280 (GNO 1, 108,11–109,1); *Eun* 1.532–533.

100 *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 48,11–19); *Epistula* 38 (Deferrari, *The Letters*, 204–207).

101 *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 42,26–43,4); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 89,21–90,5, 98,21–28, 113,24–114,5); *Epistula* 38 (Deferrari, *The Letters*, 206–207); *Eun* 1.531 (GNO 1, 180,4–6); *Cant* 4 (GNO 6, 106,5–10).

102 *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 15,15–16,21); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 102,17–103,13); *Or dom* (GNO 7/2, 39,18–19, 39,22–40,8).

103 *Eun* 1.385 (GNO 1, 139,22–140,2); *Antirrh* (GNO 3/1, 222,11–19); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,9–13, 108,18–109,15); *Tunc et ipse* (GNO 3/2, 21,22–22,16); *Cant* 15 (GNO 6, 467,2–468,4).

104 *trin.* 1.8 (CCSL 50, 36).

105 *trin.* 1.7, 5.12 (CCSL 50, 35, 219); *f. et symb.* 20.

106 *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219).

107 *trin.* 5.12 (CCSL 50, 219–220).

the Holy Spirit more relationally in that He as *donum* is given by the givers, Father and Son, to whom He is *communis*. Second, the more relational definition of the property of the Spirit as *donum* shows more clearly “how to exist as being *communis*.” In other words, the Spirit as *communio* and *donum* exists by being given from both the Father and the Son. As such, the relation between the Spirit and the other persons is causal in nature. Finally, the term *principium* had to be attributed to the Son to express the causal relationship between the Spirit and the other two persons. For Augustine, there was no other term or concept except *principium* for expressing the causal relation among the three hypostases.¹⁰⁸ Augustine stated that the Spirit as being *communis* to the Father and the Son proceeds from both of Them. The Spirit’s procession from both signifies His hypostatic property as being *communis* to them.

Even though the Son was called *principium*, Augustine never considered the Son to be the same *principium* as the Father. No damage was done to Augustine’s monopatristism by his attribution of the term to the Son. The Son is rather *principium* for the Spirit only as generated from the Father. Augustine emphasized that the Father Himself allowed the term to be attributed to the Son.¹⁰⁹ The Son is the generated *principium* from the Father who is the *principium sine principio* or *principium principaliter*. Here too the formula *deus de deo* is valid. Moreover, the Son is *principium communiter*.¹¹⁰ The Holy Spirit as being *communis* to both Father and Son proceeds *principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son. The word *communiter* thus gives expression to the requirement of the role of the Son for a complete definition of how the Spirit exists as being *communis*.

Being the generated *principium communiter*, the Son is not passive but active in negatively distinguishing the person of the Spirit from Himself and in positively determining the property of the Spirit as being *communis*. Without the role of the Son, the Spirit cannot exist as being *communis*.

The summary of Gregory’s and Augustine’s ideas on the role of the Son in the procession witnesses several similarities between them. Even if there are differences in each of these similarities, they are not so serious as to under-

108 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 529).

109 *trin.* 15.29, 47 (CCSL 50A, 503–504, 528); also, see *trin.* 4.29 (CCSL 50, 199–200). In eternity, the Father does not give His Spirit to the Son, but gives to him that the Spirit proceeds also from him.

110 *trin.* 15.47 (CCSL 50A, 528–529).

mine or devalue them. In fact, the similarity is so strong that the Church Fathers can be assessed to have had no serious disagreements on the role of the Son.

First, Gregory and Augustine had to make room in their monopatrism for the Son in the procession of the Spirit. In their monopatrism, where the Father is called the only cause and the others are similar in being caused, the two Church Fathers distinguished as clearly as they could the second and third hypostases or persons from each other by the role of the Son in the procession. To this end, Augustine had to distance himself from his Latin predecessors, in particular Victorinus whom he had himself followed at an earlier time in his life. In Gregory's thought, on the other hand, no such change or revision could be found on this point. Nevertheless, both explicitly shared the requirement of a distinction between the Son and the Spirit in monopatrism in their mature trinitarian theologies. The role of the Son completes the hypostatic distinction among the three in the Trinity.

Second, apart from the above distinction, the role of the Son was required by Gregory and Augustine for defining the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit. In their trinitarian thinking, who the Spirit is corresponds with how the Spirit exists. The role of the Son in the Spirit's procession, which is His "how to exist," explicitly defines who the Spirit is.

Third, Gregory and Augustine similarly defined the property of the Holy Spirit as being also of the Son by the role of the Son in the procession. In their monopatrism, the Spirit is from and then of the Father. Retaining this causal relation and property of the Spirit, Gregory and Augustine demonstrated that the Spirit is also of the Son definitively. Gregory expressed this property as "Spirit of Christ," "Kingship and anointment of the Son," and "Glory of the Son." Augustine emphasized the Spirit's "being *communis*," which was derived from His being of the Father and also of the Son. Using slightly different expressions, Gregory and Augustine mobilized the role of the Son in the procession to underscore the fact that the Spirit exists also as "Spirit of the Son."

Finally, the role of the Son was similarly active and transmissive for Gregory and Augustine. The role of the Son is active in distinguishing Him and the Spirit negatively, and in defining the hypostatic property of the Spirit positively. The role of mediation in Gregory was fundamentally transmissive and had a more passive sound to it than Augustine's idea of generated *principium* did. In this sense, Gregory's mediation can be considered to maintain monopatrism more strictly than Augustine, and to attributed *aitia* to the Father more explicitly. However, Gregory's transmissive mediation was active enough to define the Spirit as Spirit of the Son. In this sense, the activity of the mediation was similar to the activity of Augustine's generated *principium*, which has the same role

as Gregory's mediation in terms of defining the Spirit as Spirit of the Son. Likewise, Augustine's generated *principium* is similarly transmissive to Gregory's mediation in that the Son as generated *principium* gives to the Spirit what He as being generated receives from the Father.

2.4 *The Hypostatic Property of the Holy Spirit*

As has been noted, for Gregory who the Spirit is corresponds with how the Spirit exists. The Spirit proceeds from the Father who is the only *aitia* for the same divinity and hypostatic existence of the Holy Spirit in a definitive and mediate way. At the same time, the Spirit proceeds definitively and immediately through the Son whose role is that of transmissive but active mediation. The whole procession from the Father through the Son defines the hypostatic property of the Spirit: the Spirit is immediately of the Son, and of the Father definitively and mediate. In other words, the hypostatic property of the Spirit, who is Spirit of the Father, is immediately and positively defined as "Spirit of Christ," "Kingship and anointment of the Son," and "Glory of the Son."

Gregory's notion of the *φιλάνθρωπος οἰκονομία* of the Holy Spirit is deeply colored by his trinitarian thinking. The Holy Spirit, whose property is defined immediately by the Son and mediate by the Father, creates the spiritual and anagogic journey which is strongly Christo-centric and ultimately proceeds through the Son up to the Father.

This anagogic journey through the Son toward the Father consists of the two parts. The first is the Christo-centric hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit. The *φιλάνθρωπος οἰκονομία* of the Holy Spirit in Gregory's trinitarian treatises is the hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit (see pp. 152–157 above).¹¹² The Spirit interprets biblical passages and analogies based on what Christ taught His disciples about the Triune God, especially with the baptismal formula.¹¹³ Through this interpretation, the Holy Spirit reveals the Glory of the Son to be the same divinity that the Son shares equally with the Father.¹¹⁴ Moreover, He accurately interprets biblical verses about the *οἰκονομία* of the Son so as to signify His *φιλανθρωπία* which causes believers to become brothers and sisters of the firstborn Brother.¹¹⁵ In these ways, the hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit has a powerfully christological accent for glorifying the Son as the same divinity and as the incarnated God who has *φιλανθρωπία*.

111 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 89,25–90,1, 90,1–4); see pp. 147–148 above.

112 *Eun* 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–19); *Ref Eun* 91 (GNO 2, 349,18–26); *Abl* (GNO 3/1, 42,13–43,2).

113 *Eun* 3.9.62 (GNO 2, 287,22–29); also, see *Eun* 1.10, 54, 156 (GNO 1.25, 40–41, 74).

114 *Eun* 3.6.32 (GNO 2, 197,6–19); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 179,9–13, 109,8–15).

115 *Eun* 3.2.44, 2.55 (GNO 2.66.18–25, 70,18–71,2); *Ref Eun* 76 (GNO 3/1, 343,18–26).

By this christological hermeneutics, the Holy Spirit ultimately causes human beings to see through the Image and Imprint who God the Father is.¹¹⁶ He makes them to be conformed to the archetype of the Father through the Son¹¹⁷ who is εἰκών¹¹⁸ or χάρακτῆρ¹¹⁹ of the Father and His visible glory.¹²⁰ More concretely, the archetype of the Father is imprinted on the human intellect (γνώμη) by Its Image and Imprint.¹²¹ The human γνώμη is conformed to the archetype through its Image when the human soul as mirror is transformed and conformed to the archetype by the collection of the images and impressions of the Image of the archetype.¹²² He causes them to believe that they have become adopted children of the Father through the Only-begotten and Firstborn. The hermeneutics of the Holy Spirit is immediately christological and then proceeds through the Son toward the Father.

The second part of the anagogic journey is deification (see pp. 157–166 above). The Holy Spirit, who guides the Christo-centric hermeneutics, deifies believers, that is, He causes them to share (κοινωνεῖν) or participate (μετέχειν) in the divine virtues¹²³ which are God's ἐνέργεια.¹²⁴ It is another φιλόανθρωπος οἰκονομία of the Holy Spirit, which is likewise Christo-centric in nature. Christ is the cause of deification in that the incarnation during the entire life of Christ, which consists of His conception, birth, death, resurrection, and ascension,¹²⁵ is the deification of the human nature.¹²⁶ So too He is the mediator of deification in that a man was reconciled with the divine in Christ.¹²⁷ The Father

116 *Ref Eun* 32 (GNO 3/1, 324,25–325,2); *Eun* 1.531–532, 636–637, 3.6.11–14 (GNO 1, 180,3–14, 209; GNO 2, 189,29–190,27); *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 13,11–23).

117 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,9–13).

118 *Eun* 2.215, 3.6.11 (GNO 1, 288,6; GNO 2, 190,2–3); *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,11–12); also, see Ekkehard Mühlenberg, *Die Unendlichkeit Gottes bei Gregor von Nyssa: Gregors Kritik am Gottesbegriff der klassischen Metaphysik*, FGD 16 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1966), 134n1; Claudio Moreschini, trans., *Gregorio di Nyssa: Opere dogmatiche*, PenOcc (Milano: Bompiani, 2014), 1976n60.

119 *Eust* (GNO 3/1, 13,14).

120 *Eun* 3.10.28.

121 *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 107,9–13).

122 *Vit Moys* 2.47, 318 (GNO 7/1, 46,13–23, 143,14–18); *Cant* 3 (GNO 6, 102–104, 439–440); *Beat* 6 (GNO 7/2, 143–144); *Virg* (GNO 8/1, 296).

123 *Beat* 5 (GNO 7/2, 124,13–18); *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 135,6–15).

124 *Prof* (GNO 8/1, 135,6–15, 138,17–18, 138,22–23).

125 See Lucas F. Mateo-Seco, “Christology,” in *The Brill Dictionary of Gregory of Nyssa*, eds. Lucas F. Mateo-Seco and Giulio Maspero, trans. Seth Cherney, VCSup 99 (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 142; Raymond Winling, *Grégoire de Nyssa: Discours catéchétique*, SC 453 (Paris 2000), 87–93.

126 *Or cat* 25, 26, 32 (GNO 3/4, 64,8–10, 67,13–18, 77,16–21, 77,23–78,3); also, see *Or cat* 37.

127 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 204,17–206,14).

permitted the disinherited to be adopted as His children in the mediator. The Father allowed His enemies to share in the divinity.¹²⁸ Being cause and mediation, Christ is the model for deification. Christ is the Image and Imprint of the invisible God in time, and as such He is the only model and example that human beings can imitate in time. The divine virtues that Christ has revealed are the divine activities that human beings can imitate and participate in. By the imitation of Christ as model, human beings can participate in the deity.¹²⁹

By this Christo-centric deification, the goal and perfection of the creation of human beings is restored and realized. Human nature as image of God was created to exist in the process of assimilation to God and in the reflection of Him through participation in God.¹³⁰ While human beings are limited by *diastema*, God is unlimited because He has no *diastema*. In this sense, the created and restored perfection of human beings as participation in the divinity must be unlimited. Gregory referred to this as ἐπέκτασις. The human being was created to imitate and reflect his Creator without end. For this unlimited progress, Christ is the only rock,¹³¹ and motive and goal.¹³² The mind is boiled with love (ἐρωτικῶς) by the Holy Spirit.¹³³ The Spirit creates and arouses the love of believers for their Bridegroom so as to be united with Christ as the cause and mediator, and to imitate Him as the model so that they can participate in the divine virtues.

During this Christo-centric deification, the Spirit guides the brides ultimately to participation in God the Father.¹³⁴ The Father is the ultimate origin of the divine virtues that were revealed as activities of Christ. In this unlimited process, the Spirit causes believers to participate in God the Father through Christ.

As was true for Gregory, so for Augustine who the Holy Spirit is corresponds with how He exists in the Trinity: The Holy Spirit who is *communis* to and *donum* of the Father and the Son proceeds *principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son. As such, He has the two hypostatic properties of being *communis* to, and being *donum* of, the Father and the Son.

128 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 206,1–9).

129 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 194,14–195,8).

130 *Or cat* 5 (GNO 3/4, 18,5–16); *Op hom* 4, 5 (PG 44, 136C, 137B); *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 213,1–214,4); *Beat* 1 (GNO 7/2, 82,24–25); *Vit Moys* 2.318 (GNO 7/1, 143,14–18); *Cant* 8.

131 *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 192,15); *Vit Moys* 2.244 (GNO 7/1, 118,20).

132 *Vit Moys* 2.244 (GNO 7/1, 118,13–24); *Beat* 4 (GNO 7/2, 122,25–123,3); *Perf* (GNO 8/1, 212,17–213,1).

133 *Cant* 1, 4 (GNO 6, 27,13, 127,7–129,19).

134 *Vit Moys* 2.318 (GNO 7/1, 143,14–18); also, see *Maced* (GNO 3/1, 106,30–32).

Furthermore, Augustine defined the Spirit also as *caritas* of the Father and the Son (see pp. 237–242 above). He typically defined this property of the Spirit in relation to the other two properties. First, being *communis* to the Father and the Son, the Holy Spirit is love of Them who are love.¹³⁵ More precisely, the Holy Spirit is *caritas* since both Father and Son are love and the Spirit is “*communis* to both.”¹³⁶ Second, being *donum* of the Father and the Son, the Spirit proceeds or is given as *communis caritas* from Them both. Love is the excellent *donum* of God, since God is love.¹³⁷ Since the Spirit is *donum* of the Father, He proceeds or is given as *caritas* of the Father from the Father who is love. “*Deus ergo ex deo est dilectio.*”¹³⁸ Since the Spirit is *donum* of the Son, He proceeds as *caritas* of the Son from the Son who is love.¹³⁹

The property of the Spirit as *caritas of* the Father and the Son was extended by Augustine to a *caritas between* Father and Son. The Holy Spirit exists as *caritas* between the other two hypostases who love each other through the Spirit.¹⁴⁰ In this sense, the Holy Spirit might be misunderstood as God’s *essentia* which is love. However, what emerged from the deep analysis in chapter 4 is that the *caritas between* must be understood from the *caritas of*. Otherwise, there is the risk that two subordinations which Augustine never intended may follow. The first of these is the subordination of the Holy Spirit to the Father and the Son. This would follow if the Holy Spirit as *caritas between* were to be considered to exist by the mutual relationship of love between Father and Son preceding the existence of the Holy Spirit. The second possible subordination works the other way around. If the property of *caritas between* were to be overestimated, the Spirit as the divine essence itself would precede the other hypostases. Augustine avoided the risk of these subordinations by emphasizing first of all the property of *caritas of*, deriving from the properties of being *communis* and *donum*.¹⁴¹ The Spirit as *caritas* exists between Father and Son in that He is *communis caritas* to them both who are love. Hence, the claim that the Father and the Son love each other through the Spirit basically signifies that all three persons who are the true God love each other in absolute simultaneity and perfect equality.

The Holy Spirit who exists as *caritas of* and then *between* Father and Son creates in the human mind love toward the Son and ultimately toward the Father. This is reflected in His twofold *dispensation*.

135 *trin.* 6.7 (CCSL 50, 235–236).

136 *trin.* 15.37 (CCSL 50A, 513–514).

137 *trin.* 15.32 (CCSL 50A, 507).

138 *trin.* 15.31 (CCSL 50A, 505–506).

139 *trin.* 15.33 (CCSL 50A, 509).

140 *trin.* 6.7, 15.27 (CCSL 50, 235; 50A, 501).

141 *trin.* 15.27 (CCSL 50A, 501–502).

First, love toward the Father through love of the Son by the Spirit as *caritas* is reflected in Augustine's trinitarian epistemology (see pp. 252–256 above). The Holy Spirit as *communis caritas principaliter* from the Father and *communiter* from the Son transforms the human mind to love and believe in Christ, and leads believers to *contemplatio* of the Father through Christ.¹⁴² The medicine for the immature and perverted love of *ratio*¹⁴³ is the christological faith. The faith in Christ who is *scientia* and *sapientia* and has *forma serui* and *forma dei*¹⁴⁴ is transmitted from Christ¹⁴⁵ through the Apostles and the continuous succession.¹⁴⁶ It cures the human mind from its perverted love of adhering to material things. Yet the christological faith does not just aim at believing in Christ. The ultimate goal to which the faith leads believers through purification is *contemplatio* of God the Father.¹⁴⁷ The Holy Spirit “attaches” (*subiungit*) human beings to Christ by love toward Christ¹⁴⁸ and then toward the Father through Christ.

Second, love toward the Father through love toward the Son by the Spirit as *caritas* is reflected also in Augustine's spiritual theology (see pp. 252–275 above). The angels' creation for participation in God¹⁴⁹ through illumination by¹⁵⁰ and conformity to the Son¹⁵¹ is maintained by the love of the Holy Spirit.¹⁵² Similarly, by the christological journey the Spirit effects a *reformatio* to the original *formatio* from its *deformatio* from the *imago dei*.¹⁵³ The Spirit as Love (*caritas*) renews the *bona voluntas* and converts human beings to loving, believing in, and being united with Christ as *sacramentum*¹⁵⁴ and *exemplum*¹⁵⁵ and as *scientia* and *sapientia*. In the *unus* and *totus Christus* established by the Holy Spirit, the inner man is justified and free from sins, purified from material thinking, reformed to the *Imago*, and imitates Christ's *exemplum humilitatis* and *oboedientiae*. So too the outer man is transformed by the renewal of life toward the

142 *trin.* 7.5 (CCSL 50, 253); *ench.* 5–8.

143 *trin.* 1.1 (CCSL 50, 27).

144 *Io. eu. tr.* 36.2 (CCSL 36, 324).

145 *Io. eu. tr.* 37.6 (CCSL 36, 334); *trin.* 1.18, 21 (CCSL 50, 53–54, 58–59).

146 *Io. eu. tr.* 37.6 (CCSL 36, 335).

147 *trin.* 1.20, 27 (CCSL 50, 56, 68).

148 *trin.* 7.6 (CCSL 50, 254); also, see *trin.* 15.32 (CCSL 50A, 507).

149 *conf.* 12.15 (CCSL 27, 223).

150 *conf.* 12.20, 13.3, 6 (CCSL 27, 225–226, 243, 244).

151 *conf.* 13.3, 11 (CCSL 27, 243, 247); *ciu.* 11.9 (CCSL 48, 329–330); *Gn. litt.* 1.4.9 and 2.8.16 (CSEL 28/1, 7, 43).

152 *conf.* 13.8–9, 11 (CCSL 27, 245–246, 247); *ciu.* 12.9 (CCSL 48, 364).

153 *trin.* 7.5, 14, 22 (CCSL 50, 252–253; 50A, 451–452).

154 *trin.* 4.4 (CCSL 50, 164), 13.15–19; *ciu.* 18.49.

155 *trin.* 4.6, 8.7, 13.19, 22 (CCSL 50, 168, 267; 50A, 408, 412–413).

resurrection as the gloried body of Christ. Through the whole journey in *unus* and *totus Christus*, the Holy Spirit ultimately leads believers to *contemplatio* of the Father face to face.

As the above comparative summary revealed, Gregory and Augustine shared a number of similarities in regard to the hypostatic properties and works of the Holy Spirit. Even though there are differences in accent and expression, as was also true for the other themes discussed above, the similarity is so substantial that the differences can serve to complement each other.

First, Gregory and Augustine in similar ways considered the Spirit's fundamental property to be being of the Father and the Son. For both, who the Holy Spirit is corresponds to how He exists. If the Spirit proceeds from the Father and through or from the Son, the Spirit exists as Spirit of the Father and of the Son. It is indeed true that Gregory and Augustine used different expressions for this procession. Gregory used the preposition *διὰ* and accentuated the concept of the Son's mediation. Augustine, on the other hand, boldly attributed the term *principium* also to the Son. Nevertheless, as explained in the previous chapters and summarized above, Gregory and Augustine intended something similar with these different expressions. They thus distinguished the Son and the Spirit, and defined the hypostatic property of the Spirit as Spirit also of the Son.

Second, Gregory and Augustine in like manner gave priority to the Spirit's property as Spirit of the Son over his property as Spirit of the Father. This priority was reflected in their conception of the Spirit's procession. The Spirit, who is manifested immediately through the Son (Gregory) or proceeds *communiter* from the Son (Augustine), is in the first place of the Son even though He is also of the Father. Gregory used clearer expressions than Augustine did for articulating this priority in his account of the "how to exist." Whereas Augustine used the expression "being *communis*," Gregory construed the Spirit's relationship to the Son more immediately than the Spirit's relationship to the Father using the prepositional pair *ἐκ—διὰ*. Nevertheless, Augustine's notion of "being *communis*" to and *caritas* of the Father and the Son maintained the taxis Father—Son—Spirit. In the taxis, the Son stands between Father and Spirit.

Based on the taxis shared by Gregory and Augustine, their pneumatologies expressed a similarity in the anagogic process which proceeds first toward the Son and then to the Father through the Son. The Spirit guides and leads the anagogic journey of believers which proceeds through the Son toward God the Father. In this common *οἰκονομία* or *dispensatio* of Gregory and Augustine, the Spirit converts believers immediately to the Son and then to the Father mediately through the Son. Accordingly, the Spirit's property as Spirit of the Son takes priority over His property as Spirit of the Father.

Third, the priority of the property as Spirit of the Son pushed their respective pneumatologies toward Christo-centrism. The work of the Spirit is to convert human beings first of all to the incarnated Son. Only through this work does the Spirit lead them ultimately to the Father. To express this Christo-centric work of the Spirit, Augustine gave more explicit emphasis to the Spirit as *caritas* toward the Son and the Father. Likewise, Gregory introduced the theme of the Spirit as ἔρως toward the Son and then toward the Father, even though Augustine's argument on the Spirit as *caritas* typically had greater depth and clarity.

The Christo-centric work of the Spirit was reflected also in Gregory's and Augustine's respective theological epistemologies. The Spirit leads human beings to believe in Christ who is true God and true man, and then to know who the Father is through the faith of who Christ is. For this οἰκονομία of the Spirit, Gregory underscored the Spirit's guidance for the interpretation of what the Bible says about the Son. The Spirit aids and encourages the human mind and conceptual thought to interpret biblical passages about the Son in a manner appropriate to who the incarnated God is and what He did in His οἰκονομία for human beings. As for Augustine, he more explicitly emphasized the christological grammar for the Spirit's guidance. Christ as *scientia* and *sapientia* is the grammar by which the Spirit guides the *mens humana* to be free from material thinking and to obtain *sapientia* of the eternal God from *scientia* of temporal and corporeal beings and the Bible.

The Christo-centric journey toward God the Father by the Holy Spirit also finds reflection in the respective spiritual theologies of Gregory and Augustine. The Holy Spirit causes human beings to be united with, participate in, and imitate Christ so as to be transformed to participate in or contemplate the divinity of God the Father. For Gregory, this journey is one of deification. With the theme of deification, he emphasized participation in the divine virtues revealed by the incarnated Son. For him, the journey of deification is an endless one in that God and His ἐνέργεια are infinite. On the other hand, Augustine's notion of deification was not as deeply connected as it was in Gregory with the relationship between God's ἐνέργεια and the divine virtues. So too Augustine did not emphasize endless participation in the divine ἐνέργεια as explicitly as Gregory did. Instead, Augustine stressed the Christo-centric characteristic of his spiritual theology using the closely related themes of "*Christus as sacramentum and exemplum*" and "*unus and totus Christus*." In the face of Pelagianism, Augustine did not allow autonomy to the human ability to imitate Christ. With the theme of "Christ as *sacramentum* and *exemplum*," he sought to emphasize that the *sacramentum* of Christ supports the *exemplum* of Christ. In "*unus and totus Christus*," the inner man is justified, freed from sin, and restored to imitate the *exemplum* of Christ by *Christus as sacramentum*. It is only *in unus* and

totus Christus that the life is renewed in the outer man imitating the glorified body of Christ. Even though Christ is the cause and mediator of deification in Gregory's spiritual theology, Augustine more explicitly emphasized the christological foundation.

Finally, in the spiritual theology of Gregory and Augustine the *οἰκονομία* or *dispensatio* of the Spirit is to restore human beings as *imago dei*. What united them is their understanding of creation as *imago dei* as the process of formation in participating in and being likeness to the divinity. This formation is restored in Christ by the Holy Spirit who arouses the love of believers so as to adhere and be conformed to Christ. Through this conformity to Christ, the *imago dei* is restored to participate in God the Father and to be conformed to Him.

3 Contribution

This analytic summary and comparison now offers an opportunity for answering the main question which had been formulated for the present study. Even though several differences emerged in the trinitarian theologies of Gregory and Augustine, the summary and comparison of their ideas above all demonstrated significant similarities in relation to the four disagreements identified as still remaining in the current controversy over the filioque. These similarities form their contribution to the attempt to find a patristic foundation for a satisfying agreement in these major remaining discrepancies.

3.1 How to Define *οἰκονομία*—*θεολογία* and *οὐσία*—*ἐνέργεια*

As the analysis and summary of the contemporary controversy over the filioque in chapter 2 revealed (see pp. 43–44, 61–65, 77–79 above), the relationship between *οἰκονομία* and *θεολογία* is one of the issues of continuing debate among theologians from West and East. The crucial question concerns the integration of the role of the Son in the sending of the Holy Spirit in *οἰκονομία* with His role in *θεολογία*. Even if most eastern and western theologians agreed that *οἰκονομία* is related to *θεολογία* “in some sense,”¹⁵⁶ a further circumscription of that “in some sense” in the filioque controversy has proved a difficult task. This question has been given particular shape and gained in complexity in that most modern eastern participants to the debates connected the role of the Son in the sending (for example, in John 15:26) to the role of the Son in the procession

¹⁵⁶ See Lukas Vischer, ed., *Spirit of God, Spirit of Christ: Ecumenical Reflections of the Filioque Controversy*, FOP 103 (London: SPCK, 1981), 14.

in terms of ἐνέργεια. In other words, drawing on John of Damascus and Gregory Palamas, most eastern theologians have attempted to define “in some sense” in terms of ἐνέργεια, and argued that the role of the Son in time and in eternity is related to the energetic procession of the Spirit through the Son. From this position, they deny the close relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία by which most western theologians, as well as a number of eastern theologians, integrated the role of the Son in οἰκονομία with his role in θεολογία in terms of consubstantial or hypostatic origin or mediation.

In marked contrast with this remaining disagreement in the contemporary controversy, Gregory and Augustine shared similar ideas on the definition of the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία and the definition of that relationship in terms of ἐνέργεια. As to the relation between οἰκονομία and θεολογία, Gregory and Augustine were shown to have given similar emphasis to the point that God acts in time. Insisting on the distinction between God and His creatures, both claimed that God exists in time and reveals Himself in His οἰκονομία (or *dispensatio*) according to His ἐνέργεια (or *operatio*). As such, God exists always beyond the human mind according to His οὐσία or *essentia* in His οἰκονομία, but He reveals Himself to the human mind according to His ἐνέργεια in time. In this similarity, θεολογία does not signify a mode of the Trinity’s existence other than that in time, but means thinking of the Trinity in time in a way appropriate to what the divine nature is. Hence, Gregory and Augustine offered a similar definition of the relationship between οἰκονομία and θεολογία as doing θεολογία in οἰκονομία.

So too Gregory and Augustine shared similar ideas on this relationship in terms of ἐνέργεια. Briefly stated, they did not use the term ἐνέργεια or *operatio* for the “*in se*” of the Trinity. On this point, Gregory expressed himself more explicitly than Augustine (see pp. 93–96 above). Against Eunomius who identified begetting as ἐνέργεια in the Trinity and defined the ontological distinction between the Father and Son in terms of the ontological distinction among actor, act of begetting, and acted,¹⁵⁷ Gregory denied the possibility of using the term ἐνέργεια in the Trinity¹⁵⁸ and identified begetting with the hypostasis of the Father.¹⁵⁹

157 *Eun* 1.206, 208, 209, 244, 247 (GNO 1, 86,22–24, 87,17–18, 87,19–20, 98,9–16, 99,11–12); Eunomius, *Apologia* 25.4–5, 25.23–25, 28.14–15.

158 *Eun* 1.246–247, 249, 3.2.129 (GNO 1, 99,5–12, 20–24; GNO 2, 94,13–23).

159 *Eun* 3.8.30 (GNO 2, 250,1–7). In this sense, Larchet’s reading of his own tradition of the Greek Church Fathers, at least of Gregory, requires revision when he attributes the energetic relationship between Son and Spirit in the Trinity to Gregory. Larchet, “La question,” 784–787, 792–808; see pp. 62–63 (note 131) above.

3.2 *How to Define Monopatristism*

Another discussion that has not yet been settled concerns the definition of monopatrism. As the remaining disagreements identified in chapter 2 show (see pp. 32–34, 49–52, 66), East and West still await a reconciling definition of monopatrism. Eastern theologians have not been satisfied with the monopatrism of western theologians who base their ideas on an interpretation of Augustine's trinitarian theology. Western theologians have attempted to define monopatrism on the basis of Augustine's theology so as to reconcile the monarchy of the Father with their understanding of the *filioque*. Their monopatrism, however, has been assessed as falling out of line with the eastern tradition on the following two interrelated points. First, the monopatrism of western theologians has not succeeded in avoiding the charge of confusing the hypostatic property of the Father and that of the Son. If the *filioque* allows the term *principium* to be attributed to the Son in any way, in the eyes of eastern theologians this signals a confusion in terms of the hypostatic property of the Father as *aitia* or *principium* being granted to the Son. Second, the confusion of the hypostatic property potentially weakens the distinctions between the persons in the Trinity and as such leads to an essentialism that either emphasizes the one divine essence more than the hypostatic distinction, or even neglects the latter altogether.

In contrast with this reigning disagreement over the issue of monopatrism, Gregory and Augustine provide patristic agreement for defining monopatrism and for overcoming the eastern charge of confusion and essentialism.

Gregory and Augustine shared the same idea that the Father is the only cause for the same divinity and for the hypostatic existence of the Son and the Spirit in absolute simultaneity and perfect equality. In their shared monopatrism, the *taxis* of Matt 28:19 is not reversed: the Father is called *aitia* or *principium* before the names of the Son and the Spirit are mentioned.

This monopatrism settles the key charges of confusion and essentialism from eastern side. When Augustine shared Gregory's monopatrism, he explicitly called the Father *deus* (*pater deus*),¹⁶⁰ *pater uero a nullo*,¹⁶¹ and *pater solus*,¹⁶² and considered a reversed *taxis* in terms of being *principium* to be nothing less than *insanus*.¹⁶³ In this sense, Augustine managed to avoid the suspicion of confusion. For him, the Father is the only *principium* from and with

160 *trin.* 15.12, 29 (CCSL 50A, 476, 503); *s.* 140.2; *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13.

161 *trin.* 4.28, 6.12 (CCSL 50, 198–199, 242); also, see Hilary of Poitiers, *De trinitate* 2.1.

162 *trin.* 15.12 (CCSL 50A, 477).

163 *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 249); also, see *trin.* 2.2, 4.27 (CCSL 50, 82, 195); *Io. eu. tr.* 19.13 (CCSL 36, 196).

whom the Son and the Spirit exist. Consequently, Augustine did not fall into an essentialism underestimating the hypostatic distinction among the three persons. Denying the confusion, Augustine emphasized that the person of the Father is the only cause for the one divinity of the Son and the Spirit and for their hypostatic existence.¹⁶⁴ In spite of Augustine's acknowledgement of the complexity in finding "a generic or a specific name which may include the three together,"¹⁶⁵ the real distinction of the three persons in the Trinity was not denied in any way by his emphasis on the priority of the personal substances of the three over the relationship among them.¹⁶⁶ The term *persona* itself is a term that was used absolutely and it does not weaken to signify just a relation.¹⁶⁷

3.3 *How to Define the Role of the Son*

As the study in chapter 2 concluded (see pp. 32–34, 52–55, 66–67), most theologians from East and West were agreed on the patristic common tradition attributing the Son involvement in the procession of the Spirit in some sense. This agreement, however, has not resulted in a satisfying concord on the definition for the Son's role in the procession. Western theologians have related this role to consubstantiality or to the communication of the one divinity. This idea, however, has not succeeded in securing agreement from the eastern theologians, in whose eyes it seems to detract from monopatristism and to suggest a subordinationism between Son and Spirit in terms of their divinity. On the other hand, the general idea of the eastern theologians has not avoided criticism altogether, either. They related the role of the Son in the procession in a limited sense to the communication of ἐνέργεια in eternity as well as in time. For this, they relied on the distinction of the Palamite tradition between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια and on the traditional criticism against Augustinian trinitarian theology alleging that it confuses οὐσία and ἐνέργεια. As the previous chapters revealed, and as also summarized above, this is inaccurate. Neither Augustine nor Gregory used the term ἐνέργεια or *operatio* in eternity, and they both witnessed the same idea on the relationship between οὐσία and ἐνέργεια *ad extra*.

164 *trin.* 15.12 (CCSL 50A, 477).

165 *trin.* 7.7 (CCSL 50, 255).

166 *trin.* 7.2 (CCSL 50, 247–248); also, see pp. 194–197 (especially, note 133) and p. 225, note 251 above. Augustine's trouble with the term *persona* does not point to a supposed hidden modalism in his trinitarian theology (*contra* Colin Gunton, in particular), but to his apophaticism. Additionally, his apophaticism did not neglect that the term *persona* has an absolute meaning, and Augustine emphasized the priority of personhood to that of relationship. Briefly stated, personhood was not undervalued just as a mutual relationship in the Trinity, but each of the three persons can be called *solus deus* for Himself.

167 *trin.* 7.11 (CCSL 50, 262).

The study of Gregory and Augustine thus offers a reconciling alternative for resolving the modern disagreement. As summarized above, they shared similar ideas on the role of the Son in the procession. Even if there are certain differences of accent or expression in these similarities, they had to insist on the role of the Son in the procession, both to distinguish the Son and the Spirit negatively from each other and to define the hypostatic property of the Spirit positively in monopatrism. By the mediation of the Son, as Gregory argued, or by the generated *principium*, as Augustine claimed, the Spirit is negatively distinguished from the Son in that the Spirit is not another Son. So too by the Son's role in the procession, the hypostatic property of the Spirit is positively defined as being also of the Son.

As such, the role of the Son is not related to consubstantiality or to the communication of the one divinity. In the monopatrism shared by Gregory and Augustine, consubstantiality or the communication of the same divinity rather relates to the property of the Father as *aitia* or *principium*. So too the role of the Son is not limited to the communication of ἐνέργεια. As noted, neither Gregory nor Augustine spoke of the energetic communication in eternity. The role of the Son is quite definitive for the hypostatic existence of the Spirit.

3.4 *How to Define the Hypostatic Property of the Holy Spirit*

In recent discussions about the hypostatic property of the Holy Spirit, Augustine's notion of *vinculum amoris* or *caritatis* has been subjected to criticism by theologians from both East and West (see pp. 73–75 above). If the Spirit is the *vinculum* which exists between Father and Son, it would seem that in Augustine's theology the Spirit is not a Person like the other two, who love each other. In other words, the property of being common to the Father and the Son is not appropriate for defining the third hypostasis or person as person in the same way as the other hypostases are defined as hypostasis or person.

To overcome the criticism on Augustine's idea of the Spirit's property as *vinculum amoris* or being common, some western theologians attempted to give this concept a more personal interpretation. Using similar arguments, they sought to define the Spirit as *vinculum* as the active agent of love. In other words, the Spirit as love is not something common existing between Father and Son, but he *actively* conforms (persons) the other two persons as loving persons.¹⁶⁸ Alternatively, the Spirit as the agency of love *actively* binds Father

168 Thomas G. Weinandy, "The Filioque: Beyond Athanasius and Thomas Aquinas: An Ecumenical Proposal," in *Ecumenical Perspectives on the Filioque for the 21st Century*, ed. Myk Habets (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 193; *The Father's Spirit of Sonship: Reconceiving the Trinity* (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1995), 17.

and Son.¹⁶⁹ These personalizing re-interpretations of Augustine's idea have been offered not only by systematic theologians, but also by patristic scholars like Cipriani and Ayres who were examined in the excursus to chapter 4 (see pp. 242–252).

However, this re-interpretation does not find support in Augustine Himself. As summarized above, any such attempt fails to avoid the second of two subordinations which Augustine never intended in his trinitarian theology. If the hypostatic property of the Spirit as active agency of love is overestimated, the Spirit as the divine essence itself precedes the other hypostases. Augustine called this "*insanus*," since it reverses the revealed *taxis* Father—Son—Spirit maintaining at once the doctrine of monopatrism and the Son's role in the procession for distinguishing and defining the hypostatic property of the Spirit.

The study of the present work on the Spirit's hypostatic property in Augustine offers a revision to the criticism launched against his ideas on the property of the Spirit. Although Augustine has been criticized for depersonalizing the Spirit with his ideas on the Spirit's property, he in fact did not really depersonalize but rather just distinguished the third person from the other persons, particularly from the second person, by calling the Spirit the Spirit *of* the Father and the Son, being *communis*, or *caritas of* and *between* Them. When the Spirit as *caritas between* is considered as the *vinculum*, this property also does not turn the Spirit into something between the other two persons, but just distinguishes Him from them.

Along with this revision, Augustine as well as Gregory offer an alternative approach for affirming the personhood of the Spirit like that of the other persons. What they emphasized was the *deus de deo* for the hypostatic existence of the Spirit: the Spirit is *deus de deo*. With this Nicene formulation, Gregory and Augustine underscored that the Spirit is the *same true* God as the Father and the Son in perfect equality and in the absolute simultaneity of their existence without any participatory or temporal intervals. As noted, Augustine's claim that the Father and the Son love each other through the Spirit basically signifies that all three persons who are the true God love each other absolutely simultaneously.

Moreover, in their spiritual theologies Gregory and Augustine explicitly emphasized the personhood of the Spirit. The Spirit as *deus de deo* leads the anagogic journey through Christ toward God the Father. The *οἰκονομία* or *dispensatio* of the Holy Spirit is of such crucial significance that the journey can

169 John C. McDowell, "On Not Being Spirited Away: Pneumatology and Critical Presence," in Habets, *Ecumenical Perspectives*, 179.

never occur without the work of the Spirit. Their Christo-centric spirituality is also called Pneuma-centric since it is the Spirit alone who creates and arouses love toward Christ. It is the Spirit alone who makes the salvific journey in that He is true God *and* the Spirit of Father and Son.

4 Conclusion

The long history of the *filioque* controversy, which began at least as far back as the ninth century, has not yet ended. It is quite probable that a full resolution will only be given by the grace of God at that time of the *contemplatio* of the Trinity confessed by Augustine as follows:

We shall see the truth there without any difficulty, and shall enjoy it to the full because it is most clear and most certain. Nor shall we seek anything by the reasoning of the mind, but by contemplating we shall perceive why the Holy Spirit is not the Son when He proceeds from the Father.¹⁷⁰

The question in the final sentence of the quoted passage relates to the necessity of the Son's role in the procession, which is the most crucial issue of the controversy. When, according to Augustine, the question will be answered at that time, the controversy will be completed by *contemplatio* of the Triune God who is Father, Son, and Holy Spirit.

Nevertheless, Gregory and Augustine themselves did not cease doing their best to understand the mystery of the procession of the Spirit. As Origen had done, they attempted to explain the mystery with the catholic faith and with human reason. Like them, the present work has attempted to contribute to the current controversy over the *filioque* on the basis of a study of their trinitarian and spiritual theologies in which they explored, with faith and with reason, the mystery of the Trinity and particularly the mystery of the procession of the Holy Spirit.

What has emerged from the present chapter's comparison of their theologies is that Gregory and Augustine shared tremendous similarities relating to the remaining disagreements of today. Even if there were differences in accent, approach, and expression, these differences were not so great as to either weaken or even deny these similarities. The similarities detected have rather revealed that it is not easy to detect serious disagreements between them on

¹⁷⁰ *trin.* 15.45 (CCSL 50A, 523–524); *c. Max.* 2.14.1 (CCSL 87A, 569).

the four issues for which contemporary theologians from the East and the West have as yet failed to find satisfying agreements. Their theologies thus establish a patristic common foundation on which the controversy between East and West ought to rely in order to pursue significant progress in the hope of *contemplatio* of the Triune God.

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